Is he talking about Wittgenstein? I think so. — Pneumenon

Yes. In reality he is against all analytical philosophy and similar.

But to understand Foucault, if such a thing is possible, we should go to p. 90 ff. of The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York, Pantheon Books, 1972) where he explains his peculiar conception of "statement".
However, I doubt that it can be understood because he resorts to markedly metaphorical expressions that he does not explain ("field of emergence", "spaces of differentiation"...).

One can see in any case that the description of this enunciative level
can be performed neither by a formal analysis, nor by a semantic investiga­-
tion, nor by verification, but by the analysis of the relations between the
statement and the spaces of differentiation , in which the statement itself
reveals the differences. (Wittgenstein, Ibid, p. 92)

Perhaps someone can explain this Foucaulian entanglement. I would appreciate it.

It seems to me post modernism wants to root language and knowledge in biology and culture, which might put too much pressure on Wittgenstein's position for it to hold. I am interested in post modernist conceptions about physics, since much of the latter seems to me to be philosophy

And what in the hell does he mean with that bolded section? — Pneumenon

What does he mean by the rest of the quote, while you are at it.

he is against all analytical philosophy — David Mo

That's like being against motherhood. No one actually believes it, it's what folk say to get attention.

What does he mean by the rest of the quote, while you are at it. — Banno

It's all so clear.

That possible enunciative analysis--possible, bear in mind, not actual--simply must make it possible--not certain or probable--to raise that transcendental obstacle--no ordinary obstacle, mind you--to all analyses of language, in the name of the being of that language--being being, after all, being, and the being of the language therefore not being the language itself--but not merely in the name of the being of that language; also in the name of the ground from which it--the being of that language, or perhaps that language, or perhaps the transcendental obstacle (here it becomes a little bit unclear)--should derive its origin--not necessarily, therefore, the ground from which it does or may derive its origin.

Ah... yes... I see...

Thank you. You have expressed the essence of the issue.

In short, if A is possible, then it must make B possible, which opposes C, in the name of the being of C, and of the D from which (B, the being of C, or C) should derive. I think we can just substitute most anything we like for A, B, the being of C, C and D and the resulting assertion will seem much like that made by Foucault, and make as much sense.

If time travel is possible, then it must make visiting the past possible, which opposes the view that time travel is not possible, in the name of the being of time travel and of the idea from which time travel should derive.

If good is possible, than it must make evil possible, which opposes determinism, in the name of the being of free will and from the idea of free will from which free will should derive.

Sadly, I could go on and on.

I've seen these kind of objections to Hegel, but the more I read him the more I don't see it. I'd bet if you read the post modernist in context, it can be seen they are not just playing games. I look forward to reading much of them in the future

Wittgenstein wanted to find a universal algorithm for human language. Herder of Germanycenturies before post modernist thinkers had already told the French such was impossible. I notice how some are willing to entertain Humean doubts, also, but not when they are voiced by post modernism. I think post modernism will morph into something else and dramatically change the West. I don't see it going away.

Wittgenstein wanted to find a universal algorithm for human language. — Gregory

No, he didn't.

So there's your problem, right there.

Does not the private language argument amount to saying everything can be expressed in language. "It depends on the language, culture, and biology" is the post modern response. I'm open to criticism in this

If I'm not mistaken, Wittgenstein would say every word is translatable from one language into any other. He says the private experience of the word is known only on an individual basis, but language is a game we all play. Post modernist deny that all words can be translated. They told me tis in college in my cultural anthropology class. And Mexican people have told me they have words there is no way to translate into English. I tried to press them "is the word something good, bad, referring to something, ect." They just say it's a cultural barrier

Does not the private language argument amount to saying everything can be expressed in language — Gregory

Nope. It just argues that anything you can talk about is, more or less by definition, not private.

If I'm not mistaken, — Gregory

Well...

That sounds more like Davidson than Wittgenstein.

Most of what I hear from Wittgenstein is trivial. So far I haven't seen a strong, solid idea from him

Yeah, that's really about you, I suspect.

