The probability just is the confidence — Isaac

The above is prima facie evidence that there is a conflation of two completely distinct things hard at work. Uncertainty is not equivalent to probability. Certainty is not not equivalent to probability. A lack of confidence is the cause of being uncertain. A lack of doubt is certainty.

One can render one's own belief in probabilistic terminology only by playing that particular language game. After doing so, some will temper their own confidence level and/or certainty. Here, in these situations, it is appropriate to talk in terms of the certainty of one's own belief being on a continuum, of sorts, with unshakable certainty on the one end and insanity on the other.

So...

Rendering one's own belief in probabilistic terms creates the belief that one is confident to a certain degree. I'm not denying that people believe such stuff. I'm not saying that they are wrong for doing so.

I am saying that having the very ability to render one's own belief in mathematical probabilistic terms requires language.

With that bit of magic in mind...

Can a creature that has no such ability have such belief?

Not on your life.

Can a language less creature be very uncertain about what's going on?

Of course.

I'm hesitant to talk in terms of 'caught up in' social conventions. When marks become one part of a correlation between the marks and something else, they become meaningful. Social convention is simply an agreement upon what else those particular marks ought be and/or will be correlated, associated, and/or otherwise connected to. — creativesoul

I guess I'm trying to figure out how you think of correlations. If I 'warn you about the flooded bridge' by making sounds...and you turn your car around...then the sounds I made only work because I chose the right sounds. And those sounds are the right ones because we were both trained to react that way to such sounds (ignoring the extra complexity of trust and so on for the moment.) Any sounds would do. The sign is arbitrary. We just happen to use those sounds.

This sounds like what you are saying above, if you picture correlation as there in our doings (which are not cleanly reducible to 'mental' or 'physical,' themselves signs in our doings.) Maybe you'll agree that the agreement you mention above can be and largely is implicit.

Sure. I would not argue against that notion at all, aside from pointing out that our language is much more than noises and marks, but I suspect we're in agreement here as well. — creativesoul

Right. The definition focuses on noises and marks used conventionally, but clearly gestures and facial expressions are hugely important, as is practical context.

What does the phrase "by-definition subjective" refer to? It might be worth saying that I also reject the objective/subjective dichotomy... — creativesoul

Since you reject the dichotomy, it's not a stumbling block for us. But what I mean is the picture of the mind as the scene of 'pure meaning' or 'qualia' that some people envision. This mind stuff is radically private and philosophers worry about whether the qualia or sense data or universals correspond to something outside, something non-mental or physical.

The difference is that not all belief formation(drawing correlations) involves social convention. However, it is the commonality that is key to understanding. All social conventions consist - in large part - of common belief... shared meaning. Shared meaning is nothing more and nothing less than a plurality of creatures drawing correlations between the same things... — creativesoul

OK, I can work with this. A human on an island alone can learn new tricks, develop new private routines. With language we have public routines that you are correlating with private routines, it seems. I just stress the synchronized behavior and have neglected nonsocial behavior.

The only ...thing...I would mention is that what we recognize as things seems related to our social conventions. I mean we learn to break the world apart in different ways in different cultures. Do I see stacks spheres of snow with some junk on top or a snowman? That sort of thing. But I don't think that's news to you, and none of us can cough it all up at once.

I suspect that we're in agreement here on some basic level anyway... — creativesoul

I think so. I guess the challenge of complex conversation is getting a rough sense of how others are using their terms, which involves getting a rough sense of their big picture view.

I guess I'm trying to figure out how you think of correlations. If I 'warn you about the flooded bridge' by making sounds...and you turn your car around...then the sounds I made only work because I chose the right sounds. And those sounds are the right ones because we were both trained to react that way to such sounds (ignoring the extra complexity of trust and so on for the moment.) Any sounds would do. The sign is arbitrary. We just happen to use those sounds. — path

For the most part, the marks are arbitrary maybe. Some are not. A sign is always meaningful. Clouds are signs of rain when, and only when, a creature connects them.

Correlations are the basic building block of thought and belief... at every level.

For the most part, the marks are arbitrary maybe. Some are not. A sign is always meaningful. Clouds are signs of rain when, and only when, a creature connects them. — creativesoul

Right. So the issue for me is: how is this connection manifested? I think (?) you'll agree that they act differently. Clouds affect the probability that they'll do this or that. In the human case, clouds might increase the probability of speech acts invoking 'rain.' Or of carrying along an umbrella.

Correlations are the basic building block of thought and belief... at every level. — creativesoul

I like to read this in terms of the world as a system of relationships (correlations as relationships.) Any comments?

