I must disappoint you by saying that I did not read the later parts. I did try, but quickly came to the realization that I really should try to understand part 1 first. Surely understanding of the first part should be a requirement for understanding the later parts? Or at least it shouldn’t be the other way around?

However, after reading some of the recent discussions in this thread, I realized that my understanding fails already at the very first paragraph. Initially I thought that you defined belief in a similar way as I (and I assume most others) would, but in a response to Coben you say this:

A belief is simply a wish or desire that something is a particular way.

Equating belief with a wish or desire seems quite extraordinary. According to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Contemporary Anglophone philosophers of mind generally use the term ‘belief’ to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true.

To me that’s quite a common sense definition. Would you agree with that (and I’m just not understanding the way you define the same thing) or is your conception of belief really something very different?

I have to agree with Jarmo here. It's the validity of the premises I question.

"That sentence is not a conclusion, only a first premise I consider." - Philosophim
And
"Knowledge occurs after you run a belief through a process." - Philosophim

I will unpack the example of the toddler and the water bottle more fully.

He feels a wet spot on the floor - information.
He drinks from the bottle, it's wet - information.
He shake a few drops onto the floor and feels the result - information testing
.
Tested information is knowledge. The knowledge claim is knowledge plus belief in the validity of the claim. Starting with belief ignores the fact that a belief can be held without any validity. Knowledge proceeds belief.

I know you try to work through this farther on in the paper. Consider the meta-criticism I made.

You are attempting to create an epistemology based on a formal logic system. A formal logic system cannot serve as a foundation for an epistemology.

A formal logic system is itself a knowledge claim.
A formal logic system can validate logically proofs that have no actuality.
A formal logic system creates logical proofs that only prove the system and only within that system.

Logic is one of the best tools we've created to refine information into ever more precise knowledge-claims. Like all knowledge-claims it has limitations, particularly when comes to creating knowledge-claims.

I really should try to understand part 1 first. — Jarmo

Not a worry! As long as you are referencing the paper, we can have a great conversation.

Contemporary Anglophone philosophers of mind generally use the term ‘belief’ to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true.

This is also a great way of defining a belief. A wish or desire is one of the attitudes we can have. A "certain way" implies a match with reality, or "what is", or "truth".

Feel free to point out if I've made an error in the argument if we use the encyclopedia definition.

Tested information is knowledge. The knowledge claim is knowledge plus belief in the validity of the claim. Starting with belief ignores the fact that a belief can be held without any validity. Knowledge proceeds belief. — Megarian

What am I testing if I have no belief? After combining the first two bits of information, the child had a hunch, or a belief that the drink and the wet spot had a link. Otherwise, why would the child purposefully shake the bottle and then immediately feel it?

This is also what science does. There is a hypothesis, a belief, then that belief is tested. My knowledge theory will support, but also explain at a level beyond simple observation and opinion, that yes, the child knows that wet spot came from the water in the bottle. This is a creation of a formal theory of knowledge that can be used to explain why that child knows in terms that can be reapplied to any case.

Again though, read part 2 at least. Part 1 is about distinctive knowledge, or "the knowledge of identities". Part 2 is applicable knowledge, or how I apply the knowledge of identities without contradiction. Once you understand this, I can go back to the child argument and show how the child has applicable knowledge that the spot on the floor came from the bottle.

A formal logic system is itself a knowledge claim.
A formal logic system can validate logically proofs that have no actuality.
A formal logic system creates logical proofs that only prove the system and only within that system. — Megarian

Heh, yes, I am well aware of this. A good summation of the theory is called, "Subjective deduction" What I do conclude is that this methodology of knowledge is our best bet at creating conclusions that match to reality. Knowledge is a tool of measurement. But it is clearly different from simple beliefs. I conclude nothing different from your points above. That does not invalidate it, because the alternative to logical thinking, is illogical thinking. In part 4, I demonstrate why illogical thinking is sometimes necessary, but why using probability, logical thinking is usually the smarter choice if one wants to understand reality.

Logic is one of the best tools we've created to refine information into ever more precise knowledge-claims. Like all knowledge-claims it has limitations, particularly when comes to creating knowledge-claims. — Megarian

Yes, I show that in part 2 with applicable knowledge, later in part 3 with contextual knowledge, and finally in part 4 where I cover the tiers of cogency with induction. Part 1 is only the primer. Think of it as the "I think therefore I am" portion of many epistemology arguments. Every tool has its limits. But limits do not mean it is invalid. Part 4 takes the limitations of knowledge, then says, "What do we do when we reach those limits?" and then uses the lessons learned prior to identify levels of induction that are more cogent than others.

While you may have trouble with the premises, you seem to not be arriving at my conclusions. You are drawing your own conclusions first, without reading my own. Find my conclusions, then see if the premises fit the conclusion. Otherwise, you're only critiquing half of the argument, and seem to be thinking I'm not going to be drawing conclusions that I do, and drawing conclusions that I do not.

