Okay, thanks for your responses. Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be an account by the Eternalists of how we experience time the way we do. Except for those who simply assume (Presentist/A-theory) temporal passage within what is supposed to be a static block universe. — Luke

The temporal passage thing is not the problem, the block is only static viewed from the outside. Within the blockuniverse time is one of the dimensions, like I said earlier. So things change and we interpret that as time passing, though we never actually see a thing like time passing.

What does need to be explained is the unequality between past and future, because in principle the laws of physics go in either direction just the same. There the low entropy of the early universe and the second law of thermodynamics can do some explaining.

Imagine a transparent ball rolling along a table. People live in the ball and look out at the surface of the table (time) going by. But all of the table is there all of the 'time'. Just a thought... — EnPassant

I do understand Eternalism, believe it or not.

If time is real and the future did not happen yet then the earth of tomorrow (or the earth in one second from now) does not exist. Likewise with the past. The earth of one second ago does not exist. This means the earth, and everything else, must be recreated every nanosecond??? — EnPassant

I am aware that Presentism has its own problems, but the intended topic of this discussion is whether a B-theory Eternalist universe allows for motion.

The temporal passage thing is not the problem, the block is only static viewed from the outside. — ChatteringMonkey

Is that A-theory or B-theory?

So things change and we interpret that as time passing, though we never actually see a thing like time passing. — ChatteringMonkey

Is that A-theory or B-theory?

It's the B-series. But look, if you don't engage the ideas themselves, I don't think we will get anywhere.

I don't think characterization as A-series or B-series explains anything by itself. It seems to be merely about the language we use to describe things, and so not about the nature of things. From the stanford Encyclopedia :

McTaggart begins his argument by distinguishing two ways in which positions in time can be ordered. First, he says, positions in time can be ordered according to their possession of properties like being two days future, being one day future, being present, being one day past, etc. (These properties are often referred to now as “A properties.”) McTaggart calls the series of times ordered by these properties “the A series.” But he says that positions in time can also be ordered by two-place relations like two days earlier than, one day earlier than, simultaneous with, etc. (These relations are now often called “B relations.”) McTaggart calls the series of times ordered by these relations “the B series.”

And then it goes on to say this, which I agree with :

(An odd but seldom noticed consequence of McTaggart's characterization of the A series and the B series is that, on that characterization, the A series is identical to the B series. For the items that make up the B series (namely, moments of time) are the same items that make up the A series, and the order of the items in the B series is the same as the order of the items in the A series; but there is nothing more to a series than some specific items in a particular order.)

What comes next in the article, and what you seem to be getting at, is what I think doesn't follow from merely ordering in A or B-series :

In any case, McTaggart argues that the B series alone does not constitute a proper time series. I.e., McTaggart says that the A series is essential to time. His reason for this is that change (he says) is essential to time, and the B series without the A series does not involve genuine change (since B series positions are forever “fixed,” whereas A series positions are constantly changing).

Why? What is "genuine change" as opposed to change that is merely things being different at different moments in time? What is this "temporal passage" that is supposedly absent from the B-series and essential to time? I've raised the same questions earlier, but you keep just referencing back to same ill-defined notions, as if that explain anything. If you want to discuss this topic, engage with the ideas.

I don't think characterization as A-series or B-series explains anything by itself. It seems to be merely about the language we use to describe things, and so not about the nature of things. — ChatteringMonkey

I haven't been talking about the A-series or the B-series. I have only been talking about (and only asked you about) the A-theory and the B-theory. Therefore, you have not answered the question, and before you accuse me of not engaging with the ideas, you may want to read the SEP article you are quoting from a little more closely:

(It is worth noting that some discussions of these issues employ terminology that is different from the A series/B series terminology used here. For example, some discussions frame the issue in terms of a question about the reality of tense (roughly, the irreducible possession by times, events, and things of genuine A properties), with A Theorists characterized as those who affirm the reality of tense and B Theorists characterized as those who deny the reality of tense.)

You can refer back to the OP for my quote from the same article where it states that time passes according to the A-theory, and time does not pass according to the B-theory. A more extensive explanation is provided in the SEP article, just prior to the above quote:

According to The B Theory, there are no genuine, unanalyzable A properties, and all talk that appears to be about A properties is really reducible to talk about B relations. For example, when we say that the year 1900 has the property of being past, all we really mean is that 1900 is earlier than the time at which we are speaking. On this view, there is no sense in which it is true to say that time really passes, and any appearance to the contrary is merely a result of the way we humans happen to perceive the world.

