We have a few disagreements.

Someone who cheats on their spouse thus either honestly thought that the pleasure it brought them was more important than the other consequences of it, and acted according to that judgement, in what they felt was a justified, and therefore moral — Pfhorrest

By "moral value" I mean breaking the golden rule of ethics: do onto others as you would want them to do onto you. This rule is simple enough that most people can correctly judge what is morally right and wrong; and this removes the possibility of honest rational mistake about moral judgements.

or else they thought that they should act out of more consideration for those other consequences than for their own pleasure, and yet did not act that way, doing something they thought was wrong ought of weakness of will. — Pfhorrest

Once judged that cheating is morally wrong, then they can freely choose between moral value or pleasure (picture the angel and demon on each shoulder like in cartoons). If they ended up cheating from choosing pleasure, then the act was intended, willed. If they chose the moral good but somehow ended cheating anyways (say they were drugged), then the act indeed happened against their will; but free will must exist for something to go against it.

So the free choice is at the step of choosing between moral value and pleasure, and then the remaining outcome is determined.

I don't think a choice in outcome is necessary for free will. ... this would not take away my free will, because I can still intend to move. — Samuel Lacrampe

That is not a compelling argument. That you can intend to move demonstrates volition. That you have no choice by definition rules out free will. Essentially, you're conflating free will with volition, then arguing that you aren't by conflating free will with volition. You can call anything by any name you like, but when most people refer to free will it involves making some kind of a choice; and there are plenty who believe there is no such thing as free will, who have no problem whatsoever with volition. So if you want to speak the same language as these people, free will requires choice of some sort; and volition per se doesn't demonstrate it.

"Does Free Will violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason?"
I don't believe so. — Samuel Lacrampe

Okay, so let's back track. Banno says:

It's double slit experiments - nothing causes the photon to go left instead of right. It's atomic decay - nothing causes this uranium atom to decay now, but not that one. The list goes on. — Banno

Your response to that was:

I would accept the claim "we don't know what causes [...]", but "nothing causes [...]" is a logical fallacy.
It goes against the Principle of Sufficient Reason; which is one of the four Laws of Thoughts. — Samuel Lacrampe

I'm a bit curious then. If it's a logical fallacy to say that nothing causes the photon to go left instead of right, how is it not a logical fallacy to say that nothing causes me to pick vanilla instead of chocolate?

Sure. But what's your point with regards to this discussion? — Samuel Lacrampe

It seems to me that you are placing humans in a pedestal by assigning to us a non-physical entity (the soul) and taking it away from other animals, as if we were not. Just because other animals are not humans, it should not be assumed they don't have their own "humanity".

:grin:

Yeah we have a pretty deep disagreement. As I see it, judging something as the thing to do and judging it as morally correct are the same thing. If someone assesses an action as violating the Golden Rule, but also thinks that they should do it anyway for some other reason, then that means they think there are (at least) exceptions to the Golden Rule, and it isn't always morally binding.

That's different from thinking that it is always binding, and they ought to follow it, but then failing to follow it anyway.

It sounds like you're thinking of "assessing moral value" in a kind of quotated sense, as in "assessing what people would commonly consider to be of moral value", rather than assessing what that person themselves genuinely finds of most value (all value being fundamentally moral in nature, morality being all about value).

Consider beliefs for comparison. Nobody believes something they think is false. They may believe things that are false, and they may believe things that they think other people think are false, but thinking that it's true and believing it are the same thing.

Likewise, nobody intends something they think is bad. They may intend things that are bad, and they may intend things that they think other people think are bad, but thinking that it's good and intending it are the same thing.

Premise P1: Everything that is physical is determined, as per the laws of physics.

Premise P2: Free Will enables some of our acts to be freely chosen, and therefore not fully determined.
• An act is called freely chosen when it is voluntary, intended, willed, as opposed to being accidental, fully caused by external forces outside our control.
• Note: for this discussion, we are assuming this premise to be true. Hey, it’s a simple argument.

Conclusion C: The part of us that possesses free will is not physical.
• This non-physical part is what is typically referred to as the Soul.

