I think I once read somewhere that the mathematics is the same with or without the passage of time, so @ChatteringMonkey could be right that temporal passage makes no difference to an Eternalist universe. Motion can be inferred by looking at the difference between two points, just like @noAxioms's cup being on his desk at t1 and being in the dishwasher at t2. Despite the absence of temporal passage, the Eternalists in this discussion have no issue with our experiences having the appearance of temporal passage. This must be some sort of illusion, although nobody has offered any explanation of what type of illusion it is, or how the illusion of temporal passage in a static universe works. Some posters have posited that events are eternally recurring but that we only experience them one at a time and in sequence for some reason. Others have been willing to concede that we are space-time worms who exist in our entirety in four dimensions, but they maintain that motion remains somehow possible within this type of existence. Motion seems to make sense for a three-dimensional object travelling through the fourth dimension; I just can't make sense of the possibility of motion with four-dimensional objects. Motion can be assumed by Eternalists, I suppose, but it seems to me that Eternalists should be arguing that motion is illusory just like our experience of temporal passage, for the sake of consistency.

This is like saying you dismiss salt because it requires religion to make sense of pepper. — Luke

Huh? I thought you didn't want to discuss this. Why make such a strange analogy? What I meant, is that you dismiss eternalism, because accepting eternalism requires that you also accept religion in order to understand the passage of time.

You have been harping about how eternalism makes the passage of time unintelligible, and I explained how if you accepted a religious principle (the soul), you could make sense of time passage in an eternalist framework. You said simply "please don't bring religion into this discussion". So I assume that this is the reason why you dismiss eternalism, because under an eternalist framework it requires religion to make sense of time passing. In other words, you seem to be biased against religious principles.

Huh? I thought you didn't want to discuss this. Why make such a strange analogy? — Metaphysician Undercover

Simply to point out your appalling logic, You originally stated:

You dismiss eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of time passage. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't dismiss eternalism because it requires accepting religion if I also dismiss religion.

However, now you are claiming that you meant the opposite of what you said originally:

What I meant, is that you dismiss eternalism, because accepting eternalism requires that you also accept religion in order to understand the passage of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

So now you are claiming that when you originally said that I dismiss eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of temporal passage, what you meant was that I accept eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of temporal passage. Except this doesn't make sense, because I don't accept eternalism either.

You have been harping about how eternalism makes the passage of time unintelligible, and I explained how if you accepted a religious principle (the soul), you could make sense of time passage in an eternalist framework. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Moving Spotlight theory already makes sense of temporal passage in an eternalist framework so no "religious principle" is required.

This must be some sort of illusion, although nobody has offered any explanation of what type of illusion it is, or how the illusion of temporal passage in a static universe works. — Luke

That's because I don't think it really requires much additional explanation once you accept the basic premisses of eternalism, namely that all moments in time have the same 'existence'. If you accept that, you already assume that we don't see the entire picture, but only a slice of it at a time... and so you already accept that the way we perceive things is limited or 'illusionary'. That is the big one, and then it doesn't take that big of a leap that, given that assumption of limited perspective, we would experience things as moving through time.

That's because I don't think it really requires much additional explanation once you accept the basic premisses of eternalism, namely that all moments in time have the same 'existence'. If you accept that, you already assume that we don't see the entire picture, but only a slice of it at a time... and so you already accept that the way we perceive things is limited or 'illusionary'. That is the big one, and then it doesn't take that big of a leap that, given that assumption of limited perspective, we would experience things as moving through time. — ChatteringMonkey

So you accept that all moments in time have the same existence and you accept that our perception of this is limited or 'illusionary'. But how do you get from there to the inference that we should expect to "experience things as moving through time"?

This also strikes me as backward. You're not making an inference that this is how we should expect to experience things; this is how we experience things, regardless of any metaphysical theory. Furthermore, the premisses of eternalism do not imply that we should only experience part of the picture at a time; they imply that we should not have any experience at all. Nothing really passes through time, including our experiences. Unless some explanation can be offered for the illusion, it is not the limited experience which is illusory, but the fact of having experience.

