If one tries to find out why we balk at hurting our own kind we reach the conclusion that it all has to do with the ability to feel pain and suffer.

I think it's more than that. Especially in the case of killing, you're ending that being's potential. Humans have potential, cows don't. It's not just about ability to feel pain. Closely related to potential is cognitive and creative abilities.

I think it's more than that. Especially in the case of killing, you're ending that being's potential. Humans have potential, cows don't. It's not just about ability to feel pain. Closely related to potential is cognitive and creative abilities. — BitconnectCarlos

Well, if you want to talk about potential then may I remind you that, according to biology, we humans evolved into our current form from ape-ancestors. How do we know, cows, likewise, don't have the potential to be human-like in terms of whatever potential you believe makes us not killable/comestible?

I'm not really talking about the species I'm talking about the individual.

I'm not really talking about the species I'm talking about the individual. — BitconnectCarlos

Aren't you talking about humans?

When we make moral decisions in the real world we're dealing with actual, flesh and blood beings in the here and now. In the current reality that we face humans have that potential that we don't see in cows.

When we make moral decisions in the real world we're dealing with actual, flesh and blood beings in the here and now. In the current reality that we face humans have that potential that we don't see in cows. — BitconnectCarlos

But the notion of potential transcends what you call "current reality" for potential is always about what could be in the future. Just as a human's potential lies in the future, so too a cow's potential.

Isn't there also the potential that the cows turn into an extremely intelligent, powerful species and wage war on the humans? Shouldn't we get a head start on that and eliminate them then?

Isn't there also the potential that the cows turn into an extremely intelligent, powerful species and wage war on the humans? Shouldn't we get a head start on that and eliminate them then? — BitconnectCarlos

I'm not sure about that.

This is why you don't base your practical ethics on some possibility which may arise in 10 million years which wouldn't involve any of the participants of the ethical scenario.

This is why you don't base your practical ethics on some possibility which may arise in 10 million years which wouldn't involve any of the participants of the ethical scenario. — BitconnectCarlos

Humans are killing each other and the odd fact is we are the only extant life forms, apart from sharks, hippopotami, wild bufallo, the occasional crocodilian, capable of that. We are our own worst enemy. It must be that we're not ready yet to ascend to the next rung in morality where animal welfare becomes important. Some have though - vegans and vegetarians for example - and it would be very interesting to speculate on how things pan out in the future. Will we see animal rights become a reality or will the killings continue?

I think it's more than that. Especially in the case of killing, you're ending that being's potential. Humans have potential, cows don't. — BitconnectCarlos

Potential to do what exactly? Are you really going to base a system of ethics on any given individual's ability to "potentially" create a Mona Lisa or an Etude in C Minor? Or is your bar a little lower than that?

The reason I ask is because I do not see a bar of potentiality that would be able to encompass all of the humans we'd want to protect, including all mentally and physically disabled persons, that would not simultaneously encompass cows.

Potential to do what exactly? Are you really going to base a system of ethics on any given individual's ability to "potentially" create a Mona Lisa or an Etude in C Minor? Or is your bar a little lower than that?

Potential to make the world a better place, to form positive connections/relationships, potential to create something beautiful, etc.

The reason I ask is because I do not see a bar of potentiality that would be able to encompass all of the humans we'd want to protect, including all mentally and physically disabled persons, that would not simultaneously encompass cows.

Maybe we run into problems with this standard when it comes to the very severely disabled - maybe. Even if someone has a disability that doesn't make them useless. Sure a mentally disabled person isn't going to be the next Einstein but focus on the things s/he can do. Even if someone's in a coma maybe they have the potential to become better.

However, I dont think that all the animals vegans/animal rights folk believe shouldnt be eaten are going to be shown by science to have anything like the human ethics or suffering. I think some will, and based on suffering as a metric we shouldn't (ethically speaking) eat those animals. That would be consistent with the premiss of suffering as the metric. — DingoJones

Dingo, I am not sure of your stance as described there - are you agreeing that when we are reasonably confident that another animal can experience pain and suffering, we shouldn't eat them?

Potential to make the world a better place, to form positive connections/relationships, potential to create something beautiful, etc. — BitconnectCarlos

Cows can and do do all that.... Especially when you're willing to include the betterment abilities of severely disabled and comatose people into your ethical scope here.

We do owe ethical duties to animals. I just think that treating cows or frogs as having the exact same value as humans is insane. In theory it might sound great, but what it would practically translate into is that if we had to make a choice between saving 100 humans or 100 frogs we'd remain totally indifferent.