For the most part, the marks are arbitrary maybe. Some are not. A sign is always meaningful. Clouds are signs of rain when, and only when, a creature connects them.
— creativesoul

Right. So the issue for me is: how is this connection manifested?

I think (?) you'll agree that they act differently. — path

What does they refer to?

Clouds affect the probability that they'll do this or that. In the human case, clouds might increase the probability of speech acts invoking 'rain.' Or of carrying along an umbrella. — path

Seeing the clouds may influence subsequent behaviour. The notion of probability does not play a role in all belief. I agree though, humans often do something specific after seeing rain clouds. What does that have to do with basic rudimentary non linguistic belief?

Bedrock belief is not always linguistic. The connection between the clouds and rain could be bedrock to all subsequent behaviours influenced by that belief. That includes language less creatures too!

That's a prerequisite for an acceptable notion of belief amenable to evolutionary progression.

Correlations are the basic building block of thought and belief... at every level.
— creativesoul

I like to read this in terms of the world as a system of relationships (correlations as relationships.) Any comments? — path

Too broad a brushstroke.

Some relationships exist in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. Some of those, yet still... exist in their entirety prior to us altogether. So... not all relationships require a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. All correlations do.

That's a distinction lost when treating correlations as relationships.

What does they refer to? — creativesoul

The creature you mentioned.

For the most part, the marks are arbitrary maybe. Some are not. A sign is always meaningful. Clouds are signs of rain when, and only when, a creature connects them. — creativesoul

So the issue for me is: how is this connection manifested? I think (?) you'll agree that they act differently. — path

I'm trying to avoid mentalistic language, basically. A sign is related or correlated to a response. Can we explore this without peering inside the 'mind' of the creature? And can we do this when talking about humans, also?

Seeing the clouds may influence subsequent behaviour. The notion of probability does not play a role in all belief. I agree though, humans often do something specific after seeing rain clouds. What does that have to do with basic rudimentary non linguistic belief? — creativesoul

Let's imagine some species that sometimes responds to a sign, maybe half of the time. Some other sign (which we would then not call a sign) never elicits a response. Other signs always elicit a response. At least from our perspective it's tempting to talk of probability as a measure of their response.

Bedrock belief is not always linguistic. The connection between the clouds and rain could be bedrock to all subsequent behaviours influenced by that belief. That includes language less creatures too!

That's a prerequisite for an acceptable notion of belief amenable to evolutionary progression. — creativesoul

I agree. I'm trying to come from a place where talking is just one more form of behavior that can be noted. I'm happy to explore belief in terms of response to signs/stimuli.

We can then think of bedrock beliefs as dominant tendencies to respond in this or that way, confidently, the way humans step out of bed, not 'expecting' to fall through. I mean we don't dip our toe in the carpet to check its stability. We just roll out of bed. This stability of the floor is a kind of bedrock for what we 'expect' if something rolls off the bed. Non-mentalistically speaking we might bother to reach down and get it before seeing it. We 'know' that it is down there somewhere.

Truth, meaning, thought, and belief all exist in their entirety prior to our ability to become aware of them.

When my cat expects treats and gets them, her belief becomes true. The sound of the plastic is meaningful to her as a result of her connecting it to getting treats. When she hears the plastic, she expects treats. She thinks about the sound and it is significant to her as a result of a pattern of past events. One could say that the sound symbolizes the treats. One could say that the sound is a sign of things to come. One could describe what happened over and over again in a number of different ways.

We must be very judicious regarding what sort of belief we attribute to that cat.

That's a prerequisite for an acceptable notion of belief amenable to evolutionary progression. — creativesoul

Right. I think we both want that. I see human cognition as animal, however complex. I've been watching some great nature documentaries, complex mating dances by birds of paradise, dolphin hunting strategies, etc. Can we see ourselves that way?

A sign is related or correlated to a response — path

I did not say that though.

A sign becomes such as a result of being part of the correlation.

We must be very judicious regarding what sort of belief we attribute to that cat. — creativesoul

I agree.

The sound of the plastic is meaningful to her as a result of her connecting it to getting treats. When she hears the plastic, she expects treats. She thinks about the sound and it is significant to her as a result of a pattern of past events. — creativesoul

OK, but how does 'expect' and 'think' add to what is already happening? Don't get me wrong. It's plausible and intuitive. But how is it explanatory? Maybe it is in some way, but this detour to hidden consciousness is curious. Or if expectation is not consciousness, how is it not just the pattern in the cat's behavior? If I open a can of tuna downstairs, my cat will probably come down. Half the time she does. Then we are tempted to add hypothetical entities..

