Put this way, the choice is between: 1) assuming that the wheels of determinism have a little 'lash' between them (indeterminism), and 2) assuming the existence of billions of billions of billions of parallel universes out there... — Olivier5

This is what I mean by your seeming wilful misunderstanding. I did not say the choices were Copenhagen or MWI. I chose my words carefully, you simply choose not to notice them.

Put this way, the choice is between: 1) assuming that the wheels of determinism have a little 'lash' between them (indeterminism), and 2) assuming the existence of billions of billions of billions of parallel universes out there... — Olivier5

Even with parallel universes determinism prevails because in each universe every event can have only one outcome (a priori). I think this view is called actualism. It denies that possibility is any more than a logical assessment of events.

I see no good reason to assume an infinity of worlds. It's a very heavy hypothesis, it assumes a humongous lot, and to explain away what? A little randomness in the way our universe works at pixel level... I'd rather go for the latter hypothesis.

Cool. That outlook doesnt support volition either, right?

I think it does. Even some forms of determinism support volition (if by that you mean agency).

think it does. Even some forms of determinism support volition (if by that you mean agency). — Olivier5

Support or accommodate?

Support. Accommodate is too weak. Let me try to explain what I mean.

Let us start with a logical point: A theory cannot deny the possibility of its own existence, as a meaningful and possibly true theory. It's like the cogito applied to theories. Or Russel's paradox applied to theories. No theory can state that "no theory can possibly exist that make any sense". Because if such a theory is true, then it makes no sense.... It self destructs, in a way.

Therefore, any theory about the inner workings of the universe (or about human beings within it) must allow for its own emergence, in this very universe it describes, as a meaningful and possibly true theory.

This very simple, logical point rules out any 'naïve materialist' view eg epiphenomenalism. If thoughts are meaningless noise made by the brain, then the idea that thoughts are meaningless noise made by the brain is itself meaningless noise made by the brain. The theory undermines itself; it doesn't allow for its own emergence as a meaningful and possibly true theory.

Therefore, any determinist theory worth it's salt must consider theories and thus thoughts as meaningful and operative, causative. It must integrate thoughts as possible causes of events. That is to say, it must view our mental space as mechanistic and predetermined (of course, being deterministic), but an integral part of this cosmic cause and effect game of the universe.

Therefore supporting the concept of 'agency'.

Therefore, any determinist theory worth it's salt must consider theories and thus thoughts as meaningful and operative, causative. It must integrate thoughts as possible causes of events. That is to say, it must view our mental space as mechanistic and predetermined (of course, being deterministic), but an integral part of this cosmic cause and effect game of the universe. — Olivier5

This is in the vicinity of Schopenhauer, though I'm not fond of your logical progression.

Shoot. I think it's logically watertight. It's not my idea by the way. It's been said time and again, including in the very terms I used by a US cognitive scientist who's name I can't locate now.

If a determinist wants to make a metaphysical assertion, she must allow that humans are capable of making assertions.

Are you saying that volition is required to make an assertion?

More precisely, some form of agency is implied by the capacity to develop meaningful and possibly true theories (which are more than just assertions).

More precisely, some form of agency is implied by the capacity to develop meaningful and possibly true theories (which are more than just assertions). — Olivier5

Is it? How so?

Because to write down a meaningful (scientific) theory (or to contribute to it's development) is not something you can achieve by some random permutations of letters or some bubling up of a chemical soup. It takes an agent to write it down. Doing so is a deliberate act of cognition, based on a sample of observations that is itself deliberately selected to support some form of logical or mathematical analysis, some for of processing of observations, which is also deliberately chosen for this purpose based on a number of well argued reasons. The whole process ought to have logical coherence, and be described precisely so that it's replicable by other err... well... agents!

Science (or philosophy) is an activity of the human mind. It implies human agency, capacity to observe, to reason, to speak and to act on this basis.

This is in the vicinity of Schopenhauer — frank

Spinoza is right on that train of thought: determinist in a rational way, that is to say in a way that allows for reason to exist and to work.

I think you'd agree that what you've said of science applies equally to making a shopping list.

If I understand you correctly, meaning is the sticking point. You believe the existence of meaning implies volition. Or is it reason?

Spinoza is right on that train of thought: determinist in a rational way, that is to say in a way that allow for reason to exist and to work. — Olivier5

I dont know much about Spinoza. I think a key to understanding Schopenhauer is to see identity as fluid. You can identify with Cause.

you'd agree that what you've said of science applies equally to making a shopping list. — frank

Completely. It applies to any cogent process.

