Depends on your definition of freedom. Freedom is an ambiguous word limited by the restrictions of language. To Kant freedom is the faculty in reason to give the universal moral laws unto your will which is like in effect, the observer effect making the universal moral laws appear in existence. In doing so, you do not allow objects of the senses to subject your will unto them due to a relative illusory self interest. This is Heteronomy.

Essentially freedom is to detach yourself from the empirical relative physical world. The self, the ego is what enslaves you through your desire and grasping constantly seeking a past sense of happiness which is only a empirical ideal, not an absolute ideal.

Even this freedom would seem limited but it is the extent of freedom that we as rational beings can achieve.

Can you choose to believe in magical leprechauns? Can you choose to desire homosexuality over heterosexuality? Can you choose to be happy instead of sad? — chatterbears

Do you have any evidence that says the choices you list cannot be made?

it is "the ability to have acted differently" — chatterbears

I don't understand that definition. Let's suppose there's a universe exactly like ours, excepting that there's "the ability to have acted differently". What would that look like? It doesn't sound like the proposal is that we can actually retroactively change what we did... but the suggestion is that there's some distinction between that universe and our universe... ours being, one in which there is no such ability. And I have no idea what form that distinction would take, if any.

I would argue that there are 3 things that enforce your actions. Beliefs, Desires (or wants), Mood. — chatterbears

Not sure I quite understand this either. Let's take an example action... you typed stuff on a keyboard in English. To me, I would explain your ability to type in terms of your ability to interact with your keyboard; and to type in English as a result of your prior interactions with other English speakers.

We might could argue that belief is involved, but that sounds like an imprecise view. In order to type what you want to type, you have to hit the right keys. Since you're presumably doing so, then somehow you had to either learn the layout of your keyboard, or you're during the act searching on the keyboard for the letters. Either way it's more precise to say that you're interacting with the keyboard (whose precise layout was designed by the manufacturer) than it is to say you're just being driven by your beliefs about it. That you're typing in English is kind of the same thing, only it involves interacting socially with other humans.

Can you choose to believe in magical leprechauns? Can you choose to desire homosexuality over heterosexuality? Can you choose to be happy instead of sad? — chatterbears

This sounds like cherry picking to me. Your definition of free will has something to do with the ability to do otherwise. Your point is that we have no free will. But your argument is to point out particulars we can't influence. I don't think that matches the burden you selected... if you're trying to make the point that we have no free will, your burden is to argue that nothing we do is such that we had the ability to do something diferent, not that some particulars are such.

I've been leaning towards free will NOT existing, after some deep thought on the subject. And to define 'free will' quickly, I would say it is "the ability to have acted differently". I would argue that there are 3 things that enforce your actions. Beliefs, Desires (or wants), Mood. None of which are your choice. Can you choose to believe in magical leprechauns? Can you choose to desire homosexuality over heterosexuality? Can you choose to be happy instead of sad? — chatterbears

An interesting fact is that people seem to have conflicting thoughts on the matter of whether we have free will or not: people say things like "that's just like John to have done something like that", implying that we have some general predispositions, presumably having no control over them, and then people also say "I didn't expect that from John" which suggests people can "free" themselves of these predispositions.

Nevertheless, if we are to judge which of the two intuitions/beliefs, described above, society operates under then it's the one that we do possess free will; after all we have the concept of responsibility. However, the existence of responsibility as a concept only indicates we believe that we have free will and isn't evidence that we actually do possess it.

So, is our intuition that we have free will correct? Do we actually possess free will?

Well, compare humans, us, to animals, say dogs. I've seen news of dogs having killed people and while some did claim a dog was responsible for the killing, nobody ever thought of such incidents as murder. This I take as an indication that full responsibility can't be assigned to animals: animals have little control over their instincts which in this example led to ferocious attacks on people by dogs and so dogs aren't be as responsible for their actions as humans, in full possession of their faculties, are.