"What am I testing if I have no belief?
After combining the first two bits of information, the child had a hunch…."
- Philosophim
 
The information is being tested.
The "hunch" is the instinct to learn born of evolutionary heritage made rational by  evolving in a rational world.
 
 "…alternative to logical thinking, is illogical thinking." - Philosophim
 
Logical systems are human creations based on the instinctual rationality formed by evolving in a rationale world. Rational thinking does not require a formal logical. The majority of rational thought is simply utilitarian, knowing something worked before and believing it will work again, from this logical systems are born.
 
This is a creation of a formal theory of knowledge that can be used to explain why that child knows in terms that can be reapplied to any case. - Philosophim
 
Then you should be able unpack your conclusions from the system and return to the field where you encountered a sheep and apply them to the sheep (or any animal you're familiar with) to explain its knowledge system. (Non-human learning and knowledge)
 
How would your conclusions explain people holding and acting on beliefs that they admit have no actuality to support them; in some case admitting that those beliefs are disproved? (Belief as emotional attachment to a social group.) How does it apply to Scientific Methodology's creating knowledge claims as a social activity?
 
"While you may have trouble with the premises, you seem to not be arriving at my conclusions." - Philosophim
 
Well yeah, of course. You've carefully designed an enclosed abstract logical system where the design insures the premises support the conclusions. The only lines of criticism open are the premises.
 
Your conclusions, whether they have real world validity or not, are not relevant to my criticism, that an abstract formal logical system, no matter how carefully constructed, cannot be imposed on the world as foundation for an epistemology.
 
It should be obvious by now that my strict-materialist evolutionary naturalism will find few points of agreement with logical idealism.
If you are only interested in someone to parse the logical formulae and not interested in systemic criticism feel free to say so. 

The information is being tested. — Megarian

What is the information? Lets be generous and simplify it to "The wet spot on the ground and the liquid in the bottle."

What is a "hunch"? A belief that the liquid in the bottle caused the wet spot on the ground.

I think we're having a semantics issue. Part 3 covers this. We are speaking about the same thing, we're just using different words to represent those things. Lets not get caught up in that.

Logical systems are human creations based on the instinctual rationality formed by evolving in a rationale world. — Megarian

I agree. Part of the paper goes into the question of limiting one's context versus expanding one's context for knowledge. It notes that for some people, limiting their context might be more helpful for them. Like the example I use in part 3 with the biologist, the group of friends, and the "tree".

Rational thinking does not require a formal logical. — Megarian

I would disagree. Rational thinking requires logic. Now most of our thinking is not rational, because rational thinking would take too much time. But one problem in epistemology is determining the validity of different types of irrational thinking. This can also be called, "The problem of induction". Part of the theories purpose is to give a rational way of evaluating which forms of "irrational thinking" are most valuable. However, we must first understand what rational thinking is, and rationally evaluate which inductions are more cogent then others. That is covered in part 4.

If you wish to have this statement be more than an opinion, you'll need to point out in the paper why I am incorrect in making this conclusion.

Then you should be able unpack your conclusions from the system and return to the field where you encountered a sheep and apply them to the sheep (or any animal you're familiar with) to explain its knowledge system. (Non-human learning and knowledge) — Megarian

Ha ha! You need to read part 2. I do exactly that. It is a nod to the famous epistemological argument of course. And yes, my system can be used from an animal's context as well. I can show how a dog or a child can know. Of course, in the dog's case they would need to understand what a contradiction is. I believe they do at a basic level.

How would your conclusions explain people holding and acting on beliefs that they admit have no actuality to support them; in some case admitting that those beliefs are disproved? (Belief as emotional attachment to a social group.) How does it apply to Scientific Methodology's creating knowledge claims as a social activity? — Megarian

Part 3 and Part 4. Science is a context. As for holding beliefs that are not knowledge, I go over in part 4 what plausible and irrational beliefs are, and demonstrate that they are on the lower tier of beliefs when we have higher tiers available to consider. I give plenty of examples there, feel free to pull one out to discuss.

Well yeah, of course. You've carefully designed an enclosed abstract logical system where the design insures the premises support the conclusions. The only lines of criticism open are the premises. — Megarian

This is quite possibly the biggest compliment I could receive as a philosopher.

However, I believe you are drawing conclusions that are not being made from these premises in your criticism. You are thinking about where I'm going to go, instead of seeing where I am actually going. In essence, one cannot critique a conclusion or its premises in isolation from one another. Criticizing one or the other must take the other into account to be valid criticism.

an abstract formal logical system, no matter how carefully constructed, cannot be imposed on the world as foundation for an epistemology. — Megarian

All this translates to is, "I believe before I've read and understood your argument, that its wrong, because I believe it cannot be right".

