The main point for an objectivist (and I hope and think most of us are objectivists) is that nothing is ever right just because someone thinks it is right. — Congau

I'll add my applause :clap:

What do you actually mean by “A is right for Joe”? ... The first position is relativist, — Congau

The point here being to complete your argument, so pick the one that makes your argument least complete.

Objectivism is not about reaching a common agreement. — Congau

Correct; from the link in the OP (i.e., the wiki page):

Moral universalism (also called moral objectivism) is the meta-ethical position that some system of ethics, or a universal ethic, applies universally, that is, for "all similarly situated individuals" — Moral_universalism

The main point for an objectivist (and I hope and think most of us are objectivists) is that nothing is ever right just because someone thinks it is right. — Congau

Okay, but we can still devise a moral meta-ethic where some things are objectively wrong and others are relatively wrong, and such would avoid the issue by your metric of not being a moral system but can still hold that some things are indeed right just because someone thinks it right. What I'm really interested in is your argument against those positions.

What do you actually mean by “A is right for Joe”? Do you mean “Joe thinks A is right and therefore I think Joe should do A” or do you mean “I think Joe should do A whether or not he thinks it is right”? The first position is relativist, the second is objectivist. — Congau

That doesn't seem quite right.

What about the situation where “I think Joe should do A whether or not he thinks it is right” because I think it is right. I don't think that makes me an objectivist.

I was leery about going along with "objectivist," but I thought Randianism was obscure and disreputable enough that there would be little chance of confusion. — SophistiCat

Yes, my remark was vis-a-vis the OP. I don't have a problem with OP's defining their own terms ... but I don't have a problem criticizing those term selections either.

If you have never lived in the US then Randianism does seem completely disreputable and irrelevant. However, for those in the US, the word "objectivist" has clear Randian connotations, and insisting on the idea that "still, morals can be objective; objectivism as such can still make sense" I would interpret to be closet Randianism (a basic empathy with the Randian objective, but without committing to defending her arguments directly, as that hasn't worked out well).

I think Pfhorrest is apt to treat moral propositions much like a physicalist would treat propositions about the physical world, and he believes that we can use something like a scientific method for discovering moral truths. In any case "objective morality" is a term of art, though I wouldn't have a use for it. — SophistiCat

Yes, I understand the basic idea of the program, but clearly morals aren't discoverable by a physicalist process as such, moral principles are clearly not objects like a chair or a fork. Universal morals can still only exist subjectively, just with the qualifier of being true for all subjects (such as a categorical imperative binding all moral agents), and clearly cannot exist as an object with measurable properties; we can never settle a moral principle debate by simply weighing or timing or measuring the distance or angle of some apparatus with respect to some physical object.

Normally, I don't care so much about such labels, I'd be willing to roll with it as you have been doing and being content to just note traditions that have used other words for the same idea, but in this case the label more or less contains the basic error in reasoning which is a misunderstanding of the scientific process, and so I think it is worth dwelling upon. The word "objectivist" simply sets up all sorts of bait and switch fallacy as it's associated with the scientific method (that clearly "works") but also employed colloquially as a sort of "virtue" of removing one's biases; however, neither does the scientific method nor attempting to remove biases conclude with any moral principles. In the case of science as such the scientism fallacy is well trodden ground, but the more colloquial interpretation of "being objective" is a more subtle fallacy in the category of the virtue moral distinction (more subtle as pertaining to inner qualities, so at least on the same side, or the perhaps somewhere in the middle if we view our faculties as objects, of the subjective-objective divide, and clearly closely related to moral principles as such as we require virtues to implement any moral project effectively); the usual examples being discipline and courage being a virtue we can understand the import of but doesn't resolve any moral debate as to what goals one should pursue with discipline and courage, and so dedicating oneself to such virtues as somehow fundamental is simply a ruse to avoid reviewing one's actual moral values and activities; such as the Nazi's for whom discipline and courage was everything -- and, to make no mistake, I would closely associate with Randianism: it's all about feeling better than other people, in the case of Rand having the virtue of "being objective" (a more "modern" virtue than the ancients listed, and therefore quite sophisticated), which for her meant despising altruism and a basic misunderstanding of the idea of collective action, makes you better than other people.

I've lived in the US my entire life and associating lower-case "objectivism" with Randianism sounds very weird and parochial to my ear, like something only someone who gets all their information from right-wing talk-radio would think. I know you're not that kind of person, quite the opposite, but it seems like you balk at that term like you've only really heard it from that kind of person. Maybe you've had the misfortune to associate a lot more with them than I have. (If it's not clear, I definitely don't sympathize with them).

FWIW, a quick Google for "moral objectivism" shows only #6 out of the top ten results having anything to do with Rand, and the rest using the more general sense that I'm using here.

I had the same reaction as boethius as I mentioned on my first post (page 1). It's not damning - I'm aware that, in the main, moral objectivism's provenance has nothing to do with Ayn Rand. In my case though, moral naturalism (which implies objectivity) is more precise and less encumbered.

I've lived in the US my entire life and associating lower-case "objectivism" with Randianism sounds very weird and parochial to my ear — Pfhorrest

That's because Randians put some effort to reformulate Randianism without explicitly defending Rand (as she said the quiet pars out loud, and that becomes a nuisance in the long term). Turning the "O" in "Objectivism" to an "o" is another small step in this process. I have simply never encountered the term "objectivism" outside the Randian tradition (i.e. people who have read Rand and appreciated her work, empathize with her and her protagonists and agree with the main point).

FWIW, a quick Google for "moral objectivism" shows only #6 out of the top ten results having anything to do with Rand, and the rest using the more general sense that I'm using here. — Pfhorrest

I ran the same experiment, so here we can be objective about something.

#0

This site can’t be reached, www.ucs.mun.ca took too long to respond.
Try:

Checking the connection
Checking the proxy and the firewall
ERR_CONNECTION_TIMED_OUT — Moral Relativism and Objectivism

#1

Robust moral realism, the meta-ethical position that ethical sentences express factual propositions about robust or mind-independent features of the world, and that some such propositions are true.

Moral universalism, the meta-ethical position that some system of ethics or morality is universally valid, without any further semantic or metaphysical claim.

The ethical branch of Ayn Rand's philosophy of Objectivism (Ayn Rand). — Moral objectivism - wikipedia

So either talking about something we already have a word for ... or talking about Rand.