In the above context then free will can be understood as an ability to resist/overcome our animal instincts which presumably we possess, animals that we are. Viewed through this lens we're justified in saying, if not that we possess complete freedom of will, that we have more freedom than animals in re our actions. However, this is only comparative freedom and might not satisfy the actual definition of free will for some. To make the long story short, we have more freedom (of will) than animals for sure but that doesn't imply that another higher level of freedom, as yet beyond our reach, doesn't exist.

Picking up on the last sentence above, what would a "higher" level of free will look like? We have or can overcome our so-called animal instincts; what else is there that bears on our freedom (of will)? Here I wish to make what I feel is an important point: as it appears to me, the essence of free will is negation, negation and denial of influences on our thoughts and actions which can come in many forms. Evidence for why this is the case is the fact that humans consider themselves more free, in possession of a certain level of free will, than animals and that because we can negate/deny our animal instincts.

Affirming as herein relevant amounts to giving in to our predispositions and that is precisely what no free will is.

Given that we can negate/deny our animal instincts it means we're in possession of the power to negate and that power - to say "no" to things that influence us - is the key to free will. My question is then if we possess the ability to negate and that ability is the key to free will and we've managed to use this ability to negate to free ourselves from our animal nature what influence (mood, desire, beliefs, etc) on our choices are there that is resistant to this ability to negate? None! We are free! We do possess free will!

Coming to your definition of free will as an ability to have acted differently, I see this to be problematic because to demonstrate it would require time travel into the past (to prove that I could've acted differently, I would've have to be put in the exact same situation (again) and that's only possible if I went back in time) and that serves only to worsen what is already a complicated issue. Why do that?

What say you?

I would argue that there are 3 things that enforce your actions. Beliefs, Desires (or wants), Mood. None of which are your choice. — chatterbears

Your beliefs, desires, and mood contribute to making you who you are. Your choices are therefore a product of you, and you alone.

It's true that you (your beliefs, desires, moods) were caused, but you weren't intentionally caused, whereas your misdeeds are intentional acts - and it is this intentionality that makes you morally accountable. Your DNA and environment were not product of deliberation, and choice making.

You chose the misdeed from among a set of options, and you knew your choice was morally wrong. This makes you blameworthy. Blaming your mama, no matter how bad her parenting, doesn't get you off the hook, because you own your choices.

You would not have done the misdeed had you been more mindful of the harm it would cause, or taken the consequences more seriously. The memory of your guilt will have changed you. You will have learned from your mistake, and because of this learning you will not repeat it. If you abandon the notion of blameworthiness, you will be rationalizing continuing bad behavior. You are a moral agent because your moral beliefs can influence your actions. You have both the knowledge and freedom you need to do the right thing. Your DNA and past environment had no such freedom, and their respective consequences were not the product of moral deliberation.

Contrary to what? Restricted will? No.

Our will is - to some degree - restricted - but not in the way you posit.

You posit "no control in life", when at times, you're in control, partially, and at others you aren't, partially.

Perhaps it isn't totally free mind...

There's definitely an amount of liberty in our body to perhaps move left or right.

It doesn't happen at the thought, but rather, the act, which is interesting...

The only primary reason why irrelevant "free will" debates exist within the context of popular debates and media, is because idiots and lowlifes want to use it to affirm fatalistic, "behavioralistic" or "deterministic" nonsense, which they'd ultimately believe no matter what, simply because they want to, even if every thinker was in consensus that free will "exists", in total ignorance or apathy to the vast majority of legal and moral philosophy which is relevant in 1st world countries, from the 19th century and before, all the way up to the present day, and more or less known and considered to be nonsense and silliness even in the outdated days where they were trendy and popular to begin with, as far as serious legal and moral philosophy and the various evidences, reasonings, logic, and axioms which they and/or it were based on to begin with.

Such as associating "addictions" such as cigarette smoking with "brain disorders" to imply that the addict doesn't have the "free will" to quit, when in reality, in practice, people do quit, regardless of whether it was by "free will", or whether they were "pre-destined" or "pre-determined" to quit to being with, while others' weren't, a la Calvinism.

