• Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    I don't use "ontological dependence", that's why I asked you what you meant by this? So how would I be the one causing confusion? If someone else thinks that I said what I didn't say, that's not me causing the confusion.
  • Pneumenon
    469
    Q = "There are no truths."

    Would Q be true, in the absence of minds?

    This isn't a recoil argument. I want to look at the relationship between counterfactuals here.
  • Pneumenon
    469
    I suppose you could say that Q would not be true if there were no minds, since there would be no truths. But now we've got these two statements:

    Q1: "Q would not be true in the absence of minds." (note that this does not come out to "Q would be false."
    Q2: "If there were no minds, there would be no truths."
  • Pneumenon
    469
    So, let's take it a little further.

    Two more statements:

    R1: "If there were no minds, there would be no truths."
    R2 "If there are no minds, then there are no truths."

    These two look to be logically equivalent, inasmuch as both say that a world without minds also lacks truth. Recalling that Q = "There are no truths," we have R2 as: "If there are no minds, then Q."

    Let W be a world without minds. Q lacks a truth value in W, but "There are no truths in W" is true in the actual world.

    It looks like our theory of truth comes into play here. On a deflationary account, we're in trouble because "Q" = "Q is true" in deflationary theories, i.e. "There are no truths in W" = "It is true that there are no truths in W." Maybe we should adjust our theory to say "Q" = "Q is true in the actual world." This lets us say that "It is true in the actual world that there are no truths in W."

    So the best way to phrase it is that a world lacking minds also lacks truths. Now, why would we want to say that? Presumably, because sentences are the things with truth values. Worlds without minds lack sentences, so they lack truth.

    Here's where it gets interesting: what does it mean for a world to contain sentences? We can imagine that W contains a scrap of paper with this post written on it. Does W then contain truth, despite lacking any minds?

    I am not sure how to make a conclusive argument here, but the whole position looks more shaky - the presence of a piece of paper with some letters on it ought not to bring truth into a world.
  • Michael
    15.7k
    I am not sure how to make a conclusive argument here, but the whole position looks more shaky - the presence of a piece of paper with some letters on it ought not to bring truth into a world.Pneumenon

    It's a piece of paper with markings on it that in the actual world are treated as words.
  • Pneumenon
    469
    No dice. Does the paper have words on it or not? Keep in mind that we want to know if there are sentences in a world here. How do you put sentences in a world?
  • m-theory
    1.1k
    a world lacking minds also lacks truthsPneumenon

    The problem is this cannot be a truth about the world without minds by definition.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    The problem is this cannot be a truth about the world without minds by definition.m-theory

    Although why is it a problem that it cannot be a truth about the world without minds?
  • m-theory
    1.1k

    If truth is mind dependent, and there are no minds in the world, then there are no truths about that world.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k


    Right. And why is that a problem?
  • m-theory
    1.1k

    This is also a contradiction you might notice.
    It cannot be a truth about that world that there are no truths
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k


    It's not a mind-independent truth about the world that there are no mind-independent truths.

    What you quoted made no claim to being a mind-independent truth though.

    (On my view, as well, which I probably expressed earlier in this thread, I'd also say there are no mind-independent truths, by the way.)
  • m-theory
    1.1k

    You can't make mind dependent claims about the truth of worlds if truth is mind dependent.

    At least not without arriving at a contradiction.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    You can't make mind dependent claims about the truth of worlds if truth is mind dependent.m-theory

    That makes no sense.

    Truth is mind-dependent.

    So when we make a claim about anything, we're saying something mind-dependent, right?

    So when we make a claim about "the truth of worlds," we're making a mind-dependent claim.

    There's nothing at all contradictory about that. If truth is mind-dependent, then any truth claim we make is mind-dependent. So it's not contradictory that we're making a mind-dependent claim about the "truth of worlds." It would only be contradictory if we were to say, "It's a mind-INdependent truth that such and such." But no one said that.
  • m-theory
    1.1k

    So it is not a truth about the world, that truth is mind dependent.