That's like being against motherhood. No one actually believes it, it's what folk say to get attention. — Banno

No one believes in analytical philosophy? Many philosophers believe in it or go on the same way.

It seems to me post modernism wants to root language and knowledge in biology and culture, which might put too much pressure on Wittgenstein's position for it to hold. — Gregory

Foucault's opposition to analytical philosophy seems to be based on the fact that the analysis of language leaves out linguistic functions that are not restricted to the semantic meaning of a statement. This is something that no one, not even the analytical philosophers, denies. The problem is to specify what these "domains" are that "correlate" with the statement. Here is a list:

Domain of material objects possessing a certain number of observable physical properties, a domain of fictitious objects , a domain of spatial and geographical localizations, a domain of symbolic appurtenances and secret kinships; a domain of objects that exist at the same moment and on the same time-scale as the statement is formulated, a domain of objects that belongs to a quite different present -that indicated and constituted by the statement itself, laws of possibility, rules of existence.

The referential of the statement forms the place, the condition, the field of emergence, the authority to differentiate between individuals or objects, states of things and relations that are brought into play by the statement itself; it defines the possibilities of appearance and delimitation of that which gives meaning to the sentence, a value as truth to the proposition. It is this group that characterizes the enunciative level of the formulation. (Foucault: Ibid, p. 91)

I honestly see nothing that an analytical philosopher cannot accept in principle within the concept of meaning as use of language. What Foucault mentions are only some not strictly referential uses of language. Or I have not fully understood the scope of his proposal and someone can explain it to me better.

It seems to me post modernism wants to root language and knowledge in biology and culture, which might put too much pressure on Wittgenstein's position for it to hold. — Gregory

In Wittgenstein's idea, the "analytical" philosopher is not concerned with language for its own sake, but with the epistemic values to which its uses point. Consequently, the role of grammatical systems is to manifest the multifaceted life and/or cultural perspectives that the human world allows us. In Wittgenstein there is a "metaphysical" background that is reflected in his diaries and conversations more conspicuously than in the Investigations or the Tractatus.

No one believes in analytical philosophy? — David Mo

:roll:

Hmm, what makes you think he's talking about Wittgenstein? It seems to me that his target here is rather structuralism (and phenomenology). I'll get to this. As for the bolded section - surely it's simply referring to the passage that just precedes what you quoted. Read together:

"Language, in its appearance and mode of being, is the statement; as such, it belongs to a description that is neither transcendental nor anthropological. ... The possibility of an enunciative analysis, if it is established, must make it possible to raise the transcendental obstacle that a certain form of philosophical discourse opposes to all analyses of language, in the name of the being of that language and of the ground from which it should derive its origin.

Thus: In the name of the statement [which 'is' language], the transcendental obstacle must be raised so that enunciative analysis can take place.

--

As for what this 'transcendental obstacle' is - again, I think it's structuralism. Read the posed Q&A in the conclusion. Foucault there continually associates transcendental inquiry with strucutrualism, and continually works to distance himself from it: "For me, the problem was certainly not how to structuralize [the history of thought], by applying to the development of knowledge or to the genesis of the sciences categories that had proved themselves in the domain of language (langue). ... My aim was to cleanse it of all transcendental narcissism; it had to be freed from that circle of the lost origin, and rediscovered where it was imprisoned; it had to be shown that the history of thought could not have this role of revealing the transcendental moment that rational mechanics has not possessed since Kant..." (p.203).

I've seen these kind of objections to Hegel, but the more I read him the more I don't see it. I'd bet if you read the post modernist in context, it can be seen they are not just playing games. I look forward to reading much of them in the future — Gregory

I think anyone who reads Hegel is remarkable, in the same sense that I think anyone who voluntarily wears hair shirts is remarkable. It's as if one is doing penance in the hope of being rewarded sometime, if not in heaven then perhaps in 19th century Prussia during the reign of Friedrich Wilhelm III, its earthly equivalent.

