Why should they care? Firstly, they are very likely to care without any encouragement from me, because my dislike of seeing others suffer is very widely shared in the human population. To the extent that it isn't, the challenge to me is to try to persuade enough people to care so that action is taken. That's what is happening in political debate.

Lastly, you observe that a - presumably incurably psychopathic - serial killer will not care. That doesn't matter. All I need to do is to persuade enough people to take action to arrest and imprison him. What the serial killer thinks about that is irrelevant. — andrewk

So again... in a society with some people with some preferences, and others with other preferences... how are we to decide which to allow? Do the stronger make the rules? Does the majority rule (vote on it?)

And again... are you merely telling us facts? or telling us what should be done?

The extent to which the rules are made by the powerful as opposed to made by the majority depends on how democratic the society is. Either way it's politics. One of my aims as a moral agent is to work to get my moral values incorporated into the rules of those societies I can affect. I am neither powerful nor persuasive, so I am not terribly good at that, but I do what I can.

And again... are you merely telling us facts? or telling us what should be done? — anonymous66

Neither. I was answering your question, which was not about either of those alternatives. Your question was about what I would do, in a situation in which somebody is doing something that I find morally abhorrent, but which they do not.

All valid questions, but tangential to whether or not the Golden Rule stands on its own — javra

I wouldn't say that wondering how the golden rule could even exist at all "standing on its own" would be tangential to the issue of whether it stands on its own, but okay.

One does not need to have a formalized theory of the Golden Rule for it to be innately present, such as instincts are. To say otherwise would be to say that there can be no sense of fairness devoid of there being cognition of what fairness implies. A child playing in the school yard doesn’t need to know what the abstract concept of fairness is—to have thought of fairness—in order to sense that it is unfair to be bullied or to bully, for example. — javra

The concepts involved do not need to be something they could express to others very easily, but I'd say that if they don't have thoughts of fairness or something like it present in their consciousness, then they have no sense of fairness at that time.

So yeah, I'd agree that one doesn't need to have something like a "formalized theory of the golden rule," but I'd say that there's nothing like the golden rule if an individual doesn't have something that amounts to the golden rule present-to-consciousness.

So no. Feeling something is not equivalent to thinking something. — javra

Feeling something implies conscious mental content on my view, otherwise there's no reason to believe that the individual in question feels something.

Do we will those basic feelings of fairness into being? — javra

It's simply a way that one's brain works. But I'd say that it's not working that way if the content in question isn't present-to-consciousness.

This is contrasted to those basic feeling of fairness being part of our inherent biological makeup as humans, which would make the foundations of ethics no longer morally relative. — javra

Aside from my comments above, this argument doesn't hold water. Say that a sense of fairness is unconscious, that it's innately part of our biological makeup. Well, there can be an individual who has physiological abnormalities so that they have no such unconscious sense as part of that individual's biological makeup. Thus, the sense of fairness is still relative to individuals. It's present in the individuals who have it, and not present otherwise.

Even if you were to argue that it's impossible to have a human with abnormal physiology, so that they have no sense of fairness, and necessarily, all humans have the sense, it would still be relative to humans, since it's not a part of rocks, say.

power is ability to accomplish; — javra

Ability to accomplish what? And you're obviously equivocating here, as you were talking about power in the context of governments and societies and "might is right."

Whereas, according to relativism, a murderer isn't wrong, — anonymous66

This is incorrect. According to relativism, a murderer isn't wrong per some absolute. That in no way implies that he's not wrong per some relative morality, such as communal or personal moral views.

It seems you must have some way of judging between preferences, — anonymous66

Of course, and we do. We think about them and state what we think/how we feel.

I wonder if we're on the same page here. Earlier you called yourself a relativist, but now you're calling yourself an emotivist. Which are you? — anonymous66

Emotivists are relativists. Moral stances are relative to how one feels.

You also made a valid distinction between descriptive and prescriptive. Which are you advocating? — anonymous66

I'm not advocating one over the other. Some comments about ethics are not themselves ethical judgments and are made from a descriptive perspective.