Once you accept that it's now just a matter of finding some way to justify it, if there is one.

Well I wouldnt agree with that no, because I wouldnt use suffering as the metric.
If you do use suffering as a metric then I think there is a spectrum and not a simple meat or veggie dichotomy. To be consistent, I think rather than being measured by whether its an animal or a veggie you would have to measure whats ethical to eat by the mental capacities of each thing you consider eating. I dont think that all meat would be entirely excluded in that calculus, we would find some meats (maybe alot) that would be ok to eat. It would depend on what “ability to experience suffering” standards are being used but the calculus is the same regardless and thats why I dont think vegans or vegetarians have the moral high ground they think they do.

I dont think that all meat would be entirely excluded in that calculus, we would find some meats (maybe alot) that would be ok to eat. — DingoJones

This sounds very vague. What meats specifically? What vegetarians specifically? I've been finding it incredibly difficult to actually apply your criticisms.

For example, there are a lot of vegetarians that don't mind eating eggs... some, don't eat eggs, not because the egg suffers, but because the hen that lays it does. It sounds to me these are actual examples of applications of the principles you prescribe. Or are you talking about the morality of eating termites? Without some actual specific critiques, it's hard to find, well, an actual critique here.

As another example, you did discuss the "bug suffering" thing in raising crops, but that sounds suspicious, because those farmed animals eat crops too; so I'm not quite sure how you can argue that it's "more" or "equivalent" suffering to eat said crops versus to feed them to farmed animals and eat them (especially since I don't quite see eating, using a rough metric, a pound of crop as being equivalent, in terms of mere crop related "harm", to eating a pound of farmed animal that was fed crops... surely it takes raising much more crops to make that pound of farmed animal than it does just eating that amount).

This sounds very vague. What meats specifically? What vegetarians specifically? I've been finding it incredibly difficult to actually apply your criticisms. — InPitzotl

I feel like ive answered this...the meat that meets the thresholds of suffering being used to decide what's ok to eat and whats isnt. The vegetarians im referencing have been the ones that dont eat meat because it causes suffering to the animal providing the meat and ones that think hey have the moral high ground for not eating meat. (Two different references for two different points but those are the two types of vegetarians Ive referred too.

The vegetarians im referencing have been the ones that dont eat meat because it causes suffering to the animal providing the meat and ones that think hey have the moral high ground for not eating meat. — DingoJones

But I don't see any inconsistency, even here:

Anyway, once you decide insects arent to be included as suffering creatures you are making the same calculus as a meat eater, arbitrarily drawing the line at insects the way a meat eater might draw the line at dogs, or monkeys. Thats problematic for what I hope are obvious reasons. — DingoJones

Such vegetarians draw a line arbitrarily, but it's a false equivalence to say that this makes it the same exact calculus, because said vegetarians factually would eat less kinds of things than the people they claim to hold the moral high ground over. To say this is the exact same calculus is to commit a fallacy of the heap. Your "obvious reasons", to me, sound more like rationalizations; irrational ones at that.

As for your social contract theory, I think that's a miss as well. We cannot hold social contracts with non-humans, so... it makes sense to say not hold court trials for the atrocities of cats against the suffering they cause mice. But certainly that doesn't prohibit us from making social contracts with humans against abusive behaviors for pets. If you think we can do that, then shouldn't we be able to likewise make social contracts with humans to avoid eating meat? And if you don't, why not? If it's the latter, I haven't seen an argument for it from you in this thread.

The real problem here is that I have to invent what I think are fictitious vegetarians to be targets of your criticisms. For example, regarding those who are concerned with just minimizing overall suffering who apparently don't realize suffering exists in nature, what specific thing do such vegetarians do that make them morally culpable? For a non-vegetarian example, if I were a doctor am I compelled to stay awake, working myself to exhaustion, to save lives, given I can? Back to the vegetarians, are they likewise compelled to, say, save caterpillars from Ichneumon wasps? What sort of actual moral criticisms (using actual vegetarian moral systems) are you advancing?

I don't think you have answered that in this thread, at least none I can comprehend. What you have presented, at least to me, seems like a bunch of fuzziness and false equivalences.

I see what you are driving at. So if we are to use pain and suffering as our moral benchmark, some organisms may be excluded from consideration. For example, if we are confident that wheat doesn't feel pain, we have no need to concern ourselves with any moral duty to any particular wheat plant (we might however, on a different basis, have some concerns about a wider ethical concern relating to the growing of wheat as a commodity). Similarly, the same should apply to any animal that does not experience pain (if we are sufficiently confident that an oyster for example isn't likely to suffer any more than a stalk of wheat).

