I say it was reached in the matter of factual discourse because it proved itself pragmatically useful -- it got results, it resolved disagreements, it built consensus, it didn't leave people in an intractable mire of unresolvable disputes about what is or isn't real. — Pfhorrest

Agreed.

I give exactly that reason for why we should adopt a similar practice for moral discourse — Pfhorrest

What practice? You've still yet to provide the details.

Scientific 'accounting' method = theory, controlled trial, statistical analysis, qualified presentation, peer review - not a thorough explanation of the process, but enough to see it's more than just 'having a think about it'.

Moral 'accounting' method = ??

doing otherwise leaves us in an intractable mire of unresolvable disputes about what is or isn't moral. Either because "nothing's actually moral, that's all just, like, your opinion, man", or because "God has handed down his unquestionable moral decrees and anyone who disagrees is a heathen who will burn in hell!" To put it dramatically. My whole approach boils down to: don't do either of those things. — Pfhorrest

No, it absolutely categorically does not. We currently do otherwise and we currently are not in such a mire. The 'accounting' method people already use, whilst being diverse and defiantly relative to one's culture and upbringing does not result in those extremes. People do not routinely murder whomever they feel like killing, they do not routinely steal from others, they do not routinely rape and torture. They also do not routinely try to universally account for everyone's moral sentiments. So your thesis is simply wrong, we do not appear to need such an accounting process in order to avoid such extremes.

Most cultures have some sort of moral code, it's very difficult for people raised in that culture to act in opposition to it (we're strongly influenced by the social norms we grow up with). We also have basic biological wiring which leads us to generally empathise, seek to cooperate and care for our young. These are difficult to eradicate even id cultural norms somehow conflict with them (in fact they're probably the cause of most cultural norms which is why they're so similar). Variation in biology, variation in culture and variation in exposure to that culture all lead to variation in the resultant moral decision-making process (hence relativism). But similarity in biology, similarity on the parameters of successful culture and similarity in degrees of exposure (sensitivity) already leads to sufficient similarity in moral decision-making to avoid the moral hellscape you're trying to paint.

In essence this is the problem with your approach. You're treating the method by which we judge physical reality as being separate and mutually exclusive to the method by which we judge the way reality 'ought' to be. But judging the way reality 'ought' to be is something which happens in human minds, and human minds are physical objects, and the contents of them are often indirectly observable in physical behaviour. So our account of physical reality already has something to say about these 'oughts'. It tells us how they are likely to be generated, it tells us how they are affected by which external forces, it tells us how they change over time, it tells us how similar/dissimilar they are across cultures, it tells us how they change as we develop... all of these facts form part of our model of physical reality, developed using our agreed on 'accounting' method, derived by treating people and brains as physical object (which they are).

We cannot then develop models of the contents of those objects (which, if we are physicalists, must be physical states of those objects) which contradict the physical models we've already agreed on.

The idea that there is a universal 'right' thing we ought to do in any circumstance which accounts for all of which seems to people to be right in that circumstance already contradicts our physical models of how brains work - and it's brains which generate what 'seems to be right'. We know for a fact that brains are influenced by changing social norms, we know that brains alter what 'seems to be right' over time, with development, dependent on culture etc. So our physical theories about brains already preclude that they could, even theoretically, arrive at a universal 'right solution' for any ought-type feelings. Basically they don't arrive at ought-type feelings by any process that rational discourse has full control over.

Moral 'accounting' method = ?? — Isaac

http://geekofalltrades.org/codex/deontology.php and http://geekofalltrades.org/codex/politics.php

I haven't gone into details on those yet here because I've yet to get past the much simpler basics of just "let's proceed on the assumption that there are answers and we can figure them out". If nobody will even agree to that, there's no point yet going into details on how to figure them out.

People do not routinely murder whomever they feel like killing, they do not routinely steal from others, they do not routinely rape and torture. They also do not routinely try to universally account for everyone's moral sentiments — Isaac

People do not routinely believe other than what their religions tell them about the creation of the world, or what happens when we die, or the fate of mankind, etc. They also do not routinely try to universally account for all observations (i.e. do science).

Within a given worldview there's no problem, pretty much by definition: everyone agrees, or they wouldn't be within that worldview. It's at the boundaries between them, where disputes emerge, that a method of resolving disputes is important.