This also strikes me as backward. You're not making an inference that this is how we should expect to experience things; this is how we experience things, regardless of any metaphysical theory. — Luke

This is how (some) science works, that's not exactly backwards in the sense that you start from some observation and consistently derived theory from that observation. Take QM for instance, that is no metaphysical speculation because it is empirically tested that electrons behave according the the wavefunction. So then the question becomes, if it is a fact that electrons behave that way, why do we experience things fundamentally different on a macro level?

I'm not saying that eternalism is empirically verified or verifiable, and therefore not metaphysics, just that is this is the same type of reasoning... we try to explain how our experience fits into a theory that seems to fit other specific observations (in this case there is relativity, and the idea of a now not making sense in it, at least if you think of it as a non-local 'now').

And about the last part, this is something I already addressed in earlier posts, namely that I think you are viewing 4d from a 3d perspective... 4d existence is not static, it has time and movement included in existence.

So now you are claiming that when you originally said that I dismiss eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of temporal passage, what you meant was that I accept eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of temporal passage. Except this doesn't make sense, because I don't accept eternalism either. — Luke

Sorry Luke, it seems like we're speaking different languages.

The Moving Spotlight theory already makes sense of temporal passage in an eternalist framework so no "religious principle" is required. — Luke

As stated in the op, the moving spotlight theory requires a "special metaphysical status" assigned to a series of instants. I simply validated this "special metaphysical status" by giving it something tangible to correspond with, "soul". Otherwise the series of instants with a so-called special metaphysical status, would be completely arbitrary. I could have used "God", but that seemed too religious.

So you accept that all moments in time have the same existence and you accept that our perception of this is limited or 'illusionary'. But how do you get from there to the inference that we should expect to "experience things as moving through time"? — Luke

Maybe I didn't really answer this in particular. So we only experience one slice or one moment of time, at a time. But we also have a memory, we remember some of those experiences of moments at a time. And then there is also entropy always increasing, giving the appearance of directionality, (the textbook example being layered coffee and cream always tending towards totally mixed cream-coffee, but not the other way around). All of this together could give us the experiences we have of time passing, whether presentism is the case or whether eternalism is the case... both theories could fit our experience, we don't really know.

It's maybe somewhat similar to both flat earth theory and spherical earth theory fitting our basic experience of the surface we see being mostly flat (because a sphere with a big radius also looks flat from a certain perspective).

So we only experience one slice or one moment of time, at a time. But we also have a memory, we remember some of those experiences of moments at a time. And then there is also entropy always increasing, giving the appearance of directionality, (the textbook example being layered coffee and cream always tending towards totally mixed cream-coffee, but not the other way around). — ChatteringMonkey

I responded to this earlier. Entropy explains why there is a directionality to time. However, such an account presupposes that temporal passage is real ("time passes, but why is it only in one direction?"). Whereas what is required is an explanation of our experience given that temporal passage is not real. You can't invoke an explanation which presumes temporal passage in order to account for why we have the experiences we do without temporal passage.

4d existence is not static, it has time and movement included in existence. — ChatteringMonkey

4D existence has time, but there seems to be no "room" for any movement. As I said earlier, "Motion seems to make sense for a three-dimensional object travelling through the fourth dimension; I just can't make sense of the possibility of motion with four-dimensional objects." Do you agree or disagree with @noAxioms earlier statement that "Under eternalism, we beings are worldlines"?


I'll also just note here my disagreement with the rest of his statement:

Under eternalism, we beings are worldlines, and experience every moment along that worldline. So iff I define 'me' to be my worldline, then I am present at some event in 1995 and also 2021, and I experience those events and all others. There is none of this 'privy to one moment', which again smacks of a preferred moment. — noAxioms

He states that he experiences and is "present at" each and every event on his worldline, but then he rejects any preferred moment. However, the preferred moment is the present moment. As he stated elsewhere in the thread:

The spotlight defines a present (preferred) moment, which makes it presentism, just like all the other variants described in the OP. Eternalism asserts the lack of a present, — noAxioms

I guess he could reject the existence of an actual present moment, but no account is given of how we can possibly experience time in this way without temporal passage.