What do you think? — Samuel Lacrampe

Argument 1:

1. We have free will
2. Determinism is true for all physical things
3. If we have free will and determinism is true for all physical things then, the part of our being that has free will is nonphysical
4. We have free will and determinism is true for all physical things (from 1 & 2 conjunction)
5. The part our being that has free will is nonphysical and is what we call a soul(from 3 and 4 modus ponens)

Argument 2:

1. We have free will
2. If we're entirely physical then determinism is true of us
3. If determinism is true of us then we don't have free will
4. Determinism isn't true of us (1, 3 modus tollens)
5. We're not entirely physical (2, 4 modus tollens)
6. If we're not entirely physical then there's a part of us that's nonphysical
7. There's a part of us that's nonphysical (5, 6 modus ponens)
8. Either the part of us that's nonphysical has free will or the part of us that's physical has free will
9. If the part of us that's physical has free will then determinism is true for us
10. It's not the case that the part of us that's physical has free will (4, 9 modus tollens)
11. The part of us that's nonphysical has free will (8, 10 disjunctive syllogism)
12. There's a part of us that's nonphysical AND the part of us that's nonphysical has free will (7, 11 conjunction). This nonphysical part of us that possesses free will is what we call soul.

Which version (1 or 2) of your argument do you prefer? As might be obvious to you, the difficulty is in making the connection between the nonphysical part of our being that has free will and what we consider as the soul. Are they the same or are they different?

and it's not just virtual particles. It's double slit experiments - nothing causes the photon to go left instead of right. It's atomic decay - nothing causes this uranium atom to decay now, but not that one. The list goes on.

And again, what is salient is that intelligent, practical folk accept these uncaused events as part of the mechanism that allows all our electronic devices to function. — Banno

I am not sure it's accurate to say that any events are uncaused. The double slit experiment shows that if you measure passage through the slit, the interference pattern disappears. So, whenever you have a specific event (photon passes left slit), that event has a cause. It's only in the absence of observation, i.e. when you don't know whether or not there is an event, that we can only work with probabilities.

Reduce the stream to a single particle every minute. Send through a particle. It goes left. What caused it to go left, and not right?

Reduce the stream to a single particle every minute. Send through a particle. It goes left. What caused it to go left, and not right? — Banno

The emitter caused the particle/wave, including whatever properties it ends up having. The path it takes isn't deterministic, but I don't think that means any specific path it did in fact take was uncaused.

Note that asking "what caused it to go left" is a shorthand for asking "which properties of the preceding event were the most significant for this consequent event". Otherwise the answer is always "the entire state of the universe".

So,

Premise P1: Everything that is physical is determined, as per the laws of physics. — Samuel Lacrampe

??

Well, I am inclined to agree with you that calling the result "determined" as per some clockwork model of the universe, isn't supported by current science.

I am also with @A Seagull insofar as the laws of physics are descriptive, not prescriptive.

As far as I understand 20th century physics, events are still causally connected, but the connection is probabilistic going forward.

I won't disagree with that. It's a loser sort of causation then Sam needs to make his argument work, I think you might agree.

As for the laws of physics, yes, they are descriptive. Perhaps they are not prescriptive, but they are predictive. Either way, they are not proscriptive in the way that Sam might hope.

All human beings want to be better than what they are, that's true for even those that don't admit it. Being better means acquiring knowledge. Applying ourselves to that knowledge involves self control. The words "self control" really means free will in my opinion.

As I said earlier, another fact is that we can act on ideas that do not reflect reality...therefore we are not marionettes being played by the world around us.

What I think is that you're putting the cart before the horse.

All that exists is consciousness and things within consciousness. Then you don't need to posit free will or dualism unnecessarily. Ockham's Razor suggests we start there.

So I disagree. The Laws of Physics themselves are prescriptive. The way we describe those laws is descriptive, by definition. But the actual laws are prescriptive.

