can be quite conscious, and still be unaware of something — Mww

Not to split hairs, but you can't simultaneously be conscious and unaware of the same thing. You can be conscious of some things and unaware of other things....

How do you account for attention? Attention appears to be an actual process within consciousnes that amplifies certain sensory signals over others. They are still content within consciousness, but arent focused on.

Think about having a conversation in person with a friend and hearing a bird break into song in the background. You may hear the bird, but you aren't listening. You are listening to your friend.

So is consciousness really synonymous with awareness, when there seems to be degrees of awareness within conciousness thanks to the process of attention?

So is consciousness really synonymous with awareness, when there seems to be degrees of awareness within conciousness thanks to the process of attention? — Harry Hindu

I think the whole concept of attention fits perfectly with the notion that there are degrees of awareness and consciousness. It seems that attention corresponds to a high current degree of awareness. Like self-criticality. There is awareness, and there is self-awareness.

you can't simultaneously be conscious and unaware of the same thing. — Pantagruel

For things to be the same, or even synonymous to a significant reduction, they should really be so under any condition. But they are not, to wit: I am conscious of beauty when I see it, I am aware of things that are beautiful, but beautiful things are not themselves beauty. They merely represent my consciousness of what beauty should be. They are nothing but relative examples of it.

How would I be aware of a thing’s beauty if I didn’t already possess the standard by which to judge it? It follows necessarily that, while I am always conscious of beauty, I am often times completely unaware that a thing is beautiful. To put a split hair on it, I am conscious of beauty, but aware of its negation if a thing is ugly, which makes explicit the beauty of which I am conscious does not belong to the thing of which I am aware.

But that’s not what you’re talking about. You’re talking about not being able to be conscious of and unaware of the same thing at the same time, which presupposes a real object of sense. While this may indeed seem to be the case, it is so only if one thinks being conscious of and being aware of, is the same thing. But, alas....I am always conscious of that of which I am aware, but I am not always aware of that of which I am conscious.

Philosophy is the science of hair-splitting.

I think I’ll restrict attention to the province of awareness, rather than consciousness. While it is possible to be aware of a plurality of things at once, attention is usually thought as being a focus on some part of that general awareness. And I may not even have the object of awareness as a content of my consciousness if I never had any experience with it on the one hand, and never even gave a thought to its possibility, on the other. Yet, there is is, right in front of me, being perfectly aware of it. Whatever it is.

But then, anything I think, whether aware of it or not as a sensed object, cannot be other than at my attention. So there is that.

This is an interesting question that I think about quite often. A lot of people may say that the reason humans are more valuable than animals is our consciousness, and this justifies us eating them. But if aliens could have a higher level of consciousness than us, then they are justified in doing what they want with us. One reason why meeting aliens might be our undoing. As to your question, if we assume panpsychism, I'd say: why couldn't there be organisms that are more conscious?

It's not novel. It's roughly the first sense listed at dictionary.com: — bert1

To be clear, what I said was that

The notion of consciousness is explained by opposing it to unconsciousness. — Banno

...and the examples I gave showed how we could distinguish a conscious human, animal, computer or plant from an unconscious one.

How do you tell when a rock is sleeping?

And if you do not see this question as somewhat absurd, then perhaps that's an end to our discussion.

while I am always conscious of beauty, I am often times completely unaware that a thing is beautiful. — Mww

It seems to me impossible that while you are conscious of beauty you are unaware of beauty. Your approach is to suggest that you have an abstract knowledge called awareness and then failing to find that instantiated therefore no consciousness of awareness. You are begging your own question.

I'll happily stipulate that we do have such background knowledge and awareness, but all that says is that we are aware "that there is such a thing as beauty." And while we are aware of that, we are also conscious...of that.

I'm not seeing the difference. The reason we call a knocked-out person 'unconscious' is because they don't appear to have those properties. When they 'come to' again, we mark that they have done so by the apparent return of those properties. If those properties collectively, define consciousness it sounds almost exactly like the medical definition. — Isaac

The medical definition talks about levels of responsiveness in humans. The definition is in terms of behaviour, and we assume that these behaviours are accompanied by corresponding characteristically human experiences.

But we don't have to limit the use of 'consciousness' (even partly defined in terms of behaviour) to humans. We can wonder, for example, if the responsive behaviour of rocks is evidence of their subjective experience.

The definition of 'consciousness' (sense 1 in most dictionaries) is distinct from the medical definition in that it does not include any specific behaviour and speaks in very general terms about 'sensations', 'feelings', 'experiences' which are not, by definition, tied to any particular species, and even plants and minerals are not ruled out. If we want to say rocks are not conscious in this sense, we can't just appeal to a definition. We need a theory.

How do you tell when a rock is sleeping?

And if you do not see this question as somewhat absurd, then perhaps that's an end to our discussion. — Banno

On the definition of 'consciousness' you are using, we are in complete agreement. Rocks are unconscious in that sense. This definition entails the possibility of sleep and being knocked out and so on. These conditions are defined in terms of brain function. Rocks, by definition, do not have brains. Therefore rocks, by definition, are not conscious in this sense. We agree.

Panpsychism is therefore wrong, by definition. Is that right?

These conditions are defined in terms of brain function. — bert1

Brain function? No. I don't have to examine my cat's brain function to tell that it is sleeping.

Panpsychism is therefore wrong, by definition — bert1

I would get on board with that.

You're just trolling again

Yet I maintain that panpsychism is true. Should I see a doctor?