Do you agree or disagree with noAxioms earlier statement that "Under eternalism, we beings are worldlines"? — Luke

To expand on this, if you exist at every moment of your worldline as a "space-time worm", i.e. you exist at every moment in time from your birth to your death, then what sense does it make to talk of moving through time from one moment to the next? Your physical existence, at least, exists as a four-dimensional object. What requires explanation in this scenario is why we have the conscious experience of time that we do; experiencing only one moment at a time in sequence, as though we are three-dimensional beings moving through time, and as though time actually does pass.

Do you agree or disagree with noAxioms earlier statement that "Under eternalism, we beings are worldlines"?
— Luke


To expand on this, if you exist at every moment of your worldline as a "space-time worm", i.e. you exist at every moment from your birth to your death, then what sense can it make to talk of moving through time from one moment to the next? Your physical existence, at least, exists as a four-dimensional object. What requires explanation in this scenario is why we have the conscious experience of time that we do; experiencing only one moment at a time in sequence, as though we are three-dimensional beings moving through time, and as though time actually does pass. — Luke

You know upon further consideration, I think there maybe is still something that needs to be explained, and that it 'why do we experience this particular moment of time (and not some other)?'.

I will try to come back to this later, I don't really have time now to break my head about the nature of time, but maybe I can say this already :

- The fact that we only experience one moment at a time in sequence, doesn't seem to be that big of a problem. That could easily be just a consequence of the limits of our experience, just like we only see or hear up to some distance in space, and not all of the universe at once.
- I still think movement (and temporal passage that is I think just an inference from seeing movement) is not a real issue for the eternalist, because things existing over different moments of time and positions in space, simply is movement in a 4d universe... and if we assume a limited perspective (which is what the assumption of eternalism entails) I don't see how that couldn't give rise to the same kind of experience like that of movement in a 3d presentist universe.

if we assume a limited perspective (which is what the assumption of eternalism entails) — ChatteringMonkey

Without getting too bogged down in details, I should spell out my belief that conscious experience, i.e. the mind, is produced by the brain/body. Furthermore, I believe that our collective knowledge includes at least some understanding of how the body and mind works, and that this understanding is based on the presumption that time passes and motion is real.

If we assume that time does not pass and that motion is not real, then, based on our current understanding of human physiology, I don't see how it could be possible to have conscous experiences at all. In other words, if you exist as a static four-dimensional object, then this includes your brain states. A four-dimensional brain doesn't move or function; it merely exists. If your synapses aren't firing, due to the lack of motion, then you can't be having any conscious experience either. The only thing that can get you from one state to the next (both physically and mentally), and which injects motion into this picture, is temporal passage. The perspective is not just limited under Eternalism; it is absent.

if you exist as a static four-dimensional object — Luke

This is what I'm objecting to. There is nothing static about a four-dimensional object, it's dynamics by virtue of it existing in a 'four'-dimensional space-'time'. It can only be considered static when viewed from outside the time-dimension of 4d space-time, in relation to some other imaginary fifth time-dimension.

Or put in another way, you cannot simply treat a 4d object the same as a 3d object, in the sense that the entire 4d object has to move in time, like a 3d object does. The movement happens within the object because the time-dimension is already included in its existence.

If we assume that time does not pass and that motion is not real, — Luke

And I think this assumption is not a good way to go about categorizing theories of time, because for this category it is already assumed that it cannot work. Why have a category for something that is impossible? I think, rather, we should only be looking at theories of time that could possibly fit our experience. Eternalist claim that the theory could fit our experience, I'm not entirely sure yet, but that is not because I think motion or passage of time are impossible under it... or assumed to be impossible even.

