I say "the reason for modal realism". You say every premise above is okay, and you accept modal realism. — mosesquine

No i haven't. Have you not seen the question?

How do you know this? — Agustino

I say "the reason for modal realism". You say every premise above is okay, and you accept modal realism. — mosesquine

And this isn't modal realism by the way. To be modal realism you have to prove to me that possible worlds not only CAN exist, but actually do exist. If they merely can exist, then I don't give a shit about them.

It's logic. Conclusions follow from premises. Good arguments are formally valid arguments. My argument is formally valid. You say that the premises and the conclusion are all okay. Modal realism wins.

Your attack is not on modal realism, but on the reason for modal realism. I defended the latter. Modal realism won.

It's logic. Conclusions follow from premises. Good arguments are formally valid arguments. My argument is formally valid. You say that the premises and the conclusion are all okay. Modal realism wins. — mosesquine

First, the conclusion is inconsequential, even if the premises are true (for the conclusion to be consequential you have to show me that not only CAN the possible worlds exist, but that they actually do exist - Lewis doesn't only claim that the possible worlds CAN exist. He claims they DO exist). Second of all, I disagree that whatever is thinkable necessarily can exist.

Your attack is not on modal realism, but on the reason for modal realism. I defended the latter. Modal realism won. — mosesquine

Yeah sure, you can disappear from the Earth and appear on Mars tomorrow as well. Does that mean anything? No. Logical possibility doesn't tell us anything. So all you will have proven - if you settle the premise that I questioned - is that possible worlds CAN logically exist - in other words, they are not logically incoherent. But neither is you flying to Mars today. Does that mean you'll fly? No. Likewise, your argument doesn't mean that possible worlds do, in fact, exist.So you're not even talking about modal realism, in fact, you have no clue what you're talkin' bout.

You are a stupid idiot. Therefore, you are a stupid idiot. This argument is better than your objection to modal realism.
So, what's your argument against modal realism?

You are a stupid idiot. Therefore, you are a stupid idiot. — mosesquine

No, that's not an argument, that's called begging the question. Furthermore could an idiot be "intelligent"? >:O

So, what's your argument against modal realism? — mosesquine

The burden of proof is on you to prove that modal realism is the case. Not that it COULD BE the case, but that it ACTUALLY is. Do you understand that simple difference?

As for what my argument against modal realism is - quite simple. First, there is no need to postulate an infinity of ontological entities (the possible worlds) - it doesn't help in anyway, hence why do it? (Occam's Razor). Second, the existence of possible worlds is inconsequential to this world by definition, hence pragmatically unimportant and uninformative.

So, what's your argument against modal realism? — mosesquine

I disagree that whatever is thinkable necessarily can exist. — Agustino

In other words, the mere fact that we can think about unicorns does not (by itself) entail that unicorns can exist in some world other than our own, let alone that they do exist in such a world.

It's an argument. The structure goes as follows:
A
Therefore, A
It is proved by natural deduction as follows:
1. A
// A
2. asm: ~A
3. A (from 1, reiteration)
4. A (from 2; 2 contradicts 3, reductio ad absurdum)
Q. E. D.
The argument is formally proved as valid.

A
Therefore, A — mosesquine

Logic lesson

1. Arguments don't have a single premise. Arguments always involve more than one premise. Premises in arguments cannot be proved, because, if all premises had to be proven, then no arguments could be proven because every argument would require further arguments to prove its premises, which would require further arguments to prove the premises of those arguments and so on ad infinitum.

2. A proposition of the form "A, therefore A" is a tautology - a repetition. Tautologies do not prove anything, nor do they form parts of arguments.

If a motorcycle runs, then Agustino is an idiot.
A motorcycle runs.
Therefore, Agustino is an idiot.
This argument has two premises. The proof goes as follows:
1. (∃x)(Fx & Gx) → Ha
2. (∃x)(Fx & Gx)
// Ha
3. asm: ~Ha
4. ~(∃x)(Fx & Gx) (from 1 and 3, modus tollens)
5. Ha (from 3; 2 contradicts 4, reductio ad absurdum)
Q. E. D.

Here's an example of one-premise arguments:

Agustino is a stupid idiot.
Therefore, Agustino is an idiot.

The structure goes as follows:
A & B
Therefore, B

You should look into logic textbooks.

lol kiddie, give me a break, please...

If a motorcycle runs, then Agustino is an idiot.
A motorcycle runs.
Therefore, Agustino is an idiot.
This argument has two premises. The proof goes as follows:
1. (∃x)(Fx & Gx) → Ha
2. (∃x)(Fx & Gx)
// Ha
3. asm: ~Ha
4. ~(∃x)(Fx & Gx) (from 1 and 3, modus tollens)
5. Ha (from 3; 2 contradicts 4, reductio ad absurdum)
Q. E. D. — mosesquine

Yes this argument is formally valid, however it isn't sound, because premise 1 is false.

