One reason I'm adverse to moral relativism is that it appears to inevitably results in the dictum of might makes right—be this the force of an individual or the force of the masses (slavery can come to mind).

Is there any way that moral relativism can remain consistent without resulting in right/good/ethical being that which is willed by the whims of power? — javra

Sure.. they could just call for a vote. But does consensus really mean something is morally acceptable?

Sure.. they could just call for a vote. But does consensus really mean something is morally acceptable? — anonymous66

If to be morally acceptable is to be acceptable by the majority, then yes.

So part of taking action against something that is bad in my moral framework is to try to persuade others to reach the same moral conclusion in their frameworks, so that they will help me in my attempt to defeat fascism. — andrewk

Can you elaborate? Your framework seems to be "I don't like it". We should anyone care what you do or don't like? From the standpoint of a serial killer, he likes to kill. How would you convince him to change his mind?

Does that sound right to you? If there is a consensus about morality, then that makes that thing moral?

Why try to change anything in any society then? Reformers go against public opinion.

If there is a consensus about morality, then that makes that thing moral? — anonymous66

According to the moral relativist, yes. It's true by definition.

Why try to change anything in any society then? Reformers go against public opinion.

Because people want and like different things. They'd prefer a different morality.

Because people want and like different things. They'd prefer a different morality. — Michael

Then morality isn't actually based on consensus.... Apparently it's more about preferences (according to moral relativists). Apparently, we must decide whose preferences to follow. And then it looks like we're back to "might makes right" again <-- as javra pointed out.

What I'd like a moral relativist to talk about is whether or not it's possible to be wrong about morality. What does it mean for a moral relativist to change his mind about morality? Was his previous position wrong? or just different? If it's just a matter of being different, then why change his mind?

What about the changes that have occurred in societies? Is there such a think as moral progress? Why do people listen to moral reformers?

Then morality isn't actually based on consensus.... Apparently it's more about preferences (according to moral relativists). Apparently, we must decide whose preferences to follow. And then it looks like we're back to "might makes right" again/ — anonymous66

Doesn't follow. A thing is legal if it's agreed upon by the legislature. If some members of this legislature would prefer something else to be legal then they try to change the law. But it's still only a law once it's been agreed upon by the legislature. It's not the case that the law is just preferences.

And so a thing is moral if it's agreed upon by society (as an example). If some members of this society would prefer something else to be moral then they try to change the moral rules. But it's still only moral once it's been agreed upon by the society. It's not the case that morality is just preferences.

What I'd like a moral relativist to talk about is whether or not it's possible to be wrong about morality. What does it mean for a moral relativist to change his mind about morality? Was his previous position wrong? or just different? If it's just a matter of being different, then why change his mind? — anonymous66

Of course it's possible to be wrong about morality, just as it's possible to be wrong about the law. But it's still the case that whether or not some given action is legal is relative to each individual country/state as determined by the legislature of that country/state. And so it'd still be the case that whether or not some given action is moral is relative to each individual society as determined by the members of that society.

And so a thing is moral if it's agreed upon by society (as an example). If some members of this society would prefer something else to be moral then they try to change the moral rules. But it's still only moral once it's been agreed upon by the society. It's not the case that morality is just preferences. — Michael

You're contradicting yourself. Societies did believe that slavery was ethical. So, it was ethical (according to relativism). But, a minority believed it was wrong... If morality is based on consensus, then why would anyone try to change what the society believed? And why would that society change? By definition, a reformer is just wrong (according to relativism) because he disagrees with the consensus.

So, is it preference? or is it consensus?

You're contradicting yourself. Societies did believe that slavery was ethical. So, it was ethical (according to relativism). But, a minority believed it was wrong... If morality is based on consensus, then why would anyone try to change what the society believed? — anonymous66

I'm not contradicting myself. It's not the case that those societies believed that slavery was ethical. It's the case that slavery was ethical in those societies. But a minority despised the practice and wanted it abolished, and so they fought to change their society's ethics.

Again, it's no different in kind to laws. You don't say that the UK only believes that it's illegal for someone under the age of 18 to buy alcohol. It is illegal for someone under the age of 18 to buy alcohol. But that doesn't mean that we can't try to reduce the age to 17. In wanting to change the law we're not somehow implying that it's already legal for 17 year olds to buy alcohol. And so in wanting to change our society's ethics we're not somehow implying that it's already unethical to practice slavery.