From a specific definition of consciousness that I agree with. I have nothing to say about other possible definitions. You're okay.

I would say that if the notion of having states of ‘less consciousness’ exists, then the notion of having states of ‘more consciousness’ exists. But, you are right I think. Trying to quantify something mental like consciousness does feel awkward. I would say we could make sense of it with an ad hoc definition such as x has states of more consciousness if it displays more a) self awareness and b) comprehension indicating intelligent behavior. Criteria (a) might be hard to measure though.

It seems to me impossible that while you are conscious of beauty you are unaware of beauty. — Pantagruel

Simple, really: I’m unaware of beauty when I don’t think a thing I’m aware of is beautiful. What right would I have to think that, if I didn’t already have an understanding of how beauty is represented in me? Being unaware of beauty just means the thing I’m aware of doesn’t meet some personal standard for it.
————-

You are begging your own question. — Pantagruel

It would seem that way, yes, if being aware and being conscious are taken to mean the same thing. The logical error disappears if they are considered to stand as separate and very distinct theoretical domains.
————-

I'll happily stipulate that we do have such background knowledge and awareness, — Pantagruel

Cool. “Background” tacitly understood to indicate that of which one is not immediately aware. So you’ve kindasorta acquiesced to the validity of two separate and distinct domains. YEA!!!

But we don't have to limit the use of 'consciousness' (even partly defined in terms of behaviour) to humans. We can wonder, for example, if the responsive behaviour of rocks is evidence of their subjective experience. — bert1

It wouldn't count as 'evidence' of anything. You just redefined the term to include it.

If you say "subjective experience could be defined to include the sort of things rocks have", then obviously the responsive behaviour of rocks will be evidence of it.

I could say red hair was evidence of insanity if I redefine 'insanity' to include all people with certain forms of the MC1R gene. But what would be the point?

The point of having a definition we can actually measure is that we can make use of it "is the patient concious?", "he was knocked unconscious", "were you concious at the time?". What possible use could it be to define conciousness as some property which is completely undetectable?

It wouldn't count as 'evidence' of anything. You just redefined the term to include it. — Isaac

We don't have to define consciousness' in terms of the behaviour of rocks, and I wouldn't normally do so. The definition (sense 1) is rock-neutral. We'd need a theory to link it to rocks. My panpsychist theory is that nothing could happen without consciousness: matter does what it does because of how it feels. Therefore if a rock does anything, including existing, that constitutes evidence of consciousness.

What possible use could it be to define conciousness as some property which is completely undetectable? — Isaac

Consciousness is detectable to the person that has it. And they may want to refer to this using a word.

Consciousness is detectable to the person that has it. And they may want to refer to this using a word. — bert1

But if they're speaking, they've already satisfied the original definition, so it's not serving any purpose not already met.

Speaking does not entail consciousness

Speaking does not entail consciousness — bert1

Right... So rocks are concious, but things which speak aren't?? This theory is getting more and more bizarre.

As a panpsychist, I think everything is conscious, including things that speak. But not as a matter of definition. I don't think anything is conscious as a matter of definition, except perhaps me. Panpsychism is not true by definition. That would make it a non-theory.

So perhaps I should have said 'speaking does not entail consciousness by definition'

Right. So back to my question then. Someone wishing to speak of their own conciousness is already concious, even by the medical definition (although, as you say, their speech ability does not define their consciousness). In all other potential cases it is impossible to distinguish concious from unconscious - indeed, everything is concious you say. So what's the use of the word?

Someone wishing to speak of their own conciousness is already concious, even by the medical definition — Isaac

This is really interesting. Ask me if I am conscious and I will say, "yes". Ask a zombie if he is conscious and he will either say "no", or not respond.

In all other potential cases it is impossible to distinguish concious from unconscious - indeed, everything is concious you say. — Isaac

Indeed. That is why philosophers are so exercised about the problem of other minds. Some theorise that nothing is conscious, some that some things are conscious, others that everything is conscious.

So what's the use of the word? — Isaac

To talk about which things we think are conscious, for example. Also to wonder about the experiences of other things. Consider:

John "I wonder what it's like to be a snail."
Jack: "Don't be silly, there's nothing it is like to be a snail. They're not conscious. Their brains aren't big enough to generate experience."

This is really interesting. Ask me if I am conscious and I will say, "yes". Ask a zombie if he is conscious and he will either say "no", or not respond. — Wheatley

Yes, that is interesting. I'm not sure what a zombie would say (although speculating about what things would or wouldn't say in a thought experiment is a bit rarefied!). Your take intuitively makes sense though.

'm not sure what a zombie would say (although speculating about what things would or wouldn't say in a thought experiment is a bit rarefied!). — bert1

Scientists need to create a non human zombie that can talk! Mystery solved! :party:

To talk about which things we think are conscious, for example. Also to wonder about the experiences of other things. Consider:

John "I wonder what it's like to be a snail."
Jack: "Don't be silly, there's nothing it is like to be a snail. They're not conscious. Their brains aren't big enough to generate experience." — bert1

But you said everything is concious. Jack's assertion wouldn't make any sense under that definition. Jack's assertion would only make any sense if there were some measurable difference between being concious and not, but you're saying that everything is concious, therefore there's no way one could exist, but not be concious.

I can't think of any use for such a term. What's more, we're definitely still going to want to differentiate between the level of awareness humans etc demonstrate and that demonstrated by rocks. So we're just going to need a new word to do exactly the job 'conciousness' does presently, whilst at the same time the original word becomes entirely useless. Why not just use the word as it already is?