Some are ethical judgments, and some of those are made from a prescriptive perspective.

Do the stronger make the rules? — anonymous66

Again, descriptively, that is obviously how things work now and how they've always worked, regardless of anyone's ontology of ethics.

I'm trying to understand moral relativism.. I'm trying to understand what it would be like for me to be a moral relativist (and trying to determine if any moral relativists actually exist). — anonymous66

Have you ever had a moral disagreement?
Say for example a friend of yours did something that you believed was morally questionable.
You understand why your friend thought what he did was right but...
If it had been you then you would have done it differently.

That is what it is like to be a moral relativist.

What it aims at is to describe why people or cultures believe that their values are moral.

I wouldn't say that wondering how the golden rule could even exist at all "standing on its own" would be tangential to the issue of whether it stands on its own, but okay. — Terrapin Station

Regarding this and a few subsequent comments, when addressed biologically, the sense of fairness would be something inherited through genotype. The reason I’m avoiding questions such as “where would it be located” is because it’s located in psychological (and not strictly physiological) phenotype. And this is a hefty topic, not too much unlike asking, “where is that emotion located?” (e.g., to dichotomize between conscious and unconscious locations would be a misplaced dichotomy).

Aside from my comments above, this argument doesn't hold water. Say that a sense of fairness is unconscious, that it's innately part of our biological makeup. Well, there can be an individual who has physiological abnormalities so that they have no such unconscious sense as part of that individual's biological makeup. Thus, the sense of fairness is still relative to individuals. It's present in the individuals who have it, and not present otherwise. — Terrapin Station

Genetic abnormalities do complicate matters, granted, and in this view the issue is no longer white & black on either side. But say there is a person birthed devoid of capacity to sense physiological pain. I still would say that this capacity is nevertheless a universal human trait. You can argue that it isn’t. At the end of the day, though, do you perpetually question whether the individually person next to you is so endowed with this capacity?

It can get complicated in other ways as well: one can lose all sense of empathy as an adult due to horrendous experiences as a child; preadolescent bullies most always have a bad time at home, though most still hold onto some empathy.

Yet the same question can be brought up: do we as agents originate the reality of the Golden Rule individually and communally in manners in which the Golden Rule could fully vanish among the morality of people were all people to so will?

Ability to accomplish what? And you're obviously equivocating here, as you were talking about power in the context of governments and societies and "might is right." — Terrapin Station

Anything. Just checked, this definition is accordant to definition 1.1 on Wiktionary--“ability to affect or influence”--as well as definition 1.2: “control or coercion” [emphasis on the “or”].

No equivocation on my part. Moral relativism addresses morality which is due to individual(s)’ ability to affect, influence, control, or coerce others (in this case, regarding that which is moral) – hence, ethics which is there due to power.

Then: the might (a term synonymous with power) to affect, influence, control, or coerce others makes right. More briefly: might makes right.
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Even if you were to argue that it's impossible to have a human with abnormal physiology, so that they have no sense of fairness, and necessarily, all humans have the sense, it would still be relative to humans, since it's not a part of rocks, say. — Terrapin Station

Yes, as I’ve already stated. It would then be a human universal.

Then: the might (a term synonymous with power) to affect, influence, control, or coerce others makes right. More briefly: might makes right. — javra

Descriptively it would be more like.
"it is believed that it a thing is right because the might makes it so"

Regarding this and a few subsequent comments, when addressed biologically, the sense of fairness would be something inherited through genotype. — javra

The capacity for it, but again, I'd say that it doesn't occur if it's not conscious mental content.

At the end of the day, though, do you perpetually question whether the individually person next to you is so endowed with this capacity? — javra

Not unless it seems like they aren't, but that doesn't imply that I assume that it's universal, and whether it's universal has nothing to do with whether it's objective, because even if it were universal, it would be a universal mental phenomenon, and by definition, that makes it subjective.