As well as ignoring other aspects of scientific data or research that don't fit their childish and nonsensical agenda or logic, and allow them to peddle snake oil in the form of unhealthy or antisocial dependency to the sheep who fatuously and selfishly consume it to begin with, such as brain neuroplasticity.

IMO, a priori arguments cannot predict the outcomes of single-case research across human participants. One needs scientific testing. For example, when looking at outcomes for people that play slots, we find that some people overuse.

Because different people experience different effects on their behavior, philosophical and psychological explanations often pay too much attention to the individual and too little to the conditions when trying to explain addiction.

People attempt to explain the apparent loss of will through metaphysical schemas. They postulate a will at work when people do something normative, or a will that is absent or inaccessible when behaving at the extremes--due to other hypothesized psychological processes at work. In the end, they ignore the simplest explanations (from demonstrations) that the schedule of reinforcement delivered at the slots selected the person's gambling behavior in a way that looks very similar to what happens when arranging those schedules of reinforcement for non-human species used in experiments.

What experimentation shows through replicable effects on people's behavior is that the person is not the origination point for the choices they make. People that want to appeal to free will need the person to be the one that creates the thought, otherwise, assigning credit or blame to the person for the things they do becomes tenuous.

In the end, they ignore the simplest explanations (from demonstrations) that the schedule of reinforcement delivered at the slots selected the person's gambling behavior in a way that looks very similar to what happens when arranging those schedules of reinforcement for non-human species used in experiments. — CeleRate

One needs scientific testing. — CeleRate

Because different people experience different effects on their behavior, philosophical and psychological explanations often pay too much attention to the individual and too little to the conditions when trying to explain addiction. — CeleRate

I'm having some difficulty untangling what you're trying to say here. The demonstrations you're referring to sound like something akin to Pavlovian experiments. That in my mind qualifies as scientific testing, in particular, in the field of psychology. Where I'm choking is that you're partially complaining about psychological explanations on the basis that one needs scientific testing, but then appealing to scientific testing performed as part of a psychological investigation.

What experimentation shows through replicable effects on people's behavior is that the person is not the origination point for the choices they make. — CeleRate

Because different people experience different effects on their behavior — CeleRate

I'm confused. If different people experience different effects, then in what sense are those replicable effects?

The demonstrations you're referring to sound like something akin to Pavlovian experiments. — InPitzotl

Pavlovian experiments were based on reflexes and stimulus-stimulus pairing. Operant conditioning is fundamentally different in that it appeals to the selective effects of consequences on behavior in a manner analogous to how biological evolution appeals to the selective effects of contingencies of survival.

I'm confused. If different people experience different effects, then in what sense are those replicable effects? — InPitzotl

Good question. Experimentation reveals the orderliness of events on behavior, and with proper experimental control, allows the scientist to predict, verify, and replicate the effects. This further reveals principles at work that are then described with models that explain the observed phenomena.

However, when stepping away from experimental settings and experimental control, and people casually observe one another doing things for what appears to be capricious reasons, the naive observer assigns causes to events noticed in conjunction with what the person was doing (i.e., Hume's problem of induction), or will speculate metaphysical psychological explanations, or will rely on reports of what a person believes was felt (or at work) at the time the person made a choice--a reliance on an unreliable source of information.

Where I'm choking is that you're partially complaining about psychological explanations on the basis that one needs scientific testing, but then appealing to scientific testing performed as part of a psychological investigation. — InPitzotl

This is a common misunderstanding. Psychology is the study of the mind. Although it is true that operant conditioning had its beginnings in psychology, it eventually became a field unto itself as the study of the self went from metaphysics, to logical positivists, to radical behaviorists in one of the lines of epistemological changes. The study of the mind became the study of behavior, with an entirely new set of tools and scientific methodology.

Experimentation reveals the orderliness of effects on behavior, and with proper experimental control, allows the scientist to predict, verify, and replicate. This further reveals principles at work that are then described with models that explain the observed phenomena. — CeleRate

That I would describe as replicable experiments; i.e., we get the same results when we repeat these experiments. To me the term "replicable effects" is stronger, suggesting that the effects themselves are replicable.