This is what I'm objecting to. There is nothing static about a four-dimensional object, it's dynamics by virtue of it existing in a 'four'-dimensional space-'time'. It's can only be considered static when viewed from outside the time-dimension of 4d space-time, in relation to some other imaginary fifth time-dimension. — ChatteringMonkey

It seems as though we are at an impasse. I can only reiterate that Eternalism assumes the B-theory unless you are talking about the Moving Spotlight theory. The static nature of time according to Eternalism is not something that only applies, as you say, "when viewed from outside the time-dimension of 4d space-time":

The B-theory of time is the name given to one of two positions regarding philosophy of time. B-theorists argue that the flow of time is an illusion, that the past, present, and future are equally real, and that time is tenseless. This would mean that temporal becoming is not an objective feature of reality. — B-theory of time - Wikipedia

According to The B Theory...there is no sense in which it is true to say that time really passes, and any appearance to the contrary is merely a result of the way we humans happen to perceive the world. — SEP article on Time

Or put in another way, you cannot simply treat a 4d object the same as a 3d object, in the sense that the entire 4d object has to move in time, like a 3d object does. The movement happens within the object because the time-dimension is already included in its existence. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't expect a 4d object to move in time like a 3d object. Instead, B-theory Eternalism rejects the idea that 3d objects move through the 4th dimension of time:

Eternalism...is sometimes referred to as the "block time" or "block universe" theory due to its description of space-time as an unchanging four-dimensional "block", as opposed to the view of the world as a three-dimensional space modulated by the passage of time. — Eternalism (philosophy of time) - Wikipedia

And I think this assumption is not a good way to go about categorizing theories of time, because for this category it is already assumed that it cannot work. Why have a category for something that is impossible? I think, rather, we should only be looking at theories of time that could possibly fit our experience. Eternalist claim that the theory could fit our experience, I'm not entirely sure yet, but that is not because I think motion or passage of time are impossible under it... or assumed to be impossible even. — ChatteringMonkey

Perhaps motion is possible under Eternalism, but there seems to be few explanations forthcoming for how it is possible. It certainly seems impossible, unless one sneaks in temporal passage, but then it's no longer B-theory Eternalism.

Eternalism...is sometimes referred to as the "block time" or "block universe" theory due to its description of space-time as an unchanging four-dimensional "block", as opposed to the view of the world as a three-dimensional space modulated by the passage of time. — Eternalism (philosophy of time) - Wikipedia

According to The B Theory...there is no sense in which it is true to say that time really passes, and any appearance to the contrary is merely a result of the way we humans happen to perceive the world. — SEP article on Time

Okay, maybe that is how some view the block-universe, I can't speak to how they view it of course. But still, I think using words like 'unchanging' or 'static' to describe the block-universe is misleading because it assumes a perspective from outside the 4 dimensions.

It seems as though we are at an impasse — Luke

Yes I agree, but that's ok... the discussion has certainly helped my understanding of the issues involved.

Or put in another way, you cannot simply treat a 4d object the same as a 3d object, in the sense that the entire 4d object has to move in time, like a 3d object does. The movement happens within the object because the time-dimension is already included in its existence. — ChatteringMonkey

You don't seem to ever comprehend what Luke is telling you ChatteringMonkey. There is no movement within that 4d object because there is no passage of time. All time exists as part of the block, and for there to be movement something would have to go from one part of the object to another. But this thing would not be represented as part of the object.

Okay, maybe that is how some view the block-universe, I can't speak to how they view it of course. But still, I think using words like 'unchanging' or 'static' to describe the block-universe is misleading because it assumes a perspective from outside the 4 dimensions. — ChatteringMonkey

See, you're on the right track here. Now, do you see how your statement above, "movement happens within the object because the time-dimension is already included in its existence", is inconsistent with this? You cannot say that "movement" happens within the object, because it's a word classed with those others, "unchanging", and "static", which assumes something outside the four dimensions.

Movement requires a passing of time, and there is none of that within the four dimensions, unless you establish a timeline, an ordering, which requires an outside perspective..

There is no movement within that 4d object because there is no passage of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

So I've been told, over and over again, but I don't see why there is something fundamentally different about something existing at time t1, t2, etc ... and time passing (aside from the direction and the ontology which I already agreed with). The moments of times associated with past, future and present all exist in eternalism, but not at the same time, right? That's what the 4th dimension indicates.