Can we explore this without peering inside the 'mind' of the creature? And can we do this when talking about humans, also? — path

Well, I've not been using such language. However, the language I've been using effectively exhausts all 'mind' talk I am aware of. Human thought and belief make for good subject matter(s).

Well, I've not been using such language. However, the language I've been using effectively exhausts all 'mind' talk I am aware of. Human thought and belief make for good subject matter(s). — creativesoul

Indeed, and I don't think we can even help talking mentalistically. It takes serious effort to avoid it just a little. At the same time I think it's interesting, and I do associate it with Witt's insights.

A sign is related or correlated to a response — path

I did not say that though.

A sign becomes such as a result of being part of the correlation. — creativesoul

I don't understand the difference. Becoming correlated/related is becoming part of a correlation. To be related is to be in relationship. That's how I understand it.

Let's imagine some species that sometimes responds to a sign, maybe half of the time. Some other sign (which we would then not call a sign) never elicits a response. Other signs always elicit a response. At least from our perspective it's tempting to talk of probability as a measure of their response. — path

Saying that we know, as a result of enough testing results/data, that some creature or another will probably act this or that way when presented with the same scenario, is all fine and good.

There is no ground for claiming that the creature thinks in probabilistic terms... at least not language less ones.

Saying that we know, as a result of enough testing results/data, that some creature or another will probably act this or that way when presented with the same scenario, is all fine and good.

There is no ground for claiming that the creature thinks in probabilistic terms... at least not language less ones. — creativesoul

I agree. There is no ground, in some sense, for saying that the creature thinks at all. There is, in some strange sense, no ground for saying that humans think probabilistically. Does consciousness even exist? In the everyday sense, of course. My issue is whether 'thinking' has some deep meaning beyond patterns in behavior. What does it add? That's the beetle, as I see it. At the same time, we obviously know how to use words like 'think' with the usual blind skill. So there's no doing away with that. We can only question the mentalistic paradigm from within that paradigm. Does it lead us down dead ends philosophically?

A sign is related or correlated to a response — path

I did not say that though.

A sign becomes such as a result of being part of the correlation. — creativesoul

I don't understand the difference.. — path

It's the difference in becoming meaningful and being meaningful. All signs are already meaningful. The clouds were clouds prior to becoming a sign of impending rain. They were part of a causal relationship. They were not meaningful.

I agree. There is no ground, in some sense, for saying that the creature thinks at all. — path

I would not agree.

Everyday events count as more than adequate ground. We just have to know what to look for.

Become correlated/related is becoming part of a correlation. To be related is to be in relationship. — path

There is a causal relationship between touching fire and the sudden onset of pain. That relationship need not be thought about. When a creature draws a correlation between the behaviour(touching fire) and the subsequent pain it has attributed meaning to both. It has recognized and/or attributed causality. Causality is a relationship. Drawing a correlation between touching fire and the onset of pain is not... that is belief formation about(the content of which is) the fire and the pain.

There is a causal relationship between touching fire and the sudden onset of pain. That relationship need not be thought about. — creativesoul

I agree, but talk of pain is maybe not as good as talk of behavior that we associate with pain or interpret as pain. 'Pure' pain is the beetle again.

So not only do I agree that the relationship need not be thought about, I suggest that even worrying about thought at all might muddy the water here.

Drawing a correlation between touching fire and the onset of pain is not... that is belief formation about(the content of which is) the fire and the pain. — creativesoul

Intuitively, yes. I understand you. But why not notice a relationship between touching a hot coal and suddenly withdrawing the paw? Then we can notice that the creature stops touching hot coals. Or touches them less often. Is there more to belief formation? Especially for languageless creatures?

Everyday events count as more than adequate ground. We just have to know what to look for. — creativesoul

Well in everyday terms I do think that my cat thinks. Some of this is just empathy. Conceptually it seems to be an extension of the usual hypothetical entities, thoughts which can never be measured or touched. In some sense attributing thoughts might be a fancy way of describing tangible behaviors.

My issue is whether 'thinking' has some deep meaning beyond patterns in behavior. What does it add? That's the beetle, as I see it. At the same time, we obviously know how to use words like 'think' with the usual blind skill. So there's no doing away with that. We can only question the mentalistic paradigm from within that paradigm. Does it lead us down dead ends philosophically? — path

"Thinking" - in quotes - refers to terminological use of that term. Not all use of "thinking" is on equal footing. That's been a problem throughout the history of philosophy. You pointed towards some of those issues earlier regarding humans using the idea to draw a clear distinct line between dumb animals and humans... purportedly. Animals do not think, reason, etc.