However, when stepping away from experimental settings and experimental control, and people casually observe one another doing things — CeleRate

...this to me sounds like it's describing folk psychology; and I would agree there are problems with folk psychology. I don't think folk psychology is entirely flawed, because it's demonstrably useful (theory of mind, for example, is critical for deceiving people... not necessarily unethically). Things like personality traits and such get muckier; e.g., we are susceptible to things like attribution bias... so I can buy a general criticism here.

This is a common misunderstanding. Psychology is the study of the mind. Although it is true that operant conditioning had its beginnings in psychology, it eventually became a field unto itself as the study of the self went from metaphysics, to logical positivists, to radical behaviorists in one of the lines of epistemological changes. The study of the mind became the study of behavior, with an entirely new set of tools and scientific methodology. — CeleRate

Wait... back up. What is a common misunderstanding?

According to multiple primary sources, the study of behavior is psychology. Wikipedia: "Psychology is the science of behavior and mind.", Merriam-Webster: "1 : the science of mind and behavior.", Random-House Unabridged is a bit more interesting: "1. the science of the mind or of mental states and processes. 2. the science of human and animal behavior." Per these primary sources, I interpret a field claiming to be a science of behavior as being psychology.

It sounds to me like you're using the terms a bit differently than these sources suggest. That's... actually, just fine by me. Let's say then the study of mind per se psychology, and the study of behavior we'll just call behaviorism (just as an umbrella term; we can call anything you like a branch of behaviorism).

So would you say that the mind does not affect behavior, that there is no such thing as the mind, or that the mind itself is simply a result of operant conditioning?

That I would describe as replicable experiments; i.e., we get the same results when we repeat these experiments. To me the term "replicable effects" is stronger, suggesting that the effects themselves are replicable. — InPitzotl

Different experimental tactics reduce threats to internal validity to varying degrees and add to the strength of statements describing the influence of the independent variable (IV) relative to the dependent variable (DV). As the effects on a DV are repeated through the systematic application of the IV across increasing numbers of participants, the study's external validity (i.e., replicability) strengthens. The effects of the IV on the DV can be demonstrated within an experiment and across experiments. When an individual participant's behavior changes within an experiment, you know the degree of impact on that individual. When study replications occur and the effects of the IV on the DV are repeated across experiments, we may eventually reach the point that theories and models are formulated to describe the observed phenomena. This is what has happened in the behavior analytic literature with respect to gambling as just one example.

It sounds to me like you're using the terms a bit differently than these sources suggest — InPitzotl

It could very well be. Dictionary terms are descriptive, not prescriptive. Members of the fields view the subject of why people do what they do fundamentally differently. Psychology has been tied to metaphysics in a way that behavior analysis has not
http://www.behaviorpedia.com/conceptual-issues/is-behavior-analysis-part-of-psychology/

So would you say that the mind does not affect behavior, that there is no such thing as the mind, or that the mind itself is simply a result of operant conditioning? — InPitzotl

I view "mind" as shorthand for the sense of agency we all have, and a way to describe the thoughts that we happen to notice. How this sense came to be I would speculate had more to do with the evolution of our genetic endowment and the evolution of our culture. Because our vocal musculature came under operant control in our evolutionary past, we are now able to create all sorts of fun and interesting paradoxes for ourselves to argue about. Now we might have even more time to sit at the safety of our computers opining about such topics.

I view "mind" as shorthand for the sense of agency we all have, and a way to describe the thoughts that we happen to notice. — CeleRate

Interesting... that's somewhat similar to how I view mind, only I would describe it more in terms of what's useful at the agency level as opposed to the sense of agency per se. I think I generally get here from a different path though... more like a software engineer reverse engineering his mind.

Now we might have even more time to sit at the safety of our computers opining about such topics. — CeleRate

Well, the way I see it, on the topic of free will, everyone is an expert but nobody can agree. That itself looks a bit fishy to me; my gut instinct suggests that there are flaws in our assumptions (at least most of us) at play. (I suppose at some level this has to be true of everyone; but for me, I'm more interested in pausing here and just trying to find those flawed assumptions).