Maybe I don't understand because I'm not a metaphysician and I think words are merely trying to describe things and are never the things themselves... but who knows?

See, you're on the right track here. Now, do you see how your statement above, "movement happens within the object because the time-dimension is already included in its existence", is inconsistent with this? You cannot say that "movement" happens within the object, because it's a word classed with those others, "unchanging", and "static", which assumes something outside the four dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it precisely doesn't assume something outside the four dimensions, that's the whole point, that one should adjust the concept of movement to the 4d frame. If I were to say a 4d object moves as a whole then I would be assuming some other additional dimension, but I'm not doing that, that's what I'm criticizing.

Again I'm not a metaphysician and I don't assume words to have fixed meanings... but if you want to insist that the word movement doesn't apply, fine, then i'll have to invent another word with basically the same meaning for things changing position over time.

I think using words like 'unchanging' or 'static' to describe the block-universe is misleading because it assumes a perspective from outside the 4 dimensions. — ChatteringMonkey

Just to try and address this objection, what difference do you perceive there to be between the A-theory and the B-theory? You seem to be saying that the A-theory and the B-theory are identical with regard to temporal passage from within time, and that they differ only with regard to temporal passage outside of time. That is, you seem to say that time passes for the A-theory both inside and outside of time, and that time passes for the B-theory inside of time, but not outside of time. My question, then, is why you believe that these two theories which purport to be about the nature of time itself are about something external to time instead?

I'll try the explain.

This is the first description I've found of B-theory on wiki and I think it better than the others because it uses 'flow' of time rather than 'passage' of time :

"B-theorists argue that the flow of time is an illusion, that the past, present, and future are equally real, and that time is tenseless."

I think it's not so much that time doesn't pass in the sense that there are different moments of time, but that it doesn't flow in any particular direction. The other difference is that all moments of time have the same ontological status, they are equally real if you want.

Maybe it's easier to understand with a graph :



In A-theories what exist is only everything in the 3 spacial dimensions (represented by 2 in the picture), and those move through the 4th dimension in one direction.

In B-theories all everything in all 4-dimensions exists (respresented by a 3d-block in the picture). But the time dimension is still there.

If one says the block-universe is static or unchanging, one is looking at the whole picture, all the 4-dimensions, and says the 'line' or 'worm' in the eternalist graph as a whole doesn't change (thereby imagining another 5th dimension where that change would have to take place, i.e. 'viewed from the outside').

Movement or change is just the same as in the presentist picture, it is represented in the eternalist picture by the line bending in the space-dimensions at different moments in time. If we were to fastforward time in the presentist picture, and place a dot in it representing an object, you would get the same bended line or worm as you fastforward.

So to re-iterate, there is no difference with regards to movement and moments of time (time passing), only what exists and the direction of time (flow) is different.

And for both, looking at it from the outside of the time-dimenision, would be the wrong way of looking at it in respect to movement. It's just that we are more tempted to look at the block-universe from the outside because all times exist and we picture an entire block allready... but it would be just as bad a move for presentism.

You're talking about Presentism and Eternalism rather than A-theory and B-theory.

I think it's not so much that time doesn't pass in the sense that there are different moments of time, but that it doesn't flow in any particular direction. — ChatteringMonkey

Time flows but not "in any particular direction"?

If one says the block-universe is static or unchanging, one is looking at the whole picture, all the 4-dimensions, and says the 'line' or 'worm' in the eternalist graph as a whole doesn't change (thereby imagining another 5th dimension where that change would have to take place, i.e. 'viewed from the outside'). — ChatteringMonkey

That's not what the B-theory is. This would imply that time flows when "viewed from the inside", but then it would be no different to the A-theory.

