I'm beginning to think that transcendental illusions are separate in character from the predictive errors spoken about in this approach; insofar as transcendental illusions are necessary failures of reason generated by its misapplication, I don't think they'd apply to the contingent error prone-ness of valuations. I'm not saying that there aren't transcendental illusions for emotion, but I can't see a neat way of linking the paper to the question I wrote to you (summarised: "Are there analogues of transcendental illusions in emotion?"). — fdrake
We are born with emotions in place — Colin Cooper
A brief review of the emotion literature indicates that, even after 100 years of research, the scientific status of emotions as natural kinds remains surprisingly unclear. In every domain of emotion research, there is some evidence for the view that emotion categories like anger, sadness, and fear carve nature at its joints. But there is also steadily accumulating evidence against the natural-kind view. Strong correlations among self-report, behavioral, and physiological measures of emotion do not consistently materialize as expected, calling into question the idea that anger, sadness, fear, and so on are homeostatic property clusters that can be identified in observable data. It is difficult, if not impossible, to characterize any emotion category by a group of instances that resemble one another in their correlated properties. That is, it is difficult, if not impossible, to empirically identify the extensions of each emotion category.
Nor does the empirical record provide strong evidence for distinct causal mechanisms for each emotion. Emotion categories such as anger, sadness, and fear have thus far not clearly and consistently revealed themselves in the data on feelings, facial and vocal behaviors, peripheral nervous system responses, and instrumental behaviors. The jury is still out on whether there are distinct brain markers for each emotion, but so far the available evidence does not encourage a natural-kind view. An individual study here or there might produce evidence to distinguish between two or more emotions, but inconsistency in findings across studies is thus far the norm, and the specificity of correspondences between emotions and brain locations has not been adequately addressed. — Barrett - Are Emotions Natural Kinds?
People parse the world into things emotional and non emotional, and they further divide the emotional world into discrete categories.
Do they? I can have an emotional experience, but that doesn't entail emotion is an experience. It doesn't entail that it is any thing at all.Emotions exist, but only as experiences.
Specifically,the experience of feeling an emotion... occurs when conceptual knowledge about emotion is brought to bear during the act of categorization.
I'm beginning to think that transcendental illusions are separate in character from the predictive errors spoken about in this approach; insofar as transcendental illusions are necessary failures of reason generated by its misapplication, I don't think they'd apply to the contingent error prone-ness of valuations. I'm not saying that there aren't transcendental illusions for emotion, but I can't see a neat way of linking the paper to the question I wrote to you (summarised: "Are there analogues of transcendental illusions in emotion?"). — fdrake
When you experience affect without knowing the cause, you are more likely to treat affect as information about the world, rather than your experience about the world...In these moments of affective realism, we experience affect as a property of an object or event in the outside world, rather than as our own experience. ‘I feel bad, therefore you must have done something bad. You are a bad person’. In my lab, when we manipulate people’s affect without their knowing, it influences whether they experience a stranger as trustworthy, competent, attractive, or likeable, and they even see the person’s face differently. — Barrett, “How Emotions Are Made’
Maybe I will, but I expect to find as much difficulty with the idea of an emotion being a state as I do with emotion being an experience. I can be in an emotional state, but that doesn't entail emotions are states. — jkg20
n fact, even 'error' seems a bit of an 'off' way to talk about things. — StreetlightX
Moreover, I like that similar ideas can be arrived at from totally different paths - it makes an idea more robust, and allows for a greater extension of the concept into new and exciting areas. — StreetlightX
I've been trying to think about this and I think you're entirely right to think about this in terms of modality. I hope this is not a case of me just trying to curve-fit, but given how messy the production of emotions can be, would it not be the case of something like a necessary production of contingent valuation errors? Like, given the exigencies of bodily developmental history, the openness of context, the instability of (emotional) meaning (in Derridian terms one might speak here of a necessary play of différance involved in emotion), the overlapping patterns of cultural meaning, etc, etc - that in some sense, we're almost guaranteed to have errors crop up often. — StreetlightX
I myself fall into the Voluntarist camp. The Will and emotions come before intellect/your idea of concepts. The Will is an unconscious urge and/or innate energy force in consciousness and/or the universe. — 3017amen
So what does it tell us when someone can not learn a emotion? Personally I believe both point to emotions being something build into us rather then just learned during life — Colin Cooper
Very Schopenhaurian of you! :grin: — schopenhauer1
Maybe one way of condensing Barrett's points about errors is that they are more like infelicities of speech acts — fdrake
So perhaps a transcendental illusion in this context would be an enduring or widespread heuristic bias that the machine of active inference is likely to pick up (on a population level), and even then they could not easily be distinguished from cultural effects. — fdrake
Have you considered metaphysical Voluntarism? Meaning, the intellect is subordinate to the Will — 3017amen
Can there be involuntary emotions, according to this theory? — Luke
Humans experience emotion. For many, experience serves as an emotion’s central and defining aspect. We feel the heat of anger, the despair of sadness, the dread of fear..
the empirical evidence supports two conclusions about the study and measurement of emotion experience. First,the experience of emotion cannot be measured objectively. Second, discrete emotion experiences are not psychologically primitive.
Shortly afterwards we have the phraseEmotions exist, but only as experiences.
the experience of feeling an emotion
So not only do we experience emotions now, we also experience our feeling an emotion. How do we do that? I can feel angry, can I also experience that feeling? Would it make any difference if I did not? — jkg20
Emotions...are not universally expressed and recognised. They are not hardwired brain reactions that are uncontrollable.
I am not suggesting to you that you can just perform a couple of Jedi mind tricks and then talk yourself out of being depressed or anxious or any kind of serious condition. But I am telling you that you have more control over your emotions than you might imagine, and that you have the capacity to turn down the dial on emotional suffering and its consequences for your life by learning how to construct your experiences differently.
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