intuitions like the ones you start from are to be taken seriously - in which case the clash involved in your conclusion should indicate that your logic has gone very wrong somewhere. — Isaac

Here is the thing.. I can agree with you conclusions can show something is wrong, if those conclusions actually indeed cause harm to someone or a negative. But quite the opposite and an example of obstinate assertion and indignation without reason behind it. Your objection is, "The conclusion would mean no humanity!!!". Then of course the response is:

"What obligation do we have to humanity as opposed to individual people?

But you see, you have no good answer to that except going back the obstinate assertion and indignation.

I'm not trying to argue with you here. We've already agreed that being inherently involves "suffering" and certainly the individual being subject to forces beyond their control (i.e. non-consensual forces), you're just much more sensitive to it than me.

I'm not trying to justify procreation here. I'm not sure if I need to.

I'm not trying to argue with you here. We've already agreed that being inherently involves "suffering" and certainly the individual being subject to forces beyond their control (i.e. non-consensual forces), you're just much more sensitive to it than me.

I'm not trying to justify procreation here. I'm not sure if I need to. — BitconnectCarlos

Ok, I don't have any argument then. It's basically the Lucretius argument that we had eternity before and after our birth. I just don't see that as comforting during the actual being part, ha.

Why is my view that humanity should be preserved "obstinate assertion and indignation", but your view that "cause[ing] harm to someone or a negative" must be avoided at all costs not similarly unsupported assertion?

They're both just moral assertions about what ought and ought not be done.

Your logic like others, goes something like this "Even if I was to know a being would be born into certain torture, I would not consider this future event because that being doesn't actually exist yet, so how can I consider a future being or event if they don't exist yet!" — schopenhauer1

But you've changed your argument. Where is consent?

We start with the intuition that I have a moral duty to respect the autonomy of others and take actions that affect them only if I have their consent.

We then infer that if I do not have the consent of an entity, I must do nothing to them.

If an entity cannot give consent? Children and animals for instance? We make special rules. Rocks and trees? We make different special rules.

Beings that don't exist? No rule needed, since I can't do anything to them.

But, you argue, I could cause the non-existent entity to exist; the entity I cause to exist could not possibly give consent, because at the time I cause them to exist, they don't exist.

To you that might look like an absolute moral truth but to most people, I submit, this will look like a bit of sophistry, or dorm-room philosophy, or stoner profundity, or, in the best case, a paradox. However it's taken, it doesn't look like the foundation for an ethical position, nothing on the order of respecting the autonomy of others.

My point was that the way you're relying on consent in this argument may be logically defensible (or may not -- there are logical challenges I'm not bothering to mount) but it is not persuasive.

If you want to abandon the reliance on consent and just ask me if it's moral to bring a being into the world knowing with certainty they will be tortured continuously, that's a different question.

Why is my view that humanity should be preserved "obstinate assertion and indignation", but your view that "cause[ing] harm to someone or a negative" must be avoided at all costs not similarly unsupported assertion?

They're both just moral assertions about what ought and ought not be done. — Isaac

The basis is on the idea that preventing harms are more important than whatever other excuse you have to procreate someone. In any other realm, this makes sense. No humans just seems like something of a panicky vision, but the actual operation of morality isn't "visions of humanity", but "What is this going to do to someone else?".

The basis is on the idea that preventing harms are more important than whatever other excuse you have to procreate someone. — schopenhauer1

As I said right at the beginning (and indeed the last time we discussed this) if one agrees with your idiosyncratic axioms then maybe one is indeed compelled by logic to agree with your conclusion. My question is, given such a massively counter-intuitive conclusion, why would you persist in holding such an heterodox premise?

the actual operation of morality isn't "visions of humanity", but "What is this going to do to someone else?". — schopenhauer1

From where did you get this notion of what morality really is?

We start with the intuition that I have a moral duty to respect the autonomy of others and take actions that affect them only if I have their consent.

We then infer that if I do not have the consent of an entity, I must do nothing to them.

If an entity cannot give consent? Children and animals for instance? We make special rules. Rocks and trees? We make different special rules.

Beings that don't exist? No rule needed, since I can't do anything to them.

But, you argue, I could cause the non-existent entity to exist; the entity I cause to exist could not possibly give consent, because at the time I cause them to exist, they don't exist.