That you can intend to move demonstrates volition. That you have no choice by definition rules out free will. Essentially, you're conflating free will with volition — InPitzotl

It's weird because in french, "free will" is translated as "volonté libre", and "volition" as "volonté". Be that as it may, a choice is still present as long as you have the choice to intend one way or another. Intentions must be free and have multiple choices, otherwise they would be no intentions at all. And if you tie me up so that I am immobile, we say this was done "against my will", that is, against my intention, my consent.

If it's a logical fallacy to say that nothing causes the photon to go left instead of right, how is it not a logical fallacy to say that nothing causes me to pick vanilla instead of chocolate? — InPitzotl

Alright. You pick vanilla because vanilla tastes better than chocolate for you, and since this choice in taste is not voluntary, it must come from psychological history; and everyone with the same history would do the same. Now if that was the whole story, then indeed positing free will would be superfluous. But let's add to the example that vanilla is more expensive than chocolate. You then have to choose between two conflicting values: taste and money. And choosing between values is voluntary, and so is caused by our power of free will (or volition if you prefer).

I actually am haha. But that is besides the point of the discussion which is about the argument in the OP.

Hey all. Sorry, I'm a little behind in answering the comments. Will be back at it tomorrow.

Alright. You pick vanilla because vanilla tastes better than chocolate for you, and since this choice in taste is not voluntary, it must come from psychological history; and everyone with the same history would do the same. — Samuel Lacrampe

Why? The vast majority of humans have a unique genome. Human brains it's rumored have 100 trillion neural connections. And human males seem to find female humans attractive significantly more often than they find female turkeys attractive. So, yes; humans indeed are a highly social species, so nurture (for which "psychological history" is longhand) is very significant. But nature is also very significant; and even if you count development (phenotype from genotype) entirely in the nurture camp, there's plenty of nature to go around to explain different behaviors.

Now if that was the whole story, then indeed positing free will would be superfluous.

But that's a false dilemma, because for reasons mentioned above it cannot be the full story anyway. To make this argument you would have to prove a point you don't even believe... that we are tabula rasa.

But let's add to the example that vanilla is more expensive than chocolate. You then have to choose between two conflicting values: taste and money.

Making preferences complex isn't impressive. AlphaZero learned to play chess with no heuristics and, though there's still a tad bit of controversy about some particulars, it seems to have bested the prior best chess engines. Many chess experts who have seen sample games recognize the games that AlphaZero plays as "beautiful" compared to typical engines, FWIW. Now I'm not going to argue that AlphaZero is conscious or sentient, or on par with human agency (because, quite frankly, I don't believe it), but... imagine AlphaZero "choosing" which chess piece to move in a particular game; weighing variables that it literally "invented" a way to even valuate (read up on how it works if you're curious). AlphaZero is a program; it runs on a deterministic machine (I don't know; it could use entropy, but even if it does it could in principle run off of a CSPRNG). I've no idea how many variables of this self-learned valuation AlphaZero uses, but compared to my "choosing" to get vanilla versus chocolate, preferring the taste of chocolate, but weighing it against price; since AlphaZero can definitely beat the best human players hands down, I don't quite think that choice is as impressive as you're making it out to be.

And choosing between values is voluntary, and so is caused by our power of free will (or volition if you prefer).

I've no problem with choice, and no problem with volition; I just make a distinction between these two things. I'm agnostic on the free will question, though I can't take libertarian free will too seriously without new physics (and some better argument for why we should buy it than I've heard). That's not the problem here, though.

The problem I have with your argument can be described with two metaphors: (1) You're telling God what to do, (2) You want to have your cake and eat it too. (1) comes into play with how you argue that physics is fully determined; it must be, "laws of thoughts" demand it to be. That to me sounds not so much like an argument as it does an excuse not to give one. What's worse is that when it comes to how we behave, this rule suddenly gets thrown out the window; "laws of thoughts" demand physics to be fully determined; "free will" demands us to not be. That's (2). Even if logic did demand physics to be fully determined, how is it logic doesn't demand us to be? If we're excepted by free will how come photons and radioactively decaying atoms cannot be excepted? This immediately flunks my baloney detector test; real logical implications are invariant with respect to what they apply to.