The opponents of The B Theory accept the view (often referred to as “The A Theory”) that there are genuine properties such as being two days past, being present, etc.; that facts about these A properties are not in any way reducible to facts about B relations; and that times and events are constantly changing with respect to their A properties (first becoming less and less future, then becoming present, and subsequently becoming more and more past). According to The A Theory, the passage of time is a very real and inexorable feature of the world, and not merely some mind-dependent phenomenon.

What is "genuine change" as opposed to change that is merely things being different at different moments in time? What is this "temporal passage" that is supposedly absent from the B-series and essential to time? — ChatteringMonkey

The dispute between A- and B-theorists is "genuine change" as opposed to apparent-but-not-real change. This might be better understood in terms of three-dimensionalism vs. four-dimensionalism (see here): i.e. the (3D) whole of you passing through time vs. different temporal parts of your (4D) space-time worm (not passing through time, but eternally existing).

The takeaway here is that B-theorists deny that time genuinely passes, so if you think it does, then you might not be one.

The takeaway here is that B-theorists deny that time genuinely passes, so if you think it does, then you might not be one. — Luke

I've read the things you referred to, and my question is still the same, what do you mean with genuinely passage of time and genuine change? I can't answer the question if I don't know what it means.

Again, to me it seems that the only difference between the theories is what you consider to be real or existing. In 4d spacetime an object exists temporally extended, "wormlike" over time, but that doesn't mean it doesn't change, or that time doesn't pass... it does, per definition. And that is not merely 'apparent change', change is part of the existing temporally extended object and just as real as change is in A-theory it seems to me.

In 4d spacetime an object exists temporally extended, "wormlike" over time, but that doesn't mean it doesn't change, or that time doesn't pass... it does, per definition. — ChatteringMonkey

Per what definition?

And that is not merely 'apparent change', change is part of the existing temporally extended object and just as real as change is in A-theory it seems to me. — ChatteringMonkey

You've introduced this talk of "change" rather than temporal passage. What changes about a space-time worm? Obviously, it has different parts at different times, but nothing about it changes. Moreover, any assumption that time actually passes from one temporal part to the next is rejected by B-theorists.

I've read the things you referred to, and my question is still the same, what do you mean with genuinely passage of time and genuine change? I can't answer the question if I don't know what it means. — ChatteringMonkey

As the SEP article notes, it's taking tense seriously, which means "the irreducible possession by times, events, and things of genuine A properties", which simply means that future events become present and then past. Genuinely! But I'm sure you already knew that.

For a more detailed answer, I could refer you to Tim Maudlin's 'On the Passing of Time', which you can download directly as a pdf file by clicking here: http://philocosmology.rutgers.edu/images/uploads/TimDavidClass/05-maudlin-chap04.pdf

The passage of time is an intrinsic asymmetry in the temporal structure of the world, an asymmetry that has no spatial counterpart. It is the asymmetry that grounds the distinction between sequences which run from past to future and sequences which run from future to past. Consider, for example, the sequence of events that makes up an asteroid traveling from the vicinity of Mars to the vicinity of the Earth, as opposed to the sequence that makes up an asteroid moving from the vicinity of Earth to that of Mars. These sequences might be ‘matched’, in the sense that to every event in the one there corresponds an event in the other which has the same bodies in the same spatial arrangement. The topological structure of the matched states would also be matched: if state B is between states A and C in one sequence, then the corresponding state B* would be between A* and C* in the other. Still, going from Mars to Earth is not the same as going from Earth to Mars. The difference, if you will, is how these sequences of states are oriented with respect to the passage of time. If the asteroid gets closer to Earth as time passes, then the asteroid is going in one direction, if it gets further it is going in the other direction. So the passage of time provides an innate asymmetry to temporal structure. — Tim Maudlin

This is the temporal passage that B-theorists reject.

Per what definition? — Luke

The 4th axis of 4d spacetime.