So our account of physical reality already has something to say about these 'oughts'. It tells us how they are likely to be generated, it tells us how they are affected by which external forces, it tells us how they change over time, it tells us how similar/dissimilar they are across cultures, it tells us how they change as we develop... — Isaac

It also tells us all that same kind of stuff about how people come to form opinions about what is real, but we don't then rely on psychological research into how people form descriptive beliefs in order to do something like physics. Or more poignantly: psychological research into why people are inclined to believe in gods, magic, etc, tells us nothing at all about whether or not god, magic, etc, are actually real. What people think, and why they think it, is a different question from what thoughts are properly justifiable, i.e. what it is correct to think, what is true.

People do not routinely believe other than what their religions tell them about the creation of the world, or what happens when we die, or the fate of mankind, etc. They also do not routinely try to universally account for all observations (i.e. do science).

Within a given worldview there's no problem, pretty much by definition: everyone agrees, or they wouldn't be within that worldview. — Pfhorrest

Dodging the point. The point was that people do not do the accounting method you're suggesting we should do and yet do not end up in some kind of moral hellscape. The part of your thesis that this disproves is that such an accounting method is necessary. It is not. The fact that people routinely believe supernatural things has nothing to do with it. all that proves is that we do not need a universal accounting method for physical reality either. We're fine without both. What we can't do is send people to the moon, or carry out any physical joint activity without an agreed on account of the physical world. We can, it seems, believe in God. Many people do and it doesn't seem to get in the way of basic physical activities. It is the same for for morality. We don't have an agreed upon accounting method and yet mainly everyone gets along fine.

It's at the boundaries between them, where disputes emerge, that a method of resolving disputes is important. — Pfhorrest

Agreed. Not sure how you think anyone is more likely to agree on an accounting method than they were to agree on the moral 'oughts' in the first place.

It also tells us all that same kind of stuff about how people come to form opinions about what is real, but we don't then rely on psychological research into how people form descriptive beliefs in order to do something like physics. — Pfhorrest

Yes we do. If it were discovered that our brain's models of physical reality were influenced heavily by upbringing, culture, mood, social norms...we would control for those things when assessing our observations. Luckily, our brain's models of basic physical reality are not heavily influenced by those things so we don't have to. We seem to be born with concepts of basic physics which the rest of our models of reality are built on. Certain cultural norms have an effect at the edges, but not in its core.

Or more poignantly: psychological research into why people are inclined to believe in gods, magic, etc, tells us nothing at all about whether or not god, magic, etc, are actually real. — Pfhorrest

It absolutely does. If we can show how such feelings are generated (and that they are generated by cultural influence, or brain lesions or something) then it absolutely does stand as evidence that they are less likely to be real (ie resultant from our models of physical reality).

What people think, and why they think it, is a different question from what thoughts are properly justifiable, i.e. what it is correct to think, what is true. — Pfhorrest

We're not talking about the result of the question "what ought we to do" we're talking about the accounting method. That takes place in brains and their function is absolutely crucial to the question.

Imagine everyone in the world has a chip implanted in their brain which generates a random number and a strong feeling that this is the 'right' number. No one knows about these chips. A study of 'numberology' is started to talk to people about why they feel their number is the 'right' number. People give all sorts of post hoc rationalisations, these are all gathered and assessed with an aim to find what really is the 'right' number. No one is having the success they want. Almost all the numbers are somewhere between 5 and 15, with only a few outliers, but beyond that, no further progress has been made.

One day, a scientist discovers the chip and finds out how it works. It generates a random number (but has a statistical anomaly which favours numbers between 5 and 15).

Why would anyone now continue the effort to find out what really is the 'right' number? We already know it's the chip generating it randomly. We know why there's a tendency toward 5-15, we know why there's such a strong feeling that it's the 'right' number. What would be the point of the continued study?

I would like to point out that the scientific method provides no certainty of being 'right'. All its conclusions are temporary by nature, subject to being falsified one day. And often, several interpretations of the same facts are possible.

By analogy, even if we were to agree on a method for adjudicating moral claims, it would provide us with no certainty of being "right".

I don’t find banality; your position seems rather commonplace. In the Good Old Days, such would be called “vulgar understanding”. Plain to see why we don’t call it that anymore.