If someone assesses an action as violating the Golden Rule, but also thinks that they should do it anyway for some other reason, then that means they think there are (at least) exceptions to the Golden Rule, and it isn't always morally binding. — Pfhorrest

The Golden Rule is an absolute; here's why. Fairness is defined as treating everyone equally; no discrimination. Nobody in their right mind can judge that being unfair is morally good, and that being fair is morally bad. And unfairness necessarily results when breaking the Golden Rule.

Consider beliefs for comparison. [and the rest of this post] — Pfhorrest

Yes I agree with this when it comes to beliefs; but not when it comes to morality. You make it sound like the way people act is always out of the honest belief that the act is morally good. But this is absurd for a couple of reasons.

(1) Rapists exist; and nobody in their right mind would honestly believe rape to ever be the morally good. They do it because of some sort of pleasure it brings, not out of moral duty.
(2) A prerequisite of guilt is that the defendant knows or should have known that the act was bad. Thus if all moral errors are honest errors, then nobody can be a morally bad person.

Maybe the following test will work. As a child, have you ever lied? If so, was it really out of honest belief that it was your moral duty to lie at this time; or was it because it was an easy escape while knowing it was morally wrong?

I like the first one better, as it is simpler and thus easier for me to follow.

You are correct that the argument can only go as far as proving that we have a non-physical part, and that the claim that this is the soul is an add-on at the end. That's okay, I think the hard work is in the first part for most people. After that, it is not great effort to connect this part which is non-physical and has free will, to what is commonly referred to as the soul.

I am inclined to agree with you that calling the result "determined" as per some clockwork model of the universe, isn't supported by current science. — Echarmion

the laws of physics are descriptive — Echarmion

Perhaps they are not prescriptive, but they are predictive. — Banno

I agree that when we say "physical things obey the laws of physics", it is merely an expression to say there is uniformity or consistency in causality, and the laws of physics describe that uniformity. That's also all I meant in P1.

But there appears to be a discrepancy with our meaning of the term "determined". My understanding of "determined" is that a given Cause A will consistently result in Effect B; not necessarily that we can know with certainty what Cause A and Effect B are. Do you mean something else by it?

I agree that when we say "physical things obey the laws of physics", it is merely an expression to say there is uniformity or consistency in causality, and the laws of physics describe that uniformity. That's also all I meant in P1. — Samuel Lacrampe

Sounds good to me.

But there appears to be a discrepancy with our meaning of the term "determined". My understanding of "determined" is that a given Cause A will consistently result in Effect B; not necessarily that we can know with certainty what Cause A and Effect B are. Do you mean something else by it? — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't think that's true, at least not on the quantumn scale. Particles don't have fixed positions, they instead have probablity distributions. So you have cause A and then 50% chance for effect B, 20 % chance fo effect C etc. This does not normally occur on the macro scale, but the jury is still out on exactly when this breaks down into determined effects. It may just be that probablities are so skewed on the macro scale that it seems the effect is always the same, but in reality there is an infinitesimal chance that, for example, your desk spontaneosly turns into an octopus.

Edit: There is of course the "hidden causes" line of argument that claims this apparent probablity distribution is just dues to lack of knowledge. But so far experimental results have not backed it up. I think there have actually been a number of experiments that make "hidden causes" seem less likely.

You make it sound like the way people act is always out of the honest belief that the act is morally good. — Samuel Lacrampe

Not act, but intend. People often act in ways they wish they hadn’t; that’s what regret is. Regret is a great way to frame this, if we ignore regret from unforeseeable consequences. Someone doesn’t regret something that they honestly meant to do (unless they didn’t foresee some consequence of it). They regret things that they did out of weakness of will, despite intending to do otherwise, knowing that to do otherwise would be the best course of action.

If someone honestly thought that the pleasure of sex was more important than their marriage or whatever, they wouldn’t regret cheating. That they do regret it shows that they thought it would be better if they didn’t cheat, but they did anyway, indicating weakness of will on their part.

I think I understand what you are saying better now. Yes, if self-control is not a result of knowledge but is applied alongside knowledge, there perhaps it is indeed synonymous to free will.