This seems to point in the right direction. Broadly then we could see an endorsement for vegan ethics in regard to animal farming - that is, those animals which can feel pain and suffer would be those we'd owe the greater duty to. Wouldn't the typical farmed animal fall within that scope? And as I mentioned earlier, we have some reasonably sound empirical grounds for excluding insects from that duty which would free us from particular concerns about insects as individuals. That would mean we can happily eat insects and kill them in crop farming (with the same caveat as earlier - for example, a broader ethical duty to insects as species and members of the ecosystem).

Just as an aside, is there a particular objection to folk seeking the higher moral ground? I'm not sure I'd advocate for chasing the lower moral ground!!

Animal Sacrifice & Universal Care

My 'conversion' to a plant-based diet occurred many years ago and was ethically based. It came about by way of the simple recognition and acknowledgment that, while many animals cannot live without eating other animals, human beings can. For us, eating animals is a choice—neither our health nor our well-being depend on us eating meat or dairy; in fact, for optimum health, research strongly supports a plant-based diet. Of course, there are people in some isolated geographic areas who may need to eat meat or dairy, but it can nearly always be avoided.

When I contemplated this fact along with my life-long commitment to kindness and care for all beings (and things), I was 'done in'. I was ethically and rationally cornered: How could I possibly sacrifice an animal's life when I knew for certain it was merely a personal choice based on my tastes, customs, habitual patterns, and/or pleasure?

I had to ask myself why I would sacrifice any life, anywhere, at any time, merely for my own pleasure? I know beyond a shadow of a doubt that from now until I die, I can thrive in robust health without eating meat or dairy. There is no question of this; I've done it for many years. I realize I cannot live on earth without sacrificing life, but, ethically, I must do all I can to minimize, rather than justify, that sacrifice.

I am very grateful to Stephen David Ross. For I was prompted to this way of life in consequence of reading his “Plenishment in the Earth: An Ethic of Inclusion.” In Chapter 7, Carnaval, he briefly discusses the Eden story and includes the following lines from Alexander Pope's “Essay on Man” (3, 4:152-164):

Man walk'd with beast, joint tenant of the shade;
The same table, and the same his bed;
Nor murder cloath'd him, and no murder fed.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Heav'n's attribute was Universal Care,
And Man's prerogative to rule, but spare.
Ah! how unlike the man of times to come!
Of half that live the butcher and the tomb;
Who, foe to Nature, hears the gen'ral groan,
Murders their species, and betrays his own.

I would guess we have reached an impasse, as your responses seems scarce on substance to me as well.

↪DingoJones I see what you are driving at. So if we are to use pain and suffering as our moral benchmark, some organisms may be excluded from consideration. For example, if we are confident that wheat doesn't feel pain, we have no need to concern ourselves with any moral duty to any particular wheat plant (we might however, on a different basis, have some concerns about a wider ethical concern relating to the growing of wheat as a commodity). Similarly, the same should apply to any animal that does not experience pain (if we are sufficiently confident that an oyster for example isn't likely to suffer any more than a stalk of wheat). — Graeme M

Yes, as you say you see what Im getting at. I think we might disagree about what levels of pain and suffering matters though...i wouldnt say you couldn't eat anything that feels any pain or suffering. I would say it depends on how and what capacity the animal has for pain, suffering and/or consciousness compared to humans. (Presumably there are attributes to human suffering that make it wrong that we would want to see present in the animal we shouldn't eat (ethically speaking, and with suffering as our metric).

This seems to point in the right direction. Broadly then we could see an endorsement for vegan ethics in regard to animal farming - that is, those animals which can feel pain and suffer would be those we'd owe the greater duty to. Wouldn't the typical farmed animal fall within that scope? And as I mentioned earlier, we have some reasonably sound empirical grounds for excluding insects from that duty which would free us from particular concerns about insects as individuals. That would mean we can happily eat insects and kill them in crop farming (with the same caveat as earlier - for example, a broader ethical duty to insects as species and members of the ecosystem). — Graeme M

Well I wouldnt qualify the capacity for pain and suffering alone. I think it needs to be an experience of suffering/pain of a certain kind, a kind that fits the same criteria for why pain and suffering is wrong to inflict on humans.
Aside from that consideration, yes I think ethics (with preventing suffering as the moral metric) would demand we be more careful about what animals we eat.

