There is indeed an infinite regress there, and that is precisely why the normative equivalents of justificationism would be absurd; there is likewise a similar infinite regress about beliefs that makes epistemic justificationism equally absurd. But nevertheless, it still makes sense to wonder what it is about something that makes it seem good to you (or makes it seem true to you). You may not have an answer, but if you do then I’ve learned more about the details of your thoughts by asking. — Pfhorrest

Why would you call this a fallacy? — TheMadFool

As far as I understand Hedonism it is that life should be judged through pleasure and pain - obviously with the aim of maximising the former!

I’m here for punishment :D — I like sushi

Because it is specifically an example of the fallacy of division? — Pantagruel

Why are you here Pantagruel? — TheMadFool

LOL! I presume you just read why in the other thread and this is banter — Pantagruel

As long as one always give a reason for one's pleasure, the question why the reason you gave makes one experience pleasure can be asked. — TheMadFool

Yes, that is the essence of criticizability in general. It's what makes rationality possible!

Edit:
I think it isn't clear that pleasure is the only or highest desideratum. Many moral philosophers believe the apperception of duty through recognition of obligations and rights to be an elevated type of experience. I think I'm rather of that ilk. I don't believe my answer on the other thread (which was just the question "why are you here") depended in any way on the concept of pleasure. — Pantagruel

Just because you can ask an infinity of questions, that doesn't make hedonism either infinite or looped. What makes you think that it does? You can ask an infinite number of questions about anything. — A Seagull

think the issue here is subjectivity. If I were able to give you an objective, physical, explanation of why X is pleasurable, I think it would end the regress. An example of this type of explanation would be to explain that your brain reacts in a specific way to a specific stimuli which causes the subjective experience of pleasure. Of course, we’re not able to give these types of explanations at this time because we aren’t aware of what our brains are doing physically. And it is that reason that when we are asked for an explanation that we just point to some other quality of the object. One the one hand we give the wrong answer, but on the other hand, asking “why” doesn’t make sense. We should instead ask “how.” — Pinprick

If I say that something, say x, gives me pleasure, it is perfectly ok for someone to ask me "what about x gives me pleasure?" Pfhorrest asked me that exact question. From this it's a small step to the next question "what about that about x, that gives me pleasure, gives me pleasure?" The third question is wating in the wings and so is a fourth and a fifth...ad infinitum. — TheMadFool

For the latter, we need to think deep and hard for we're always in unmapped territory. — TheMadFool

So what? What do you conclude from that?

It certainly does not mean that pleasure is infinite, nor even infinitely reducible. — A Seagull

Not to speak for Fool, but I would conclude that there simply is no essence of pleasure. IOW’s it can’t be reduced at all. It is what it is. — Pinprick

Or because we are desperately trying to justify our choices, feelings, etc. after the fact. We’re simply making it up as we go, because we’re unable to access the true causes of our actions, beliefs, etc. We aren’t aware of the cause (what our brain is doing), but we are aware of the effect (subjective experience X). It seems that our brains are wired to seek causes, but since the cause lies outside our perception, we seek elsewhere. I think the lengths we will go to justify our actions, etc. are apparent to anyone paying attention. — Pinprick

So what? What do you conclude from that?

It certainly does not mean that pleasure is infinite, nor even infinitely reducible. — A Seagull

However, there's absolutely nothing wrong in asking P the question: what about rationality is pleasurable? P then might reply that the fact that rationality ensures not losing touch with reality makes rationality pleasurable. Can no more questions concerning Hedonism be asked to P? To my surprise, it seems we can ask another question to P: what about not losing touch with reality is pleasurable? P might have a perfectly reasonable reply but whatever constitutes that reply, we can always ask what about it (content of the reply) P finds pleasurable? So on and so forth, ad infinitum. — TheMadFool

Beyond these concrete forms of beauty, there are also more abstract aspects to beauty, to be found in the form or structure of a phenomenon (be it natural or a work of art) rather than in its relation to reality or morality, though this abstract sense of beauty also factors into the concrete kinds discussed above. This is beauty as in elegance, which is to say, the intersection of a phenomenon being interestingly complex, but also comprehensibly simple. Complexity draws one's attention into the phenomenon, seeking to understand it; and if that complexity is found to emerge from an underlying simplicity, beauty can be experienced in the successful comprehension of that complexity by way of the underlying simplicity. That is to say, symmetries and other patterns, that allow us to reduce a complex phenomenon to many instances and variations of simpler phenomena, are inherently beautiful in an abstract way detached entirely from whether the phenomena are concretely real or moral. This is the kind of beauty to be found in abstract, non-representational art, and also in places besides art such as in mathematical structures.

The tension here between interesting complexity and comprehensible simplicity is, I think, what underlies the distinction many artists, audiences, and philosophers have made between what they call "high art" and "low art". Those who prefer so-called "high art" are those with enough experience with the kinds of patterns used in their preferred media that they are able to comprehend more complex phenomena than those less experienced, but simultaneously find simpler phenomena correspondingly uninteresting. Those who prefer so-called "low art" (so called by the "high art" aficionados, not by themselves) instead find more complex phenomena incomprehensible, but are simultaneously more capable of taking interest in simpler phenomena. Unlike the attitudes evinced in the traditional naming of these categories, I do not think that "high art", a taste for complex phenomena, is in any way inherently better than "low art", a taste for simple phenomena. In each case, the aficionados of one are capable of appreciating something that the other group cannot, while incapable of appreciating something that the other group can. In my opinion, if any manner of taste was truly to be called objectively superior, it would be a broader taste, capable of comprehending complex phenomena and so appreciating "high art", while still remaining capable of finding simple phenomena interesting and so appreciating "low art". In that way, audiences with such taste would be best capable of deriving the most enjoyment from the widest assortment of phenomena, both natural and artistic. — On Rhetoric and the Arts

That's all very clever, lol, but I guess you run into problems with how OTHER philosophers define pleasure, — ernestm

Hence I think it difficult for you to defend that philosophy is hedonistic — ernestm

S that means, I guess, you are also at odds with Wittgenstein. Well whatever, I do wish you well on your pursuit. If it gives you an erection to talk about philosophy, I couldnt be happier for you! lol — ernestm

What about X does A find pleasurable? — TheMadFool

X.

End of regress. — Banno