If that's umweildy, we can use the acronym: CSF3T. — Olivier5

Why add that?

What is gained by talk of the-qual-of-the-flower that is not found in talk of the red flower? I suspect we agree that the additional philosophical jargon is needless.

Qualia is only useful to distinguish between things like "700 nanometer wavelength electromagnetic wave" and "Red". — khaled

Again, what is added to talk of the difference between "700 nanometer wavelength electromagnetic wave" and talk of red by introducing qualia?

We can speak for instance of the gorgeous reds of Georgia O'Keeffe. — Olivier5

Yes; and such talk need make no mention of qualia...

Qualia are bundles of properties without a distinct object. — magritte

That would seperate them from perception. THat's at odds with how they are used in the literature.

To my understanding, qualia are a special kind of "things in themselves". — litewave

This is at odds with the notion that we can't know what a thing is in itself... since we do supposedly know qualia directly. As if they could be used in order to found some sort of certainty.

You can't directly know a thing in itself... unless you are that thing.

Good of you to actually address the article - cheers.

It's in the third person in order to introduce "it occurs to me that to you, cauliflower probably tastes (must taste?) different". The target seems to be the individuation of a quale... the taste to me is not the same as the taste to you; the taste to me now is not the same as the taste to me then. I agree with you that this seems to moss the point of qualia. Perhaps he put his weakest point first...

But for my part I will maintain that nothing has been added by talking of the

first-person, qualitative aspect of the experience of eating cauliflower, — Luke

that is not found in "how this cauliflower tastes to you, now".

SO I still find the notion of qualia oddly hollow.

That'd be because the notion of a thing in itself is an odd piece of philosophical nonsense.

Likewise what Dennett's intuition pumps demonstrate is that, when considering a particular individual interacting with a particular object, there's nothing added by considering the objects of subjective experience of that individual of that object. — Kenosha Kid

You seem to be agreeing with me...?

...we don't know *which* qualia changed — Kenosha Kid

A memory is also a qual?

Intuition pump #1: watching you eat cauliflower.
There is a way this cauliflower tastes to you right now. Well, no. the taste changes even as you eat it, even as the texture changes as you chew.

So those who thought experience is something static and eternal were wrong. It doesn't present that way.

Here's my question for those who would have us talk of qualia: what is added to the conversation by their introduction? If a qual is the taste of milk here, now, why not just talk of the taste of milk here, now?

That'd be because the notion of a thing in itself is an odd piece of philosophical nonsense. — Banno

Why, a thing without itself makes more sense to you?

Back to Wittgenstein: how could you tell that your qualia had been inverted, so that what was once blue is now red, as opposed to say, your memory had changed, so what you always saw as red you now recall, erroneously, previously seeing as blue?

I'm thinking of a number between 1 and 10.

Two seconds later, I'm thinking of the same number.

It's commonly accepted that the sort of thing I just described happens all the time.

Is there an argumemt that shows it doesn't? If not, voila: privacy.

I suspect we agree that the additional philosophical jargon is needless. — Banno

Agreed. We have a number of concepts available already, such as "sense data", "sensations", "perception", and even "apperception" (the perception of perception, aka meta perception).

For any philosophical purpose, eg to establish the specificities and subjectivity of mental phenomena involved in perception, the subjective concept of "color" can suffice, in its relation to more objective light wavelengths. Or the concept of "music" in relation to air pressure modulation. E.g. a machine really enjoying music, or able to feel any easthetic experience is hard to imagine, providing an "intuition pump" about the asserted irreducibility of sensations to physical phenomena.

So I agree: who needs the philosophical term "qualia" when "music" or "colors" or "sensations" exist and can do any philosophical work that "qualia" was made up to do?

Why, a thing without itself makes more sense to you? — litewave

If you can't know anything about the think in itself, then why insist on talking about it?

It drops out of the conversation.

Two seconds later, I'm thinking of the same number. — frank

How do you know? What's your justification for thinking it is the same number? Could you never be mistaken here?

How do you know? What's your justification for thinking it is the same number? Could you never be mistaken here? — Banno

Sure. I could be mistaken and actually be a brain in a vat. What's my justification for thinking I'm not?

My point was that it's commonly held that humans can have private thoughts and experiences. I need more than "how do you know?" to seriously doubt it.

OK.

The next step is to recognise the damage the introduction of such a notion can do... see and .

Hm. The private language argument did not deny that humans can have private thoughts.

Exactly.

Colours too have their unsayable and illogical dimensions. "Of taste and colours one should not speak". That's no 'dammage' as I understand magritte. It's a territory, with its own rules.

Qualia are bundles of properties without a distinct object. — magritte

?

