every question has an answer — Pfhorrest

....the principle grounding empiricism and rationalism generally;

every answer must be questionable — Pfhorrest

....the principle grounding objectivism and critical rationalism.

If epistemology and ontology are not in conflict, which is agreeable, and are necessitated by the same principle, yet these listed principles are not the same......what is the same principle that necessitates both?

Is “empiricism and rationalism generally” to be considered epistemology, and “objectivism and critical rationalism” to be considered ontology? The other way around? Not connected at all?

I see two fundamental principles but I don’t see the same fundamental principle necessitating two schematically distinguished cognitive paradigms.
(ontology the prime schema of which is “existence”; epistemology the prime schema of which is “necessity”)

And.....how is the intrinsic circularity of those two given principles reconcilable with the characteristics of human knowledge? Seems rather to be fertile ground for the infinite regress terminating in nihilism, which is the same as the impossibility of human knowledge itself, which is anathema to both a posteriori science and a priori metaphysics.

Not trying to be obtuse, honest. Just don’t see the logical authority in those principles, when conjoined to each other, which appears must always be the case.

The overall thesis is that there is nothing to reality besides the observable features of it, nothing hidden behind our experience, of which our experience is merely a representation -- our experience is direct contact with a very small part of reality (the parts that we are literally in direct contact with — Pfhorrest

Yes, obviously with the 'in principle' caveat: there are potentially possible modes of experience that we will, through localism, dumb luck, or technological limitation, never realise. For instance, when an electron moves from A to B it has a high probability of scattering with many virtual photons. Each virtual photon has a low probability of decaying briefly into a virtual electron-positron pair. Accounting for this is extremely important for making extremely precise comparisons between theory (knowledge) and experiment (technology). It is the fortune if our technological maturity that this can be experienced indirectly by us, and a matter of necessity that it may be experienced by the electron.

I guess that's why I find the primacy of mind and experience in your language (and I think that you do not distinguish between the experience of a person and of an electron) a bit of a barrier. That said, I haven't slept for two days, so...

Massless particles like photons (and the particles that get "blended" into electrons etc by the Higgs) are exactly like the "occasions of experience" that philosophers like Whitehead wrote about, and that in my elaboration upon that (viz the mathematicism stuff above) can be taken as signals passing between the mathematical functions that constitute the abstract object that is our concrete reality. — Pfhorrest

I guess I'm just not seeing the relevance of masslessness. Unless you're drawing a poetic equivalence between light (image, appearance, experience) and matter (the thing itself as an element of objective reality). I will Google Whitehead and "occasions of experience" and see if I get anywhere. :)

This might be off topic, but one thing occurs to me. When we interact with anything, it is overwhelmingly electromagnetic in nature. When we see a tree, photons emitted by that tree are destroyed in our eyes: this is sight. When we feel the tree bark, virtual photons emitted by the charges in the bark are destroyed by charges in us: this is touch. We never destroy charges, only the emissions of charges or systems.

In your literalist interpretation of the creation/annihilation operators of QFT, it is the fields that destroy electrons directly. (The Higgs mechanism is the destruction of an electron with one isospin followed by the creation of another with the opposite isospin. The motion of an electron is the destruction of the electron at one position followed by the creation of an identical electron at another.) Somehow this makes me think of the sort of equivalence between experience and objective reality you're getting at without necessarily being the sort of thing you had in mind.

But gas is just more... I've lost track; is it real, or is it experience, or is it mere phenomena, or is it an idea, or is it information...? — Banno

Phenomena are things that are experienced, by definition, so those are the same thing. And I’m saying there’s nothing more to those phenomena than the information that is conveyed in the experience of them, so on my account that’s the same thing too. But an idea is something in a mind, so in a universe with no minds, just gas, there aren’t any ideas per se.

Then what we "experience" is made entirely of sodium ions. — Isaac

Or the photons that mediate the chemical interaction with those sodium ions, sure; at least, if you draw the border between “self” and “world” at the edge of the brain, rather than the edge of the whole body as I was doing earlier. Exactly where to draw that border is a fuzzy question to begin with and I don’t have a hard opinion on which of those is the more appropriate place.

Isn't "empirical" a property of justifications or knowledge? — frank

No, “empirical” just means related to experience. It can be used of knowledge—that which is gained from experience—but it’s not limited to that use. To say that reality is empirical is just to say there is nothing real that is beyond all experience, e.g. nothing supernatural.