A question asked in good faith to moral relativists in general [not to say that my other questions weren’t asked in good faith]:

One reason I'm adverse to moral relativism is that it appears to inevitably results in the dictum of might makes right—be this the force of an individual or the force of the masses (slavery can come to mind).

Is there any way that moral relativism can remain consistent without resulting in right/good/ethical being that which is willed by the whims of power? — javra

There's a "domain" confusion here.

"Might makes right" is a descriptive aphorism about what happens--or at least tends to happen--socially. The ethical stances that become entrenched legislatively, or culturally as mores, etc., are those that either through concentrated power/influence or sheer numbers have force behind them. They're literally enforced, either through agents sanctioned by the government or at least via social acceptance versus ostracization.

"Might makes right" is not anything prescriptive or that relativists are endorsing or anything like that. You seem to be looking at it as if relativism has to suggest some ultimate prescriptive principle that functions just like an objective principle would.

Of course, some relativists do focus on socially accepted or enforced moral stances as what's moral for that society, but they're just doing that descriptively--they're simply telling you that that's what's accepted in that society (which is hardly debatable), and they're additionally saying that there's not some (objective) overarching morality that makes that society's entrenched ethics wrong. That doesn't mean that they're saying that that society's entrenched ethics is right, either. They're just saying that what's right in that society, descriptively, is what's entrenched.

Other relativists, like me, focus on individuals, and stress that what's right is per individual, where individuals very well can, and often do, disagree with what's entrenched in their society. Again, this is just descriptive. But as something descriptive, it's not saying that what's right (in a broad sense) is whatever is "willed by the whims of power."

I wouldn't say that descriptively, what's right is a matter of whim by the way. Most folks' moral stances obtain at more of an intuitive "gut level." They're dispositions that people have, not momentary whims. You can't just choose to change them.

We should anyone care what you do or don't like? — anonymous66

For one, believe it or not, some people do actually care what (at least some) other people feel, simply because they like and care about other people, they're interested in other people qua other people, etc.

But aside from that, a lot of what we do when it comes to morality is to try to persuade other people to particular stances by appealing to their own dispositions, their own reasoning, etc.

Also, we could just as well say to objectivists, "Why should anyone care that such and such is factually right/wrong. If it's factually wrong to murder others, why should a serial killer care about that? He likes to murder people. He'd rather do what he likes."

What I'd like a moral relativist to talk about is whether or not it's possible to be wrong about morality. — anonymous66

Not objectively, no.

What does it mean for a moral relativist to change his mind about morality? Was his previous position wrong? or just different? If it's just a matter of being different, then why change his mind? — anonymous66

First, it's not going to be that you believe it was factually or objectively wrong. Keep in mind that ethical right/wrong to a subjectivist, say--which is what I am--is a matter of feeling, basically a negative preference against it, basically "booing" it. So you can definitely change your mind so that you "boo" your previous stance.

Stances change for a number of reasons, where combinations of these can be factors. Some examples:

* You weren't sure how you felt about the behavior in question. You thought you felt one way, but as you contemplated it more, you realize that you feel a different way instead.

* You have new experiences or new information that cause you to feel differently about some behavior.

* You realize that your stance on one thing conflicts with your stance on something else and you're not comfortable with that inconsistency, so you modify stances to make them consistent (usually while trying to ferret out how you "really feel" about some of the conflicts).

* Someone presents some rhetorical argument to you that you find persuasive--maybe something you hadn't really thought of before, some angle, etc., and so you realize that a different stance is more in line with how you feel.

What about the changes that have occurred in societies? Is there such a think as moral progress? — anonymous66

Moral progress would simply be morality shifting to stances that you prefer.

Why do people listen to moral reformers? — anonymous66

When they do, it's simply a matter of the moral reformer presenting new information, different angles, saying things that make the person in question realize they really feel a different way, etc.

Of course, there are also non-ethical social factors, such as people tending to go along with certain crowds, wanting to please or get along with certain others, etc., and those actions can wind up having a psychological affect on how someone feels about the stances in question.

You're contradicting yourself. Societies did believe that slavery was ethical. So, it was ethical (according to relativism). But, a minority believed it was wrong... If morality is based on consensus, then why would anyone try to change what the society believed? And why would that society change? By definition, a reformer is just wrong (according to relativism) because he disagrees with the consensus. — anonymous66

I don't agree with Michael's view (in my opinion, morality IS just preferences of a certain sort), but his view makes logical sense: He's saying that IF morality is not just preferences but what's communally accepted or enforced in a given society, then simply having different preferences doesn't mean that one has different morality--it's not morality until it's communally accepted by the society. That doesn't imply that one doesn't have different preferences. One would prefer a different morality. So one tries to influence things so that the different morality obtains instead (via communal agreement in that society).