Nahhhh.....banal it isn’t; incomplete and partially wrong, it is. Incomplete insofar as a grand metaphysical system of some kind is required for moral discourse, and wrong insofar as ambiguity is not everywhere, re: mathematics, logical and general physical law, and, moral choices are always irreversible.....
(It is never not good to make my sick mom her breakfast should she desire, given no known injurious conditions)
.....while reversible choices are those without moral predication.
(Sorry mom, we’re out of eggs so I made you oatmeal)

Anyway.....carry on.

Incomplete insofar as a grand metaphysical system of some kind is required for moral discourse — Mww

Says who? Moral discoursers?

and wrong insofar as ambiguity is not everywhere, re: mathematics, logical and general physical law

What part of "in philosophy" don't you understand?

and, moral choices are always irreversible.....

Of course not. One can often right a wrong.

One can often right a wrong. — Olivier5

Oh. Hmmmmm....so it is possible to un-ring the bell. Yeahhhh-no, it isn’t. Sorry.

Wait. That was probably tediously analytic, wasn’t it.

Never mind, then.

You're asking the questions and providing the answers now... Very nice, please carry on this discussion with yourself.

The point was that people do not do the accounting method you're suggesting we should do and yet do not end up in some kind of moral hellscape — Isaac

You’re projecting “moral hellscape”; I never said that. At the borders between groups who already have moral agreement within themselves, we do see exactly the problems I said, as you agreed in the paragraphs below. Whenever there is actually a live question as to what is moral, people either insist authoritatively that they are right, thrown up their hands and say there’s no such thing as right, or else do something much like I am suggesting everyone should always do in such circumstances.

Agreed. Not sure how you think anyone is more likely to agree on an accounting method than they were to agree on the moral 'oughts' in the first place. — Isaac

Because it’s pretty simple to see that some accounting methods cannot work — yelling at each other authoritatively and throwing up our hands in despair, specifically — and my method is just what’s left over if you reject the both of those.

You’re projecting “moral hellscape”; I never said that. — Pfhorrest

Fair enough. A rhetorical whimsy on my part.

some accounting methods cannot work — yelling at each other authoritatively and throwing up our hands in despair, specifically — and my method is just what’s left over if you reject the both of those. — Pfhorrest

Really? If you think your method is literally all that's left after discarding those two options then you're either astonishingly hubristic, or you really haven't understood what I mean by 'your method' when it comes to the accounting procedure.

Good lord, people. This is so far astray of the OP topic, why are you even writing it in this thread?

As soon as we're just posting to call someone stupid, for saying that we were stupid, for saying that they were stupid...ugh, no one's going to change their mind, and it's not helping anyone.

If you guys have pre-existing beefs with each other, please go fight it out in those threads. Or start a PM.

Please limit your comments here to things that are on topic.

Really? If you think your method is literally all that's left after discarding those two options then you're either astonishingly hubristic, or you really haven't understood what I mean by 'your method' when it comes to the accounting procedure. — Isaac

My method is explicitly formulated as just whatever is entailed by rejecting those two options. I don't start with a complete idea of how to do things and then say "it's either this, or one of those two options". I say "it's clearly not one of those two options; what's left?" and end up with the position I end up with by combining the negations of those two options.

That position is just, in short: there are some correct moral answers (not throwing up our hands) but they're not correct just because anybody said so (not yelling at each other), so we have to give all the possible answers a shot (otherwise we'd end up throwing up our hands) until they can be shown unacceptable by appeal to our common experiences (otherwise we'd end up just yelling at each other).

We could talk about whether what I think is entailed by rejecting those two things really is entailed by it, but so far I've yet to get past even rejecting the "throw up our hands" option with you.

I certainly hope we can keep yelling at one another... otherwise where's the fun? :-)

We could talk about whether what I think is entailed by rejecting those two things really is entailed by it, but so far I've yet to get past even rejecting the "throw up our hands" option with you. — Pfhorrest

Was this aimed at me, or one of the other three?

That was aimed at Isaac, whom I was responding to.

Sorry our argument has derailed your thread.

Though I guess the "throw up your hands" thing is relevant to you too, if you actually are, as you say, a moral nihilist.

until they can be shown unacceptable by appeal to our common experiences — Pfhorrest

That's the method I'm talking about. You keep referring to this 'accounting for', or here 'appeal to' without specifying how such activities are supposed to produce any resolution.

It goes like this...