Perhaps I have failed in my construction. You need to show me this. I would like to think you are a bit more charitable than that. But if you simply think I'm wrong, so wrong in fact that you won't even bother reading and understanding it, then further discussion will not get us anywhere. I understand that a lot of these questions are to feel out whether its worth your time to read it. But at this point, I think I've given plenty of reasons that are pertinent to your interest.

All of these questions you've pointed out are addressed in some fashion in the paper, and its no longer than a philosophy journal article. Keep your questions in mind while you read it. Read the whole thing through once. Then feel free to point out where I have failed so we can get to the meat of these questions. Thanks!

Feel free to point out if I've made an error in the argument if we use the encyclopedia definition. — Philosophim

So, if we go with the encyclopedia definition, we can go back to the first sentence that I quoted from your paper:

[Knowledge] is both the belief in something, and a further belief that “the something” is co-existent with reality

If we rephrase the encyclopedia definition with the words used here, we get: belief in something is the attitude we have, whenever we regard that “the something” is co-existent with reality. Then what does the “further belief that ‘the something’ is co-existent with reality” add here?

So, if we go with the encyclopedia definition, we can go back to the first sentence that I quoted from your paper:

[Knowledge] is both the belief in something, and a further belief that “the something” is co-existent with reality — Jarmo

Yes, to me the encyclopedia definition cannot fit that sentence because any belief in something already includes the further belief. It is implicit in that sentence that one can have a belief in something but not believe it is coexistant with reality. (I am also not sure what this latter phrase means. I assumed at first it meant something like 'real' or 'the case', but actually co-existent means lives or occupies the same space as something else. If I believe in yaks, then this means I believe yaks are not part of reality but in the same space as it. Not a subset) Further it makes for an odd epsitemology. Knowledge is not a belief that meets certain criteria (generally rigorous ones) but a belief that is two beliefs, neither of which must meet certain criteria.

So, pick a belief you consider false: an Abrahamic God, alien abductions, whatever you considera false belief. It is clear that believers in alien aductions believe in alien abducutions and consider these to be coexistant with reality. Or real. So this would mean it is knowledge. Or perhaps he is saying they consider it knowledge, which is often also true. Since most people conflate belief and knowledge or don't have any extra criteria except degree of certainty not based on thought out criteria.

Then what does the “further belief that ‘the something’ is co-existent with reality” add here? — Jarmo

A good question. Lets look at the second portion of the definition.

roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true.

Being co-existent with reality is an assertion of your belief "being the case", or yourself regarding it as true. What I've done is define what "being the case" is. If you have a belief that you can pick up a ball , then you believe reality will not contradict you when you go to pick up the ball. You believe it is the case that you will be able to pick up the ball. You believe that it is true that you will be able to pick up the ball.

The point of stating "not contradict reality", is to spell out what "being the case" is in a less clearly abstract manner. Basically, what is true is what cannot be contradicted.

I believe these to be two separate beliefs. For me, belief is more atomic. I can contain in my head different types of beliefs that I do not hold as "being the case". They "might" be the case. So if I go outside, it might be sunny, or rainy. These beliefs could be contradicted by reality. I don't know for certain, but I don't believe that if I go outside I'm going to warp to another dimension. This is a claim that I believe will not be contradicted by reality.

So to me, having a belief does not necessitate that it must be the case. Beliefs can be inductive, and doubted in one's mind. That does not mean they are not beliefs. A particular type of belief in which one also believes the belief is not contradicted by reality, is an attempt at a knowledge claim. If I believed that when I stepped outside it would be sunny, and not any other state, I am making a knowledge claim that could be contradicted by reality, but I believe will not be.

In the introduction, I am trying to use the most basic language and build up from there, but it seems this needs greater explanation at the beginning. If I added an explanation like the one I gave above, would that help clarify the issue? Do you think a better example or word can be given for what I am trying to describe? I appreciate the feedback!

The point of stating "not contradict reality", is to spell out what "being the case" is in a less clearly abstract manner. Basically, what is true is what cannot be contradicted. — Philosophim

This would mean your definition of knowledge is even more rigorous than, for example, that in science. Because science is always - at least theoretically - open to revision. At the point in time something gets accepted as knowledge, the scientific community has not evidence to contradict the theory, however it is not determined that it cannot be contradicted.

That is a very hard thing to predict. Strong evidence and nothing to falsify it now and no competing theory with either more evidence or less posited entities is more or less current practice in science. No claims are made that it cannot be contradicted.

Though perhaps you meant 'cannot be contradicted now as far as we know.'

roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true.


Being co-existent with reality is an assertion of your belief "being the case", or yourself regarding it as true. — Philosophim

I think everyone beliefs that their beliefs are the case and regard them as true. They may have different degrees of certainty. It might be a shaky belief as a kind of working hypothesis or it might be something one considers must be the case.

Knowledge is a communal belief - at least in many epsitemologies. What beliefs do we decide are knowledge? And some set of criteria are put forth.