I don't agree with Michael's view (in my opinion, morality IS just preferences of a certain sort), but his view makes logical sense — Terrapin Station

As an aside, it's not even my view. I was just making sense of (cultural) relativism. I'm inclined to a collective view than includes cultural relativism but also emotivism, prescriptivism, and error theory.

I'm trying to understand moral relativism.. I'm trying to understand what it would be like for me to be a moral relativist (and trying to determine if any moral relativists actually exist).

Is it correct to say that moral relativists believe that the majority determines what is moral? That doesn't sound right.... because I try to imagine myself as a moral relativist, living in a society where slavery is accepted. I hear reformers trying to convince other people that slavery is wrong... I know the reformers are wrong, because they are arguing against the majority. If reformers succeed (presumably because the majority aren't moral relativists), and now slavery is determined to be wrong, wouldn't I be disappointed that our society made a mistake (because they now accept the minority position)?

OR, is it rather the case that moral relativists believe that morality is merely a matter of preference. In that case, then why do I care what other people prefer? Why would I think that other people would care about my preferences? Why would I complain or attempt to change the view of other people, since I understand that they just have different preferences?

Is it correct to say that moral relativists believe that the majority determines what is moral? — anonymous66

First, anyone saying that would be saying something descriptive about a culture. In other words, it's more like doing anthropology in that respect.

What a lot of us would say is simply that people with enough power/influence in a culture (that could be a majority, but it doesn't have to be) determines what is culturally moral for that society.

I try to imagine myself as a moral relativist, living in a society where slavery is accepted. I hear a reformer trying to convince other people that slavery is wrong... I know that reformer is wrong, because he is arguing against the majority. — anonymous66

You could say that relative to what is culturally moral for that society (at that time) they're advocating something contrary to what's moral. Again, this would simply be a descriptive, anthropological account of what's going on there.

In terms of right/wrong judgments, however, that depends on who is making the judgment. Obviously some people are going to feel that slavery is right (they're yaying slavery in other words), some will feel that it's wrong (they're booing it).

Where you're going off the rails in trying to understand this is that you're conflating a descriptive/anthropological account with making ethical judgments. The two aren't the same (and I already explained this to you above). While someone could personally feel--so we're talking about on what basis they're making moral judgments--that they should follow whatever the majority feels, that would be quite rare.

If that is the case, then why do I care what other people prefer? Why would I think that other people would care about my preferences? Why would I complain or attempt to change the view of other people, since I understand that they just have different preferences? — anonymous66

You realize that you live in a society where people interact, and where some people have the power to make laws, enforce laws, socially ostracize, etc., right? Most people care about what they can and can't do when they're interacting with other people. They care about what they might be arrested for, what they might be socially shunned for, etc.

No, I meant the dictum to be a descriptive aspect of what is, not a prescription of what ought to be. Although, given the variety of characters in the world, it is doubtlessly that some will come to interpret it in prescriptive ways for themselves and their own cohorts. (Regardless of our objections to their so doing. Social Darwinism as an example taken from history of prescription derived from description.)

--------

Regarding laws, hypothesize a government’s well established law that people will be publically decapitated if they in any way speak out against the laws of the government.

Were this government to be so endowed with authoritarian power so as to overtake the entire world, this law would become global, as would the mores that go along with it.

This now hypothesized global law would then become ethical to any moral relativist embedded within such global governance?

No, I meant the dictum to be a descriptive aspect of what is, — javra

Okay, but how would that even be in dispute? It's obvious that folks with the right influence/power in a society are the ones that entrench ethical stances in legislation and cultural mores.

This now hypothesized global law would then become ethical to any moral relativist embedded within such global governance? — javra

AGAIN--all anyone is saying re the "might makes right" aphorism is a descriptive, anthropological fact.

The "would then become ethical . . ." has to be asking if the relativist from that point on makes the judgment that the law is indeed morally right. Why does it have to be asking that? Well, because you're stipulating that in terms of legislation, it becomes the morally entrenched stance. So you can't be asking if the relativist would then say that the law has become the legislatively morally entrenched stance of that culture. The answer to that is obvious--you just stipulated that it IS the legislatively morally entrenched stance of that culture, and anyone--moral relativist or not, would agree.