Yet the same question can be brought up: do we as agents originate the reality of the Golden Rule individually and communally in manners in which the Golden Rule could fully vanish among the morality of people were all people to so will? — javra

Maybe I'm too tired at the moment, but I can't work out what this is asking. I'm getting lost in the prepositional phrases.

No equivocation on my part. Moral relativism addresses morality which is due to individual(s)’ ability to affect, influence, control, or coerce others (in this case, regarding that which is moral) – hence, ethics which is there due to power. — javra

The morality part is the judgments about/preferences of behavior part--not the actions part.

Do you think there is something beyond 'herd' morality? Or is this precluded in capitalistic societies where flourishing is conflated with economic success: ideal marriage, college education, perfect job, nice house and reasonable mortgage... the 'good' life rules.

It seems to me that relativism is the morality of the herd. If man has a human nature then I suspect that morality might be a salient characteristic in his nature. Kant choose reason, since it common to all men but he left the position/role of desire as only viable as part of our absolute duty to do good. If rules, like the Golden Rule, can be anthropologically supported, as the way humans in general have acted throughout time, regardless of context, then perhaps they can serve as basis for objective non-variant rules in morality.

It seems to me that relativism is the morality of the herd. — Cavacava

Even under the view that what morality is relative to is individual disposition?

If rules, like the Golden Rule, can be anthropologically supported, as the way humans in general have acted throughout time, regardless of context, — Cavacava

Why wouldn't that be a contingent matter in that case? It would be that humans have happened to believe/act that way, but not be that it's a metaphysical necessity for them to act that way. It would be metaphysically possible for there to be a human who doesn't believe in the golden rule or act per the golden rule.

Of course, that we'd be able to show that every human who has ever lived has believed in or acted per the golden rule is completely dubious, but assuming we could do that somehow, I don't see how we'd show that it was metaphysically necessary rather than just contingent. Can we empirically show that anything is metaphysically necessary for that matter?

Even under the view that what morality is relative to is individual disposition?

The "individual disposition" is to a large extent a delusion, we are all part of a tribe, a city, a state, a nation; what and how we think are structured by these roots, whether we are aware of it or not. Again, its the 'Good' life that become the goal in a capitalistic society, and those who achieved it societal icons.

Why wouldn't that be a contingent matter in that case? It would be that humans have happened to believe/act that way, but not be that it's a metaphysical necessity for them to act that way. It would be metaphysically possible for there to be a human who does

The ancient Egyptians had a version of the 'Golden Rule' according to Wikipedia. Do you think that certain behaviors speak to what man is. What is "metaphysical necessity"? Does metaphysical necessity mean every act is contingent, or are there causes. The idea that things that are a certain way, tend to act a certain way, which does not preclude the contingency of each act.

Of course, that we'd be able to show that every human who has ever lived has believed in or acted per the golden rule is completely dubious, but assuming we could do that somehow

Do we have to show that every human being is rational? Or do you accept that reason is part of the accepted definition of what it means to be human. I an suggesting that if reason is part of 'human nature', then perhaps a non-variant objective morality may also be part of it.

Moral relativism is descriptive.
It says nothing about what people ought to do to be moral.
Instead it is an attempt to describe why people believe that this or that is the moral thing to do.

Descriptive moral relativism holds only that some people do in fact disagree about what is moral; meta-ethical moral relativism holds that in such disagreements, nobody is objectively right or wrong; and normative moral relativism holds that because nobody is right or wrong, we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when we disagree about the morality of it.

It's the latter part that I have a problem with.

ah
I did not realize there was such a thing as normative moral relativism, forgive my mistake.

The "individual disposition" is to a large extent a delusion, — Cavacava

An individual delusion?

we are all part of a tribe, a city, a state, a nation; what and how we think are structured by these roots, whether we are aware of it or not. Again, its the 'Good' life that become the goal in a capitalistic society, and those who achieved it societal icons.