Just as an aside, is there a particular objection to folk seeking the higher moral ground? I'm not sure I'd advocate for chasing the lower moral ground!! — Graeme M

No, my issue is with claiming the moral high ground when you dont actually have it. (And by “you” i mean people in general, not you personally).
Plus, and again not directed at you personally, claiming the moral high ground is far too often the cry of the self righteous.
Anyway, Im glad I was eventually able to articulate my view more clearly. You’ve given me food for thought so Im going to do some thinking on what youve said.

I would guess we have reached an impasse, as your responses seems scarce on substance to me as well. — DingoJones

I disagree that it's an impasse, so I cannot "agree to disagree". In my mind, you're simply refusing to voice specific complaints about actual moral high grounds real vegetarians have, and are giving the excuse that I haven't said anything of substance. (Maybe you misunderstand the complaint? Saying that my response is "scarce on substance" is a bit odd to me... presumably, you're griping about vegetarians holding moral high ground. I'm assuming you're saying they don't hold moral high ground by their own rules. The question then is, are you correctly applying those rules? Are you actually refuting them? Nothing I see in your complaints is genuine... it all seems straw-mannish).

But if you prefer forfeiture, fine; that's your prerogative. I cannot force you to defend your claims.

Well I wouldnt qualify the capacity for pain and suffering alone. I think it needs to be an experience of suffering/pain of a certain kind, a kind that fits the same criteria for why pain and suffering is wrong to inflict on humans. Aside from that consideration, yes I think ethics (with preventing suffering as the moral metric) would demand we be more careful about what animals we eat. — DingoJones

I like this, it's more my own stance on vegan ethics. I find it hard to adopt the view that all animals are accorded the same ethical duty, largely due to the problematic claims that all animals have interests of the kind we believe carry a moral weight and that all animals experience pain and suffering.

Vegan ethics also rejects the commodity status of other animals but I am troubled by that claim as well. Why do we reject the commodity status of cows but not wheat? Presumably, because cows are "conscious" and can have both interests and suffering. But the interests of cows are not the same as our interests. Equally, we can farm cows without causing them harm (though I suspect that is not at all the norm) so on theoretical grounds at least I don't really see the need to accept this claim. In the end, I think that claim also really boils down to pain and suffering, because as I noted earlier if an organism can't suffer why would it matter if I own it?

So I think pain and suffering are strong grounds for arguing for a moral duty to other animals, though it might not always require not using (or eating) another animal.

if we had to make a choice between saving 100 humans or 100 frogs we'd remain totally indifferent. — BitconnectCarlos

We don't determine ethical value based on extreme scenarios though. That's like me saying, who would you save, your son or your daughter, and whoever you don't save has no ethical value and under all circumstances, not just these fringe ones, should be slaughtered and eaten.

We don't determine ethical value based on extreme scenarios though.

We could make it 1 to 1 instead of 100 to 100, it's the same thing.

That's like me saying, who would you save, your son or your daughter, and whoever you don't save has no ethical value and under all circumstances, not just these fringe ones, should be slaughtered and eaten.

Son or daughter is asking about specific people and I don't have a son or daughter so I couldn't answer. We could ask "would you rather save a man or a woman" or "would you rather save a white person or a black person?" in both cases my answer is indifference.

With this question I'm only talking about the question of whether the two have equal moral value or ought to be valued equally. It doesn't follow from this that the one who doesn't get saved has no ethical value nor am I seeking to validate the morality of meat eating here.

I'm only talking about the question of whether the two have equal moral value or ought to be valued equally. It doesn't follow from this that the one who doesn't get saved has no ethical value nor am I seeking to validate the morality of meat eating here. — BitconnectCarlos

Again, the extreme scenario doesn't help you determine moral value AT ALL under normal circumstances. It tells you nothing about how cows or humans should be treated in non-life-or-death scenarios.

Again, the extreme scenario doesn't help you determine moral value AT ALL under normal circumstances. It tells you nothing about how cows or humans should be treated in non-life-or-death scenarios.

I know, I was only seeking to address the question of moral worth. I stated in my OP that I believe meat eaters need to acknowledge their own speciesism. I believe speciesism is a presupposition to meat eating, but as far as I can tell I don't think it's a bad one.

I do believe we should treat animals well in their day to day life. I do believe humans have ethical duties to animals, but I don't think an animal can have a moral duty.

We are in agreement, I think your stance is consistent.