So you're saying there are no unstated true propositions? — frank

Nope, I don’t see where you get that from.

every question has an answer
— Pfhorrest
....the principle grounding empiricism and rationalism generally;

every answer must be questionable
— Pfhorrest
....the principle grounding objectivism and critical rationalism. — Mww

You got those backward: answers being questionable implies empiricism and rationalism generally; questions being answerable implies objectivism and critical rationalism specifically.

Empiricism and objectivism are ontological positions in this context, while rationalism (including critical rationalism) is epistemological, so each of those principles has implications on both ontology and epistemology.

Phenomena are things that are experienced, by definition, so those are the same thing. And I’m saying there’s nothing more to those phenomena than the information that is conveyed in the experience of them, so on my account that’s the same thing too. But an idea is something in a mind, so in a universe with no minds, just gas, there aren’t any ideas per se. — Pfhorrest

So you're saying there are no unstated true propositions?
— @frank

Nope, I don’t see where you get that from. — Pfhorrest

SO you're saying there is no unexperienced information?

The point being that since idealism holds that all is in some way mental, an idealist can moot no true propositions that are not thought - stated, in Franks terms, or information that is not experienced, in your terms. That the unexperienced cup in the cupboard is red, is a realist position; that it cannot be said to have a colour is an idealist position.

If you are not an idealist, then you must hold that there is unexperienced information. If you hold that all information is experienced, as you seem to be saying here, then your position is idealist, not realist.

My general position on the nature of reality is empirical realism. — Pfhorrest

My own worldview is best defined as both Empirical Realism and Transcendental Idealism. That seems to be similar to Kant's position on Reality and Ideality. It's based on the usefulness of both Empirical and Theoretical knowledge. Rational theories can try to fill gaps in Materialistic Science. :smile:

Kant's Realism : Nonetheless, while Kant is an empirical realist and this is a commendable thing (was it ever in dispute that he wanted to establish the objectivity of science and mathematics?), he remains a transcendental idealist. In short, Kant’s empirical realism only extends as far as the subject and humans. He nonetheless remains committed to the thesis that what objects might be independent of humans, and whether objects exist as our empirical claims portray them, is something that we can never know and which must be carefully excluded from philosophical discussion.
https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2009/12/02/empirical-realism-and-ontological-realism/

Empirical and Theoretical Science :
http://bothandblog2.enformationism.info/page57.html

So the cup in the cupboard is red, and yet also has has no colour? How to make sense of adopting apparently contradictory views?

So the cup in the cupboard is red, and yet also has has no colour? How to make sense of adopting apparently contradictory views? — Banno

Your comment missed the point. From my perspective, the Empirical and Theoretical views are not contradictory, but complementary. Human reason can "transcend" empirical reality, by imagining scenarios that are not visible to the physical eye. This is how Einstein came up with his revolutionary ideas about the ultimate nature of Reality. Of course, it helps if the theories are subject to empirical testing, as some of his were. :cool:

Both/And Principle :
My coinage for the holistic principle of Complementarity, as illustrated in the Yin/Yang symbol. Opposing or contrasting concepts are always part of a greater whole. Conflicts between parts can be reconciled or harmonized by putting them into the context of a whole system.
The Enformationism worldview entails the principles of Complementarity, Reciprocity & Holism, which are necessary to ofset the negative effects of Fragmentation, Isolation & Reductionism. Analysis into parts is necessary for knowledge of the mechanics of the world, but synthesis of those parts into a whole system is required for the wisdom to integrate the self into the larger system. In a philosophical sense, all opposites in this world (e.g. space/time, good/evil) are ultimately reconciled in Enfernity (eternity & infinity).
Conceptually, the BothAnd principle is similar to Einstein's theory of Relativity, in that what you see ─ what’s true for you ─ depends on your perspective, and your frame of reference; for example, subjective or objective, religious or scientific, reductive or holistic, pragmatic or romantic, conservative or liberal, earthbound or cosmic. Ultimate or absolute reality (ideality) doesn't change, but your conception of reality does. Opposing views are not right or wrong, but more or less accurate for a particular purpose.
This principle is also similar to the concept of Superposition in sub-atomic physics. In this ambiguous state a particle has no fixed identity until “observed” by an outside system. For example, in a Quantum Computer, a Qubit has a value of all possible fractions between 1 & 0. Therefore, you could say that it is both 1 and 0.
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html

PS__I apologize for resorting to my peculiar "style" of argumentation, that you are not comfortable with.