#2

Moral objectivism is the position that moral truths exist independantly from opinion.

There are several versions of moral objectivism, of varying levels of strentgth. They area, from weakest to strongest:

Moral universalism
Moral realism
Moral absolutism — Moral Objectivism -

"Philosophy Index" is made for homeschooling by North Gate Academy. Essentially every link is broken; going to the home page and clicking "Camus" (or any other philosopher) just gets to a "404 not found" page. According to North Gate Academy: "Northgate strives to foster a culture of excellence in learning based on biblical teachings, in a flexible and nurturing online learning environment." So, not dedicated to philosophy as such.

If this is google's second choice, rather than Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, or Oxford, or even just any university online material ... maybe this tells us something, but moving on.

#3

On a side note: Don’t confuse moral objectivism with Objectivism. Objectivism is an ethical theory
proposed by Ayn Rand which is related to Ethical Egoism, a theory we will discuss later in the course. — Introduction to Ethics - Indian Hills community colledge

I can only help but notice the close association with Rand and that Randiasm will be taught in this "introduction to Ethics".

#4
[quote=Our Morality: A Defense of Moral Objectivism - Mitchell Silver
;https://philosophynow.org/issues/83/Our_Morality_A_Defense_of_Moral_Objectivism]
Among the rules that can motivate actions and determine judgments are those that classify all possible actions as either permissible or impermissible. I call such rules ‘categorical permissibility rules’ (henceforth, simply ‘permissibility rules’). Common examples of permissibility rules include: it is always impermissible to act in a way that will not increase overall happiness or reduce overall suffering (John Stuart Mill promoted that one); it is always impermissible to treat someone merely as a means (a favorite of Immanuel Kant’s); never do to others that which is hateful to you (the Talmudic version of a commonplace in religious ethics); always obey whatever the priest tells you God has commanded (another commonplace in religious traditions); and, never act against self-interest (Ayn Rand). Less common, but equally possible permissibility rules include: never run for a bus (Mel Brooks); and, never act against Mitchell Silver’s interests (no one, alas). There are an endless number of possible permissibility rules.]

This is simply a bizarre essay in terms of making new labels for things referred to within the essay.

Why makeup the term "categorical permissibility rules" without explaining how it is either exactly the same or then in some way different than Kant's "Categorical Imperative", and, moreover, go onto to reference Kant as an example of a categorical permissibility rule in the next sentence? Also, if all these previous authors such as John Stuart Mill, Kant, Talmudic authors, common place religious traditions, Ayn Rand, Mel Brooks, it makes us wonder whether there was a term for these contrasting ideas with moral subjectivism (which the author clearly doesn't understand that moral principles existing subjectively does not necessarily imply they cannot be universal, as they can nevertheless be true for all subjective view points in one way or another; so he is just ignorant about the subject matter) and to contrast with moral relativism.

The author also doesn't follow the above quote with the obvious followup claim that insofar as these "categorical permissibility rules" are incompatible with each other, some or all of them are wrong and have no justification for believing in them, but rather goes on to defend commitment to one's chosen "permissibility rule" as a reasonable thing, which is moral relativism.

We could go on, but the casual mention of Ayn Rand along side Kant, Mill, the Talmud, is clearly someone who is self consciously reformulating the foundations of Randianism (either to attract that Randian audience or then to show Randianism as "reasonable" for the authors own empathy with Rand). We can also notice in passing how the only principle mentioned in "other religions" is to " obey whatever the priest tells you God has commanded" rather than "do onto others as you would have them do onto you" (Jesus) or "Love the whole world as if it were your self; then you will truly care fore all things" (Tao) or "Teach this triple truth to all: A generous heart, kind speech, and a life of service and compassion are the things which renew humanity" (Buddha) ... but nope, the "commonplace belief" in religion outside the Talmud is "do as the priest says".

#5

"My morality, the morality of reason, is contained in a single axiom: existence exists—and in a single choice: to live. The rest proceeds from these. To live, man must hold three things as the ruling values of his life: Reason—Purpose—Self-esteem. Reason, as his only tool of knowledge—Purpose, as his choice of the happiness which that tool must proceed to achieve—Self-esteem, as his inviolate certainty that his mind is competent to think and his person is worthy of happiness, which means: worthy of living. These three values imply and require all of man's virtues…"
— Ayn Rand , Atlas Shrugged .

For thousands of years, people have been taught that goodness consists in serving others. "Love your brother as yourself" teach the Christian scriptures. "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need" preach the Marxists. Even the liberal Utilitarian philosophers, many of whom defended free market capitalism, taught that one should act always to attain "the greatest good for the greatest number." The result of this code has been a bloody trail of wars and revolutions to enforce self-sacrifice, and an endless struggle in society to achieve equality among people. — What is the Objectivist Position in Morality (Ethics)? - Atlas society

I suppose this is the one of the six that was indeed associated with Rand.

#6

"Objectivism" denotes the thesis that morality is objective. Subjectivism holds that morality is subjective. Relativism holds that morality is relative. In the sequel, I am interested in distinguishing moral objectivism from its denial; therefore, I assume that "relative" and "subjective" both mean "non-objective". If they do not already mean this, then I stipulate that meaning hereby. There are a number of people who believe moral relativism so defined. — Moral Objectivism by Michael Huemer - This is an undergraduate paper from circa 1992

... just, wow. Xism is X, Yism is Y, Zism is Z; I assume Y and Z both mean not-X; I don't know if this is true ... so in case it's not I'm stipulating it anyway??? :(

Sigh, again, subjectivist approach to ethics can be simply that moral principles are properties of subjects, not objects, but this does not stop moral claims from being true for all subjects (universal to all moral agents).

Michael Huemer has long essays critiquing Rand's "Objectivism" while building his alternative "objectivism", and is really a great example typifying this group of people in the US who see Rand as worthy of lengthy reflection and critique, whether water to fill one's vase or an anvil to sharpen one's blade.

General Conclusion:

On just the quality of the sources and authors alone, without reviewing the content, one can conclude that "objectivist" isn't really a thing in world philosophical debate; it is confined to the US and not associated with major publications nor major authors and philosophers.