To you that might look like an absolute moral truth but to most people, I submit, this will look like a bit of sophistry, or dorm-room philosophy, or stoner profundity, or, in the best case, a paradox. However it's taken, it doesn't look like the foundation for an ethical position, nothing on the order of respecting the autonomy of others.

My point was that the way you're relying on consent in this argument may be logically defensible (or may not -- there are logical challenges I'm not bothering to mount) but it is not persuasive. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't see the problem here. You cannot ask for consent, yet you go ahead and make the decision for them that it would be okay to cause the conditions whereby suffering takes place.

If we were to go the other direction, essentially your argument is: "In order to consent to be tortured or not, one must be born to be tortured, so they can consent not to be tortured".. So the inverse of your argument is essentially, "As long as no one exists at the time of the decision that affects them, the decision is justified on behalf of that person". However, you probably agree that certain decisions on other people's behalf are wrong, like the decision that they will be born into direct and immediate torture. However, the antinatalist, recognizes that life spread over a whole lifetime, has many instances of pain and suffering, and (in my version at least), there is always some inherent suffering no matter what (that's another debate though). Either way, these are decisions that have no consent that are affecting (majorly!) another person's whole state of being. You cannot get consent, that is the case. Yes or no? The next move that you seem to disagree with is, when you cannot get consent, you are not then permitted to affect a person's state of being. Rather, by not procreating, de facto, no ONE is being affected, and thus consent is not being violated.

If you want to abandon the reliance on consent and just ask me if it's moral to bring a being into the world knowing with certainty they will be tortured continuously, that's a different question. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure, my argument doesn't even rely on consent, though I did use it in this example. The basic premise is that one can prevent the conditions of all harm for another person. One is not obligated to procreate for any X, Y, Z reason. By not affecting a future person, that is recognizing that there is suffering in the world as a living human being, and that the world for humans has a lot of "dealing with" situations. And to foist this burden and "dealing with" on another, would not be respecting that indeed an individual will be affected negatively by this decision.

From where did you get this notion of what morality really is? — Isaac

You have to start somewhere. I get the notion that morality is based on a foundation and at some point you can't go much further. I will say this though- where if you follow my argument's premises, you literally create no new lives of suffering in the world. If you follow your argument's premises, more people who will suffer will be created. To then say, "But in an interview, the person born said 51% of their life was good, not bad!" is not a justification for thus creating the conditions for suffering for someone else. We can go into that if you want.

Since you don't seem to find anything logically suspect in non-existent entities, let's look at a related case.

You arrive on the scene of a car wreck. There is before you on the ground a young man whose heart has stopped. As he is unconscious, he cannot give consent for you to perform CPR.

Your position suggests that there is no issue here at all, that it is absolutely immoral to perform CPR.

You have to start somewhere. — schopenhauer1

That's not a sufficient justification for any given starting point. Notwithstanding that, you having personally chosen such an odd starting place is also not sufficient justification for trying to convince others of it. You've not answered my question (not that you're obliged to) as to why you've decided to persist with this odd premise despite the magnitude of the conclusion.

if you follow my argument's premises, you literally create no new lives of suffering in the world. If you follow your argument's premises, more people who will suffer will be created. To then say, "But in an interview, the person born said 51% of their life was good, not bad!" is not a justification for thus creating the conditions for suffering for someone else. — schopenhauer1

Why not?

Since you don't seem to find anything logically suspect in non-existent entities, let's look at a related case.

You arrive on the scene of a car wreck. There is before you on the ground a young man whose heart has stopped. As he is unconscious, he cannot give consent for you to perform CPR.

Your position suggests that there is no issue here at all, that it is absolutely immoral to perform CPR. — Srap Tasmaner

This is why it's not just about consent, but about what the consent is about. This person was ALREADY created. Thus, you are harming him, by waiting for consent. But that's not the case of birth. It's more like.. If I put you in a deadly, harmful, difficult, game without your consent, and then I saved you from some of the pitfalls that I have put you in in the first place, without your consent.

odd starting place is also not sufficient justification for trying to convince others of it. — Isaac

This is essentially your argument over and over. They also ridiculed Galileo.

This is essentially your argument over and over. — schopenhauer1

Yes, that's correct.

They also ridiculed Galileo. — schopenhauer1

So. Some people are deserving of ridicule, others aren't. I'm not seeing the relevance here. Your starting premise is odd, you've given no reason at all for preferring it over more commonly held ones, and it leads to a conclusion which most people find ridiculous (if not outright repugnant). So why should we take it seriously?