So, the cup that we can't see in the cupboard; what colour is it?

So, the cup that we can't see in the cupboard; what colour is it? — Banno

I don't know. You tell me. It's your subjective theory. :joke:

I don't know. — Gnomon

Well, presumably, since you accept both p and ~p, by the explosion principle it can be any colour. Or not.

But then, because quantum.

You got those backward — Pfhorrest

Hmmm...I sure did. Beside the point, though, I think, with respect to knowledge.

Thanks for the clarification anyway.

No, “empirical” just means related to experience. It can be used of knowledge—that which is gained from experience—but it’s not limited to that use. To say that reality is empire is just to say there is nothing real that is beyond all experience, e.g. nothing supernatural. — Pfhorrest

Science does not give us any evidence that all real things can be experienced, so how did you arrive at that conclusion?

Let's put this in context: it's neither as amazing or alarming as a giant sky lord judging me for masturbating. — Kenosha Kid

I don't see how your masturbation is relevant.

I don't see how your masturbation is relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

My masterbation is relevant...don't make me show you. Joking, just joking

Yes, obviously with the 'in principle' caveat: — Kenosha Kid

Yes, of course.

I guess I'm just not seeing the relevance of masslessness. — Kenosha Kid

It's only massless particles that are lightlike, and so have an existence that (from their frame of reference) consists entirely of the interaction between what emitted them and what absorbed them.

This might be off topic, but one thing occurs to me. When we interact with anything, it is overwhelmingly electromagnetic in nature. When we see a tree, photons emitted by that tree are destroyed in our eyes: this is sight. When we feel the tree bark, virtual photons emitted by the charges in the bark are destroyed by charges in us: this is touch. We never destroy charges, only the emissions of charges or systems. — Kenosha Kid

Yes, that's something I've been assuming as background knowledge in this thread. Glad you explicitly pointed it out though. :-)

I guess that's why I find the primacy of mind and experience in your language (and I think that you do not distinguish between the experience of a person and of an electron) a bit of a barrier. — Kenosha Kid

I see the experience of a person as a special subset of the experience of an electron. "Experience" here can be taken as equivalent to QM "observation". When a human observes something, they are still doing the thing that an inert object merely interacting with it does, that causes (or is) wavefunction collapse or entanglement or the splitting of worlds, however you want to interpret it. But a human is also doing a lot of other stuff that an electron isn't doing. That other stuff isn't metaphysically important here, it's just brain function, more complex information processing, but it's a thing humans do that electrons don't.

In your literalist interpretation of the creation/annihilation operators of QFT, it is the fields that destroy electrons directly. (The Higgs mechanism is the destruction of an electron with one isospin followed by the creation of another with the opposite isospin. The motion of an electron is the destruction of the electron at one position followed by the creation of an identical electron at another.) — Kenosha Kid

Yes, although not all motion can be reckoned like that -- specifically, the lightlike motion of massless particles can't, because from their frame of reference they travel zero distance in zero time, so motion is irrelevant. It's only massive particles, which already consist of a "blending" of several more-fundamental massless particles through their constant annihilation and recreation by the Higgs field, that can be construed as moving through a series of annihilations and recreations; because it's precisely that series of annihilations and recreations that gives them mass, and makes their motion slower than light.

Somehow this makes me think of the sort of equivalence between experience and objective reality you're getting at without necessarily being the sort of thing you had in mind. — Kenosha Kid

It sounds like you're on basically the same track as me, to me. :up:

If you are not an idealist, then you must hold that there is unexperienced information. If you hold that all information is experienced, as you seem to be saying here, then your position is idealist, not realist. — Banno

I am not saying that all information is experienced, but that all that exists is the kind of stuff that can be experienced -- whether or not it actually does get experienced. That kind of stuff can be characterized as information.

My own worldview is best defined as both Empirical Realism and Transcendental Idealism — Gnomon

In Kantian terms, any empirical realism is also a transcendental idealism, and conversely any transcendental realism is an empirical idealism.