If we look into the content, we find the authors specifically reference Rand in their discussion of "objectivism". It is simply the history of the term that it was posited by Randians as a more "proper philosophical" reformulation of the basic Randian approach (inventing a philosophical tradition after Rand in which Rand is just one formulation; that Rand was right for being a "moral objectivist" even there's some fault in her particular "Objectivism"; but then denying small "o" objectivism has nothing to do with Rand is like positing small "k" kantianism has nothing to do with Kant; it's just juvenile hair splitting of terminology distinctions that have no basis in history and clearly don't make sense; it's simply not reasonable to use the label small "k" kant, have a similar starting point and terminology, a "Categorical Permissibility" if you will, but refuse any relation to the big "K" Kant). The labels of moral universalism, moral absolutism, moral rationalism, deontology, moral naturalism, already exist, so to rename one or all of these concepts "moral objectivism" without any need is, in the contemporary scene, to place oneself in the Randian tradition and not these other traditions (in searching around "objectivism" was used a bit as an expression, but was synonymous to moral naturalism; "objectivism" as simply moral universalism is not naturalism, as there are universalist moral theories not founded on nature but logic and "moral agents" in the most general sense or then founded on the divine, neither of which are based on nature as we find it).

Equating "objective" with "reasonable" is a Randian invention, and all the top 6 google hits for "moral objectivism" are American sources or authors, most mention Rand explicitly.

The small "o" objectivists I have encountered are people who are trying to reformulate Rand's basic program (wittingly or unwittingly), are deep in her frame as red pillars would say, and see "objective" as the natural alternative to "relativism" based on the mistaken association of relativism with subjectivism (they see Rand's basic terminology, aka false dichotomy, as making sense but want to draw slightly different conclusions than Rand; rather than see Rand as total nonsense and joining the philosophical conversation and using the common terminology, and lack of an obvious false dichotomy between "subjective" and "universally true", found within the debates that happened between Aristotle and Rand as a superior idea; and, to be sure, we should also be clear that Aristotle didn't view moral principles as similar to physical objects).

All philosophers of note view moral principles as subjective, a property of subjects and not objects, because it's obviously true; how we subjects might justify moral principles and are those justifications true of all subjects (through reason or divine decree or happenstance) or then fundamentally arbitrary or then individually contingent (somehow neither arbitrary nor universal) being the key contentions. Likewise, nearly all philosophers would say their approach is "reasonable", and so whatever moral principles they decide on (for themselves or for everyone or for some) follows reasonably from reasonable things to believe; moral relativists are also saying their moral principles, which they are free to choose, follow from the reasonable conclusion that moral relativism is true and they are thus free to choose (just as having a preference for blue over red without insisting everyone have the same preference doesn't make one unreasonable; so, another false dichotomy to say moral objectivism views morality as derivable from reason in contrast to moral relativism that does not).

Philosophers have proposed similar "sense experience" of moral principles as we have with objects, but have been quite cognizant that such "moral sense" is not the same kind of sense as heat or sight; there's also already a word for such a proposed sense, "our conscience"; this "conscience" would be the closest philosophical idea of morality being objective (we can sense moral principles just as we can sense objects; i.e. we can be objective about both and "sense the truth" in some sense and in a similar way; the difference being we cannot use an apparatus to settle a debate about whether one moral principle is weightier than another as we can use an apparatus to settle a debate about whether this rock is weightier than this log, and it is this lack of apparatus to settle debates that leads such philosophers to be clear moral principles are not objects); this lack of an apparatus to measure an object is the main difficulty these philosophers try to contend with, and so again, even if there is a proposed "moral sense" such moral principles to be sensed are not objects (if Rand or her "objective" followers read any philosophy, they would have realize simply saying "I'm the objective one" doesn't suddenly conjure the truth out of thousands of years of philosophical debate between different subjects). So, simply following our conscience in a naive way (our altruism if we feel it) would be the theory most inline with "objectivism" based on what it means to conclude about something objectively (through our senses).

Conclusion:

Equating "objective" with "reasonable" is a Randian invention — boethius

I don't know why you make so much of this. I am obviously not well-read in this area, but even a cursory search shows that the word "objective" and its forms are routinely used in relation to ethics in philosophy and psychology literature, with no reference to Rand, e.g.

Moral realism and the foundations of ethics
Moral realism: A defence (36 uses of 'objectivist,' 'objective,' etc. in just the first two chapters)
Ethical intuitionism

The third link you post is a book by Michael Huemer, who I've already cited, and who has long critiques of Rand.

The following responds to "The Objectivist Ethics" by Ayn Rand. I assume the reader is familiar with it. I begin with a general overview of what is wrong with it. I follow this with a set of more detailed comments, which make a paragraph-by-paragraph examination of her statements in the essay. The latter also elaborates further some of the points made in the overview. — Critique of The Objectivist Ethics - Michael Huemer

The first link you post is indeed more scholarly but is arguing for moral realism, as "objective in some way". Perusing the book (what pages are available for free), a central theme is analyzing "rational egoism" and different analytical approaches, but mainly seems to be refuting "objectivism" as a justification for believing something is true. From what I gather, a main purpose of the book is to demonstrate that moral realism is not "objectivism". My guess is the author is aware of the popularity of Objectivism arguments, as the book is published in 1989 by an American author, and the rejections of "objectivism" in various specific contexts, and focus on "rational egoism", but transposed into scholarly terms, is a terminology chosen to be both scholarly and analyzing "big O" Objectivism at the same time (big "O" Objectivism is not worth considering directly, but the basic themes of rational egoism and universal moral truths based on realism, which we can call "objective" if we want, are still relevant for analysis).

I don't know why you make so much of this. — SophistiCat

The reason I dwell on this point is that there's simply lot's of Randians in the US (on the Supreme court to boot), and simply using the term "objectivism" they clearly view as some small victory for Rand, whether they are explicit or closet supporters. I've had lot's of debates with explicit or closet Randians and setting up the terminology "Objectivist" is a very important starting point, and since it sets up false dichotomies (as they use it, such as in the OP here), I find it's best to simply keep to this point than to accept the terminology and then try to explain later that subjective truths can be universal. I have simply never encountered the term "Objectivist" outside people influenced by Rand. In doing some digging, the term does appear from time to time before Rand, but for different things, not in the way the OP uses it; opposing "objectivism" to "subjectivism" seems pretty clearly a framework started by Rand and is a false dichotomy as it pertains to morals, as I've explained (so, perhaps why the term was not used in this way before).