I still think you ought to behave a certain way, it doesn't stop being about how others ought to behave. I just don't think there's a logical method by which I can derive that feeling. — Isaac

See, you THINK I ought to behave a certain way. Now I have no complaints. It sounded like you were objectvely saying antinatalism should be changed.

How do you propose to debate whether an axiom is 'correct'? What measures would we judge it by? — Isaac

Even more base axioms. What shope is doing for example is clashing multiple intuitions against each.

It needs the axiom that annihilating humanity is an acceptable conclusion — Isaac

Wait, so when you argue for a conclusion, one of your premises has to be "This conclusion is acceptable?". So if you want to find the sum of 2 and 2 but you think "2+2=4" is an unacceptable conclusion then 2+2 does not equal 4?

There is no such thing as "acceptable conclusion". You start with premises and you reason through them. And whatever you get at the end is true as long as the premises and logic are true. The truth value of an argument does not change because one thinks the conclusion is unacceptable.

b) intuitions like the ones you start from are to be taken seriously - in which case the clash involved in your conclusion should indicate that your logic has gone very wrong somewhere. — Isaac

Not really. Why would a clash of intuitions somehow lead to a logical inconsistency? Our intuitions are not non contradictory. Our brains are not as brittle as a logical system. They can handle some amount of internal inconsistency.

It's quite an unusual principle that one's personal emotional response is what provides the basis for rights — Isaac

That's not the argument. The argument is that my right to have children provided by the intrinsic value of human life is trumped by the child's right not to be harmed. And I think most people would agree that in MOST cases, the right of an individual not to be harmed trumps most other "rights" unless said individual is harming others. Tell me of a situation where harming others is considered acceptable other than self defence, and when the alternative to not harming a few individuals is harm to many individuals.

I am aware a child doesn't exist until they're had but the rights of a hypothetical person must also be respected. Which is why, for example, planting a bomb with a 15 year timer in a fetus is wrong. Even though at the time of the action no one existed to have right not to be harmed.

Your position suggests that there is no issue here at all, that it is absolutely immoral to perform CPR. — Srap Tasmaner

So the alternatives are:

1- Perform CPR: very low chance of harm, very high chance of benefit
2- Don't perform CPR: very high chance of harm, very low chance of benefit (that is counting successful suicide as a benefit)

Both alternatives are "risky" but one is clearly more risky. Consent is required when it is a "risky" alternative vs a "safe" or "safer" alternative and you want to perform the riskier one. That is not the case here. Whereas for procreation it is:

1- Have children: low chance of them leading a life they hated (overall negative), high chance of them leading a life they find meaningful (overall positive)
2- Don't have children: Nothing

So you would need consent to have children here because it is more risky than not. It's not that it's very risky, we don't life in a terrible insufferable world, it's just more risky.

For taking any action at all of any kind that may ever effect anyone else in any way:
1. Do something: some chance of good effect (impossible to calculate); some chance of negative effect (impossible to calculate).
2. Do nothing: no effect.

If you take any action, you incur a risk that you may produce a negative effect, because of your uncertainty, therefore it is better never to take any action at all of any kind that may ever effect anyone else in any way.

2. Do nothing: no effect. — Srap Tasmaner

Not in this case. And not in most cases. This is what I'm saying. Doing nothing to the guy in the car crash scene will result in his death. Passivity has consequences.

(impossible to calculate) — Srap Tasmaner

Numerically, yes it's impossible. But relative to other actions it is possible. For example if you have to kill one innocent person vs kill 5 innocent people you can't sit there and say "Gee, I can't tell which is better because this is impossible to calculate"

Not in this case. And not in most cases. This is what I'm saying. Doing nothing to the guy in the car crash scene will result in his death. Passivity has consequences. — khaled

Suppose I keep him alive until paramedics arrive and they revive him, he looks at his crushed hands and says, "Oh God! Why didn't you just let me die!" because he's a pianist and the rest of his life will be miserable. How can I possibly know, especially if he's just been in a car crash, whether he will consider the rest of his life good or bad?

Or suppose he's evil, and by saving him, I allow him to do appalling amounts of harm to others. How can I possibly know whether others will suffer because he lives?

Or, perhaps, I should not guess at the sum worth of lives I know nothing about, and the effect those lives have on other lives.

I can also deny, no matter your arguments, that my not acting must be counted as an action. I can deny responsibility for his death all I like. I did not act; if I did not act, I caused nothing to happen.