An empirical realism is a view that takes the stuff we can observe, phenomena, to be the stuff that is concretely real, and conversely the transcendental, unobservable stuff, the noumena, to be only abstract ideas. My account of the "objects of reality", the nodes in the "web of reality", being abstract mathematical functions, which we infer from their behaviors that we experience in response to other behaviors they experience, accords with this.

An empirical idealism, on the other hand, would hold that the kind of stuff we can observe, phenomena, are just abstract ideas in our minds, and conversely that actual concrete reality is the transcendental, unobservable stuff, the noumena, that underlie those phenomena, and which those phenomena represent to our minds. That's a view that both Kant and I reject.

Science does not give us any evidence that all real things can be experienced, so how did you arrive at that conclusion? — frank

From the practical reasoning that if we ever take any claims to be beyond questioning, we simply stop searching for the truth, and so are likely to never find out if we are wrong, so we must not ever take any claims to be beyond questioning; and that claims about things that are not subject to experience cannot ever be shown wrong (because we could not tell whether or not they were, because we have no experience of them at all), so we could only take such claims on faith, without the ability to question them; so we must not ever entertain the possibility of things that are in principle beyond all experience, for in doing so we would be giving up our pursuit of truth.

And it definitionally cannot be shown that there does exist something beyond experience, because to show that would be to make it available for experiencing, so we don't have to worry about ever finding our assumption that there is not to be wrong.

Reality is what exists outside and independently of us and that minute by minute imposes on us something that we would not want to know, something that we would prefer that it did not exist.

Science does not give us any evidence that all real things can be experienced, so how did you arrive at that conclusion?
— frank

From the practical reasoning that if we ever take any claims to be beyond questioning, we simply stop searching for the truth, and so are likely to never find out if we are wrong, so we must not ever take any claims to be beyond questioning; and that claims about things that are not subject to experience cannot ever be shown wrong (because we could not tell whether or not they were, because we have no experience of them at all), so we could only take such claims on faith, without the ability to question them; so we must not ever entertain the possibility of things that are in principle beyond all experience, for in doing so we would be giving up our pursuit of truth. — Pfhorrest

So I follow your advice and make no claims at all about unexperiencable things. But I hear you making the positive claim that there is no such thing. Why should I believe that?

I think you could support the notion that all real things can be experienced if you could demonstrate a contradiction in the idea of the unexperiencable thing.

And it definitionally cannot be shown that there does exist something beyond experience, because to show that would be to make it available for experiencing, so we don't have to worry about ever finding our assumption that there is not to be wrong. — Pfhorrest

And that doesn't support your claim either. There is a view that true statements must in principle be confirmable. But that's not really in line with what you're saying either. Hmm.

There is a view that true statements must in principle be confirmable. But that's not really in line with what you're saying either. — frank

Nope, my view is that statements must be falsifiable. That’s exactly why I reject all claims of unobservable things: they could not be falsified.

And if they were true, their truth would make no difference whatsoever to us, so such claims are effectively empty. They add nothing. Appending a claim about unobservable things to your view of reality is like adding zero to a sum.

Well, presumably, since you accept both p and ~p, by the explosion principle it can be any colour. Or not.
But then, because quantum. — Banno

Does your "explosion theory" take into account the weirdness of Quantum Reality? If so, then statistically your exploding particle can be both P and ~P.. Both here and there, both singular and dual as it passes through a slit. :joke:

Quantum Weirdness : https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22730370-500-where-does-quantum-weirdness-end/

An empirical idealism, on the other hand, would hold that the kind of stuff we can observe, phenomena, are just abstract ideas in our minds, and conversely that actual concrete reality is the transcendental, unobservable stuff, the noumena, that underlie those phenomena, and which those phenomena represent to our minds. That's a view that both Kant and I reject. — Pfhorrest

Are there philosophers who hold that "actual concrete reality" is transcendental? How would you classify neuroscientist Don Hoffman's Model Dependent Realism? As I understand it, the physical phenomena we think we see are merely models in the mind that represent the underlying reality : indirect concepts instead of direct percepts. It's a "symbolic interpretation of the world, yet it is not an illusion, but merely a simplification of the messy reality of the Actual world (true reality vs apparent reality??), most of which we are not aware of. He thinks that evolution prepared our brains to abstract just enough information from the outside world to survive long enough to replicate.

