That's the point of the debate. If there's no hard problem, then it's just a matter of the easier problems amenable to neuroscience and psychology. Easier as in they don't cause a metaphysical or epistemological issue. — Marchesk
The obvious problem however, is that we don't have the slightest of clue how such a process results in the experience of qualia — StarsFromMemory
But we don't need a justification to ignore the hard problem. We can just concentrate on the easier problems regardless. It's not like the hard problems presents any barrier to physical research. — Echarmion
Because the hard problem potentially alters what we think about the world and ourselves. But again, you can ignore that if you want. — Marchesk
Nope, because an illusion of qualia does not present a fundamental conceptual problem That's what the illusionists think. — Marchesk
There is no redness of red. Instead, there is an appearance of something which seems to have those qualities. — Marchesk
It only seems like qualia, p-zombies, inverted spectrum and Mary the Color scientist are a thing. — Marchesk
You can always prove you are conscious to yourself because you are the one experiencing the phenomena you just can't prove it to other people/ give it third person accessibility — Forgottenticket
Because it builds on "problem of other minds" Chalmers' argument is set up in a way that it can't be refuted. He even said as such to another neuroscientist. — Forgottenticket
Fwiw, don't bother with Dennett if you're interested in anything mind related. if you look at his earlier psychology work he denies dreams exist during sleep ignoring a lot of empirical evidence they do. — Forgottenticket
It seems to me that if you claim that it is an illusion, then you know how to overcome the illusion and see things as they truly are. — Harry Hindu
What is it that is being misinterpreted, and what is it being misinterpreted as, — Harry Hindu
If we see light and not objects, mirages and bent sticks in water is what you would expect one to experience. — Harry Hindu
We don't just have eyes. We have other instruments (senses). While each one provides a different experience (seeing you is different than hearing you), they share this quality of depth. They even overlap providing fault-tolerant and reaffirming information about an object's location relative to the body. You are where I see you, hear you and feel you. So it seems to me that a very important part of the description of some object is it's location relative to the body. It is even how the visual field is arranged - the world located relative to the eyes.First step would be understanding how the illusion is generated. Neuroscience would have to supply that.
As for seeing things as they really are, eyes only give you limited information from a certain perspective. You need other instruments to form a proper physical description. — Marchesk
Maybe the problem (illusion) is assuming some kind of dualism, like subjective/objective, physical/mental, direct/indirect, etc.,Our subjective experiences are being misinterpreted as something which is hard to reconcile with any sort of objective explanation. — Marchesk
What is an "experience"? What does it mean for an object (a brain) to have, or generate, an "experience"? How is the brain different from the experience?Sure, but that doesn't work for the experience of color, because physically color is a label for the wavelength of photons based on our having experiences of color. The photons themselves are not colored. It wouldn't matter if they were, because it's electrons which get sent to the visual cortex, not photons. The brain has to turn that stimulus into an experience of color.
As some people like to say in response to direct realism, the green grass doesn't get into our heads. It's not like the color green (or it's shape) hops onto photons from their reflective surface, rides the photons into our eyes, then hops on electrons to ride into the brain for us to see it. Rather, we generate an experience of green grass from the information provided by our senses. — Marchesk
They even overlap providing fault-tolerant and reaffirming information about an object's location relative to the body — Harry Hindu
So it seems to me that a very important part of the description of some object is it's location relative to the body. — Harry Hindu
Maybe the problem (illusion) is assuming some kind of dualism, like subjective/objective, physical/mental, direct/indirect, etc., — Harry Hindu
What is an "experience"? What does it mean for an object (a brain) to have, or generate, an "experience"? — Harry Hindu
How is the brain different from the experience? — Harry Hindu
what the illusionist is saying is there are no ineffable, intrinsic, private and immediately apprehended sensations. There is no redness of red. Instead, there is an appearance of something which seems to have those qualities. — Marchesk
The illusion is that there is an appearance of something that is red that seems to have the quality of redness, but it doesn't? I don't get it. What is that something that appears to be red but isn't, and why does it appear red? What are we referring to when we say, "red"?what the illusionist is saying is there are no ineffable, intrinsic, private and immediately apprehended sensations. There is no redness of red. Instead, there is an appearance of something which seems to have those qualities. — Marchesk
Wait, I thought we needed many people to tell us what an object is, yet now you are asking what an object is without people. You're not being consistent.They even overlap providing fault-tolerant and reaffirming information about an object's location relative to the body
— Harry Hindu
Yes, and those senses still don't tell us most of what an object is without serious investigation by many people.
So it seems to me that a very important part of the description of some object is it's location relative to the body.
— Harry Hindu
Yes, but that's a relation. What is an object when we're not around to sense it? — Marchesk
The only necessary dualism is cause and effect. Redness is a property of minds. Ripeness is a property of apples. When they are both causally related, the experience of a red apple occurs (the effect). Maybe the illusion is assuming apples are red as well as ripe instead of the correct answer which is that red represents ripe. One would be confusing one's mental properties with the properties of the apple. Just as saying the "apple is good", good is a property of minds that projects values onto objects in which values are not a property. It's not the apple that is good or red. The apple is simply ripe. Good and red refer to our gustatory and visual sensations of the apple's ripeness, and are not properties of the apple, but of our mind.Qualia certainly makes dualism a possibility. But there's no getting around some sort of dualism, even if it's only epistemic. There's a difference between how we experience, think and talk about the world and the world itself. Unless you're an anti-realist. — Marchesk
Really? Where?What is an "experience"? What does it mean for an object (a brain) to have, or generate, an "experience"?
— Harry Hindu
i feel like this ground has been covered already. — Marchesk
No. I'm simply asking you what the difference between a brain and an experience is - ontologically. If the two are so distinct, then how does one generate (cause) the other? How does meat get fooled by illusions?How is the brain different from the experience?
— Harry Hindu
Are you asking whether idealism is the case? — Marchesk
Wait, I thought we needed many people to tell us what an object is, yet now you are asking what an object is without people. You're not being consistent. — Harry Hindu
A picture in the head? — bongo fury
You have it backwards. The hard problem is the product of the dualists own making by positing two different substances with no means for them to interact. How does meat generate meatless illusions? There is no hard problem for a monist.Difference between epistemology and ontology. Hard problem raises the possibility that the ontology of the world is dualistic, but it also raises an epistemological question of whether we can know what the nature of consciousness is. — Marchesk
There is no hard problem for a monist. — Harry Hindu
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.