For me, I think the answer is both yes and no.

Could I switch off my computer and go to bed right now without posting this comment? Of course, if I wanted to. But I want to post the comment, so that's what I'm going to do.

Here's the question though. If time were rewound and my mum gave birth to me all over again, and I had no memory of my first run-through, would my life unfold the same way the second time around, or differently?

At the time of birth, my body was configured a certain way. My brain cells were too. That particular configuration of cells gave rise to me – my conscious mind; my personality. Was my entire life mapped out at that point? Would changing a single brain cell have led me to make different choices at different points throughout my life? If, as they say, you simply can't avoid being the person you are, then I'd be tempted to say that free will does not exist.

In a way I think it depends on how you see consciousness. If you take it as an inevitable outcome of the human brain being what it is, then perhaps all your choices are essentially made for you the moment you are born.

I don't know where I stand on consciousness, and as a result I don't really know where I stand on free will either. But there are certainly times when I agonise over a particular decision ad nauseum that I wish I didn't have free will!

the ability to have acted differently — chatterbears

I heard Daniel Dennett speak on this definition of free will. He said something to the effect that this definition is suspect because it's premised on recreating a choice scenario (the occasion where a choice is made) in every possible relevant way and that, he goes on to say, is an impossibility. Perhaps he was exploring the utility of this definition in proving the existence/nonexistence of free will. I don't know.

That being said, we could imagine a path that forks into two other paths and you walking down that path. When you reach the fork in the path, you choose the left path and proceed. At some point, you turn back and travel back to the fork - this amounting to recreating the choice scenario - and you will discover that you can choose to take the right path. The only difference between the first time you encountered the fork and the second time you encountered the fork is time - nothing else has changed - and time seems to lack a causal power. You can act differently. Free will!?

You can't act differently, but only because you are you. You're not some standard human who will always make the same choices given your body.

I see a tendency towards disassociation here. Your identity includes your body. No, you can't entirely choose your identity, but if you accept that is who you are, then your choices are wholly your own.

There's no time gap where you could choose an alternative. And you can't choose your environment. But you aren't abstract from it, either. You know you make choices. They may not be "free," per se, but they are personal, and the personal is real.

So maybe not "free" will...we are constrained...but personal will is real.

The clue to comprehending free will is that the question what the agency of a choice is, is a subjective issue.

That you throw out free will equally means that you have thrown out the concept of personal opinion, like opinion on beauty.

Sadness and happiness are subjective, therefore they are agency of choices. You choose things out of sadness and happiness.

You cannot choose any subjective thing, like happiness, but you can make a morality to achieve such a state where you judge yourself to be happy.

I've been leaning towards free will NOT existing, after some deep thought on the subject. And to define 'free will' quickly, I would say it is "the ability to have acted differently". I would argue that there are 3 things that enforce your actions. Beliefs, Desires (or wants), Mood. None of which are your choice. Can you choose to believe in magical leprechauns? Can you choose to desire homosexuality over heterosexuality? Can you choose to be happy instead of sad? — chatterbears

We are formed by nature and nurture, they are two sides of the same coin. They define how we act. But free will needs to be defined first. If you are talking about free will versus determinism then no, we don't have any free will. There are those arguing for quantum randomness to be a part of the neurological activity and therefore randomness can be part of how we choose something, but outside of evidence supporting it, it won't give you free will anyway. You are a product of deterministic pathways and you can't change that.

However, in terms of practical philosophy, the nature of the universe is separated from how we define acts of freedom as human beings. Even though we live in an illusion of free will, it doesn't mean you are doomed to fate. That's a universal law that we live within, but not something we perceive. The choices you take might be determined, but you act through your experience and knowledge in a way where choices feel free.

One of the best cases to study the consequences of free will as we live by it would be to look at the justice of criminals. By the very definition of determinism, criminals are the result of deterministic paths that lead them there. If you put aside emotion when viewing justice of criminals you realize that there are no criminals at all; it is a social construct of defining the outliers who suffer consequences from society, other people or mental illness. By determinism, they haven't chosen to be criminals, no one in their right mind would, they are forced or compelled by different factors.