E.g. if I give you a shopping list and I tell that it's the result of some chemical reaction within a solution of water and proteins structured through a set of phospholipid membranes, you are less likely to do the implied shopping than if I tell you that your wife wrote it and expects you home at 6 with the turkey.

Or is it reason? — frank

Reason, and its effectiveness. Reason as a force in this world.

I dont know much about Spinoza. I think a key to understanding Schopenhauer is to see identity as fluid. You can identify with Cause. — frank

Unfortunately, I don't know much about Schopenhauer.

You believe in God, dont you?

Nope. Do you?

No, but I'm surprised that you don't. The argument you present is similar to what's known as the Clockmaker argument. It's a rationalist argument for God.

Essentially, it points to the intuition that living things wouldn't just "bubble up" from random mechanics and chemistry. It's not as naive as it might look at first glance, but its famous weakness is that in inserting God as the explanation, it's added as many questions as it answered. Where did God come from?

Likewise, with reason and meaning, science presently has no explanation, and philosophy questions whether we could have the vantage point necessary to explain it. We're in Chalmers territory, right?

Into that cavern of unknowns, you place volition as a necessary ingredient, yet we have no schematic for reason and meaning. How is volition supposed to relate to things like math, the ability to imagine and hypothesize, and logic in general?

In the end, nothing has been explained. We've only pointed to the intuition that filling out a shopping list requires volition.

No, but I'm surprised that you don't. The argument you present is similar to what's known as the Clockmaker argument. It's a rationalist argument for God. — frank

Yes, Spinoza's view. Note that this is NOT my view. I'm indeterminist. I think the universe is imperfectly predetermined, only partly so, that there is some 'lash' between the wheels of that celestial clock, that if God exists, He can't or won't predict the future. He'd rather play dices

But then in my view these very imperfections make our world better than a perfectly determinist world, because a world where not everything is prewritten can allow novelty to happen. An indeterminist universe would be less static than a determinist universe, more evolutive, and that's a good thing.

Note that this is NOT my view — Olivier5

Didn't say it was.

Didn't say it was. — frank

Just wanted to clarify. Re God I mean

Just wanted to clarify. Re God I mean — Olivier5

Cool, so you agreed with the thrust of that post: that the argument you presented boils down to the intuition that much of human behavior appears to be volitional.

More precisely, my point is that intellectual activities such as science and philosophy cannot deny the agency of human reason without contradicting their own existence. And it's not an intuitive argument but a purely logical one. Reason cannot be used to debase reason.

I disagree, but respect for being interesting :victory:

Thanks. That's always the most important!

And by the way, you can of course disagree with simple logic -- scores of illogical 'philosophers' do it all the time -- but it's at your own expense.

I know, I'm always tripping over stuff. Damn logic! :joke:

You ask good questions, which counts for something.

Into that cavern of unknowns, you place volition as a necessary ingredient, yet we have no schematic for reason and meaning. How is volition supposed to relate to things like math, the ability to imagine and hypothesize, and logic in general? — frank

I don't have any complete answer to that but here would be my take.

Reason and meaning are things we experience daily. They are part of us. We strongly identify with our own thinking. We tend to think of our own thoughts as reasonable and meaningful, whether or not this is confirmed by others. This is the way of the mind: like any system it is made of elements, it is based on a certain axiomatic, an a priori set of tools. For instance the concepts of truth and meaning. You cannot think without using these concepts, because they underwrite your thinking. Another example is logic. Natural human logic is not exactly like mathematical logic but it's very close to it, as close as you can ever get between a human idea and its formal codification, I would guess. Another example of an a priori mental tool is a 3D euclidian space. You're born with it, it's part of the standard operating system.

Concepts such as truth or meaning are hard to analyse because you must assume them in any analysis. You cannot approach them 'from outside'. So when someone says: "meaning and truth do not exist", he naturally assumes that what he just said is meaningful and true, thereby contradicting himself. There's no exit, no way out of these concepts except madness. So let's use them, since we cannot do otherwise, even though we cannot anylse them productively. We have no other choice than trust our intuition of them; we are indeed predetermined to think in those terms.

As for 'volition', I am not sure what it means for you. My money is on something we cannot avoid but doing.

Right, this is the gap in your logic. You insist that reason implies volition, but you cant explain how (and you admit that it may not be possible to explain how).

You have a bald assertion in your works, and I maintain that your argument collapses down to that assertion.