A & B
Therefore, B — mosesquine

No - that's called begging the question, merely re-stating what is already in the premise(s) in the "argument's" conclusion. In any case - that doesn't qualify as a fucking argument, but as a logical fallacy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question

You should look into logic textbooks. — mosesquine

Yeah, I think you should look outside of logic textbooks - you've clearly been looking there so much that you have lost all reason.

Every formally valid argument is not begging the question.

Every formally valid argument is not begging the question. You are ignorant and stupid. — mosesquine

I think you should maybe have a look in the mirror. I never said this one is begging the question:

If a motorcycle runs, then Agustino is an idiot.
A motorcycle runs.
Therefore, Agustino is an idiot.
This argument has two premises. The proof goes as follows:
1. (∃x)(Fx & Gx) → Ha
2. (∃x)(Fx & Gx)
// Ha
3. asm: ~Ha
4. ~(∃x)(Fx & Gx) (from 1 and 3, modus tollens)
5. Ha (from 3; 2 contradicts 4, reductio ad absurdum)
Q. E. D. — mosesquine

But rather this one is begging the question:

The structure goes as follows:
A & B
Therefore, B — mosesquine

Now I suggest you follow that link and figure out what begging the question means, so next time you are aware of it.

And I never claimed that "every formally valid argument is begging the question". Just your second argument is (and by the way, to beg the question, an argument always must be valid - otherwise it has much bigger problems than just begging the question). I advise you to close your mouth and keep it closed, or otherwise you'll just be humiliating yourself even more.

This is an interesting paper on question-begging/circularity with respect to P therefore P arguments:

'P, Therefore, P' Without Circularity by Roy A. Sorensen

He can only do stuff in the possible worlds in which he still exists... >:O — Agustino

Possibly.

Possibly. — John

>:O

this is extremely ironic to me

If a motorcycle runs, then Agustino is an idiot. — mosesquine

Ha!

Descartes was at least important enough for Kant et al to respond to, wheras they wouldn't notice you even as you tried to pleasure them.

Plato. The rest of them try to escape him and fail.

Descartes was at least important enough for Kant et al to respond to, wheras they wouldn't notice you even as you tried to pleasure them. — Hanover

:-! I would rather not be mentioned at all, than be mentioned in jest

Not quite. The point about possible worlds is they do not exist. Rather than a state of the world, they are a logic truth, necessary and unaffected by what exist in the world. To pose the question: "Can possible worlds exist?" simply doesn't make sense. Since they never exist, there is no question of doubt or possibility to consider.

The point about possible worlds is they do not exist — TheWillowOfDarkness

And thus modal realism is false, which is my point.

It wasn't your point. You were more or less trying to use metaphysics to take out (the necessity) of radical contingency. In your argument, you treated logical possibility as if it was like a state, almost like we needed to observe those logical possibilities actualised if it were true they were logical possibilities.

He refuses to answer what the metaphysics actually are, and instead throws up his hands and goes like - "oh yeah, everything and anything is possible!" Thanks, but no, that's a lazy answer. — Agustino

Everything and anything is, indeed, possible. Whatever Lewis's mistakes, it is not wrong to say that. What you are trying to do here is use metaphysics to constrain the world. The reason you think it's the lazy answer is it means metaphysics don't necessitate anything in the world.

If "everything and anything is possible" is true, we can't use metaphysics to judge anything, we will be left only with disruptions of the actual world, rather than being able to rely on metaphysics to guide us (radical contingency, for example, takes out Aristotle's metaphysics). Rather than identifying what laziness in this context (trying to logical possibility when descriptions of the actual world are relevant), you are deny the necessary truth of logical possibility to keep metaphysic relevant for dealing with the actual world.

It wasn't your point. You were more or less trying to use metaphysics to take out (the necessity) of radical contingency. In your argument, you treated logical possibility as if it was like a state, almost like we needed to observe those logical possibilities actualised if it were true they were logical possibilities. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No you don't get it. The point isn't that they are logical possibilities - which they could be for all I care. The problem is that according to modal realism, there really and actually exist other possible worlds. Like those possible worlds aren't just possibilities - they are actual. That's what I have a beef with.

Either Plato... or Deleuze. Plato it is.

Hegel. Do I always believe him? No. I've largely read interpretations and secondary sources, but I've recently been tackling translations of the man himself more seriously. He wants to harmonize and justify human experience. I'm biased toward the image of the philosopher as an affirmative or serene character. I find the idea that consciousness evolves via self-knowledge to an affirmation of reality more than a little seductive (and "accurate" on a personal level.) The process becomes self-aware. "It" decides in retrospect that this was its goal all along.

Our mode of treating the subject is, in this aspect, a Theodicaea, — a justification of the ways of God, — which Leibnitz attempted metaphysically in his method, i.e. in indefinite abstract categories, — so that the ill that is found in the World may be comprehended, and the thinking Spirit reconciled with the fact of the existence of evil. — Hegel

Im saddened to see Plato top Aristotle :P

Ah Deleuze is even missing from the list...You should've picked Deleuze's Prince of the Philosophers maybe :D