How is that damaging?

who needs the philosophical term "qualia" when "music" or "colors" or "sensations" exist and can do any philosophical work that "qualia" was made up to do? — Olivier5

Qualia are a synonym for sensations that emphasizes the qualitative, as opposed to structural, aspect of sensations. The structural aspect is more amenable to description - verbal or mathematical ("I see two triangles and a square.") while the qualitative aspect seems ineffable ("The square is blue."). It also seems more conceivable how the structural aspect of a sensation could be encoded in a neural network than the qualitative aspect, which again seems to be a problem of description: we can more easily describe experienced shapes and their numbers in relation to configurations and numbers of neurons, than we can describe the quality of "blue" in relation to the qualities of neurons when we don't even know their qualities (we don't have a conscious experience of them, probably).

we can more easily describe experienced shapes and their numbers in relation to configurations and numbers of neurons, than we can describe the quality of "blue" in relation to the qualities of neurons when we don't even know their qualities (we don't have a conscious experience of them, probably). — litewave

I would still say, how is it that one is equivalent to the other. We keep moving the goal posts, aka the Cartesian Theater fallacy. That's a fallacy I think was coined by Dennett, but ironically I think he himself violates. It's neurons encoding for this or that.. but then encoding itself has to be explained as for why it is mental states. The problem lies in positing a hidden dualism. Mental states exist, yes or no? If yes, whence mental states? We keep referencing another complexity of physical states. It's not like if you pile on more physical explanations, "poof" mental states appear.

If you can't know anything about the think in itself, then why insist on talking about it?

It drops out of the conversation. — Banno

Even if you can't know the thing in itself directly, you know it must be something; a thing cannot be nothing. And you can know the thing in itself indirectly - you can know its representation in your mind that is created via sensory perception, by mapping of at least some properties of the external thing onto your neural network. The representation is not the same as the external thing but there may be useful similarities between the two.

The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it — Russell, 1918

... leading on, we hope, to reconception of and improvement on the received wisdom. (Leading on to another round, etc.)

I always assumed that an "intuition pump" is to be admired as an artificial aid for getting the process going. Perhaps like agreeing of definitions "for the sake of argument", but more, er... erotic?

Seems to apply in the case of the Chinese Room, at least.

Turns out Dennett only really wants to disable all the pumps. Oh well.

Anyway, I'm often surprised at how amenable he (and if he isn't playing around) is to mentalistic talk.

We keep moving the goal posts, aka the Cartesian Theater fallacy. That's a fallacy I think was coined by Dennett, but ironically I think he himself violates. It's neurons encoding for this or that.. but then encoding itself has to be explained as for why it is mental states. The problem lies in positing a hidden dualism. Mental states exist, yes or no? — schopenhauer1

Quite.

I do think that the "neural representations" favoured by the likes of Dennett and Frankish (thanks for the links) are questionable as being probably ghosts of "the idea idea", and other mentalisms. Hence the prevaricating in 3.3 Who is the audience?. And the possible own goal, if

An appearance of something which isn't there.
— Marchesk

gets supposed as a thing located in the head, to the delight and justified exasperation of dualists everywhere. — bongo fury

Can't (yet) find a smoking gun to quote from Quining. But,

Fair enough. Let's talk of colours, smells, feelings, tastes, timbres and tunes then. — Olivier5

Hopefully, @Banno and Dennett mean, merely, external stimulus sets, while you mean, specifically, qualia (or some such) in the head?

It's not like if you pile on more physical explanations, "poof" mental states appear. — schopenhauer1

Hence the "hard problem". And yet, mental events must be underwritten by physical events. There’s no information without some material support. Genes need DNA, a poem needs paper.

But for my part I will maintain that nothing has been added by talking of the
first-person, qualitative aspect of the experience of eating cauliflower,
— Luke
that is not found in "how this cauliflower tastes to you, now".

SO I still find the notion of qualia oddly hollow. — Banno

Why do you expect anything to be "added"? AFAIK, "qualia" is just a term of art for any phenomenal experience, including taste. I don't believe it's meant to add anything, or refer to anything, over and above taste (or other phenomenal experience). Maybe it is troublesome for materialism/functionalism, but can it seriously be questioned whether we have taste and pain and other phenomenal first-person experiences?

Hopefully, Banno and Dennett mean, merely, external stimulus sets, while you mean, specifically, qualia (or some such) in the head? — bongo fury

What Dennett means remains unclear to me, and I suspect to his proponents as well. Ambiguity has its advantages. As for Banno, he seems to accept that we experience qualitative sensations inside our head, such as colours, or the timbre of a musical instrument (the “sound of trumpet”). He just doesn’t think the word « qualia » adds anything useful to his conceptual tool box.