Well, sure, most people in the thread are making assertions, claims, guesses about ontology.

Well, sure, most people in the thread are making assertions, claims, guesses about ontology. — Coben

And I was urging against that kind of response to the OP.

As it happens, though, doing ontology, in the straightforward sense of inferring domains of objects to serve as the potential targets of our word-pointing, i.e. doing semantics, would be my suggestion for roughly where to look for the emergence of consciousness in (e.g.) human infants.

And I was urging against that kind of response to the OP. — bongo fury

It seemed that way. But I think simply labeling something woo is rude and contentless.

As it happens, though, doing ontology, in the straightforward sense of inferring domains of objects to serve as the potential targets of our word-pointing, i.e. doing semantics, would be my suggestion for roughly where to look for the emergence of consciousness in (e.g.) human infants. — bongo fury

I think that could have been shortened to 'I think consciousness emerges in human infants and not in any simpler organisms.' In my posts here I have been arguing that the people I responded to were reacting to various cognitive functions, memory for example, that may or may not correlate with experiencing. It is not woo to point this out. I was not asserting that viruses must be conscious or a pantheism. So, thank you for finally actually describing your views, even if you have failed so far to actually respond to my posts in any substantive way. And using 'metaphysics' as a pejorative, to me, doesn't seem to fit with the kind of intelligence you just showed in this last post. I know a lot of people use metaphysics as a pejorative - not realizing that everyone has metaphysical positions - but that last post tells me you must know better. Most of what is happening in this thread is speculative. I was raising an issue about what might be being (problematically) assumed, especially given our history of bias in relation even to mammals. You disagree with me. Fine. This 'I was urging against that kind of response' is a fancy way of saying you don't want people to disagree with you or who approach the issue another way to post their opinions. Using 'woo' is lazy ass posting and rude. Tossing metaphysics in after that was poor use of the term, since it is a blanket pejorative use for a whole area in philosophy that even you have assumptions within. On your third post, you can't even bother to respond to my arguements, but presume I should have noticed your earlier desire in a post of yours in the thread I was not responding to. You'll have to forgive me if I ignore any further posts of yours in the thread.

The functionality of things is what groups them. The way information flows through systems, the causal connectedness or isolation of them.

And phenomenalist panpsychism had the same usefulness as naturalism: it ends up purporting that a completely trivial property belongs to everything (naturalness/first-person experience) sure, but in the process of denying that a property that would be absurd if substantiative applies to anything.

Actually nothing in what you wrote implies that consciousness is the result of evolution. Because certain things can be the result of evolution does not mean all things are. — Coben

No I am not claiming that I had provided argument in support of evolution. What I meant was that if consciousness is a trait of organisms possesing neural systems, then it must have evolved. Nothing in my text supports consciousness being a trait.

And scientists, after long bias, are beginning to consider that plants are conscious, despite the lack of nervous systems. They have memory, react to pain, communicate, even across plant species, make choices (albeit much slower than we do in general, but not always), and have across whole plant reactions that look very much like nervous system reactions despite not having one. There is absolutely no reason to assume they are not conscious. Note my wording. — Coben

Okay, there is not much evidence for plants having memories. The only evidence we have of a long time memory is from the mimosa pudica plant that exhibits behaviour that is similar to what we would expect if it had memory. However, it is no way clear that the plant posses memory, only that the exisiting biological mechanisms can't explain the results of the experiment. Again, it could be that they indeed have a memory, but nothing can be said as of now.

Here is the point though, if we assume that plants are conscious in a fashion even remotely similar to humans because they posses a communications system, a memory storage system and so on, then many inanimate things like computers must also be considered conscious in the same sense.

Panpsychism must be true in some way because it’s maximally vague and ambiguous. Consider emergentism, the opposite of panpsychism, and yet if true, panpsychist could still say the possibility of emergence was built-in throughout the fabric of the universe all along, and that would be truth, but useless truth. Too general to the point of being meaningless, like stating “everything is universe”. It’s far more reasonable to say “consciousness is a program”, because, at least in some way, that’s what it is. — Zelebg

Emergentism claims that consciousness is more than the sum of its parts. Or put another way, that the parts are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for (self) consciousness.

Panpsychism claims that the parts (or a part) are sufficient for consciousness, but in order to make this claim its proponents need to redefine consciousness as two different things; phenomenal and access. Phenomenal consciousness being a necessary condition of access consciousness. Or, put another way Access, or self-consciousness, emerging from phenomenal consciousness.

Put this way there seems to be little or no difference between the two positions apart from the convoluted terminology required in order to argue for panpsychism.

When we talk about consciousness aren't we really talking about self-consciousness? After all, what could non self consciousness possibly be?

The functionality of things is what groups them. The way information flows through systems, the causal connectedness or isolation of them.

And phenomenalist panpsychism had the same usefulness as naturalism: it ends up purporting that a completely trivial property belongs to everything (naturalness/first-person experience) sure, but in the process of denying that a property that would be absurd if substantiative applies to everything. — Pfhorrest

Are you suggesting panpsychism or functionalism? Or do you think that some mixture of both is a better theory of consciousness?

Functionalism about access consciousness, panpsychism about phenomenal consciousness.

Emergentism claims that consciousness is more than the sum of its parts. Or put another way, that the parts are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for (self) consciousness.