You've introduced this talk of "change" rather than temporal passage. What changes about a space-time worm? Obviously, it has different parts at different times, but nothing about it changes. — Luke

The parts at different times are different right? Well, that simply is change. I don't know how to put it any other way really. Change is part of the thing that exists temporally extended. You cannot expect the whole temporally extended object to change in yet another 5th dimension. Then you are trying to apply a 3d presentist logic, where the time dimension isn't included yet, to 4d spacetime…. naturally that won't work.

As the SEP article notes, it's taking tense seriously, which means "the irreducible possession by times, events, and things of genuine A properties", which simply means that future events become present and then past. Genuinely! But I'm sure you already knew that. — Luke

I get that if you think only the present exist, the future and past are ontologically different... And so yes you would take tense seriously. But that is just a question of what exist, which I agree is different in the two theories. I'm just not sure what the word "genuinely" is supposed to add to all of this.

The passage of time is an intrinsic asymmetry in the temporal structure of the world, an asymmetry that has no spatial counterpart. It is the asymmetry that grounds the distinction between sequences which run from past to future and sequences which run from future to past. Consider, for example, the sequence of events that makes up an asteroid traveling from the vicinity of Mars to the vicinity of the Earth, as opposed to the sequence that makes up an asteroid moving from the vicinity of Earth to that of Mars. These sequences might be ‘matched’, in the sense that to every event in the one there corresponds an event in the other which has the same bodies in the same spatial arrangement. The topological structure of the matched states would also be matched: if state B is between states A and C in one sequence, then the corresponding state B* would be between A* and C* in the other. Still, going from Mars to Earth is not the same as going from Earth to Mars. The difference, if you will, is how these sequences of states are oriented with respect to the passage of time. If the asteroid gets closer to Earth as time passes, then the asteroid is going in one direction, if it gets further it is going in the other direction. So the passage of time provides an innate asymmetry to temporal structure. — Tim Maudlin

This is the temporal passage that B-theorists reject. — Luke

I agree that the eternalist need to give an explanation for the apparent asymmetry of time, which unlike space, seems to move only in one direction. But, as I alluded to in an earlier post, I think they probably can with the second law of thermodynamics. Entropy only increases, and so that gives time an apparent direction, only one way.

Perhaps even better:https://arxiv.org/abs/0912.0808Time and Spacetime: The Crystallizing Block Universe
George F. R. Ellis, Tony Rothman
The nature of the future is completely different from the nature of the past. When quantum effects are significant, the future shows all the signs of quantum weirdness, including duality, uncertainty, and entanglement. With the passage of time, after the time-irreversible process of state-vector reduction has taken place, the past emerges, with the previous quantum uncertainty replaced by the classical certainty of definite particle identities and states. The present time is where this transition largely takes place, but the process does not take place uniformly: Evidence from delayed choice and related experiments shows that isolated patches of quantum indeterminacy remain, and that their transition from probability to certainty only takes place later. Thus, when quantum effects are significant, the picture of a classical Evolving Block Universe (`EBU') cedes place to one of a Crystallizing Block Universe (`CBU'), which reflects this quantum transition from indeterminacy to certainty, while nevertheless resembling the EBU on large enough scales.

Per what definition?
— Luke

The 4th axis of 4d spacetime. — ChatteringMonkey

Is that a definition?

The parts at different times are different right? Well, that simply is change. I don't know how to put it any other way really. Change is part of the thing that exists temporally extended. — ChatteringMonkey

How so?

My concern, as presented in the OP, is with temporal passage and motion. I'm not sure whether "change" is really the same thing. Your use of this term seems to be a way for you to try and have both the A-theory and the B-theory.

You cannot expect the whole temporally extended object to change in yet another 5th dimension. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't. I deny that "the whole temporally extended object" changes at all. However, this might depend on your definition of "change". I'm not all that interested in change unless it means the same as temporal passage or motion.

I get that if you think only the present exist, the future and past are ontologically different... And so yes you would take tense seriously. But that is just a question of what exist, which I agree is different in the two theories. I'm just not sure what the word "genuinely" is supposed to add to all of this. — ChatteringMonkey

As I keep repeating, what it adds is the difference between the A-theory and the B-theory, which is temporal passage. A-theorists think it's real; B-theorists do not. It is not "just a question of what exists" if temporal passage is something over and above everything that exists. If it's not, then there's no distinction between B-theory Eternalism and the Moving Spotlight theory, which would imply there's no distinction between the B-theory and the A-theory.