Or I could agree and say the only way to be sure I am not, no matter my intent, causing more suffering in the world, is to have no dealings with other people at all -- so I should never have been there to face the choice of saving the man or not.

But I may still have a negative effect on others, however indirectly, just by living, and the only way to be sure I'm not doing harm, no matter my intent, is to make sure that I do not exist.

Or, perhaps, I should not guess at the sum worth of my life, and the effect my life has on the lives of others.

But relative to other actions it is possible. For example if you have to kill one innocent person vs kill 5 innocent people you can't sit there and say "Gee, I can't tell which is better because this is impossible to calculate" — khaled

But are you saying I must only make these obvious short term calculations? That I have no business wondering about what those involved think of their lives? Or guessing what might be awaiting them around the corner? Or speculating about the effect they have on others? What if I choose to kill the one, but he was happy and made many others happy, while the five I save are miserable and make others miserable? Are you saying I shouldn't speculate about such things when I make moral decisions?

Even more base axioms. What shope is doing for example is clashing multiple intuitions against each. — khaled

And how do we decide which of these clashing axioms trumps which?

Wait, so when you argue for a conclusion, one of your premises has to be "This conclusion is acceptable?". So if you want to find the sum of 2 and 2 but you think "2+2=4" is an unacceptable conclusion then 2+2 does not equal 4? — khaled

Yes. If you were working out the length of timber needed for a table cross brace using trigonometry and you got the answer 204m would you unquestioningly proceed to the timber yard and ask for a 204m length of timber for you furniture project, or would you presume you'd makde a mistake somewhere in the calculations?

You start with premises and you reason through them. And whatever you get at the end is true as long as the premises and logic are true. The truth value of an argument does not change because one thinks the conclusion is unacceptable. — khaled

OK, so let's start with the premise that being allowed to have children is an inalienable right and that the human race has an intrinsic value and ending it would be wrong. Having children causes (by your principle - not one I agree with) harm without consent. Therefore it must be OK to cause harm without consent. The premises are true the logic flawless so the conclusion must be true, right?

So how come the 'true' conclusion changes depending on which intuition I start with?

Why would a clash of intuitions somehow lead to a logical inconsistency? Our intuitions are not non contradictory. Our brains are not as brittle as a logical system. They can handle some amount of internal inconsistency. — khaled

Hang on - a minute ago it was all "2+2=4", now you're saying the our intuitions can all be right or all wrong even if they're contradictory. Which is it - calculus or para-consistent? If the former then how do we know which intuition to start with as that seems to affect the 'truth' of the conclusion, if the latter then (as I said earlier) the whole project is pointless as you can't show one intuition to be false using another.

The argument is that my right to have children provided by the intrinsic value of human life is trumped by the child's right not to be harmed. And I think most people would agree that in MOST cases, the right of an individual not to be harmed trumps most other "rights" unless said individual is harming others. Tell me of a situation where harming others is considered acceptable other than self defence, and when the alternative to not harming a few individuals is harm to many individuals. — khaled

Having children.

How can I possibly know, especially if he's just been in a car crash, whether he will consider the rest of his life good or bad? — Srap Tasmaner

You can't. But you know statistically that the majority of people are not pianists. And you know statistically that most people with disabiliites learn to live with them in a couple of months or years. So you can surmise that it is more likely that this person would want to be saved.

All your other "or"s can be adressed in such a manner. If I had known that the person was a pianist for example that would add some complexity to the situation. But you didn't give me any extra info.

I do not rely on somehow knowing what the future holds for the person I save but simply on knowing that it is more likely they'd see being saved as a benefit. Work with the information that you have.

I can deny responsibility for his death all I like. — Srap Tasmaner

Responsibility =/= consequences. I said there are CONSEQUENCES to passivity not that you're responsible for those consequences. In the case of the car crash I see it as: You are not responsible to save him but saving him is not immoral (for reasons stated above).

Or I could agree and say the only way to be sure I am not, no matter my intent, causing more suffering in the world, is to have no dealings with other people at all — Srap Tasmaner

And then you would simply be incorrect. Inactivity is a form of activity. Choosing not to save a drowning person WILL MOST LIKELY cause more harm in comparison to save him. That is an example of causing suffering even though you're not responsible for it and can't be blamed for it.

In my view the damage that you're responsible for is a subset of the damage you cause. The distinguishing factor is: Would the damage have still been done if you had not intervened. If the answer is yes then you're not resonsible but you still cause the damage by choosing not to intervene.