As the OP states:

I mean only what's also called "moral universalism" — Pfhorrest

However, moral universalism is compatible with moral subjectivism formulated in the sense that moral properties (where moral principles are said to "exist") are a matter of subjects and not objects. So, to use the terminology "moral objectivism" as equivalent to "moral universalism" seems to quite clearly setup either confusion or straight-up contradiction when talking about moral universalism that is also moral subjectivism. Likewise, if we try to more rigorously define "objective", a usual formulation is simply what different subjects will agree to, so objective depends on subjective, just many subjects perhaps debating for many a time; so, if we have a sort of Popperian view of objective built upon subjects, it's again simply confusing to then say objectivism is opposed to subjectivism. Of course, if we view "objective" as only a process or a quality that can be said of objects, measurable things, then we avoid all such confusions. If we're not using "objective" in anyway apart from saying "it's true" then it's just a confusing extra emblem that contains no meaning, as it then takes time to determine that nothing is meant more than "it's true"; but then, of course, everyone will claim to be objective in this way, including moral relativist (they are just "being objective" that no moral truths are universally true; i.e. everyone is objectivist).

I mean only what's also called "moral universalism", which is just the claim that, for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make, i.e. that the correct moral evaluation doesn't change depending on who is making it. — Pfhorrest

I voted no, because I have never seen a good account for how to determine what is objectively moral, or how to adjudicate between different moral views stemming from different values.

The only argument that moral objectivist seem to have is that they can't accept the conclusion that there might be different views on morality, typically including views they find hard to accept,... which is no argument at all really, because what we would want doesn't necessarily have implications for what is true.

My view is that we construct and (tacitly) agree on morals in (local) groups, and that is what we have for better or for worse.

I mean only what's also called "moral universalism", which is just the claim that, for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make, i.e. that the correct moral evaluation doesn't change depending on who is making it. — Pfhorrest

Note that this definition seems problematic in a number of ways. For the moral constructivist there also is a correct answer, if we are to take the "full context" into account... because full context also implies moral conventions and personal obligations that may apply in that particular situation. If we are to take the full context into account there doesn't seem to be a whole lot left of what one would consider universal.

And in any case the fact that there may be a correct moral course of action, doesn't have to imply that there is something objective about it. If you want to say morality is not merely a matter of personal opinion aka 'subjective', sure I can agree with that to some extend, but there are plenty of things that are not merely a matter of personal opinion that are not objective. To give but one example, the rules of any sport are not objective, we didn't find them in the world by making any kind of observation... we created them, but that doesn't make that only a matter of anyone's personal opinion.

I get that we want to use words like objective and universal to fend off the boogeyman of relativism and nihilism, but ultimately that's not what those words mean. Meaning, although not objective, is also not only a matter of anyone's personal opinion ;-).

I have never seen a good account for how to determine what is objectively moral ... — ChatteringMonkey

Consider the account linked below and point out its shortcomings:

A précis on (an) 'objective (i.e. subject/pov-invariant) morality':

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/355166 — 180 Proof

Besides, while what makes people happy varies from person to person and from day to day for each of us, what makes people miserable, or suffer, is the same for everyone (i.e. not "subjective" in the least): — 180 Proof

Right, I don't necessarily disagree with this, but I wouldn't say a fully fleshed out morality directly follows from that. Morality is a bit more concrete and contextual. How we get from that general naturalistic background of human flourishing to more concrete morals in a given situation, is somewhat of a creative act which is not fully determined by our biology and allows for variations... and that wouldn't qualify as objective i'd say.

Of course, if we view "objective" as only a process or a quality that can be said of objects, measurable things, then we avoid all such confusions. If we're not using "objective" in anyway apart from saying "it's true" then it's just a confusing extra emblem that contains no meaning, as it then takes time to determine that nothing is meant more than "it's true"; but then, of course, everyone will claim to be objective in this way, including moral relativist (they are just "being objective" that no moral truths are universally true; i.e. everyone is objectivist). — boethius

"Objective morality" is often used interchangeably with "moral realism," but that doesn't clarify things much. As Crispin Wright quipped, "a philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science, for example, or ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more than to clear her throat." (But the same can be said about many philosophical terms of art.)

For the moral constructivist there also is a correct answer, if we are to take the "full context" into account... because full context also implies moral conventions and personal obligations that may apply in that particular situation. If we are to take the full context into account there doesn't seem to be a whole lot left of what one would consider universal. — ChatteringMonkey

The difference of import here is whether a particular event, the same event, can be simultaneously good and bad to two different observers, both of whom are correct in that judgement. So, somewhere in the world some old man owns a little girl as his personal sex slave. His neighbors thinks that’s fine. Other people half a world away think that’s morally atrocious. Is at least one of those judgements of the same event wrong, or not?

That’s a different question from whether keeping sex slaves is okay if it happens in one country and not okay if it happens in another, i.e. different details of different events.

The difference of import here is whether a particular event, the same event, can be simultaneously good and bad to two different observers, both of whom are correct in that judgement. — Pfhorrest

No it can't because the same event is subject to the same set of circumstances, which includes the same particular (moral) conventions that may apply.

Edit: You can critique certain moral conventions of other cultures which you find atrocious.

Edit: You can critique certain moral conventions of other cultures which you find atrocious. — ChatteringMonkey

And if that culture disagrees with your critique (as they would), is at least one of you wrong in your judgement?

Solipsism obviously isn't true, so... — Janus

Sounds like something someone in a simulation would say.

Sounds like something someone in a simulation would say. — Mac

If there exists a simulation for someone to be in, then solipsism isn’t true.

#0
This site can’t be reached, www.ucs.mun.ca took too long to respond. — boethius

It loaded for me, and this is what it says:

2. Moral Objectivism: The view that what is right or wrong doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are. Objectivist theories tend to come in two sorts:
(i) Duty Based Theories (or Deontological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is morally right or wrong is the kind of act it is.

E.g., Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) thought that all acts should be judged according to a rule he called the Categorical Imperative: "Act only according to that maxim [i.e., rule] whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." That is, he thought the only kind of act one should ever commit is one that could be willed to be a universal law.

(ii) Consequentialist Theories (or Teleological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is right or wrong are its consequences.


Utilitarianism is the best known sort of Consequentialism. Its best known defender is John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Essentially, utilitarianism tells us that, in any situation, the right thing to do is whatever is likely to produce the most happiness overall. (The wrong thing to do is anything else.)