I agree that the eternalist need to give an explanation for the apparent asymmetry of time, which unlike space, seems to move only in one direction. But, as I alluded to in an earlier post, I think they probably can with the second law of thermodynamics. Entropy only increases, and so that gives time an apparent direction, only one way. — ChatteringMonkey

A direction to time assumes temporal passage, which B-theorists reject. Entropy won't help you. To provide an account of why temporal passage has a direction is to concede that temporal passage is real. The Eternalist doesn't need to account for the direction of apparent temporal passage, but for apparent temporal passage itself (i.e. for how and why apparent temporal passage is not real).

As I keep repeating, what it adds is the difference between the A-theory and the B-theory, which is temporal passage. A-theorists think it's real; B-theorists do not. It is not "just a question of what exists" if temporal passage is something over and above everything that exists. If it's not, then there's no distinction between B-theory Eternalism and the Moving Spotlight theory, which would imply there's no distinction between the B-theory and the A-theory. — Luke

How would anyone know whether it's real? There is no possible source of information on that question.

How would anyone know whether it's real? There is no possible source of information on that question. — Echarmion

Now now.

Now now. — Luke

See this whole discussion just seems confused to me. And noticing confusion is important. What is it we actually want to know? We already know how time appears to a subject. We also already know how time appears on an intersubjective scale. Is it possible that's all there is to it?

Your complaint could be levelled at much of philosophy, it seems. It's a metaphysical and a conceptual issue. I think it logically follows from the tenets of Eternalism that it precludes motion.

There is good metaphysics and there is bad metaphysics. Not every conceptual issue has an answer.

In the case at hand, all you're doing if you move from the A-theory to the B-theory is abstracting from the individual observer to a hypothetical universal observer. That is, in fact, what the scientific method always does. Because the universal observer has no individual position in time and space (physics being assumed to be uniform across both) "A-properties" necessarily disappear in the process, being replaced by "B-properties". This does not, in principle, seem any different than what happens to spatial directions when you do the same.

None of this implies the ontological truth of one theory or the other. In fact, it doesn't even imply that time has an ontological nature. It might just be an ordering principle in our minds.

Is that a definition? — Luke

It's figure of speech, sort of, if you plot something in a graph along an axis that indicates different moments of time, then they move in time, and change. But whatever, it's not that important.

My concern, as presented in the OP, is with temporal passage and motion. I'm not sure whether "change" is really the same thing. Your use of this term seems to be a way for you to try and have both the A-theory and the B-theory. — Luke

Motion is a subset of change. And I use change instead of time, because it's the thing we observe, unlike time itself. But if you want, what I said works just as well with motion.

I don't. I deny that "the whole temporally extended object" changes at all. However, this might depend on your definition of "change". I'm not all that interested in change unless it means the same as temporal passage or motion. — Luke

It is the same with motion. You at time x1 and you at time x2 are at different locations, so you move. It doesn't make sense to say that 'the whole temporally extended object" doesn't move as a whole. To make that claim is to apply a 3d perspective on motion to 4d spacetime.

As I keep repeating, what it adds is the difference between the A-theory and the B-theory, which is temporal passage. A-theorists think it's real; B-theorists do not. It is not "just a question of what exists" if temporal passage is something over and above everything that exists. If it's not, then there's no distinction between B-theory Eternalism and the Moving Spotlight theory, which would imply there's no distinction between the B-theory and the A-theory. — Luke

Honestly, I have no idea whatsoever what you mean with temporal passage. Earlier I asked the question if you think time was something that exists independently, and you answered this:

I do not mean by it "that time is an independent metaphysical thing acting on the universe." — Luke

Now you say temporal passage is something that exists over and above everything else?

Either way, your last sentence doesn't follow. There is still a distinction between the theories because they have a different view of what exists, regardless of temporal passage.

A direction to time assumes temporal passage, which B-theorists reject. Entropy won't help you. To provide an account of why temporal passage has a direction is to concede that temporal passage is real. The Eternalist doesn't need to account for the direction of apparent temporal passage, but for apparent temporal passage itself (i.e. for how and why apparent temporal passage is not real). — Luke

Temporal passage again eh, if only I knew what it meant... I didn't say anything about temporal passage, I said time appears to have a direction because of entropy, and I think it can explain the direction just fine.

But I give up, like noAxioms said, you seem to be incapable of entertaining another perspective, and at this point i'm just repeating myself.