But I may still have a negative effect on others, however indirectly, just by living, and the only way to be sure I'm not doing harm, no matter my intent, is to make sure that I do not exist. — Srap Tasmaner

But that would still be doing more harm most likely. Suicide is most often the more harmful option to yourself (which counts) and others.

But are you saying I must only make these obvious short term calculations? — Srap Tasmaner

No. I just gave a single variable for simplicity. These:

wondering about what those involved think of their lives? Or guessing what might be awaiting them around the corner? Or speculating about the effect they have on others? — Srap Tasmaner

Should also be considered. And in the car crash example you gave all I had was "Man in accident save or no save?". So I have to use the info that I have, that being that it is more likely for the general population that not saving is the worse option therefore consent to save is not required (because it's the safer option)

And how do we decide which of these clashing axioms trumps which? — Isaac

As I said, by reasoning from even more basic axioms. For me "It is okay to risk harming others" is much harder to believe than "It is not okay to have kids". Therefore when it comes to procreation, the former wins, since I consider procreation a form of risking harming others.

Yes. If you were working out the length of timber needed for a table cross brace using trigonometry and you got the answer 204m would you unquestioningly proceed to the timber yard and ask for a 204m length of timber for you furniture project, or would you presume you'd makde a mistake somewhere in the calculations? — Isaac

The difference here is that in the case of antinatalism the logic has been revised over and over and the premises do directly lead to the conclusion. And what you are proposing is changing the premises to get a different conclusion. Which is perfectly valid in ethics, but I would rather not do that (because as I said it reeks of self deception)

Therefore it must be OK to cause harm without consent. — Isaac

What? Complete non sequitor. You could say "Therefore it must be OK to cause harm without consent in this paticular case because I believe the "right" to have children trumps the child's right not to be harmed" and that would make sense. But you can't just contradict one of your own premises in the conclusion.

So how come the 'true' conclusion changes depending on which intuition I start with? — Isaac

Because, as I said, we all have different "amounts" of these intuitions. My intuition that I shouldn't cause harm trumps my intuition that I should have children. Because the former is much more basic. It was much easier for me to believe that having children is not okay vs believing that harming people is completely fine. And I suspect that that is the case for you too. Because although you think that having children is fine you probably don't think that harm without consent is fine. The key difference is that you don't see having children as causing any kind of harm while I see that as self deception. Especially since we have many cases where having children is immoral, for exmaple if you have a terrible genetic disease.

a minute ago it was all "2+2=4" — Isaac

No. A minute ago it was all: "You can't just tell yourself that 2+2 does not equal 4 just because you don't like the fact that it is even though the logic adds up." That's all I was saying.

intuitions can all be right or all wrong — Isaac

As I said before. Intuitions are not right or wrong. Intuitions tell us what to do in different moral situations. However they are not specific about which is applied when. So for example, we all have the intuition "It is wrong to steal from innocents" and the intuition "Benefiting yourself is good". So most of us don't steal. However if you consider everyone living in a capitalist society is already a thief and a scoundrel, stealing will come much more easily to you since the people you're stealing from are no longer innocent so the intuition doesn't apply.

Having children. — Isaac

Is that your only example? Because if it is then that's my problem. I can't live my whole life abiding by certain moral codes and then just make an exception in one spot because I feel like it.

As I said, by reasoning from even more basic axioms. For me "It is okay to risk harming others" is much harder to believe than "It is not okay to have kids". Therefore when it comes to procreation, the former win, since I consider procreation a form of risking harming others. — khaled

That's not 'reasoning'. There's no 'reasoning' taking place there at all, it's simply a declaration of how you happen to feel at the moment.

The difference here is that in the case of antinatalism the logic has been revised over and over and the premises do directly lead to the conclusion. — khaled

Nonsense. Are you suggesting that there's been no opposition to anti-natalist arguments on the grounds of faulty logic? The arguments simply seem to you to be flawless. To others they seem flawed. You can choose whether to consider yourself to have made a mistake or others to have done. One of the ways you do that (as in my timber example) is to look at the degree to which the conclusion you reach is in the range you expected. "We should end the human race" is, by anyone's standards, a rather extreme conclusion, one worthy of a thorough re-check of the calculations, and a presumption in favour of those who've reached a more moderate conclusion.

what you are proposing is changing the premises to get a different conclusion. Which is perfectly valid in ethics, but I would rather not do that (because as I said it reeks of self deception) — khaled

Why is it "self-deception" to choose one starting premise, but coldly rational to choose the other?

you can't just contradict one of your own premises in the conclusion. — khaled

Where have I contradicted one of my premises? I only have two premises in that argument - that is is a right to have children and that it is wrong to end the human race. Which of those premises have I contradicted in my conclusion?