"I think abortion is wrong"

"I think abortion is not wrong"

"Well, let's not just give up there, let's try to find out who's really right by 'accounting for' our feelings and 'appealing to' our common experiences"

"OK... (long pause). I think abortion really is not wrong because I considered x, y and z and it seems to me that the best way to account for all those factors is if abortion were not wrong"

"Ahh...I also took account of factors x, y and z, but it seemed to me that the best way to account for all three would be if abortion was wrong"

The practice of 'accounting for' is entirely subjective and so hasn't done anything at all to move moral decisions into a more objective realm.

If all you're saying is that people should give their moral choices some prior thought then you really are as hubristic as you sound. Like people don't do that already.

That's the method I'm talking about. You keep referring to this 'accounting for', or here 'appeal to' without specifying how such activities are supposed to produce any resolution. — Isaac

"OK... (long pause). I think abortion really is not wrong because I considered x, y and z and it seems to me that the best way to account for all those factors is if abortion were not wrong"

"Ahh...I also took account of factors x, y and z, but it seemed to me that the best way to account for all three would be if abortion was wrong" — Isaac

On that superficial a level, you'd think we would be unable to have a scientific method (the ordinary one about descriptive facts) too. These two people in your hypothetical argument need to figure out who is making invalid inferences where, if they all agree with premises x, y, and z, but still reach different conclusions. Maybe x, y, and z aren't enough to determine an answer, and there is some other hidden premise they disagree about that needs resolving in order to make progress. All I'm saying about them that's different from you is "don't give up there, figure out why you still disagree".

If all you're saying is that people should give their moral choices some prior thought then you really are as hubristic as you sound. Like people don't do that already. — Isaac

People do do that already. As I said, I think I'm defending common sense against bad philosophy. People ordinarily act like their moral disagreements are about things that there are correct answers to. I'm saying they're right to do so. They try to convince each other why their moral opinions are correct and the others' aren't. I'm saying that that's the right way to do things, instead of either appealing to authority/faith/popularity/etc, or else saying it's impossible to resolve. You seem to be saying it's impossible to resolve; if people disagree, tough, nothing to be done there. I say that that's just quitting. Resolution may be hard to find, but we can never know for certain that it's impossible. All we can do is either keep trying or give up.

There's plenty more detail to go into about how to try to resolve things. Epistemology is a big field, and I think there's an equally big moral equivalent to it to be explored (as I linked earlier). But if we can't even get past the groundwork of "yes there is something knowable out there to be known", there's no point in going into the details of how to sort it out yet.

Following your request to return to the OP...

Please help me identify this belief system. — Avery

Why do you want your belief system to be 'identified'? Presumably because you want to integrate your ideas with other pre-specified ideas on the topic....

But maybe this is not possible. As has been discussed in other threads, mainstream/academic philosophy is incredibly close-minded. Of course they will try to classify and belittle ideas which do not fit in with the mainstream paradigms.

Perhaps you are better to develop the ideas for yourself; though that can be a lonely, albeit fulfilling, road to travel.

That said I am mostly in agreement with you. And for those who wo8uld try to force-fit such ideas into the popular framework of morality, I would argue that the whole idea of morality as an essential foundation to ethics is one that is fatally flawed.

Thanks! Yeah...I guess what I wanted was to learn if what I believed is already shared by enough people to have a name attached to it. It would be nice to have an easier, shorthand way to identify each other. And it would be nice to find out if others had somehow made more logical connections than I have.

Like you mentioned, I’ve just been over here reading texts and developing my beliefs on my own for my whole life. And it’s worked out ok. But a sense of community is also nice, and it’s always great to learn from others. :)

And I think this thread helped me out a lot! I think moral nihilism probably is most of what I was looking for. Thanks to everyone who helped me find it. <3 <3

I also learned that people who like to discuss philosophy love to turn any conversation into a different conversation that they’re already very practiced at having. ;p

I also learned that people who like to discuss philosophy love to turn any conversation into a different conversation that they’re already very practiced at having — Avery

lol

All I'm saying about them that's different from you is "don't give up there, figure out why you still disagree". — Pfhorrest

No, that's not all you're saying at all, if it were, I'd have no problem with it. You're saying that they should continue to figure out why they still disagree, but for some some reason they must ignore the possibility the the reason they disagree is because x, y and z are post hoc rationalisations to justify feelings arising from a combination of biological and cultural influences. This despite the fact that this is exactly the explanation almost all scientific investigations on the matter point to.