None of this implies the ontological truth of one theory or the other. In fact, it doesn't even imply that time has an ontological nature. It might just be an ordering principle in our minds. — Echarmion

Yeah, that's where I'm at basically. Time is a usefull convention, regardless of it's ontological nature.

In the case at hand, all you're doing if you move from the A-theory to the B-theory is abstracting from the individual observer to a hypothetical universal observer. — Echarmion

As I understand it, there is a genuine dispute between A-theorists and B-theorists as to the nature of time, with the former affirming that temporal passage is real and the latter denying it.

Because the universal observer has no individual position in time and space (physics being assumed to be uniform across both) "A-properties" necessarily disappear in the process, being replaced by "B-properties". — Echarmion

I don't know of any B-theorists who claim that time actually passes and that temporal passage only "disappears" (or is not real) due to it being a more objective perspective. This seems contrary to the definitions I've posted and to what I've read on the subject. I'd welcome any information you have that says otherwise.

You at time x1 and you at time x2 are at different locations, so you move. — ChatteringMonkey

The Eternalist needs to account for how one moves from t1 to t2 if temporal passage is not real.

It doesn't make sense to say that 'the whole temporally extended object" doesn't move as a whole. — ChatteringMonkey

Look, you said that "In 4d spacetime an object exists temporally extended, "wormlike" over time, but that doesn't mean it doesn't change, or that time doesn't pass... it does, per definition". I've shown you that this is incorrect. B-theorists assert that time does not pass. You can always opt for the Moving Spotlight theory if you want to retain temporal passage.

Now you say temporal passage is something that exists over and above everything else? — ChatteringMonkey

I said that it's not only a question of existence IF temporal passage is something more than that. However, I had concerns this may have been unclear. To clarify, Eternalism or the block universe supposedly includes all of existence, but an A-theorist would disagree and say that it omits the existence of temporal passage. It's a different type of existence compared to all other things which exist at a time.

Temporal passage again eh, — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, it's the difference between the A-theory and the B-theory, which is the difference between Eternalism and the Moving Spotlight theory, which is the topic of this discussion.

But I give up, like noAxioms said, you seem to be incapable of entertaining another perspective — ChatteringMonkey

You want me to entertain a perspective which is not the topic of this discussion?

The Eternalist needs to account for how one moves from t1 to t2 if temporal passage is not real. — Luke

I don't see how that follows, one moves via all the intervals between t1 and t2.

Look, you said that "In 4d spacetime an object exists temporally extended, "wormlike" over time, but that doesn't mean it doesn't change, or that time doesn't pass... it does, per definition". I've shown you that this is incorrect. B-theorists assert that time does not pass. You can always opt for the Moving Spotlight theory if you want to retain temporal passage. — Luke

I don't think you have shown that. You seem to think that there is something fundamentally different about an object existing over all the intervals of time (t1, t2, t3, etc) and the passage of time, I don't. Time passes just the same, that's what the intervals of time indicate. Maybe 'passing' is a confusing word to use in an eternalist perspective because there isn't a preferred moment, but that's just a semantic issue, not necessarily because of some fundamental difference in how things move from one interval of time to another.

EDIT: And to clarify my position, I don't subscribe to any metapyiscal theory of time. I think time is a usefull convention at least. Maybe it's real, maybe not, I don't know and ultimately I don't think it really matters all that much for me as a human being.

It's a different type of existence compared to all other things which exist at a time. — Luke

Yes apparently, it just isn't clear to me what that would be.

You want me to entertain a perspective which is not the topic of this discussion? — Luke

Eternalism is the topic of the discussion.

You seem to think that there is something fundamentally different about an object existing over all the intervals of time (t1, t2, t3, etc) and the passage of time, I don't. Time passes just the same — ChatteringMonkey

Do you believe that future events become present and then past? That's the passage of time; the thing you seem to have trouble to comprehend. If you believe in this, then you believe in temporal passage. This is what B-theorists do not believe. It's that simple.

As I understand it, there is a genuine dispute between A-theorists and B-theorists as to the nature of time, with the former affirming that temporal passage is real and the latter denying it. — Luke

I don't deny there is genuine dispute, but the dispute isn't necessarily productive. I cant shake the feeling that the discussion simply runs into a language and comprehension barrier.