So either talking about something we already have a word for ... or talking about Rand. — boethius

I’m actually responsible for that page being only a disambiguation page. It used to be a messy article that wasn’t sure whether it was talking about minimal (universalist) or robust realism, with a few Randians acting like it was about their thing. Shuffling that content off into their respective articles (that already existed) and making that one a disambiguation was part of a general cleanup of metaethics articles I did over a decade ago.

I can only help but notice the close association with Rand and that Randiasm will be taught in this "introduction to Ethics". — boethius

That says that ethical egoism will be taught, not Rand specifically. And like with the Wikipedia article, it does seem appropriate to note that Randians also use this term differently, and distinguish that sense from the generic one.

My Google has 2 and 3 switched compared to yours, FWIW... though I seem to be getting different results now than I did last night, as that one Rand article is now at spot number 10 instead of 6. Above it are two SEP articles that it seems you didn’t get down to:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/

and

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moral-objectivity-relativism.html

Which both use “objectivism” throughout to mean the same thing I do here: non-relativism.

Agree. In my opinion morality is the last big illusion of mankind, after the flat earth, the geocentric view, and freewill.

I learned that there is a moral system for any type of behavior. For the selfish there is Ayn Rand's "Objectivism", for the religious there is Christian morality, for Moslems the sharia, for atheists humanism, for animal lovers there is PETA ... a.s.o. Even the mafia has its moral rules.

The main point for an objectivist (and I hope and think most of us are objectivists) is that nothing is ever right just because someone thinks it is right. — Congau

I mean only what's also called "moral universalism", which is just the claim that, for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make, i.e. that the correct moral evaluation doesn't change depending on who is making it. — Pfhorrest

Broad agreement with those things. Will have a go at saying what I think about ethics and meta-ethics in general.

There is an argument that goes; (1) moral evaluations depend upon minds and mind derived structures, therefore (2) there are no objective imperatives. I agree with the premise and the conclusion (with some qualifications), but think the implication from (1)=>(2) is false.

Regarding the premise: I find the observation that moral evaluations vary with culture and upbringing persuasive - so I'd agree that moral evaluations depend upon social facts. But that dependence strongly underdetermines moral conduct.

By moral conduct, I mean actions undertaken by agents which have intelligible proximate consequences for self and others that depend upon both what the act is and how the act is done. By moral evaluations, I mean any judgement concerning the adequacy of moral conduct by any standard. In that vocabulary. I believe culture is a strong influence on the distal causes of moral evaluation but not on the proximate consequences of the moral conduct those evaluations concern. For example, a religion might tell you abortion is wrong, but it won't force your hand into disowning your daughter for having one. There are always relevant contextual factors that shape moral evaluations that are not fully specified by the culture the moral conduct is embedded within. In other words culture facilitates standards of evaluation, rather than fully specifying any instance of evaluation. The standard is a mere part of judgement.

It is also worth lingering a minute on the impersonal character of social facts. The existence of Amazon the company existentially depends upon the collective action of humans, but it does not depend existentially upon the individual action of individual humans. It does not disappear if an individual ceases to have it in mind, it does not cease to exist when unwatched. It only ceases to exist if it ceases to function as an institution. That old Philip K. Dick quote about reality applies to institutions as much as it applies to nature; "Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away.". Emphasis on the "you".

So I characterize the dependence of moral evaluations upon minds as really being the dependence of moral evaluations on social facts. So I agree with premise (1) in this aspect. Another caveat I have is that social facts; like institutions; can be moral agents. This because their agents' aggregate actions have intelligible proximate consequences for themselves and others; their conduct is moral conduct as previously defined. If something's conduct is moral conduct, I believe it should be characterised as an agent and vice versa.

Because social facts; like institutions; partake in and structure the terrain of moral conduct, there is no problem of bridging the "is" of the universe's indifference + social mores to the "oughts" of what we do. Is and ought already intermingle when normativity is involved. In other words, since moral conduct's character depends upon social facts, we and our evaluations already operate on one side of the split. A stone tablet does not need to care about the commandments installed upon it, only we do. And we do. That we evaluate conduct in a manner constrained by social facts short circuits the need for a Platonic Good to sanctify our evaluations using an indifferent nature in the same breath as it undermines the relevance of the non-social to our conduct; which is always already social insofar as it can be subject to moral evaluation. All human conduct is the terrain to which moral evaluation is applied, and moral evaluation is part of that terrain. ("It is wrong to consider abortion wrong!")

There is then the question of the nature of this underdetermination of moral evaluation by social facts; what remains after stipulating that the social circumstance has an average shape. Fixing the social ontology we inhabit still leaves a broad domain of variation which we navigate in day to day life. An example; a shit day at work might make me prickly with my partner when I return home, but the facts of the shit day don't determine the specifics of how I treat her. And those specifics are, for the most part, what we live in.

When we go sufficiently fine grained that we've fixed societal structure, cultural structure, and even the antecedent/proximate events of our conduct - there is still moral evaluation to be done. If I call my partner names and take my day out on her, I would regret it. We would both agree that I could have treated her better. That is, it is a fact that I could've treated her better. So I would try to. So I agree with (2) insofar as it concerns purported context invariant "oughts" that apply to actions, but only because doing better is both contextual and a matter of an agent's skill. Objectivity in that sense sets the bar much higher than the demands that require us to do better.

Unfortunately, the resources available to us for such problems are rather limited; we can't discern The Optimal Way to act from the suite of apprehensions, misapprehensions, errors and cognitive blindspots we bring with us into everyday life. But that doesn't make "I could've done better" any less true; just makes doing better a difficult matter of improvisation, bodging, checking and negotiation.

That invites a problematic of moral character; how can one live so as to make that process of failing forward more adapted to the needs of those whom the moral conduct proximally effects? Which is simultaneously an intellectual endeavour - you gotta know what you need to try next and for who - and an empirical one - you gotta find out how and why you fail. What I will do depends on how I think, but those thoughts do not brand what I do as an improvement with necessity (given sufficient fixing of context). That connection between thought and improvement of moral conduct is a matter of moral character. Which is learnable, since it consists in the execution of skills; knowing how to read a situation, knowing what's relevant and irrelevant to improving your conduct, knowing how to enact the improvements so thought. Kairos is always matter of the right thing at the right time in the context, and "universalising" such a thing makes it about the agent (character) than the act (conduct). We cannot and should not expect the right thing at the right time to be the right thing for all time and all contexts.