You've singled out moral thought to be immunised from scientific investigation. You've said that no matter what, we should act as if the feelings some of us have about the categorical nature of moral imperatives must be considered genuine, this despite a mountain of evidence that they are mostly either primitive or deeply entrenched models of how to act resulting from either genetic or early cultural experiences, not from any collection of 'reasons'.

You seem to be saying it's impossible to resolve; if people disagree, tough, nothing to be done there. I say that that's just quitting. Resolution may be hard to find, but we can never know for certain that it's impossible. All we can do is either keep trying or give up. — Pfhorrest

How on earth have you concluded that?. That if we don't take our post hoc rationalisations seriously there's absolutely no other way we can resolve disagreements? How do you think the disagreements arose in the first place?

But if we can't even get past the groundwork of "yes there is something knowable out there to be known", there's no point in going into the details of how to sort it out yet. — Pfhorrest

Exactly. If we can't even establish if unicorns exist there's not much point discussing their tail colour.

but for some some reason they must ignore the possibility the the reason they disagree is because x, y and z are post hoc rationalisations to justify feelings arising from a combination of biological and cultural influences — Isaac

Because that is just to summarily dismiss that x, y, and z are good reasons at all. If they both agree that they are good reasons, but they still don't agree with the conclusion, then there must be some other places where they disagree.

You've singled out moral thought to be immunised from scientific investigation. — Isaac

Not at all. What I want is exactly for us to treat moral questions with the same rigor as science treats factual questions.

The closest to anything like this I've said is that I don't think moral (prescriptive) questions should be dismissed entirely, and descriptive questions treated as though they were equivalent substitutions, when they clearly are not. "What should I do?" is not at all answered by "you are inclined to do X because of genetic and social factors Y and Z". No matter what X, Y, and Z you posit there, they can always respond "yes yes I get why I'm inclined to do X, but should I?" Telling someone what people think and why they think it doesn't answer any questions at all about what to think -- whether we're talking about what to think about moral topics, or any other topics.

You've said that no matter what, we should act as if the feelings some of us have about the categorical nature of moral imperatives must be considered genuine, this despite a mountain of evidence that they are mostly either primitive or deeply entrenched models of how to act resulting from either genetic or early cultural experiences, not from any collection of 'reasons'. — Isaac

This exact same psychologicization can be applied to all our non-moral beliefs. We just went over this a few posts ago, and you admitted as much. Most of the time our non-moral beliefs are also a result of something less than a perfectly rational process, some combination of genetic and social factors. The scientific method is an approach to answering questions about reality in a more rigorous, rational way. You have given no reason whatsoever why a similar approach cannot be taken to questions about morality. You've only given irrelevant non-sequiturs.

How on earth have you concluded that?. That if we don't take our post hoc rationalisations seriously there's absolutely no other way we can resolve disagreements? How do you think the disagreements arose in the first place? — Isaac

So you do think there is some way of resolving those disagreements?

I'm not saying anything at all about what is or isn't a post-hoc rationalization. I'm saying that if someone reaches some conclusion on the grounds of some premises, and someone else reaches a different conclusion while agreeing with all those premises, then at least one of them must have made an invalid inference, or they must be working from some different unstated premises, and the road to resolving their disagreement is sorting out those differences in premises and inferences. For moral questions and non-moral questions. I'm not treating them differently at all. You are.

A sure-fire way to not resolve the disagreement is to say "all of your premises are baseless illusions you only think of because of your genetics and upbringing". That leaves no grounds at all to answer the question from. Yet people still can't help but have opinions on what the answer is. Which leaves nothing but hopelessly shouting past each other in perpetual disagreement.

If we can't even establish if unicorns exist there's not much point discussing their tail colour. — Isaac

Then why are you asking me about the tail color as if you need to know that before you can entertain the possibility of their existence?

They try to convince each other why their moral opinions are correct and the others' aren't. I'm saying that that's the right way to do things, instead of either appealing to authority/faith/popularity/etc, or else saying it's impossible to resolve. You [Isaac] seem to be saying it's impossible to resolve; if people disagree, tough, nothing to be done there. I say that that's just quitting. — Pfhorrest

Do people really try to convince one another of their moral views? I don't think so, not in my world.

Your moral sense is like your sense of equilibrium: it's useful to you, but not necessarily to others. They have their own personal, subjective sense.