No. A minute ago it was all: "You can't just tell yourself that 2+2 does not equal 4 just because you don't like the fact that it is even though the logic adds up." That's all I was saying. — khaled

Who said anything about 'liking' the fact. I'm talking about it being a moral intuition that ending the human race would be bad. If you equate that moral judgement with simply 'liking/disliking' (which I'm not opposed to) then your moral intuition that we shouldn't harm other is simply you not 'liking' to do so (or not 'liking' other doing so). You can't just ascribe some moral intuitions to mere self-deceptive preferences while exulting others as more important than the human species which created them.

Is that your only example? Because if it is then that's my problem. I can't live my whole life abiding by certain moral codes and then just make an exception in one spot because I feel like it. — khaled

Again, it's not 'because you feel like it' any more than the moral code in the first place was 'because you felt like it'. From where are you getting this sharp distinction such that 'not harming others' is some objective moral code divorced from your personal preferences, but continuing the human race is some trivial preference akin to preferring vanilla to chocolate ice-cream. There's no sense at all in humanity that people feel this way about those two things. They are on a par at least. either they're both trivial preferences, or they're both really important moral intuitions.

Are you suggesting that there's been no opposition to anti-natalist arguments on the grounds of faulty logic? — Isaac

None that you have presented. And none that have seemed reasonable to me from what I saw.

That's not 'reasoning' — Isaac

The 'reasoning' bit is whether or not you consider procreation a form of harming others.

Why is it "self-deception" to choose one starting premise, but coldly rational to choose the other? — Isaac

I didn't say coldly rational. It's just that I can't pretend to believe that procreation causes 0 harm or that "the interests of humanity", trump actual real life suffering.

Where have I contradicted one of my premises? — Isaac

Sorry, that was a mistake.

You can't just ascribe some moral intuitions to mere self-deceptive preferences — Isaac

I don't mean to say they are OBJECTIVELY self deceptive in nature. It's just that I would be tricking myself if I said I believed them.

From where are you getting this sharp distinction such that 'not harming others' is some objective moral code divorced from your personal preferences, but continuing the human race is some trivial preference akin to preferring vanilla to chocolate ice-cream. — Isaac

Both are preferences. Neither are objective. But for ME one is much more basic than the other. I have never implied that one is objective and the other isn't. If for you the survival of humanity is a good enough reason to harm others you do you. Though I will think that that's a stupid belief.


Anyways I'm sort of getting tired of this thread. Believing in moral relativism and then attempting to mount an attack against a moral position is basically like a discussion of whether or not you prefer vanilla or chocolate ice cream.

Believing in moral relativism and then attempting to mount an attack against a moral position is basically like a discussion of whether or not you prefer vanilla or chocolate ice cream. — khaled

The attack I'm mounting, such as it is, is not against the moral position of 'antinatalism'. It's against the idea that such a position is somehow a logical conclusion from commonly held premises. If some odd people hold harm-avoidance to be more important than the entire human race (the only things that would benefit from this lack of harm in the first place), then they're welcome to such a notion.

My objection here is to the way clearly idiosyncratic preferences which lead to conclusions most people consider repugnant, are repeatedly (and I think deliberately) disguised as some reasonable argument from commonly held intuitions, knowing full-well that at some point the argument relies upon an intuition which is not commonly held. The only reason I can think of for such a practice is the hope of 'recruiting' people who've not noticed this hidden premise, or griping about the world without actually having to bear any responsibilty for doing anything about it. Either I find reprehensible.

How can I possibly know, especially if he's just been in a car crash, whether he will consider the rest of his life good or bad?
— Srap Tasmaner

You can't. But you know statistically that the majority of people are not pianists. And you know statistically that most people with disabiliites learn to live with them in a couple of months or years. So you can surmise that it is more likely that this person would want to be saved. — khaled

What are you even arguing?

Are you seriously attributing to me, standing at the site of a car crash, the ability to correctly calculate the conditional probability of a crash victim's future happiness drawing on my knowledge of established base rates of happiness among people with traumatic injuries that resulted in disability? And this is what I do to overcome the requirement that I seek his consent before saving his life?