The inherently contextual nature of moral conduct gives moral evaluation constraints to remain within the same context while evaluating - you have to ensure you're dealing with the problem on its own terms. Evaluating something's moral conduct can only be done while retaining enough of the context's social ontology to make failure and success states meaningful. "Should Mechanical Turk have some kind of labour protections?" should not be answered with "But what if Amazon never existed?"; the social facts and antecedent that make the evaluation make sense cannot be varied arbitrarily without making a nonsense of any moral evaluation. It is required that we think sufficiently proximately for the conduct in question, though there is a lot of leeway in that. "Should Mechanical Turk have some kind of labour protections?" may be answered with "No labour protections should be required for any job in a private business, outside of what is agreed in contract with the employers" and "Yes, but labour protections would undermine the very operation of Mechanical Turk - its business model requires that contractors be compensated at well below poverty rates". Similar to Anscombe's examples regarding owing someone money in a shop; it is true that one ought to pay the cashier (given the context's social facts). I doubt there can be a complete classification for what parts of the social ontology can be varied without making category errors for arbitrary conduct, but I believe it is a reasonable principle regardless.

"Objective morality" is often used interchangeably with "moral realism," but that doesn't clarify things much. As Crispin Wright quipped, "a philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science, for example, or ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more than to clear her throat." (But the same can be said about many philosophical terms of art.) — SophistiCat

I definitely agree that, on first sight, "objective" seems to be harmless enough as meaning "it's true of reality". However, if we're formulating moral realism as "there are real moral truths out there ... but they are not physical things ... not physical objects" then if we use objective as a substitute for realism we arrive at "objective truths about things that are not objects". It's clumsy speech at best, which is why, in my opinion, it simply didn't catch on. Rand chose "Objectivist" precisely because it wasn't referring to a clearly defined philosophical tradition at the time (and is a good contrast to bleeding heart liberals and other collectivists, bringing their subjective empathy for the poor into things), as she viewed herself as skipping over and superseding all of philosophy since Aristotle, she was fairly clear about not being part of any philosophical tradition since Aristotle.

Though I agree if one was not really aware of Rand it can seem fine to start an analysis with defining "objective moral truths" to mean "universal moral truths" (until one starts to analyse moral principles as clearly pertaining to subjects and not objects, and sticking to "objective" will simply cause confusion), but if one is aware of Rand, then defining small "o" objectivism seems very clear to me a form of historical revisionism to place Rand in a broader philosophical tradition to relate her to other more well regarded philosophers (possibility for the reasons that they made more sense).

So, this historical revisionism is of curious interest to me, but also that this particular "term of art" sets up directly the false dichotomy with moral subjectivism. And it's not only me that has pointed out the association with Randianism.

There is simply none of the "great philosophers" I am aware of that uses this term small o "moral objectivist", so creating the taxonomy tree with "moral objectivist" as the broad class of theories in opposition to moral relativism is clearly a contemporary attempt, that considering the close association with Randianism, I feel it's entirely valid to question the claims that it's not associated with Randianism and a revisionist or apologetics or nudge-nudge-wink-wink to Randians in some way. It seems pretty clear to me this whole "moral objectivist taxonomy projects" is a clear favour to Randians of putting their precious foundational identity word "objective" as a shining star atop of the mighty moral Christmas tree.

Moral Objectivism: The view that what is right or wrong doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are. Objectivist theories tend to come in two sorts:
(i) Duty Based Theories (or Deontological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is morally right or wrong is the kind of act it is.

E.g., Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) thought that all acts should be judged according to a rule he called the Categorical Imperative: "Act only according to that maxim [i.e., rule] whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." That is, he thought the only kind of act one should ever commit is one that could be willed to be a universal law.

Clearly, 'moral facts' are simply not like 'physical' facts, but differ in very critical ways, and the example of Kant that immediately follows this is very debatable a "factual statement". It's also debatable as simply truth, if we want to quibble and say facts are just any truth, independent of what anyone thinks, as clearly the requirement to will the principle to be a universal law is a thought dependent process.

No where does Kant say moral facts are similar to physical facts.

Kant goes to some lengths to justify going from physical facts (sense data) to physical principles, and that this is not a simple extension of our collection of facts (Hume is fundamentally right about induction) but transcends all our facts to arrive at principles that we believe to be universally true (we nevertheless are justified in basically ignoring the problem of induction as everyone usually does, we'll just take 900 pages to do so on this occasion).

Kant uses or develops terms such as a priori, posteori, synthetic a priori, categorical, judgement as opposed to sense data, pure reason, practical reason, transcendental idealism, and so on, precisely because his views cannot be expressed as simply stating "physical facts" and "moral facts".

The categorical imperative is built on all these distinctions and arguments to arrive at true moral principles we must transcend our moral feelings about situations in the most general sense to arrive at a duty towards all moral agents as ends in themselves. It's misleading to say the categorical imperative leads to moral facts or is itself a moral fact; its simply not clear what facts mean outside verifiable physical phenomena just as "being objective" has no clear meaning if we're not "being objective about things that are objects" (to illustrate, it's not clear what it means to say "this painting is objectively more beautiful than this other painting" whereas it is clear what we mean when we say "this table is objectively 2 meters long as opposed to my subjective feeling that it was shorter than 2 meters").

As you may know, there's lot's to argue about, but whatever these arguments about what Kant really means (and if so, was he right), it is simply a complete misrepresentation of Kant to describe him as viewing ethics as discovering 'moral facts' similar to 'physical facts'; the situation is much more complicated than viewing 'moral facts' akin to 'physical facts' even insofar as we believe they are true independently of our own minds (which transcendental idealism we can interpret to preclude in principle the independence from our own minds; that we cannot actually get out of our minds and ideas to an objective view, the actual noumena, of even mundane facts if we're now interpreting facts as agreed on phenomena, but must transcend, which is opposed to just asserting whatever we believe are facts in a naive realism that 'moral facts' seems to imply).