Coben, I had accidently submitted my reply before it was finished. If you don't mind, feel free to re-examine it and see if it further answers your question.

There is an extra bit here though I think I should address as well.

The sentence preceding my particular sentence on belief is, "Knowledge expects a consistency.". I then explain that knowledge it the pairing of two beliefs together. The following sentence notes "Yet how can one be certain one’s belief is co-existent with reality?" The intent I was hoping to convey here was "Knowledge is a set of beliefs that people feel with certainty, but then we must be able to demonstrate that this "claim to knowledge" is correct.

So it appears my writing is poor and does not convey this. If I changed this section to identify what a "knowledge claim" was, would this make it more clear? As a rough draft, "So what can we call knowledge? At first glance, knowledge appears to be a claim that It is both the belief in something, and a further belief that “the something” is co-existent with reality"... and then continue on with a bit of the rewrite I've mentioned in the previous post. Essentially really emphasizing that at this point in the thought process that knowledge is a claim one's belief cannot be contradicted by reality, and that to do so, there must be some application of that belief to reality.

Though perhaps you meant 'cannot be contradicted now as far as we know.' — Coben

To clarify, it is not "as far as we know now", it is, "We cannot be contradicted." That can only be done, "now", as the future cannot contradict you. So yes, I could know one thing now, then later find that knowledge is invalided by a contradiction.

And another portion of your earlier reply:

So, pick a belief you consider false: an Abrahamic God, alien abductions, whatever you considera false belief. It is clear that believers in alien aductions believe in alien abducutions and consider these to be coexistant with reality. Or real. So this would mean it is knowledge. Or perhaps he is saying they consider it knowledge, which is often also true. Since most people conflate belief and knowledge or don't have any extra criteria except degree of certainty not based on thought out criteria. — Coben

Yes, this is good. What the paper will show is how we identify if something is not contradicted by reality. And yes, depending on your context of definitions, you can know that the God of Abraham is not contradicted by reality. We can also create another context in which you cannot know the God of Abraham, because such a context is contradicted by reality. How we tackle different contexts, and which contexts we should strive for is commented on in chapter 3, and would be a great discussion once you read that section. If I could explain all of the possible topics and consequences of a one sentence proposal on knowledge, I would. Alas, I had to write about 20 pages to do so. =P

Thanks for the feedback!

I think we're having a semantics issue.
- Philosophim
 
These are not semantic issues they're the meat of these questions. We have completely opposing world views. 
 
The world has order. This order is the predictive relationships of environments.
Environments are unstable. Organisms that evolve simple genetically coded behavior are less likely to survive that those organism that evolve Associative Learning Mechanisms (ALM) to gather  information of their environment.
 
Species process the ALM of the predictive relationships in their environment by evolving Associative Application of Information(AAI) mechanisms. 
AAI is rationality
information A with information B results in -C. C, or +C.
 
This is the rationale; genetically encoded in life long before there were any humans to use it to create logical systems.
 
Rational thinking requires logic. - Philosophim
 
No, logic is a creation of rational thinking.
In the example of the pre-verbal toddler he has neither language or belief. His activity is a genetically encoded AAI mechanism.
Encountering information, associating information and testing the association.
 
The example of the toddler is not an philosophical abstraction created to illustrate a point. It's a real world phenomena to which I am giving explanation and I don't see that process in your paper. There are no real world testable conclusions in your paper.
 
But one problem in epistemology is determining the validity of different types of irrational thinking.
- Philosophim
 
I disagree, real irrational thinking is dysfunction, brain damage or chemical imbalance.
Other than that, thinking follows the rational AAI pattern.
Criticism of validity is at the points of information, association or testing.
 
A foundation for epistemology needs to produce testable claims about the phylogenic, ontogenic and cultural environments.
 
Such a claim must stand under criticism: 
On its utility in problem solving. (Does it work?) 
On its internal coherence.  (Is it self-contradictory?)  
On its external consistency.  (Does it 'fit' in a framework of other claims about the world?) 
On its semenality.  (Does it/can it lead to new/more precise claims?)
 
I find no utility in the system you propose. Your answers to criticisms are self-referential, externally inconsistent or Argumentum ad dictionarium. Being devoid of testable claims it has no semenality.
 
The paper gives us no information promoting an understanding of the general nature of knowledge or the species-specific human nature of knowledge creation and use. It's answers to these question that an epistemology can be founded on.

Until you produce a testable conclusion on the nature of knowledge, not the nature of a logical system, you have no foundation for an epistemology.

We have completely opposing world views. — Megarian

I honestly think its not that different. Lets see if I can demonstrate this.

This is the rationale; genetically encoded in life long before there were any humans to use it to create logical systems. — Megarian

No disagreement. This does not counter my theory. I am observing the rules that result from our biological abilities and limitations, which does not require us to know how those come about. You'll notice in part one I mention that we do not need to understand why we discretely experience, only observe that we do.