I don't know of any B-theorists who claim that time actually passes and that temporal passage only "disappears" (or is not real) due to it being a more objective perspective. This seems contrary to the definitions I've posted and to what I've read on the subject. I'd welcome any information you have that says otherwise. — Luke

I didn't mean to imply that my view is compatible with what B-theorists say. I just think that the ontological nature of time cannot be established due to a lack of available information. It's too fundamental to the way our minds work. Time is essentially our stream of consciousness.

Do you believe that future events become present and then past? That's the passage of time; the thing you seem to have trouble to comprehend. If you believe in this, then you believe in temporal passage. This is what B-theorists do not believe. It's that simple. — Luke

Like I said I don't subscribe to any metaphysical theory of time. Strictly speaking the only thing I observe is things changing/moving. All the rest is I think a matter of convention. We measure change in units of time because it's useful for our purposes.... and we talk about past, present or future because we remember things that happened earlier. That is how we choose to split up things for utility purposes, but I don't think that necessarily says anything about the nature of things... I think we just don't know.

Like I said I don't subscribe to any metaphysical theory of time. — ChatteringMonkey

Are you kidding me? You've variously accused me of "not engaging the ideas", of being "incapable of entertaining another perspective", and of being mistaken about the topic of the discussion that I started, yet you can't even commit to either the A-theory or the B-theory, i.e. to whether time passes or not? You clearly don't understand what B-theory or Eternalism are about.

The fact that I don't subscribe to it, is evidence that I don't understand it?

And what do you think entertaining another perspective is?

Here's a quote from the only eternalist that posted in this thread, who said much of the same things I said :

In that case, my question is: when does motion occur according to Eternalism?
Somewhere between noon and 1 obviously (in my example). Every moment of it in fact, since at no time is any object actually stationary, what with Earth spinning and accelearting and all. — noAxioms

But believe what you want, I'm done.

The fact that I don't subscribe to it, is evidence that I don't understand it? — ChatteringMonkey

No, it's all of these things you've said:

The temporal passage thing is not the problem, the block is only static viewed from the outside.

What is this "temporal passage" that is supposedly absent from the B-series and essential to time?

In 4d spacetime an object exists temporally extended, "wormlike" over time, but that doesn't mean it doesn't change, or that time doesn't pass... it does

Honestly, I have no idea whatsoever what you mean with temporal passage.

Temporal passage again eh, if only I knew what it meant

You seem to think that there is something fundamentally different about an object existing over all the intervals of time (t1, t2, t3, etc) and the passage of time, I don't. Time passes just the same — Chattering Monkey

Time doesn't pass according to the B-theory. That's it's defining aspect. Temporal passage was the first thing I defined in the OP and the thing I have had to keep repeating to you throughout this discussion. It also marks the difference between Eternalism and the Moving Spotlight theory, which was the intended topic of this discussion. But you seem to have wanted to talk about something else.

Time doesn't pass according to the B-theory. That's it's defining aspect. Temporal passage was the first thing I defined in the OP and the thing I have had to keep repeating to you throughout this discussion. It also marks the difference between Eternalism and the Moving Spotlight theory, which was the intended topic of this discussion. But you seem to have wanted to talk about something else. — Luke

That's not its defining aspect, it's the lack of preferred moment, or a question of what exists. Time passing as you seem to use it doesn't make sense in an eternalist view, which is why I kept asking you what you actually meant with it.

To re-iterate, it's not that temporal passage does not exists in eternalism, it's that it's not a meaningfull thing to say.

Please enlighten me as to the difference between Eternalism and the Moving Spotlight theory. — Luke

Moving spotlight (and pretty much the rest of your list) has a preferred moment. Eternalism does not.

You seem to be implying that temporal passage is possible under Eternalism? How so?. - Luke

I implied no such thing. I said there is movement. I made no reference to temporal passage, which again is a term only meaningful to views that posit a preferred moment. — noAxioms

Time doesn't pass according to the B-theory. That's it's defining aspect.
— Luke

That's not its defining aspect, it's the lack of preferred moment, or a question of what exists. — ChatteringMonkey

Are you talking about B-theory or Eternalism? You clearly don't understand the difference, because your entire post is about Eternalism, while my statement was about the B-theory.

Yes i'm talking about eternalism, as per titel of the thread... and what we where talking about in most of the thread. Why are you switching to talking about B-theories in general?