So through this lens, criminals should be treated as victims of determinism. And correcting those paths is the only way to get rid of criminality. Everyone who studied justice and society concludes the same thing, that harsh punishment for their actions won't change a dime in terms of fighting crime.

But we still punish them and many advocates for harsher punishments. This is the act of our emotion towards them, not our intellect. And if we do, we are really acting as if free will existed. You cannot be a determinist without accepting this fact of justice, that would be cognitive dissonance.

So how do we apply practical philosophy towards this? How do we draw the line between determinism and practical ideas about free will? Because if we all just say we are the result of determinism we could argue against any change. A criminal would just say that he's a product of determinism and he doesn't have free will. But in order for us to treat the criminal back to a place where he can function and be part of the society we first need to cut the deterministic sources for crime, but also enforce the illusion of free will onto him in order for him to choose a new path.

Therefore, we apply free will as a practical concept towards people, in order to open up change within them. It's an illusion, but it's a practical illusion for society to work. The philosophical challenge, however, is where to draw that practical line. Most people draw that line out of emotion, without any rational thought put into it, the path of harsher punishment. But the empathic, empirical path is to study the determinism of every situation and draw the line where it is rational to do so. In terms of justice, most people are unable to draw the line correctly.

And to define 'free will' quickly, I would say it is "the ability to have acted differently". — chatterbears

If this is true, what is the difference between free will and free choice then? Would you say all choices are made freely or that none are? I do not buy your definition.

In fact free will as such can reduce the number of available choices. Universal moral laws given as a reason. You'd not be free in not following them - you'd be an animal.

I've yet to see a coherent analysis of free will. SO for instance the one given in this OP begs the question.

Free will is the determination of ends(purposes) by reason in and for itself.

- A mere bodily reaction (perceived as such by the subject in question) is not a process based on reasoning and hence is not an argument for anything (a desire isn't as well).

- A choice to do something or not is no indicator of free will per se. The question is if the purpose of a choice is itself determined by reason. Acting against reasoning and understanding does not make the choice free. In fact, this is exactly what would make the choice unfree.

- From this (the choice being based on reason) many people seem to conclude that arbitrary choices must be possible - as if everything that could potentially be done could be justified by reason

- The choice is determined by reason in and for itself. This means the subject perceives it as a choice it makes freely. This rules out "determinism" as a comprehensible reason, but not as a reason for a particular process of reasoning.

- Subjects may preserve their dignity by switching to an objective sight onto themselves: This does not question but underline their free will.

Free will is the determination of ends(purposes) by reason in and for itself. — Heiko

What is it that you are calling "reason"? It's an odd term, conflating the noun and the mass noun; The reason given for an action is a self-serving back construction thought up as an excuse after the act.

What is it that you are calling "reason"? It's an odd term, conflating the noun and the mass noun; The reason given for an action is a self-serving back construction thought up as an excuse after the act. — Banno

You are surely right that when talking about observed events the explanation follows them. The explanation makes them understandable. But here we are not talking about observed events but about intent and decision. You wouldn't say I think about how mathematics work after I write down the result of a equation.

You wouldn't say I think about how mathematics work after I write down the result of a equation. — Heiko

You think that a good model of human action?

More often we act without forethought. And even in the presence of forethought it is rare that our plans go unthwarted.

We make it up as we go along.

You think that a good model of human action? — Banno

The subject is not a model of human action, but the question of free will. "Will" denotes an intent not an action. If you act without any intent what is the point? Sh*t happens.

"Will" denotes an intent not an action. — Heiko

As if you could have an intent that was not an intent to do such-and-such.

As if you could have an intent that was not an intent to do such-and-such. — Banno

"such-and-such" is pretty universal, but: You do not really want the act in itself but you want what the act achieves.

Fair point. So what?

So what? — Banno

You think an analysis must lead to conclusions?

You think that deserves a reply?