So I've been told, over and over again, but I don't see why there is something fundamentally different about something existing at time t1, t2, etc ... and time passing (aside from the direction and the ontology which I already agreed with). The moments of times associated with past, future and present all exist in eternalism, but not at the same time, right? That's what the 4th dimension indicates. — ChatteringMonkey

Of course the moments are not the same time, they are identified as different times. But the issue is that since there is no direction, as you indicate, and no necessary relationship between moments, there is no time passage and no motion. This is what you seem to be missing, motion is what happens between the thing existing at t1 and existing at t2. The object moves from where it was at t1 to where it is at t2.

No it precisely doesn't assume something outside the four dimensions, that's the whole point, that one should adjust the concept of movement to the 4d frame. — ChatteringMonkey

One cannot "adjust the concept of movement to the 4d frame", because the frame does not allow for what we know as "movement". That's plain and simple. We might say that the frame is correct, and there is no such thing as movement, but that doesn't explain why there appears to be movement. Or we could move to a different frame which allows for movement.

Again I'm not a metaphysician and I don't assume words to have fixed meanings... but if you want to insist that the word movement doesn't apply, fine, then i'll have to invent another word with basically the same meaning for things changing position over time. — ChatteringMonkey

The point is that it would not be "basically the same meaning". That is because there is no principle which states that t1 is necessarily prior to t2, or that the order is not t10, then t250, then t8, then t654,482, or some other random ordering. There is no principle within the 4d eternalist theory which dictates a necessary order.

Furthermore, relativity theory produces a unique problem of numerous possibilities for the positioning of an object at any time point, each position dependent on the frame of reference. Therefore there are numerous possibilities for the positioning of every object, at t5, t6, t7, etc.. If we extend each possibility to the entire temporal extent of the universe we have an infinity of infinities of possibilities for each object.

If one says the block-universe is static or unchanging, one is looking at the whole picture, all the 4-dimensions, and says the 'line' or 'worm' in the eternalist graph as a whole doesn't change (thereby imagining another 5th dimension where that change would have to take place, i.e. 'viewed from the outside'). — ChatteringMonkey

There is no "line" or "worm" provided for by eternalist principles. That's the point you don't seem to get. The line must be produced by referring to something outside eternalism. We could produce the line on any arbitrary principles, including a random ordering of time moments. But whatever principle one might decide to use in producing that order, it is "outside" eternalism.

Hmm ... what is motion but a spatial path in spacetime anyway?
It's just that no particular time is considered (a special privileged indexical) now, hence the block-verse model is incomplete.
But wasn't that the idea in the first place, that a t parameter can represent any now, any time, on equal footing? That any direction only is implicit in the ordering and nothing else?
It's not that block-verse does not model motion as such (mentioned path with all of time internal to the model), it just sacrifices the special for general (non-indexical) descriptive prowess.

(An odd but seldom noticed consequence of McTaggart's characterization of the A series and the B series is that, on that characterization, the A series is identical to the B series. For the items that make up the B series (namely, moments of time) are the same items that make up the A series, and the order of the items in the B series is the same as the order of the items in the A series; but there is nothing more to a series than some specific items in a particular order.) — Time (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

What might a complete model look like anyway?
I'm thinking that both duration and simultaneity would be part thereof, which seems to suggest dimensionality of some sort.
By the way, language, English at least, is heavily tensed, which can lead to some confuzzlement.

In case you haven't yet noticed, religion offers the most intelligent understanding of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

You dismiss eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of time passage. That says a lot about you. — Metaphysician Undercover

How odd. What does that have to do with anything...? :brow: (Requires, even?)

Time flows but not "in any particular direction"? — Luke

Flow is a word we use to describe what happens to water in rivers, i.e. for things moving in one direction. In eternalism there is no present moment, and past and future exist just the same. You can go equality forward or backwards in time, it doesn't matter, there is no direction of time... so the word flow doesn't apply. But that doesn't mean that there are no different moments in time, and so things can move just like they can in other theories of time. Movement is just a function of change in position over time, directionality doesn't matter for movement.

That's not what the B-theory is. This would imply that time flows when "viewed from the inside", but then it would be no different to the A-theory. — Luke

Again past and future existing and a direction to time is different... But ok fine, if you want to talk about theories that clearly don't apply to the world I or everybody else experiences, be my guess, but I have nothing to say about that.