So how would you explain this: we have a family with four siblings, who were all raised by the same parents, went to the same schools, the same churches, there was some overlap of friends, they mostly saw the same movies, none of them read many books, etc., and the issue of how it's ethically acceptable to deal with the perpetrators of a home invasion comes up, and one is a pacifist who says that under no circumstances is it okay to react with violence, and another says that it's okay to react only with sufficient force to subdue the perpetrators until the authorities can apprehend them (after you've called 911, of course), and the third says that it's okay to incapacitate them or even kill them so long as they're threatening you in any manner, and the fourth says that it's okay to shoot and kill them even prior to them even entering your home--as long as they're on your property you can shoot and kill them, just you should them drag them into your house and make them appear armed.

What is "metaphysical necessity"? — Cavacava

If x is metaphyically necessary, then it's not metaphysically possible to not-x.

Do we have to show that every human being is rational? — Cavacava

If you're going to claim that not only was every human being who ever existed rational, but that it's a metaphysical necessity that they're rational, I would say yes, because the notion is implausible. There are human beings who existed who weren't rational--because they were born with severe brain abnormalities so that they were effective vegetables, for example. The same goes for the golden rule. There are clearly humans who don't or haven't subscribed to it.

normative moral relativism holds that because nobody is right or wrong, we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when we disagree about the morality of it

Is the "ought" here a moral ought? So we (morally) ought to tolerate the behaviour of others because nobody is right or wrong. Which then also means that this moral claim is not (objectively) right or wrong.

It seems to me that meta-ethical moral relativism is inconsistent with normative moral relativism.

normative moral relativism holds that because nobody is right or wrong, we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when we disagree about the morality of it

Let's call that "V."

I didn't see who said that, but it's not correct. What's almost always the case there is rather this: ethical objectivists/absolutists who think about moral subjectivism/relativism wind up believing V, because they have an unpacked assumption that only objective/absolute judgments justify uttering a judgment (where presumably what one is doing when uttering a judgment is trying to report the objective/absolute judgment correctly), and since there are no objective judgments under moral subjectivism/relativism, the natural upshot under this view is that there is no justification for uttering a judgment.

The problem with this, of course, is that moral subjectivists/relativists do not share that unpacked assumption, and it should be obvious that this is the case, because they do not believe that there are objective/absolute judgments in the first place, so they're not going to hinge anything on there being objective/absolute judgments.

I have to take off, but reference is from Wikipedia.

Unsurprisingly, there's absolutely no reference in the Wikipedia article to anyone who considers themselves a moral relativist who says V.

Unsurprisingly, there's absolutely no reference in the Wikipedia article to anyone who considers themselves a moral relativist who says V. — Terrapin Station

There's a reference here to Wong, D.B., 1984, Moral Relativity, Berkeley CA: University of California Press. who argues for normative relativism. He derives this position from meta-ethical relativism and "the justification principle", the principle that "we should not interfere with people unless we could justify this interference to them".

Of course, it would seem that meta-ethical relativism undermines the justification principle (unless one accepts the justification principle as only being true relative to a particular society).

So we can say that in our society one ought be tolerant, but nothing can be said against any society that doesn't accept the justification principle.

Actually, according to the Stanford article, Wong doesn't actually endorse V. He thinks that interference can be justified It's just that he'd say it's not always justified. However, yeah, he appears to say that when it's not justified we shouldn't interfere.

In my opinion, I'd say that it's not clear that he's a moral relativist if he thinks that there's a non-relative principle about whether we should or shouldn't interfere with other moral stances.