The example of the toddler is not an philosophical abstraction created to illustrate a point. It's a real world phenomena to which I am giving explanation and I don't see that process in your paper. There are no real world testable conclusions in your paper. — Megarian

There is are plenty of tests in the paper. The reason why I like the theory is all of these tests can be done yourself. In fact, they have to be applied, otherwise they are only distinctive knowledge, and not applicable knowledge. The toddler is a real world occurrence, and we can abstract that occurrence into a methodology. For example, I can see a few blades of grass. I can then abstract each blade of grass as a number. My abstraction of the baby's actions do not deny the babies actions, only explain it in a logical methodology. I gave you a breakdown, is my breakdown incorrect? If not, why?

No, logic is a creation of rational thinking. — Megarian

That is perfectly fine, it does not change anything claimed here. If you are referring to logic as the formalized linguistic expression of rational thinking, then yes, I fully agree. When I am using logic here, I am only talking about rational thinking, minus the need for language. To me, linguistic logic would be formalized logic, but that is completely unnecessary here. Distinctive knowledge does not require any language. Same with applicable knowledge. Language is a result of distinctive knowledge. Useful language is a result of applicable knowledge. But language is not necessary for distinctive or applicable knowledge.

Encountering information, associating information and testing the association. — Megarian

This is mirroring my theory here. Create distinctive knowledge, and apply distinctive knowledge. Testing is an option within distinctive knowledge, but not a necessity.

But one problem in epistemology is determining the validity of different types of irrational thinking.
- Philosophim
 
I disagree, real irrational thinking is dysfunction, brain damage or chemical imbalance. — Megarian

I will clarify, as I am speaking within the context of the paper again. You'll notice that I summarize the theory of knowledge here as "subjective deduction". This leads into an analysis of induction. The "irrationality" is using induction at all. Using this theory, I am able to address the problems with induction, showcasing 4 levels of inductive thought, and demonstrating a tier system of cogency. One difficulty with knowledge is being able to demonstrate why is is more rational to use certain types of inductions over others. For example, intuitively why is it more rational to believe the sun will rise tomorrow then to believe that it will not rise tomorrow? A breakdown of the terms and logic can identify why.

A foundation for epistemology needs to produce testable claims about the phylogenic, ontogenic and cultural environments. — Megarian

Not a problem. Once we dissect the logic, we can easily go to any of these subjects. Have you read the paper fully yet? Please actually answer this in your next answer so I can know if I can start heavily pulling terms and referencing parts of the text. It will make our conversations go much easier.

On its utility in problem solving. (Does it work?) 
Yes. I use it in my daily life.

On its internal coherence.  (Is it self-contradictory?)
No, it does not contain any self-contradictions. At least, none that I've seen. Feel free to add your own insight on the paper.  

On its external consistency.  (Does it 'fit' in a framework of other claims about the world?) 
Yes. It is the base for all types of contextual knowledge theories. I am able to explain why a baby can know that the wet spot on the floor was caused by its actions. I can explain away the Gettier theory. (I had it in the paper at one time, but it was more like a book then. I mean, I can barely get people to read the 20 pages as it is). I can explain why a family has knowledge that is specific to themselves, but if taken in the greater context of the world, would not be considered applicable knowledge.
On its semenality.  (Does it/can it lead to new/more precise claims?) — Megarian

Absolutely. I can answer the riddle of Theseus' ship. I can give a logical evaluation of inductive claims. Its pretty darn useful.

I find no utility in the system you propose. — Megarian

Considering I can tell you still haven't read the paper, that's really not a solid claim. Read the paper, then get back to me showing why the system has no utility. All you are making is an opinion claim, you are not referencing the actual material.

The paper gives us no information promoting an understanding of the general nature of knowledge or the species-specific human nature of knowledge creation and use — Megarian

You obviously did not read part 3 or 4. Again, why make claims like this without reading it? I'm really scratching my head over here. Are you just wanting to argue for arguing's sake, or do you want to actually analyze the paper, do some fun thinking, and come to a reasonable conclusion? I mean, I might be wrong. I'm open to that. But you have to actually read the paper. I don't think this is unreasonable in the slightest.

So go read it! Its not a waste of your time. If we can spend posts here here discussing when you're not even talking about what's in the paper, and instead some imaginary idea you've come up with, imagine what we could generate if you read it and we can actually discuss about the real idea!

I can contain in my head different types of beliefs that I do not hold as "being the case". They "might" be the case. — Philosophim

So is that the difference between the beliefs in your statement about knowledge (that I quoted earlier)? So the first belief (“belief in something”) is only a belief that something might be? And the second belief (“belief that ‘the something’ is co-existent with reality”) is a belief that something actually is?

First of all I think that belief in x already indicates that you believe x is true (or 'the case' or 'co-existent with reality'), so the truthiness does not need to be further emphasised. On the other hand, if you only believe that x might be, then you should be explicit about that. So your statement should be rephrased like this:

[Knowledge] is both the belief that something might be, and a further belief that “the something” is.