The answer to that is obvious--you just stipulated that it IS the legislatively morally entrenched stance of that culture, and anyone--moral relativist or not, would agree. — Terrapin Station

OK, I’ll put myself in the little lonely ostracized corner of disagreement. The Golden Rule isn’t right because of its mass appeal, nor because of legislation—nor, for that matter, because some person sitting on top clouds has decreed it so. Thank you for the answer, though.

The Golden Rule isn’t right because of its mass appeal, nor because of legislation— — javra

But do you understand that no one is saying that it's right because of mass appeal or because of legislation?

What people are saying insofar as either of those go is that it's culturally considered right because of mass appeal or that it's legally considered right because of legislation. In other words, it would just be a journalistic description of what most people accept or what's a law in the culture in question.

But do you understand that no one is saying that it's right because of mass appeal or because of legislation? — Terrapin Station

Hold on there, the Golden Rule is either there due to some power(s) so decreeing it to be right or, else, it stands on its own regardless of what various powers have to say about it. You can argue that it’s relative to human nature, but then it would no longer be an issue of moral relativism. This because it becomes again conjoined to the issue of objective universals.

By the way, I’m not denying that many go with the flow of whatever is popular for the sake of their own immediate stability of being. This conversation though concerns whether there is anything objective about ethics.

Hold on there, the Golden Rule is either there due to some power(s) so decreeing it to be right or, else, it stands on its own regardless of what various powers have to say about it. — javra

Moral judgments are how individuals feel about behavior (leaving out the qualifying details there). When some moral stance, like the golden rule, say, becomes entrenched in a culture or legislation or whatever, it's because individuals feel that way about behavior, and via interactions, where they influence each other and so on, enough of them (if we're talking about something culturally entrenched), or the ones with the right power (if we're talking about something like legislation) feel that way about behavior.

So it neither originates with a social decree nor is it independent of what various people have to say about it.

You could say that it has to do with "human nature." as long as you're not referring to something like an "essence" there that's independent of humans. It has to do with human nature simply by virtue of the fact that moral judgments are how individual humans feel about behavior.

So when we're talking about moral judgments per se, we're talking about something relative to individual humans.

When we're talking about what's morally accepted, we're talking about larger social groups and how they interact with each other, from more of an anthropological perspective.

There's nothing objective about it because we're talking about a mental phenomenon. "Objective" refers to things located outside of minds/phenomena other than mental phenomena.

So it neither originates with a social decree nor is it independent of what various people have to say about it. — Terrapin Station

I’ll take a leap and proclaim we’re using “independent of” in different ways. You understand it in terms of “severed from” and I understand it in terms of “indifferent to”. Hence, for me, the Golden Rule isn’t severed from people but is stands in ways indifferent to people’s rationalized opinions.

If it doesn’t originate with power so willing it as a right—which shouldn’t be confused with powers defending it against corruption or the like—then doesn’t it stand on its own as a right in manners indifferent to what people may will, say, or think about it?

In more concrete terms, Gandhi defended the Golden Rule; Stalinism went against it even while mimicking its motto of comradeship. Was the Golden Rule then unethical during Stalinism? If so, then it too originates with the dictums of power—and, again, I here disagree. However, if Stalinism can be declared corrupt only due to comparison to the Golden Rule (and its implications), then the Golden Rule, again, stands regardless of what authority wills—be it authority of individuals or of the masses.

In short, if it doesn’t originate with power, then the Golden Rule isn’t an aspect of moral relativism.

If it doesn’t originate with power so willing it as a right—which shouldn’t be confused with powers defending it against corruption or the like—then doesn’t it stand on its own as a right in manners indifferent to what people may will, say, or think about it? — javra

No--how could it "stand on its own" where it's "indifferent" to what people think etc. about it? How could it even exist at all in that case? Where would it be located? What would it be a property of?

In more concrete terms, Gandhi defended the Golden Rule; Stalinism went against it even while mimicking its motto of comradeship. Was the Golden Rule then unethical during Stalinism? — javra

What we'd say in that case would be that under Stalinism, the golden rule was unethical. Or in other words, per the tenets of Stalinism, it was unethical.

That's not saying that it's unethical outside of that context.

Because we'd also say in that situation that to Gandhi, the golden rule was ethical.

I don't know how someone could argue with either of those points given the situation we're talking about (assuming the description is correct, of course).