But I suspect context could provide some clarification, if the author deigns to supply helpful definitions for the more obscure words and phrases or if the reader is already familiar with the jargon. When that's required in order for an author to be understood, though, I don't think it does him/her any credit.

:roll: — Banno

:roll:??

I think anyone who reads Hegel is remarkable, in the same sense that I think anyone who voluntarily wears hair shirts is remarkable. It's as if one is doing penance in the hope of being rewarded sometime, if not in heaven then perhaps in 19th century Prussia during the reign of Friedrich Wilhelm III, its earthly equivalent.

But I suspect context could provide some clarification, if the author deigns to supply helpful definitions for the more obscure words and phrases or if the reader is already familiar with the jargon. When that's required in order for an author to be understood, though, I don't think it does him/her any credit. — Ciceronianus the White

Reading Hegel is like a game. You have to try to figure out what he is getting at all the time. He hardly defines his terms, ever. So I enjoy it. His thought that all truth besides the Absolute truth is only a semblence of truth sounds like post-modernism, except that the latter denies Hegel has proven there is an Absolute truth. I don't see post-modernists as relativist. They seem to doubt much, yes, and like Sextus Empiricus, may doubt even that they doubt. But in that situation you ask yourself "then what am I doing?" Back to Descartes, see? For post modernism, there is only a semblence of truth, and only a semblence of truth in post modernism FOR post modern thought. However far back you take it, the whole series is eclipsed by semblence. There is no absolute objective truth, but then again post modernism is no full blown relativism (which is inconsistent). I don't see post modernism is self-inconsistent

There is no absolute objective truth, but then again post modernism is no full blown relativism (which is inconsistent). I don't see post modernism is self-inconsistent — Gregory

Absolute truth, like absolute certainty, is a chimera. If they were geese, they may be said to have led philosophers on a wild goose chase for 2,500 years or more. But they're unnecessary, as we may make intelligent judgments, conclusions and decisions based on the best evidence available, on probabilities, on what's been tried in the past and the results of those efforts. From what I know of it, it's the suspicion and devaluation of reason and reasoning, which may be some kind of reaction to the pretensions of the Enlightenment, which disturbs me about postmodernism. As far as criticism of philosophical thinking in general and the idea of truth in particular is concerned, I much prefer that made by Dewey. He was less inclined to dispense with the use of critical intelligence--inquiry, as he called it, which includes logic, experimentation and reasoning--in assessing our lives and the world in which we live.

This, from here:

The oldest son of a civil servant from south-west Germany, Georg Hegel was born a quarter of a millennium ago, in 1770. As a theology student in Stuttgart, Hegel feared that he would become a Populärphilosoph – a populariser of complex theories. There was little danger of that! In fact, few thinkers are as difficult to understand. Hegel himself in his monumentally dense Phenomenology of Spirit grumbled about the “complaints regarding the unintelligibility of philosophical writings from individuals who otherwise possess the educational requirements for understanding them.” But being difficult to read does not mean he is wrong. It is odd that we are content to carefully analyse a mathematical proof, willing to ponder poetry again and again, but often not willing to do the same with philosophy. Critics of Hegel’s philosophy sometime fail to understand that this roommate of the romantic poet Friedrich Hölderlin sought to combine the stringency of mathematics with the beauty and grace of the poetic. We should, for this reason, follow Hegel when he says that philosophy must be “read over and over before it can be understood” (Phenomenology of Spirit, p.39).

Not a bad argument for reading Hegel; but there's plenty of other stuff to read first.

Hegel thought everything, history AND thought, moved by way of syllogism. Everything was logic, leading to the ultimate conclusion known as the Absolute. Everything on the way to this Omega Point (to use Teilhard's term) was only partially true, a semblance or shadow of the absolute.