What does that have to do with anything...? — jorndoe

Luke objected that I brought in religion to explain how time could be passing in an eternalist universe. But Luke didn't seem to realize that the moving spotlight theory had already smuggled in religion with the reference to a "special metaphysical status" being given to a series of instants.

Hmm ... what is motion but a spatial path in spacetime anyway? — jorndoe

The traversing of that path. Or, at least, that's what I'm asserting/challenging in the OP: doesn't motion require temporal passage?

It's just that no particular time is considered (a special privileged indexical) now, hence the block-verse model is incomplete.
But wasn't that the idea in the first place, that a t parameter can represent any now, any time, on equal footing? That any direction only is implicit in the ordering and nothing else? — jorndoe

Is this Eternalism? According to what definition?

It's not that block-verse does not model motion as such (mentioned path with all of time internal to the model), it just sacrifices the special for general (non-indexical) descriptive prowess. — jorndoe

When you say "block-verse", do you mean B-theory Eternalism? Would you care to address the OP?

What might a complete model look like anyway? — jorndoe

The Moving Spotlight theory? Depends what you mean by "complete".

I'm thinking that both duration and simultaneity would be part thereof, which seems to suggest dimensionality of some sort. — jorndoe

So?

there is no direction of time... so the word flow doesn't apply — ChatteringMonkey

You said in your last post that time flows but has no direction. You seem undecided?

Again past and future existing and a direction to time is different... But ok fine, if you want to talk about theories that clearly don't apply to the world I or everybody else experiences, be my guess, but I have nothing to say about that. — ChatteringMonkey

Hey, I didn't invent these concepts. You seem eager to be an Eternalist but you also seem reluctant to commit to the B-theory. There's always the Moving Spotlight theory (Eternalism + A-theory) instead. Otherwise, I'd welcome an explanation of B-theory Eternalism which allows for temporal passage and motion and/or an explanation of motion without temporal passage.

You said in your last post that time flows but has no direction. You seem undecided? — Luke

I'm not, I said time doesn't flow in any particular direction, which is a bit of a tautology, sure... I was just trying to be extra clear by adding 'not in any particular', I guess I failed.

Otherwise, I'd welcome an explanation of B-theory Eternalism which allows for temporal passage and motion and/or an explanation of motion without temporal passage. — Luke

You seem stuck in this metaphysical qualification sceme and the implications you think that can be deducted from them. B-theory is defined as this, and eternalism is a B-theory, therefor eternalism has to be like that etc... But a lot of scientists believe in eternalism, and I'm pretty sure very few of them believe that there can be no motion under it. Are they just all that stupid for not realizing that motion is impossible under eternalism, or doesn't it have to entail that and the presupposed qualification sceme is simply misguided? I'm guessing the latter.

I said time doesn't flow in any particular direction — ChatteringMonkey

I was talking more about the fact that two days ago you said time flows (but not in any particular direction), whereas yesterday you said "the word flow doesn't apply".

But a lot of scientists believe in eternalism, and I'm pretty sure very few of them believe that there can be no motion under it. Are they just all that stupid for not realizing that motion is impossible under eternalism, or doesn't it have to entail that and the presupposed qualification sceme is simply misguided? I'm guessing the latter. — ChatteringMonkey

And you seem to think that the definitions I've provided from the SEP and Wikipedia articles on the subject are incorrect. Do you have any support for your claims?

I was talking more about the fact that two days ago you said time flows (but not in any particular direction), whereas yesterday you said "the word flow doesn't apply". — Luke

It's just a word Luke, I'm using them in a certain context to try to get some meaning across... the meaning being in that case that it doesn't follow from things existing at different times t1, t2 etc that things don't move.

And you seem to think that the definitions I've provided from the SEP and Wikipedia articles on the subject are incorrect. Do you have any support for your claims? — Luke

Definitions can not be correct or incorrect, it's a decision, you can define something however you want in principle. They can be more or less useful though, and I'm saying they don't seem to be very useful if they only apply to a theory of time that can't be the case and that nobody believes in.