But my second point is that while the statement now makes a bit more sense, I still think it’s nonsensical. I don’t think it’s possible, at the same time, to believe that x might be and that x is.

So you can believe that it might be sunny and that it might be rainy. Then when you look out the window and see that it is actually rainy, the ‘might’ vanishes, and you only believe that it is rainy. You don’t believe that it is sunny or that it might be sunny or that it might be rainy.

So is that the difference between the beliefs in your statement about knowledge (that I quoted earlier)? So the first belief (“belief in something”) is only a belief that something might be? And the second belief (“belief that ‘the something’ is co-existent with reality”) is a belief that something actually is? — Jarmo

" It is both the belief in something, and a further belief that “the something” is co-existent with reality."

-Quote from part 1

How we obtain that "that something is co-existent with reality", is through subjective deduction, or if a belief is not contradicted by reality. For what is not contradicted by reality, "is". At least, as a very simple start within our own minds. That's what is called "distinctive knowledge". Part 2 also identifies, "Applicable knowledge".

So to keep this within the context of the paper and ease confusion, make sure you understand what "Distinctive knowledge" is. Feel free to critique it and poke holes in it, as understanding this is required for anything else to make sense. And don't just look at my comment, please read the more fleshed out portion of the later half of part 1. The above is a summary, not a comprehensive answer.

" I've used it to answer a number of Epistemological puzzles such as "Theseus's ship", and have used it in daily general assessment of whether I know things as I go about daily life.".


You seem to believe that knowledge is belief. I cannot make sense of this idea. Do you know you are aware? Or do you simply believe it?

I believe (!) Aristotle points out somwhere that true knowledge is identical with its object. Descartes reached the same conclusion. This is the idea one needs to explain knowledge. It is a difficult idea but it partly explains the claim of the mystics that knowing is fundamental.. .

That is to say, knowing, which for Russell is the most difficult and most truly philosophical problem, cannot be explained as an emergent phenomenon. This seems to be the experience of all philosophers. .

You seem to believe that knowledge is belief. — FrancisRay

Are you going by the comments here, or the paper itself? Because the comments here are only to get people to actually read the paper and understand the points. You will not glean my argument from the comments alone.

If you have read the paper, I will summarize to help you understand. No, knowledge is not merely a belief. There are two parts to knowledge. Distinctive, and applicable. In both cases, a belief that is subjectively deduced is the particular type of knowledge based on the context. Which part are you having trouble understanding?

I do not care about any of your personal philosophies of knowledge, I care about good criticism of the ideas of the paper. Now if you can apply your personal philosophies of knowledge to the paper, that would be fantastic! But generic personal opinion without addressing the paper serves no point.

Your point is a fair one, but I see no point in reading an article that seems epistemilogically naive.even before I start reading. You can ignore me.

Philosophim Your point is a fair one, but I see no point in reading an article that seems epistemilogically naive.even before I start reading. You can ignore me. — FrancisRay

If you haven't read the article, how do you know its epistemologically naive? I have studied and am familiar with the history of epistemology up through Quine. Lets be real: most people just don't want to read an article longer than a forum post, and look for every excuse not to. Which, I have nothing against! Its fine. But telling me it looks naive when you haven't read it? Come now. Just be honest and go about your day instead of trying to slight me.

Well, I read a couple of responses. You say you've used your theory 'to answer a number of Epistemological puzzles such as "Theseus's ship", and have used it in daily general assessment of whether I know things as I go about daily life.' This tells me it's not a good theory. If you need a theory to tell you that you know things then you're talking about degrees of belief, not knowledge.

Quine has no useful theory either. In the Western tradition the best there is for knowledge is 'justified true belief'. .

Well, I read a couple of responses. — FrancisRay

Which are utterly useless, as they lack the context of the paper. It never ceases to amaze me that people think they can judge a paper without actually reading the paper. I also never stated I agreed with Quine, I'm just indicating that I am familiar with several epistemological theories.

This is devolving into dumb ego. Read the paper if you're interested and converse on that. If you're going to comment on the paper without reading the actual paper, its a waste of both of our times.

I understand your pov on this issue, but I also understand mine. I don't need to read it to know I don't endorse it. .

I don't need to read it to know I don't endorse it. — FrancisRay

Congrats on a completely worthless contribution to the thread then. For anyone looking to have a worthwhile conversation, please post on the topic of the forum, which is the paper itself. I'm sure most people don't need to be told this obvious statement, but we get a few on here who don't understand basic logic.

Yes, you;re right, it was useless. I was just frustrated at how complex the issues are made by this sort of approach, but I should have engaged with it properly. My bad.

Any person who has the character to admit to a mistake becomes a giant in my eyes. You have my utmost respect and forgiveness! It is water under the bridge.

Likewise, thanks for being open to an apology. .