However, you then claim that there is no doing away with common usage of "think", and I assume the use of "believe" and "belief" as well. While you're correct in that there may be no doing away with it, we can show where it fails.

Are you asking if thinking is distinct from behavioural patterns?

Well in everyday terms I do think that my cat thinks. Some of this is just empathy. Conceptually it seems to be an extension of the usual hypothetical entities, thoughts which can never be measured or touched. In some sense attributing thoughts might be a fancy way of describing tangible behaviors. — path

There are many things that can never be measured or touched. The odd thing however is that I have painstakingly given you the tools to 'measure' all thought or belief. The increments are not mathematical. They are elemental. They consist of correlations between things. In the language less creatures' case, the correlations are always drawn between directly perceptible things.

Fire and pain. The sound of the bell and food. The sound of rustling plastic and treats. The cheep and a cat.

We can set it up and watch it happen - from the outside. No need to get in their head or our own. Behaviour is not thought. Behaviour is a result thereof. Roughly, of course.

You're right though, attributing thought is one way that folk explain/describe certain behaviours.

...I suggest that even worrying about thought at all might muddy the water here. — path

That's an odd suggestion given that bedrock belief is the topic.

So, I'm curious...

How do you account for the belief of language less creatures?

The sound of the plastic is meaningful to her as a result of her connecting it to getting treats. When she hears the plastic, she expects treats. She thinks about the sound and it is significant to her as a result of a pattern of past events.
— creativesoul

OK, but how does 'expect' and 'think' add to what is already happening? Don't get me wrong. It's plausible and intuitive. But how is it explanatory? Maybe it is in some way, but this detour to hidden consciousness is curious. — path

I've not used the terms "hidden consciousness", nor would I.

Expectation is belief about what will take place, or in this case belief about what is about to happen. Her thinking about the sound is nothing more than drawing correlations between the same things... the sound and receiving treats.

Animals show belief by displaying expectation.

Pavlov's dog involuntarily slobbering after hearing the bell shows us, along with his path towards the food bowl, that he thinks, believes, and/or expects to be fed. All as a result of drawing correlations between the sound of the bell and eating food. We can change the sound of the bell, to any sound we arbitrarily choose so long as it is audible to the dog. The same results will happen because the same thing is happening... correlations are being drawn.

How is it explanatory, regarding basic rudimentary bedrock belief?

What's it missing?

We're actually in the process of demonstrating exactly what I've been advocating. We're each drawing correlations between different things in an attempt to build a bridge of mutual understanding... shared meaning.

Pavlov's dog involuntarily slobbering after hearing the bell shows us, along with his path towards the food bowl, that he thinks, believes, and/or expects to be fed. — creativesoul

I understand what you mean, I think, but the point I'm making that is that describe slobbering after hearing the bell in terms of expectations and beliefs. Maybe you'll agree? The so-called expectation just is the behavior. It is not implied or demonstrated by the behavior. Or rather it's not clear what talk of this implication adds.

We're actually in the process of demonstrating exactly what I've been advocating. We're each drawing correlations between different things in an attempt to build a bridge of mutual understanding... shared meaning. — creativesoul

I'm inclined to agree. We are behaving in a certain key, adjusting certain linguistic conventions. Is our typing this or that word radically different from the dog salivating?

Behaviour is not thought. Behaviour is a result thereof. Roughly, of course. — creativesoul

I agree that we often think of non-linguistic behavior as caused by linguistic behavior. The creature did one thing because he thought another. I'm exploring the approach of treating linguistic behavior as on the same plane as all other kinds of behavior. We can still postulate a causal relationship between a creature saying X to himself and then acting in this or that way. We can find a suicide note explanatory, for instance, by linking one kind of hand movements to another (writing 'This world is evil' and tying a noose.)

You said 'roughly, of course,' so perhaps you are open to this or include this already.

However, you then claim that there is no doing away with common usage of "think", and I assume the use of "believe" and "belief" as well. While you're correct in that there may be no doing away with it, we can show where it fails.

Are you asking if thinking is distinct from behavioural patterns? — creativesoul

That's pretty close. I'm saying that we prioritize a certain kind of behavior as special, call it 'thinking.' But what is thinking? Making sounds and noises according to certain conventions or patterns. These days we can just imagine making these sounds. We have interior monologues. For reasons that are somewhat historical/political we often lean on some vague notion of free will, think of our thinking as ghost with a certain freedom to move the body this way or that.