    If the statement "truth is mind dependent" is true, it is not a truth about any world.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    So it is not a truth about the world, that truth is mind dependent.m-theory

    It's not a mind-independent truth about the world. It's a mind-dependent truth about the world.

    This isn't a matter of you reading "about" as "a property of," is it?

    A book about Mars isn't a property of Mars, for example. The book is ABOUT Mars. It's not itself part of Mars.
  • m-theory
    1.1k

    You can't have truths about the world if truth is mind dependent, that leads to contradiction.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k


    What's p in the contradiction? (Contradictions being instances of p & ~p)
  • m-theory
    1.1k

    The contradiction is that in the statement "There is no truth because there are no minds" is not a truth about the world absent of minds if truth if mind dependent.
  • m-theory
    1.1k

    P = Truth is mind dependent
    ~P = The world is absent of minds
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k


    Not to be patronising, but just in case you need an explanation regarding what I'm talking about:

    "p" is a variable for a proposition. Just to keep this simple for now, a proposition is the same thing as a statement or a claim. Let's consider "The cat is on the mat"--that will be our "p" for this example.

    Contradictions obtain when someone (unequivocally) both asserts and denies the same proposition. So for "The cat is on the mat," our "p" for this example, we only have a contradiction if someone asserts both "The cat is on the mat" and "The cat is not on the mat." That's p and ~p ("~" is one common symbol for negation).

    So I was asking you what p is in this example. What proposition are we both asserting and denying?
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    P = Truth is mind dependent
    `P = The world is absent of minds
    m-theory

    P can't change. You'd have to say that we're either asserting and denying either "Truth is mind-dependent" OR "The world is absent of minds."
  • m-theory
    1.1k

    So to say that truth is mind dependent is true means that it cannot be a truth in a world absent of minds.

    So where there are no minds there are no truths.
    But this is a contradiction.
    In the absence of mind/truth, it is not true that there are no truths without contradiction.
  • m-theory
    1.1k

    Saying that there are no minds is equal to saying P is not true.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    So to say that truth is mind dependent is true means that it cannot be a truth in a world absent of minds.

    So where there are no minds there are no truths.
    But this is a contradiction.
    In the absence of mind/truth, it is not true that there are no truths without contradiction.
    m-theory

    It seems like there's something else that you're confusing here.

    Say that at time T1 there are minds, including my own.
    At time T2, there are no minds.

    At time T1, I say, "In a world with no minds, nothing is true or false." (And let's call that "q.")
    Q has a truth-value (for at least some minds) at T1, because there are minds at T1, and at least some minds make a judgment about q's truth-value at T1.

    At time T2, "In a world without minds, nothing is true or false" occurs however it does (maybe it's just printed in a book or something like that).
    Q has no truth value at T2, because there are no minds at T2.

    It seems like you're insisting that Q must be read as if it's occurring at T2.

    But we can state q at T1, and at T1, it has a mind-dependent truth-value.
  • m-theory
    1.1k

    At no T absent of minds is it true that there are no truths.
    If it is true that there are not truths at T then this is a contradiction.

    The point is the statement "Truth is mind dependent" is not a truth about any world.
  • Michael
    15.7k
    No dice. Does the paper have words on it or not? Keep in mind that we want to know if there are sentences in a world here. How do you put sentences in a worldPneumenon

    They're words to us. So, dice.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    At no T absent of minds is it true that there are no truths.m-theory

    Correct, and I do not believe that anyone claimed otherwise.

    The point is the statement "Truth is mind dependent" is not a truth about any world.m-theory

    That, however, is incorrect, because we can state it at T1.
  • m-theory
    1.1k

    No that is a truth about minds, because truth is mind dependent not world dependent.
    It cannot be that the statement "Truth is mind dependent" is a world dependent statement.
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