Hello @Philosophim,

Firstly, great work! I enjoyed reading your collection of epistemological essays! Since it was a lot to unpack, I am going to simply address your epistemological proposition from an extremely broad sense (thereby only addressing the most vital quarrels I think I have with your proposition). I will leave it up to you to decide what you would like to discuss thereafter:

• Your proposition seems to be founded on the one-sided relationship between “reality” and beliefs; however, it is really two-sided: “reality” can influence a belief and a belief can influence “reality”. For example, placebo effect is a real psychological phenomenon which reveals the two-sidedness of the relationship. With that being said, I do agree with your proposition in the sense that beliefs should coincide with “reality” in some manner—but this does not necessarily mean that anything that isn’t directly factually true (such as a unicorn's existence) directly invalidates the belief in such: belief and knowledge are two distinct concepts. For example, the thorough refutation of libertarian free will does not in any way (I would argue) immediately refute the belief in such--as, even in the case that free will is an illusion (in a hard determinist worldview--which I am not advocating for but merely utilizing as an example), it does not follow that one is obliged to then completely disregard (without further examination) the proposition that the belief in free will is useful. Beliefs, completely separate from knowledge claims, can manifest (psychologically and sociologically speaking) real, empirical facts about "reality".
• Our epistemological worldviews deviate at a much more fundamental level than I expected, but, interestingly enough, we agree the broader we speak. For example, you stated (in, I believe, your first essay): “In recognizing a self,, I am able to create two “experiences”.  That is the self-recognized thinker, and everything else.” I think that this is the intuitive thing to do, but it is only an incredibly general description and, therefore, doesn’t go deep enough for me. There are three distinctions to be made, not simply “I” and “everything else”: the interpreter, the interpretations (representations), and self-consciousness. In your terms, it would translate (I think) into a discrete experiencer (self-consciousness and the interpreter joined into to one concept) and everything else (the interpretations/representations which are later divided into other “I”s and “everything else besides ‘I’ and other ‘I’s”). I would make it much more precise than that: “I am self-conscious, therefore something is”. I think Descartes biggest mistake was assuming “I” am the one “thinking”. Although you refurbish it into discrete experiences, I think this is still fundamentally assuming things we cannot. That is why I define an “experience” as a witnessing of immediate knowledge (the process of thinking, perception, and emotion) by means of rudimentary reason, and a “remembrance” (or memory as you put it in subsequent essays) as seemingly stored experiences. Notice that I am directly implying that I have no reason to believe that I am an active ingredient, so to speak, in any of those processes. I am not convinced that I am actively participating in the process of perception, emotion, or thought, but rather, I am “participating” insofar as I am a witness of such (I witness the process of rigorous thought and the feeling of convincement): I am self-consciousness. There is another aspect, or “force”, so to speak, that is distinctly separate from the “I” in a “discrete experiencer” (self-consciousness): the interpreter. The interpreter is a form of mediate knowledge (namely a prior knowledge) which is necessitated by the fact that the “I” doesn’t directly affect the processes associated with immediate forms of knowledge. In other words, both the interpreter and the “I” (self-consciousness) are apart of the subject (consciousness), but the “I” is only a particular aspect of it. This distinction, for me, between keeping it a binary distinction ("I" vs "everything else") and regressing it further (the subject into two categories) reveals some heavily impactful positions of mine (pertaining to epistemology). For example, if I wasn’t self-conscious of the process of thinking that is occurring in “my” brain, then, although this response would still get written and sent, "I" would have no knowledge of it. Likewise, if we all were not self-conscious of our process of thinking, perception, and emotion (i.e. immediate forms of knowledge), then there would be no knowledge at all. Interestingly enough, I think that the interpreter's processes would continue—as "we" (self-consciousness) are mere witnesses—but there would be no epistemological grounds for any sort of knowledge because neither of us would have any recollection of it. Think of it like the hypothetical scenario that you had a thought two seconds ago, of which you never experienced (you were not consciously aware of it—aka self-conscious of it) (or you do not and will never remember)--can any knowledge be derived therefrom? I would argue no! This is like your reference of a “discrete experiencer” in the sense that if you didn’t discretely experience then there is no knowledge, however that becomes very confusing to me as I don’t think your consciousness would completely stop. I think you would continue to do exactly what you are doing now (in terms that the interpreter, one aspect of the subject, would persist), except that “you” would have no knowledge of it. Your interpreter, so to speak, would continue to create interpretations (as far as I can tell), which are discrete representations, but those interpretations would not be experienced (in the sense that I defined it--a witnessing of immediate knowledge by means of rudimentary reason) because there would be no witness. It’s kind of like how some animals can’t even recognize themselves in a mirror: I would argue that they do not have any knowledge if (and its a big if in this case) they are not self-conscious. Yes they have knowledge in the sense that their body will react to external stimuli, but that isn’t really knowledge (in my opinion) as removing self-consciousness directly removes “me” (or “I”) from the equation and that is all that is relevant to "me" (as this fundamental epistemological question wouldn't have even been posed in any meaningful way to the subject if the second aspect of the subject--namely self-consciousness--was not present). As an example, let's take your sheep example: what if that entire concept that you derived a deductive principle from (namely tenants that constitute a sheep) were all apart of a hallucination. What if you really snorted a highly potent hallucinogen in the real world and it is so potent that you will never wake up in the real world but, rather, you will die in your hallucinated world once your body dies in the real one. Do you truly have knowledge of the sheep (in the hallucinated world) now, given that the world isn't real? What is "real"? I would argue, since the relevance directly ties to the witness (and not the interpreter) aspect of the subject, whatever corresponds best to what the witness experiences is exactly what is "real" and, therefore, the real world in my example here would be nothing except irrelevant. The knowledge, if knowledge is going to mean anything, of the sheep is just as valid in a real world as a "real" (potentially hallucinated and, thereby, "fake") one! Everything revolves around the subject for me, nay, specifically the witness (self-consciousness, one aspect of the subject). In other words, the validity (absolutely speaking) of the interpreter's interpretations has no direct effect on what one can or cannot constitute as knowledge.
• For now, the last aspect I will discuss here is the idea, which I consider to be your main point, that inductions can be classified by means of how close they are to deductive principles (i.e. your distinction between probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational induction). There is a lot that can be said about this, but, in an effort to keep this relatively short, I will focus on one aspect: the fundamental problem with this logic. The most fundamental aspect of our lives (I would argue) is rudimentary reason, which is the most basic (rudimentary) method by which we can derive all other things. We reason our way into even knowing (in the first place) that we have any forms of immediate knowledge (perceptions, thoughts, and emotions): we induce by our witnessing (experiencing) the process of perception, emotion, and thought that that we indeed have such (by means of rudimentary reason--a witnessing of a series of thoughts that, in turn, create a seemingly conclusory thought of which we are, at least in that instant, thoroughly convinced of). Imagine that you never witnessed yourself conclude anything: you therefore would be no different, with respect to yourself, than a rock (now to someone who could conclude--aka has rudimentary reason to some extent--would be able to distinguish you from a rock, but you wouldn't be able to). To realize that you have thoughts is to make a conclusion, if that is absent then the interpreter associated with you as a subject would persist in such immediate processes but, most importantly, you would be completely unaware and, honestly, I don't' think "you" would exist anymore (self-consciousness cannot persist in the absence of conclusions): this is what I mean by rudimentary reason, that, although it doesn't have to be rational, you must be able to form conclusions which requires a rudimentary form of something (which I call rudimentary reason). You see, if one were to be committed to stating that the closer an induction is to a deductive principle the more likely it is correct, then the very means by which they induced those deductive principle would have no grounds to stand. My use of rudimentary reason to induce immediate and mediate knowledge, and thereby all deductive principles, would have no deductive principle at its base: it is a pure induction. Experience at its most fundamental level, namely immediate knowledge, is pure induction. Now, I think you are right in the sense that inductions that are based off of strong deductive principles are stronger than inductions that are chained together, but I don't tend to establish what is more knowable based off of this postulation because, as I previously stated, my most immediate forms of knowledge, and consequently my basis of everything one way or another, are induced. That is why I say that the closer (metaphorically and literally) the concept is to immediate knowledge, the more reasonably "real" it is (notice that I am not anchoring it down towards a deductive base).