In fact what people spend time discussing is their legal views: what should be allowed or forbidden, what should be taxed to extinction, what should be made more accessible, etc. This the topic of those 'culture wars', not individual morality.

It makes sense to argue about the law because the law is the same for all. And mind you, there are well established processes to set the law.

So your problem results from a faulty premise, a category error: the idea that morality, a private and subjective sense, can and should be agreed by all in a given society. It cannot and should not. The correct objective social 'thing' on which a community or society needs to reach agreement, is the law.

Because that is just to summarily dismiss that x, y, and z are good reasons at all. If they both agree that they are good reasons, but they still don't agree with the conclusion, then there must be some other places where they disagree. — Pfhorrest

Why 'must' there? Why, contrary to all the psychological and neurological evidence, do you keep insisting that their feelings that these are good reasons is sufficient to believe that they are?

Telling someone what people think and why they think it doesn't answer any questions at all about what to think -- whether we're talking about what to think about moral topics, or any other topics. — Pfhorrest

No, but it does answer questions about whether there is likely to be a 'right' answer to that question. as I showed with my random number generating chip example. If we had a random number generating chip implanted in our brains which generated the impression of a 'right' number, the discovery of such a chip would give us very good reason to believe there is no 'right' number and the search for it is fruitless. This is exactly what the science of morality is telling us. That these feelings are generated by deep models in the brain and are not the result of the rationalisations that are attached to them when discussed. As a consequence, our study of brains and people as physical objects informs us about the nature (if not the content) of our study about matters which are properties of those objects. The feeling that something should be the case is a property of a brain which is a physical object. Things we know about that object can therefore tell us about the origins of those feelings. If, what it tells us (and it does) is that the origin of those feelings is a few biological systems and a lot of cultural influence, then we can stop expecting them to ever coincide on a single 'right' answer'. They are the result of several factors which are varied across populations.

This exact same psychologicization can be applied to all our non-moral beliefs. We just went over this a few posts ago, and you admitted as much. Most of the time our non-moral beliefs are also a result of something less than a perfectly rational process, some combination of genetic and social factors. — Pfhorrest

No, absolutely not. Our non-moral physical beliefs are not most of the time the result of some combination of genetic and social factors. They are in vast part the result of interaction with an external world. It is far and away the most prevalent and most well-supported explanation for our beliefs about the physical world.

You have given no reason whatsoever why a similar approach cannot be taken to questions about morality. — Pfhorrest

Yes I have, our moral thought is not the result of interaction with a single external source and so investigation of our differences with an aim to resolving them is likely to be fruitless. Our physical thought is very likely to result from interaction with a single external source and so resolution of our differences here is very likely to be fruitful. It's that simple.

A sure-fire way to not resolve the disagreement is to say "all of your premises are baseless illusions you only think of because of your genetics and upbringing". That leaves no grounds at all to answer the question from — Pfhorrest

Change the environment in which people are raised such as to generate the moral thought you think is best.

Why do you want people to leave your thread? What pleasure are you trying to maximize by having the thread to yourself?

Just want the thread to stay on topic to the OP. If there's nothing left to say on that topic, then the thread can end.

what should be allowed or forbidden, what should be taxed to extinction, what should be made more accessible, etc. This the topic of those 'culture wars', not individual morality. — Olivier5

I think you're thinking of "morality" in a much narrower sense than I am. All of those "should" questions are moral questions in the sense I mean. You're not asking what is the law, but what ought to be the law, which is to say, what ought everyone be required to do. Of course nobody really argues about "ought" questions that don't involve them, but there are "ought" questions that do involve other people, like those you just listed, and those are the ones people argue about.

(If anything, more often people seem to think that questions that don't involve obligations on other people, just one's own decisions about their own lives, are non-moral questions. I don't agree with that either, I think those are just a subset of the broader moral questions about what ought to be).

Because that is just to summarily dismiss that x, y, and z are good reasons at all. If they both agree that they are good reasons, but they still don't agree with the conclusion, then there must be some other places where they disagree. — Pfhorrest

Why 'must' there? Why, contrary to all the psychological and neurological evidence, do you keep insisting that their feelings that these are good reasons is sufficient to believe that they are? — Isaac

The 'must' is just a matter of logical necessity, given their agreement that those are good reasons. In any argument, moral or otherwise, if everyone involved agrees on some premises and disagrees on the conclusions, they logically must disagree about some kind of inferences, or disagree about some unstated premises; otherwise, they would necessarily agree on the conclusion.