As I said earlier, another fact is that we can act on ideas that do not reflect reality...therefore we are not marionettes being played by the world around us. — Chester

I'm not sure about this one though. Ideas like unicorn indeed do not reflect reality, but they might still be caused by our perception of reality in the first place. I don't think determinism and imagination are incompatible.

Defending the existence of free will would take too long, and so it is assumed to be true in this discussion. However, if we were to argue about free will, then I agree that Ockham's Razor would be a good starting point, and that the free-willer would then have the onus of proof.

I like the first one better, as it is simpler and thus easier for me to follow.

You are correct that the argument can only go as far as proving that we have a non-physical part, and that the claim that this is the soul is an add-on at the end. That's okay, I think the hard work is in the first part for most people. After that, it is not great effort to connect this part which is non-physical and has free will, to what is commonly referred to as the soul — Samuel Lacrampe

I agree. :up:

humans indeed are a highly social species, so nurture (for which "psychological history" is longhand) is very significant. But nature is also very significant; — InPitzotl

That's fine. The point was that to explain our resulting taste, nature and nurture are sufficient without having to bring in free will.

Making preferences complex isn't impressive. — InPitzotl

It's not about complexity. I'm okay with computers making highly complex decisions and still being fully determined. It's about how we all feel we freely chose our values; which once chosen, determine the rest of our behaviour accordingly.

I've no problem with choice, and no problem with volition; [...] I'm agnostic on the free will question — InPitzotl

I still don't understand the distinction between volition and free will. How can intentions truly exist if they are not freely chosen? To contrast, AlphaZero, being nothing but a program that goes through the motions, has no intentions.

(1) You're telling God what to do, [...] (1) comes into play with how you argue that physics is fully determined; it must be, "laws of thoughts" demand it to be. That to me sounds not so much like an argument as it does an excuse not to give one. — InPitzotl

That sounds to me like an ad hominem attack. Are you objecting because there is a flaw in my reasoning, or merely because it seems I am telling God what to do?

(2) You want to have your cake and eat it too. [...] when it comes to how we behave, this rule suddenly gets thrown out the window; "laws of thoughts" demand physics to be fully determined; "free will" demands us to not be. That's (2). — InPitzotl

This is a misunderstanding. Laws of Thoughts, specifically the Principle of Sufficient Reason, does not allow for random causality. This therefore leaves two possibilities for causality. Free Will, and Determinism for things which don't possess free will. Neither of these possibilities violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as far as I can tell. But if it does, let me know.

Particles don't have fixed positions, they instead have probablity distributions. So you have cause A and then 50% chance for effect B, 20 % chance fo effect C etc. — Echarmion

No objection; just thinking out loud. What you describe indeed does not fit determinism, and yet a probability distribution still implies some sort of order. It is odd that it is not fully ordered, yet not fully random... For some reason, I would be more willing to accept full absence of order over partial order.

This does not normally occur on the macro scale, but the jury is still out on exactly when this breaks down into determined effects. — Echarmion

That seems to me simply the result of Central Limit Theorem; where the macro scale averages out the inconsistencies. If so, then I'm pretty sure it's quantifiable with some confidence interval.

There is of course the "hidden causes" line of argument that claims this apparent probablity distribution is just dues to lack of knowledge. But so far experimental results have not backed it up. I think there have actually been a number of experiments that make "hidden causes" seem less likely. — Echarmion

This poses a difficulty. I am fairly sure that the Scientific Method is founded on the Principle of Sufficient Reason; and any scientific theory that goes against its founding principles would be self-defeating, like sawing off the branch it's sitting on.

So people always intend to do the good (at least in their view), and when they don't do the good, then they have regret.

But is this even logically possible? The following appears to be a logical necessity:
Intention + Possibility = Act
If you intend to do something, and it is possible for you to do it, then you will necessarily do it. If you did not do it, it was either because it was not possible, or because you did not really intend it.

E.g. Who can say "Yes I cheated, but it was unintentional"? (Aside from this of course)