Now, this definition may simply be reporting how people (since Rand and who have read and largely like Rand) have been defining "moral objectivism", and so accurately reporting this usage, but that does not make the usage "have nothing to do with Rand" nor even imply the usage makes any sense. It seems pretty clear to me Objectivists made "moral objectivism" a thing and by using this terminology introduced themselves this moral taxonomy in introductory material that they can now point to and say "see, moral objectivism is a thing". People who have not thought through that it's simply not a good term as simply doesn't relate to objects if we're talking about moral principles, may also adopt the terminology as they see it elsewhere, which is fine as far as it goes, but seems to me also fine to point out the confusions that immediately arise from this classification structure, likely influence of Rand one may expect around any corner once hearing "objectivist", and pointing to the alternative definitions that seem more current in the history of philosophy and in the rest of the world.

there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make, — Pfhorrest

I hadn't thought of it in this way before, but I suppose I am a theoretical Moral Objectivist, but a practical Moral Pragmatist. I assume there is universal moral Truth in the same sense that there is ultimate Mathematical Truth. My worldview requires an absolute state or principle that most people call "god". Only a transcendent omniscient Observer would have an Objective perspective on all human moral agency. This has been the traditional role of a monotheist deity : to be an "all-seeing eye" in the sky, or a Santa Claus "making a list of good little boys & girls". But I no longer think in those terms. Instead my Absolute is a logical necessity, just like Mathematical Truth. In theory, all partial real values will add-up to a final universal Evaluation : all things considered, the Moral Equation should add-up to Zero, i.e. perfect balance.

The pragmatic Moral rule in effect in the world is some form of Relativism, in which moral judgments are made by your collective human peers about your individual inter-personal behavior. But the ideal rule is that a complete holistic universal judgment is made at the highest possible level of discernment. So, Moral Objectivity requires an Idealistic worldview, such as that of Plato's Logos (perfect proportion & reason) . However, in the Real world, we don't have access to Absolute Knowledge, so we have to make-do with ever-changing human judgments of Right & Wrong, Good & Evil. And we use relativistic rules of thumb, like the Golden Rule, to imagine our behavior from another person's perspective.That's about as close to Objectivity as we can get. :smile:

PS__I didn't check a box, because of my BothAnd philosophy, which let's me have it both ways. Either-Or thinkers will find that to be morally evasive. But I find it philosophically useful for keeping an open mind. There is no absolute Certainty in human mathematics, but Mathematicians must assume there is an ultimate correct answer to every question or equation.

Uncertainty Principle : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle

For those interested in the positive proof side of this small o "objectivist" debate.

The small o "objectivist", or even just the word "objective" itself, does not appear in wikipedia's entry on "normative ethics", and if you click through to the usual suspects of "deontology", "consequentialism", "virtue ethics", you do not get appearance of small o "objectivists".

Simply going through such material should be enough to convince oneself that small o "objectivist" is not a popular terminology; it is not usual to say of universalist ethical theories that they are "objective".

Where we do find a notable "objective" (though not small o "objectivist") is in the entry on meta-ethics under the heading "moral realism":

Moral realism

Moral realism (in the robust sense; cf. moral universalism for the minimalist sense) holds that such propositions are about robust or mind-independent facts, that is, not facts about any person or group's subjective opinion, but about objective features of the world. Meta-ethical theories are commonly categorized as either a form of realism or as one of three forms of "anti-realism" regarding moral facts: ethical subjectivism, error theory, or non-cognitivism. Realism comes in two main varieties:

Ethical naturalism holds that there are objective moral properties and that these properties are reducible or stand in some metaphysical relation (such as supervenience) to entirely non-ethical properties. Most ethical naturalists hold that we have empirical knowledge of moral truths. Ethical naturalism was implicitly assumed by many modern ethical theorists, particularly utilitarians.
Ethical non-naturalism, as put forward by G. E. Moore, holds that there are objective and irreducible moral properties (such as the property of 'goodness'), and that we sometimes have intuitive or otherwise a priori awareness of moral properties or of moral truths. Moore's open question argument against what he considered the naturalistic fallacy was largely responsible for the birth of meta-ethical research in contemporary analytic philosophy." — Meta-ethics

And, of note, both these moral realisms listed, use of "objective" is referring to objects, and employed in this way it has a clear meaning that we somehow "observe" these moral properties like we do other properties about objects (either we have a moral sense, or the moral information is derivable from the empirical information); a clear meaning that follows from "object" in the word "objective", but is not synonymous with "universal"; moral rationalism is opposed to moral naturalism, yet both can be formulated to be making universalist moral claims: that universal moral claims are justified through appeals to reason for moral rationalism, and that universal moral claims are justified with respect to sensing the physical world in some way in the case of naturalism. So, this is completely compatible with what I have stated in previous comments: that to say moral principles are "objective" makes sense if we're talking about sense data in the same way we have sense data of other physical objects (that we sense what is right and wrong, whether directly or through some synthesis of such data without invoking an implicit deontological or conequentialist or vitue based evaluation that is not itself derived from sense data in a similar way).

this particular "term of art" sets up directly the false dichotomy with moral subjectivism — boethius

That's not a false dichotomy though, that's exactly what is meant by it: not "subjective" in the sense of relative to any particular subject.

Even empiricism about reality is "subjective" in that it has something to do with subjects: empiricism appeals to sensory experience, which is had by the subjects of that sensory experience. But besides radical empiricisms like subjective idealism or solipsism, it's not "subjective" in the sense that what any particular subject experiences matters more than any other; the objective empirical truth is that which is available to all subjects' sensory experience, without bias.

Likewise, even if (as I agree) morality has something to do with we subjects, that doesn't mean it has to be "subjective" in the sense that solipsism or subjective idealism are, a sense opposed to "objective". It can just be "subjective" in the sense that empiricism is "subjective", and still possibly be "objective" in the sense that our usual empirical realism is "objective", i.e. unbiased.

Also, "object" in general doesn't only have the one sense that we use of physical objects, as a "being" or "entity". It can also mean "end", "purpose", "aim", "goal", etc. (As in, "the object of this exercise is ..."). A moral object is something that something can be good for. It's basically just a good, a thing to be sought after, what to work toward. Moral objectivity implies that there is something that is actually good to strive for and work toward, rather than just whatever various subjects feel like doing; just like factual objectivity implies that there is something that is actually real to know and understand, rather than just whatever various subjects perceive.

And if that culture disagrees with your critique (as they would), is at least one of you wrong in your judgement? — Pfhorrest

It's wrong in my judgement, yes, but I'm not the authority on everything that is right and wrong, everywhere. I would acknowledge that my judgement is also a product of my particular context. But at the same time I would also acknowledge that some case can be made from the 'telos' that follows from our biology as I also said in a reply to 180proof. So I agree that there's a naturalistic background we can fall back on to formulate such arguments, and in extreme cases like sex slavery this seems like a an easy case to make, but there are plenty of other less clear moral issues where you could go in different directions.