Well, I think that is enough for now (although there is much to discuss!) as your essays covered a lot of ground. Again, great work! I look forward to hearing back from you on your thoughts.
Bob

Thank you for reading this Bob! This might be a long reply, and I will likely need time to go over it adequately, so sorry in advance if this takes some time for a reply. I've already spent an hour tonight going over it, and my time tonight is spent. I just wanted to acknowledge and express gratitude for taking the time to read it. I will have your answers in the coming days!

@Philosophim
Absolutely no worries! Take as much time as you need (no rush): I am looking forward to your response (:

Decartes point was that you can always doubt what you believe reality to be. You cannot doubt that you are doubting though as you'd be doubting by doing so.

A doubting thing is thinking. A thinking thing exists. I am a thing that doubts therefore I am a thinking thing. So I exist.

Our memories are plastic so we cannot rely on them. We can doubt our memories.

Ironically I think Decartes may have gotten this kind of backwards in terms of 'knowledge'. It seems the kind of knowledge framed is abstract only whereas Intentionality is necessarily experienced due to being incomplete/unfulfilled 'knowledge' as compared to pure abstractions.

Where the rules and limits are set (abstract) absolute knowledge exists - but we may still make errors within these bounds as we're no bound by them ourselves. Given that the limits and rules of 'reality' are not known (or may not exist) we are not able to form 'absolute knowledge' about Intentionality other than to say there is Intentionality - 'directed doubt' (to a proposed thing be it abstract or otherwise).