As far as I’m aware, moral relativism is the view that moral values are hierarchical rather than absolute and that - whereas most human beings from whatever cause do indeed seem innately possessed of a personal sense of ‘moral’ right and wrong - that nonetheless the criteria of judgment regarding individual moral righteousness should in practise be cognisant of the reality that any given individual’s perception of the ethical justifiability of an action must inevitably be circumscribed by the norms, and thus consequent descendant values, inculcated within him by his own limiting societal environment, and therefore that, in such a context, such judgment when adjudicating on what actually constitutes personal morality in the case of a given individual should recognise the primacy, in this moral hierarchy, of the degree of an individual's consistency of adherance, albeit over other extra-societal norms, to his own societally conceived values (such societal values presumedly admitting his sole criteria of reference) and furthermore - that it should indeed recognise the irrelevance in principle of extra-societal norms in terms of configuring an individually relevant verdict!
My own view is that moral relativism as a philosophy is ultimately casuistic. Anyway - excuse my being caught up in a ‘run-on’ type sentence btw but, as an excuse - what a distracting 'Hornet's Nest', I'm sure you'd agree, this type of question really is!

As far as I’m aware, moral relativism is the view that moral values are hierarchical rather than absolute — Robert Lockhart

There is nothing contradictory between a hierarchy of morals and there being an invariant, objective good. Most everything else in your comments is then superfluous to the issue. It can all go hand in hand with the reality of an objective good.

Think of it this way, to say that “might makes right” is not the correct description of metaphysical reality is not to deny that power-games are an integral staple of existence. But that’s rather obvious, isn’t it?

An individual delusion?

No I think we all act in or out of accordance with norms. The relationship of norms and our actions is one of authority/universal and responsibility/particular. All four of your siblings work from normative positions, while each has a difference stance, these stances in how you explained them all seem normative. If you measure up the actions of any group of individuals you will typically see a bell shaped distribution...the normal distribution.

How we act is a lot like how we fill in the conceptual rules we use to act. Similar to how a judge in common law decides a case by existing presidents and what he believes fits as a conclusion that falls in line with existing case law. We make a lot of these judgments every day and as I I have suggested most moral decisions require very little decision.

How we decided what to do changes our outlook, it changes our concepts in the same way a truly new work of art can instantly change the art world, a whole constellation of concepts. View points are critical. Hegel said:

“No man is a hero to his valet, not because the former is no hero, but because the latter is a valet.”

If you're going to claim that not only was every human being who ever existed rational, but that it's a metaphysical necessity that they're rational, I would say yes, because the notion is implausible. There are human beings who existed who weren't rational--because they were born with severe brain abnormalities so that they were effective vegetables, for example. The same goes for the golden rule. There are clearly humans who don't or haven't subscribed to it.

This sounds like a stale polemic response.

Existential universality must be proven by exception. To say the person who has brain damage or other issues is less a person only proves the status of man as a rational being, because the exception here proves the rule. It is not a disproof, it is proof in my estimation.

With the first part, you didn't actually address, in my opinion, what I wanted you to address. Given your view that morality isn't relative to individual disposition and that it's rather a matter of transmission from social interaction or culture, how can you explain the four siblings with four very different views on the same moral question? I'd only count as an answer an explicit explanation of how the scenario would be possible under the view that morality isn't relative to individual disposition. If all they're doing is regurgitating what's been transmitted to them socially (whether by rote or where they have to piece things together), that they'd have four different answers would be inexplicable. So you need to explain how they could have four different answers.

Re the second part, no one said that anyone was "less of a person." Clearly, some humans are not rational, and some have not accepted the golden rule. So clearly both "all humans are x" in these respects and "it's metaphysically necessary to x" are wrong.

I said that all of the siblings in your example act normativley, I said the general population acts normatively, and their acts are not outside the normal distribution for such actions.

It's similar to voting. You have an individual vote to cast but a limited slate of candidates. You are no more responsible for the slate candidates then you are for the moral alternatives you have to choose from, which I think are provided by the dominant normative practices of your society (the herd).

I said that all of the siblings in your example act normativley, — Cavacava

In context, I have no idea what that means then. What does it mean?

I mean that what they choose do has already been suggested by the herd as a possibility for their action, they assume normative rule patterns.

Okay--so it's suggested by the herd on your view, but how is it determined?

Historically/genealogically as previously suggested in the judge example.