However, if Stalinism can be declared corrupt only due to comparison to the Golden Rule (and its implications), then the Golden Rule, again, — javra

That's not "indifferent" to what anyone thinks, however. Stalinism would be declared "corrupt" due to comparison to the Golden Rule to someone who feels that the golden rule is a normative basis for ethical judgment. So that's dependent on what someone thinks.

In short, if it doesn’t originate with power, then the Golden Rule isn’t an aspect of moral relativism. — javra

<sigh> No, that doesn't work, because moral relativism doesn't amount to saying that moral judgments "originate with power."

No--how could it "stand on its own" where it's "indifferent" to what people think etc. about it? How could it even exist at all in that case? Where would it be located? What would it be a property of? — Terrapin Station

All valid questions, but tangential to whether or not the Golden Rule stands on its own or is a product of agency so willing it to be (see below). Let’s not sidetrack the main issue.

That's not "indifferent" to what anyone thinks, however. Stalinism would be declared "corrupt" due to comparison to the Golden Rule to someone who feels that the golden rule is a normative basis for ethical judgment. So that's dependent on what someone thinks. — Terrapin Station

One does not need to have a formalized theory of the Golden Rule for it to be innately present, such as instincts are. To say otherwise would be to say that there can be no sense of fairness devoid of there being cognition of what fairness implies. A child playing in the school yard doesn’t need to know what the abstract concept of fairness is—to have thought of fairness—in order to sense that it is unfair to be bullied or to bully, for example.

Some social lesser animals have a sense of fairness, aka the Golden Rule, and they don’t hold it due to thought concerning what the concept of fairness entails.

So no. Feeling something is not equivalent to thinking something. Nothing new in this. Do we will those basic feelings of fairness into being? … is the question here addressed to moral relativists. This is contrasted to those basic feeling of fairness being part of our inherent biological makeup as humans, which would make the foundations of ethics no longer morally relative.

<sigh> No, that doesn't work, because moral relativism doesn't amount to saying that moral judgments "originate with power." — Terrapin Station

< gees > power is ability to accomplish; it is therefore what agency entails; moral relativism requires agency to originate that which is ethical—for, otherwise, that which is ethical would be in manners independent of/indifferent of what agency wills; therefore, if it isn’t originated by agency/power it isn’t encapsulated by moral relativism. < can we stop with the sighs and such; rational arguments welcomed >

Also, we could just as well say to objectivists, "Why should anyone care that such and such is factually right/wrong. If it's factually wrong to murder others, why should a serial killer care about that? He likes to murder people. He'd rather do what he likes." — Terrapin Station

That's the point I'm making about relativism vs objectivism. Objectivists DO acknowledge that people can be and sometimes are wrong about morality.. objectivists do acknowledge that serial killers don't care... If it is wrong to murder, then someone who murders is in the wrong, and murder would not be allowed. Whereas, according to relativism, a murderer isn't wrong, he just has a different point of view/different preferences.
It seems you must have some way of judging between preferences, if some preferences (murder) are not allowed, but others are. ( Objectivists obviously do have a way of judging.)

I wonder if we're on the same page here. Earlier you called yourself a relativist, but now you're calling yourself an emotivist. Which are you?

Emotivism is the view that moral utterances are neither true nor false but are expressions of emotions or attitudes. It leads to the conclusion that people can disagree only in attitude, not in beliefs. People cannot disagree over the moral facts, because there are no moral facts. Emotivism also implies that presenting reasons in support of a moral utterance is a matter of offering nonmoral facts that can influence someone’s attitude. It seems that any nonmoral facts will do, as long as they affect attitudes. Perhaps the most far-reaching implication of emotivism is that nothing is actually good or bad. There simply are no properties of goodness and badness. There is only the expression of favorable or unfavorable emotions or attitudes toward something.

You also made a valid distinction between descriptive and prescriptive. Which are you advocating? Are you merely stating the facts as you see them(descriptive) "people do disagree about morality"? or are telling us(prescriptive) how we ought to act - "people ought not be allowed to____ and ought to be allowed to___".

Why should they care? Firstly, they are very likely to care without any encouragement from me, because my dislike of seeing others suffer is very widely shared in the human population. To the extent that it isn't, the challenge to me is to try to persuade enough people to care so that action is taken. That's what is happening in political debate.

Lastly, you observe that a - presumably incurably psychopathic - serial killer will not care. That doesn't matter. All I need to do is to persuade enough people to take action to arrest and imprison him. What the serial killer thinks about that is irrelevant.