If he's conscious but bleeding out, do I still ask for his consent to save him, or do the calculations anyway? Should I discount because he's likely in shock and just apply pressure to his open wound, even if tells me to let him die? No, wait, I need to calculate the conditional probability that he would later endorse his own withholding of consent while in shock, again considering my knowledge of the base rate of changes of heart among people who were saved having asked not to be.

Gotta say, it's starting to look I'd best just stay out of it.

On the other hand, this little exercise makes anti-natalism much more appealing. I mean, if figuring out what the right thing to do requires so much work -- and my god, what about the chance of a mistake in my calculations! -- then the simplicity of there being nothing to think about if your kids never exist is really appealing. I totally get it.

The thing is, I have kids, and I can tell you for a fact that the world is a better place for having them in it.

But I did violate their rights back when they didn't exist yet, so shame on me. Oh and their mom, she did too. We'll apologize, but I'm pretty sure they're cool with it.

Of course, as soon as they were born I took all the rest of their autonomy away. Their mom too, we both did. And we still haven't given all of it back. Thing is though, the kids did get parents in exchange, and I think they're mostly happy with the deal.

Do you think this might be a pretty common situation? You know, I violate a non-existent person's rights by bringing them into the world, and I continue to violate their rights for years, but in return I accept considerable responsibility for their well-being, at least up until the point where they're ready and willing to take if not all then most of that responsibility themselves?

That could be a reasonable set-up couldn't it? Just as an alternative to anti-natalism, which is still an awesome choice and a lot simpler.

No, it sounds okay, but where are the conditional probabilities? I can't even tell you the base rates of offspring happiness! Clearly, this approach is far too slipshod, and we should stick with anti-natalism. At least I know how to calculate 0. And while the world would be less good, less exciting, less interesting, less beautiful without my kids in it, none of us would know what we were missing, so who cares, amirite?

Again, it's not 'because you feel like it' any more than the moral code in the first place was 'because you felt like it'. From where are you getting this sharp distinction such that 'not harming others' is some objective moral code divorced from your personal preferences, but continuing the human race is some trivial preference akin to preferring vanilla to chocolate ice-cream. There's no sense at all in humanity that people feel this way about those two things. They are on a par at least. either they're both trivial preferences, or they're both really important moral intuitions. — Isaac

I don't speak for Khaled, so I am not answering for him, but I will explain what I see. He may have a different response. But you would have to answer why causing the conditions for others being harmed is acceptable when considering your preference for "humanity" (what I am going to deem a third-party/abstract cause).

Antinatalism respects the individual person that will be created. That is what is being considered. It is not an abstracted third-party. Even if one doesn't mean it, one is then using the individual for some abstract reason. It is no longer about the person who will actually be affected by the decision, but for a cause. Antinatalism respects the fact that the person who will be born will inevitably experience suffering, and therefore, with NO negative consequences for that individual (by abstaining to have them), has prevented any negative conditions that will befall that individual. I don't see how obligations of not causing harm are not really a consideration and that obligations to a third-party cause like "humanity" would be.

The only reason I can think of for such a practice is the hope of 'recruiting' people who've not noticed this hidden premise, or griping about the world without actually having to bear any responsibilty for doing anything about it. Either I find reprehensible. — Isaac

You keep thinking, clutching your pearls that this isn't what most people think, is a philosophical argument. Most of philosophical debate, especially on something like a philosophy forum convincing people about the validity and soundness of an argument with reasoning and having a general dialectic about a line of reasoning. It is also about explaining ideas. Suck it up buttercup.

Oh and because it might lead to paths that are counterintuitive to what you find to be respectable doesn't make it not so because YOU think it isn't and it is odious, or whatever bullshit you're peddling as a defense to the "nefarious" antinatalists.

Oh and "suck it up buttercup" is actually a terrible phrase.. just thought it was funny when juxtoposed with your value-signalling pearl-clutching remarks of odiousness against antinatalism.. In fact, I think many anti-antinatalist philosophies just come down to that.. "So why are you creating known conditions of harm for someone else..""

Answer: I don't know people are too sensitive to harm.. they got it suck it up buttercup.. is essentially the answer. That's what you pretty much said here:

The only reason I can think of for such a practice is the hope of 'recruiting' people who've not noticed this hidden premise, or griping about the world without actually having to bear any responsibilty for doing anything about it. Either I find reprehensible. — Isaac