I'm not saying that all of their reasons necessarily are good reasons to reach their conclusions. I'm just looking at any argument, about moral matters or other matters, and looking at what is a pragmatically useful way of conducting that argument toward the end of reaching some agreement. If one side is putting forward premises that the other side thinks don't lead to the conclusions the first side says do, that's saying they're making an invalid inference. If one side is putting forward premises that would lead to the conclusion they're making, but the other side thinks those premises are false, then that pushes the argument back to an argument about those premises. And it can keep going on and on like that, as deep into their premises' premises' premises as need be, until they find some common ground to build up from.

All I'm saying is "don't ever give up on that process just because you haven't found common ground yet". I'm not saying that anything in particular definitely is the common ground, just to proceed as though you expect to find one eventually, and keep trying. On moral or non-moral issues both. You seem to be saying, if the question at hand is a moral one, "regard all supposed premises as false, and so stop trying to convince each other using them as reasons." Which leaves... what? Either not addressing the disagreement at all (which in many cases is not practically possible, if the disagreement is about what socially ought to be done or permitted etc), or else addressing it in completely non-rational ways, like indoctrination or threats of force. I presume, being charitable, that you are opposed to people imposing their views on what is or isn't moral on others by force etc. So when there's a disagreement that must be settled because we have to either allow something or not, oblige something or not, etc, how do you propose to settle it?

these feelings are generated by deep models in the brain and are not the result of the rationalisations that are attached to them when discussed — Isaac

The same is true of non-moral beliefs, but you're about to respond to that below...

No, absolutely not. Our non-moral physical beliefs are not most of the time the result of some combination of genetic and social factors. They are in vast part the result of interaction with an external world. It is far and away the most prevalent and most well-supported explanation for our beliefs about the physical world. — Isaac

So our physical intuitions that fly in the face of what we now understand to be the fundamental nature of reality (quantum and relativistic) aren't based on some non-rational inherited or cultural intuitions? (Probably more the former than the latter) And widespread belief in "Gods, creation myths, animism..." is based on interaction with an external world? An external world which you said before we have to have a prior agreement on the existence of? You wrote earlier:

When the 'accounting process' for physical reality was widely disputed, theories about physical reality were relativist too (Gods, creation myths, animism...), we only have such widespread agreement now because we also agree about the accounting method (science). We no longer just 'have a bit of think about' the opinions of everyone we happen to have spoken to about physical reality. We consult experts in the field using a (largely) agreed on method of trials, controls, statistical analysis and peer review. This 'method' is based on the prior belief that there is an external cause for the similarity in our observations. — Isaac

And I agree with that completely.

We cannot get from inside our phenomenal sense-experience to any proof that there is any objective reality. You can't show a solipsist or metaphysical nihilist evidence that they're wrong; anything you show them, they'll take as part of the illusion of so-called "reality" that they have a prior belief in. We can only assume one way or another, that either there is or isn't an objective reality. I said earlier that the reason to assume there is an objective reality is that it's "pragmatically useful -- it got results, it resolved disagreements, it built consensus", and you replied just "Agreed."

Then I said I'm just proposing we do that with moral questions too, and you started asking what color the unicorn's tail is.

Change the environment in which people are raised such as to generate the moral thought you think is best. — Isaac

While the others do the same, and in the mean time we just fight and yell at each other, and whoever stymies the other's progress and accomplishes a change in majority opinion most effectively was definitionally right all along, because majority opinion is all there is to being right?

Might makes right? That's your solution? Maybe I was too charitable earlier.

I'm going to try a new approach to getting you folks to leave this thread. — Avery

More effective would be to ask a mod to fork the off-topic discussion into another thread. But for my part I don't really want to continue this off-topic discussion anyway. I'm tired of going around and around the same circles over and over again with Isaac in thread after thread.

Someone with nihilistic convictions of any kind (or sufficiently close to it: solipsist, egotist, relativist or subjectivist of any kind) is as unconvinceable as someone with religious convictions. If you're explicitly rejecting the possibility of reasoning about a topic, of course there's no rational discourse that can happen there. I've tried the appeal to pragmatism instead of abstract reason, but apparently that's of no concern either since he seems fine with people just forcing change of opinion through non-rational means, and that's the main thing a pragmatic argument assumes we want to avoid, so I see no point continuing.

You are just too silly :p