His novel theory may sound crazy at first glance, but the computer screen analogy makes sense to me. Be that as it may, I treat my conceptual percepts as reality, for all practical purposes. Only speculative philosophers, and imaginative neuroscientists, need to entertain the possibility of Transcendental Reality behind the curtain of Phenomenal Reality. I get confused about which is which. "Which is real and which is Memorex"? :smile:


Model Dependent Realism :
“claims that it is meaning-less to talk about the "true reality" of a model as we can never be absolutely certain of anything. The only meaningful thing is the usefulness of the model.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model-dependent_realism

Reality is not what you see : http://bothandblog6.enformationism.info/page21.html

Are there philosophers who hold that "actual concrete reality" is transcendental? — Gnomon

They don’t usually call it such because they’re usually pre-Kantian, but basically all representative realism is transcendental realism in Kantian terms, because it holds that phenomena are just ideas, not real, they only represent what is real.

How would you classify neuroscientist Don Hoffman's Model Dependent Realism? — Gnomon

It sounds like a kind of empirical realism to me.

So you can believe both idealism and realism despite the inherent contradictions and no longer need pay attention to logic because quantum.

Fine.

The basic criticism remains, If all there is, is experience, what remains of reality for you to call yourself a realist?

The basic criticism remains, If all there is, is experience, what remains of reality for you to call yourself a realist? — Banno

All there is is experienceability. I don't know why it's so difficulty to communicate this difference, between something being the kind of stuff that is available to be experienced, and something being actively experienced by someone.

On my account, there is a reality independent of anyone in particular experiencing it, but there is nothing about that reality that is not accessible to experience.

I don't know why it's so difficulty to communicate this difference... — Pfhorrest

The difference is clear enough; its use, less so. The difference between a cup and...what shall we call it...the experienceability of a cup? - sure; And the experienceability-of-a-cup will presumably be full of experienceability-of-tea. All too convolute for my taste, especially as it is apparently there to answer an unwarranted scepticism.

The difference between a cup and...what shall we call it...the experienceability of a cup? - — Banno

There is no difference between those on my account. The existence is the cup is consists entirely of the potential of certain experiences.

That potential of certain experiences vs anyone actually having those experiences is the difference I mean. The existence of the cup doesn't consist of (or depend upon) someone experiencing a cup. But it doesn't consist of anything that is not some kind of potential for experience.

Then what we "experience" is made entirely of sodium ions. — Isaac


Or the photons that mediate the chemical interaction with those sodium ions, sure; at least, if you draw the border between “self” and “world” at the edge of the brain, rather than the edge of the whole body as I was doing earlier. Exactly where to draw that border is a fuzzy question to begin with and I don’t have a hard opinion on which of those is the more appropriate place. — Pfhorrest

But you said that humans are doing what other matter does, in that it experiences this interaction. So you've decided on the unit doing the experiencing. Otherwise you're left with "The universe experiences itself". To have an experienced and an experiencer you have to divide up the universe into at least two parts. If this division is arbitrary then you've not defeated solipsism by any means other than say saying 'let's not' (which, incidentally, is my own argument against solipsism).

Once that photon 'hits' the retina, as far as our 'experience' is concerned it could be registered, ignored completely or made-up. I don't then see how something unique about the information it contains constitutes the final experience we have.

If this division is arbitrary then you've not defeated solipsism by any means other than say saying 'let's not' (which, incidentally, is my own argument against solipsism). — Isaac

I don't pretend that my rejection of solipsism is very much more than "let's not", albeit with pragmatic reasons why it's more useful to "not".

Earlier upthread I even wrote already:

In the end, identifying the world with oneself is no different than identifying oneself as just a part of the world, which is uncontroversially true. — Pfhorrest

↪Gnomon
So you can believe both idealism and realism despite the inherent contradictions and no longer need pay attention to logic because quantum. — Banno

Are there abstract Ideas in your Real world? If so, then you must accept both Idealism and Realism. If not, then you must repudiate the reality of Ideas. There is no contradiction, only the distinction between Abstract and Concrete. :cool:

Reality is what exists outside and independently of us and that minute by minute imposes on us something that we would not want to know, something that we would prefer that it did not exist. — ThePhilosopher1

Like the username 'ThePhilosopher'. Bet you were gutted!