But maybe the point is this really. If we have to create or construct morals, as I think we do, and therefore it's not merely a matter of finding, or worse just knowing what the correct morals are, than we have a continuous responsibility (as contexts change) of putting in the effort to do so. That is thinking about it rationally, getting into dialogue with other people and trying to convince them with good arguments... which ultimately seems like a more productive approach than just insisting on you being objectively right and them being objectively wrong.

It's wrong in my judgement, yes — ChatteringMonkey

Sorry, I guess I phrased that ambiguously.

I meant, is at least one of those judgements (either yours or theirs) wrong?

That's not a false dichotomy though, that's exactly what is meant by it: not "subjective" in the sense of relative to any particular subject. — Pfhorrest

It can be true of a particular subject, doesn't exclude that it is true for other subjects or even all subjects.

If we're saying it's true for all subjects, the common terminology is to say "it's universally true" or "true for all moral agents". If all we're maintaining is that it's true for all subjects, it's clearly awkward to say that such a claim is "objective".

Now, if we're claiming it's true for all subjects due to the properties of objects or then due to some sense that is akin to how we sense objects (a sense object just like other sense objects like a chair), then it is less awkward to say we are "being objective". This diction choice makes sense, but is clearly not equivalent to universal moral claims and theories in general that are not referencing objects (as sense data or then as simply things existing independently of subjects).

Now, you can stick to a terminology where "objective" just means "universally true" or "true for all moral agents"; obviously nothing's stopping you. But clearly more effort is then needed to be clear that there's not necessarily any "object" with respect to which we are being objective; there could be only subjects and they're ideas that we're dealing with under the category of "objective", as nothing is stopping me from placing great emphasis on everything we can possibly say about this word choice.

Even empiricism about reality is "subjective" in that it has something to do with subjects: empiricism appeals to sensory experience, which is had by the subjects of that sensory experience. But besides radical empiricisms like subjective idealism or solipsism, it's not "subjective" in the sense that what any particular subject experiences matters more than any other; the objective empirical truth is that which is available to all subjects' sensory experience, without bias. — Pfhorrest

You seem here just illustrating how opposing "objective" to "subjective" creates a false dichotomy. The use of the word "subjective" does not immediately imply that one experience matters more than another; this is easily a straw man of "subjective" theories such as "transcendental idealism" of Kant. Saying something is subjective can simply mean it is a property of subjects and not objects, which in turn doesn't exclude objects being subjective properties of a particular insistent kind of which there seems relatively easy agreement between different subjects (again, agreement subjectively experienced).

This "objective is what many subjects will agree about" (what the expression "objective" usually means: we and other agree this chair weighs 5 kilos), is clearly still dependent on subjective experience and so in contradiction to the definition of of objective as "independent from what people think". In otherwords, we can get to an objective belief about the situation, but still posit the object we are objective about has a existence apart from such an objective process; i.e. the "thing in itself".

Facts do not usually reference "things in themselves" (as independent of experience) but rather the conclusions that we are able to draw from our sense experience. Saying "it's a fact" implies there's at least some subjective experience somewhere justifying the belief; a fact is clearly dependent on what people think. It is just sloppy to say "claims that are true for all subjects; universally true claims" are "claims that are true independent of what anyone thinks"; these are two different assertions which could overlap but need not to.

For instance, a "claim that is true independent of what anyone thinks ... simply because no one has any experience at all about the object of that claim", maybe true, but is clearly not a "fact" in the sense of something we know (seems irrelevant to say there nevertheless exists a fact no one knows about this object no one has any experience about about, but we can presume they exist for the sake of argument), but more importantly, by definition, whatever facts we presume to exist about the unknown are not and cannot be universal claims true for all subjects (that all subjects should make such a claim that no subject knows anything about, because the claim is about something detached, and thus independent, from all subjective experiences).

Kant uses the term "thing in itself" to refer to the objects existence or essence independent of people's thoughts and ideas about it (the noumena which Kant claims we can never know as it truly is); it's clearly making a mess of things to then claim Kant's beliefs about things and moral principles are "objective" in the sense of being things or claims independent of thoughts (he is very clear we can know nothing, i.e. have no specific belief, of the noumena, we can only form belies about the phenomena; we presuppose the noumena exists but we do not come to "know" the noumena itself, only the phenomena, which does depend on our minds). And this is only for "the physical world", it's pretty clear Kant does not view the categorical imperative as noumena.

There is further confusions that can arise as it's only a "universal moral truth" in Kant's system to carry out a duty to other moral agents as ends in themselves; there is still potential of a plurality of moral principles that satisfy the categorical imperative (if it means respecting others as having intrinsic value and not being a hypocrite, there maybe many moral principles with respect to many situations that satisfy this conditions). So again, it's not clear if the specific moral principles we need to make decisions are "facts"; being a hypocrite is wrong, but there remains many ways to be right (again, we can stretch the definition of fact if we want to cover this, but we're clearly far removed from physical facts; so far removed that it's just simply recipe for confusion; we do not have all these considerations when we ask "what the facts are" of a situation).

In other-words, "objective" isn't used by Kant to describe his moral theory, and doesn't appear in discussions of Kant's moral theory by major sources, and the reason maybe because it's better to follow Kant's reasoning through all these nuances rather than redefine what his theory means in terms of objective truths and facts.

Also, "object" in general doesn't only have the one sense that we use of physical objects, as a "being" or "entity". It can also mean "end", "purpose", "aim", "goal", etc. (As in, "the object of this exercise is ..."). A moral object is something that something can be good for. It's basically just a good, a thing to be sought after, what to work toward. Moral objectivity implies that there is something that is actually good to strive for and work toward, rather than just whatever various subjects feel like doing; just like factual objectivity implies that there is something that is actually real to know and understand, rather than just whatever various subjects perceive. — Pfhorrest

Sure, you can redefine "being objective" as "pursuing a goal" rather than "facts", but all the examples covered so far have been quite clearly using "objective" as relating to "facts"; the hypothetical that another meaning could have been used that is less confusingly related to morality as just stating basically morality is about "goalism" (... and relativists can also have goals ... so the whole point of the distinction with relativism no longer makes any sense), is simply more confusing.

Again, no one's stopping you from using confusing terminology and "striking true" regardless, but no one's stopping me from pointing out the potential confusions so people are prepared to evaluate the success or failure of the undertaking.