I was listening to Bertrand Russell on Bergson. Bergson renounced reason to an extent and promoted philosophical intuition. I don't know how this related to post monernism, but ye there is a lot to read out there

to understand Foucault, if such a thing is possible, we should go to p. 90 ff. of The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York, Pantheon Books, 1972) where he explains his peculiar conception of "statement".
However, I doubt that it can be understood because he resorts to markedly metaphorical expressions that he does not explain ("field of emergence", "spaces of differentiation"...).

One can see in any case that the description of this enunciative level
can be performed neither by a formal analysis, nor by a semantic investiga­-
tion, nor by verification, but by the analysis of the relations between the
statement and the spaces of differentiation , in which the statement itself
reveals the differences. (Wittgenstein, Ibid, p. 92)

Perhaps someone can explain this Foucaulian entanglement. I would appreciate it. — David Mo

“The statement is not the direct projection on to the plane of language
(langage) of a particular situation or a group of representations. It is not
simply the manipulation by a speaking subject of a number of elements
and linguistic rules. At the very outset, from the very root, the statement
is divided up into an enunciative field in which it has a place and a status,
which arranges for its possible relations with the past, and which opens up
for it a possible future. Every statement is specified in this way: there is no
statement in general, no free, neutral, independent statement; but a statement
always belongs to a series or a whole, always plays a role among
other statements, deriving support from them and distinguishing itself
from them: it is always part of a network of statements, in which it has a
role, however minimal it may be, to play. Whereas grammatical construction
needs only elements and rules in order to operate; whereas one
might just conceive of a language (langue) - an artificial one, of course whose
only purpose is the construction of a single sentence; whereas the
alphabet, the rules of construction and transformation of a formal system
being given, one can perfectly well define the first proposition of this
language (langage) , the same cannot be said of the statement. There is no
statement that does not presuppose others; there is no statement that is not
surrounded by a field of coexistences, effects of series and succession, a
distribution of functions and roles. If one can speak of a statement, it is
because a sentence (a proposition) figures at a definite point, with a specific
position, in an enunciative network that extends beyond it.” (Foucault, Ibid, p. 99)

Foucault implements the double move here. First, he rejects a formal analysis or a semantic investigation to perform a structuralist conceptualization of a discursive formation: his statement represents a group of associated statements with inherent formation and enunciation rules. No statement can appear without the co-existence and co-operation of similar, opposing, supporting, etc. ones. Secondly, he tries to replace the structuralist approach: a family of affiliated statements is not homogeneous. When one operates discursive formation statements, there are different systems effectuated in the same process: observations, descriptions, calculations, institutions, etc. Also, the operating rules themselves are not general permanent axioms; they are variable or optional. They do not determine a structure or a system; any rule applied is primarily determined by a current enunciative context and, simultaneously, changes this context.
The principle of an inherent variation substitutes for formal structuralist
rules of construction and transformation.

I think the further we go back in history (studying texts), the less likely it is that we are really understanding the language because language changes constantly. I doubt anyone knows what the Bible really said for example

One can see in any case that the description of this enunciative level
can be performed neither by a formal analysis, nor by a semantic investiga­-
tion, nor by verification, but by the analysis of the relations between the
statement and the spaces of differentiation , in which the statement itself
reveals the differences. (Wittgenstein, Ibid, p. 92)

My mistake; this excerpt is by Foucault.

They do not determine a structure or a system; any rule applied is primarily determined by a current enunciative context and, simultaneously, changes this context. — Number2018

That is what I had more or less understood. I don't know much about structuralism, except Barthes (a little) and Althusser (less). I don't think they are closed to the consideration of how a linguistic system varies with context.
Certainly not Wittgenstein. See how in the second Wittgenstein words are defined by their use and this is inserted in a context of both linguistic and non-linguistic activities. Nor is it possible to speak of a single context since language comprises a multiplicity of functions.

It would have been nice if Foucault had mentioned the author or authors he was targeting with his criticism. But it is somewhat rare for famous philosophers to critically mention contemporary authors. They probably expose themselves to the discovery that they have not been seriously read them. This is often the case.

If Foucault's criticism refers only to the contextuality of meaning, it seems to me that it is not very original. I suspect that there is something else.