Panpsychism claims that the parts (or a part) are sufficient for consciousness, but in order to make this claim its proponents need to redefine consciousness as two different things; phenomenal and access. Phenomenal consciousness being a necessary condition of access consciousness. Or, put another way Access, or self-consciousness, emerging from phenomenal consciousness.

Put this way there seems to be little or no difference between the two positions apart from the convoluted terminology required in order to argue for panpsychism. — Txastopher

Is that so? Doesn't emergentism also argue that a new property emerges from simply the combination of matter in such a way that we can never predict such an emergence from simply looking at all the physical property of the constituent matter.

Panpyschism though doesn't make any such radical claim and says that some sort of proto-consciousness is a part of all particles and when those particles come together, full blown consciousness emerges. There is nothing exactly new emerging here nor something that cannot be predicted if we know about what this proto consciousness is.

Doesn't emergentism also argue that a new property emerges from simply the combination of matter in such a way that we can never predict such an emergence from simply looking at all the physical property of the constituent matter. — StarsFromMemory

I'd take issue with your use of 'never'. Sure, we don't understand it at the moment, but never predict it?

proto-consciousness is a part of all particles and when those particles come together, full blown consciousness emerges. — StarsFromMemory

Unless 'proto-consciousness' is 'full blown consciousness', then this is simply emergentism by another name.

There is nothing exactly new emerging here nor something that cannot be predicted if we know about what this proto consciousness is. — StarsFromMemory

We know that self-consciousness obtains when matter is arranged in a large nervous system. This is predictable. However, saying that it pre-exists in all its constituent parts is like saying that ice-cream already exists in egg yolk.

Emergentism doesn't hold that any trace of consciousness is already present in fundamental particles but when they combine in a certain way, out of nowhere, a non-physical property arises. We cannot thus deduce how the property arose simply by analysing the constiuents and/or their arrangment.

In other words, the system of matter has a property that is completely different and non existent in its constituents. However,panpyschism holds that this new property of the system is not completely different than the properties of the constituents but simply a collection of 'minds' formed by other simpler and smaller 'minds' so to speak.

An essence of ice-cream already exists in its constituents according to panpyschism, whereas emergentism holds that the constituents of ice-cream have absolutely nothing in common with the ice cream itself and the ice-cream appeared out of the blue when those constituents were combined.

Most panpyschist (?) believe that the emerging property of the system can be reduced and explained in terms of the smaller consciousness of the constituents.

Again, there are many forms of emergentism and panpyschism and there exists similarities between some forms of emergentism and panpyshism.

To be clear, I am not advocating panpychism as the best theory. Panpychism sound very unintuitive, leads to unintuitive conclusions and still faces a threatening challenge from the combination problem.

I'd take issue with your use of 'never'. Sure, we don't understand it at the moment, but never predict it? — Txastopher

That is what emergentism holds right? That the property of the system (consciousness) simply cannot be deduced by looking at the composition/ properties of the constituents of the system

Emergentism doesn't hold that any trace of consciousness is already present in fundamental particles but when they combine in a certain way, out of nowhere, a non-physical property arises. We cannot thus deduce how the property arose simply by analysing the constiuents and/or their arrangment. — StarsFromMemory

Positing phenomenal consciousness (or unself-conscious consciousness) in all matter does not explain anything. Matter is a necessary condition of consciousness.

All panpsychism can offer is an attempt to dissolve the question of when self-consciousness arises, but to do so it needs to posit an entirely contradictory form of consciousness. As far as I can see the only connection between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness is the lavish and neologistic polysemy conferred on the term 'consciousness' in order to shoehorn it into the hypothesis.

That access consciousness could emerge from phenomenal consciousness is equally mysterious as self-consciousness emerging from a large, complex, living nervous system. Indeed, phenomenal consciousness alone is far more mysterious than emergentism.

From what I gather, you don't seem to think any form of consciousness other than self-consciousness exists

What do you mean by self-consciousness? Is it simply the awareness of one's existence or does it also include awareness of one's internal mental states and awareness of the external world?

Do you also think that consciousness is a property of only complex nervous systems and is thus entirely absent in insects,birds and other simpler organisms?

Sorry.

Vote!...

Do you think that consciousness (in any important sense) goes (in any degree) right down to the level of bacteria and virus?

Grateful for any votes on this, for the reason mentioned.

Do you also think that consciousness is a property of only complex nervous systems and is thus entirely absent in insects,birds and other simpler organisms? — StarsFromMemory

Entirely, or largely? (Complexity being relative in this context.)

From what I gather, you don't seem to think any form of consciousness other than self-consciousness exists — StarsFromMemory

I am unsure that consciousness can be anything but self-consciousness.

What do you mean by self-consciousness? Is it simply the awareness of one's existence or does it also include awareness of one's internal mental states and awareness of the external world? — StarsFromMemory

Awareness of one's existence is an internal mental state so you have to take the first two together. The last refers to the senses. What is done cognitively with sensory information appears to depend on the complexity of the nervous system. I suspect, for this reason, that self-consciousness is not present in an amoeba because it's not necessary whereas in humans it appears to be a useful evolutionary adaptation.

Do you also think that consciousness is a property of only complex nervous systems and is thus entirely absent in insects,birds and other simpler organisms? — StarsFromMemory

I don't know. I suspect that it is absent in the case of it not being evolutionarily advantageous.

What do you make of qualia then? You can't deny that there is indeed a subjective experience when we look at ,say, a colour. Surely self-awareness alone can't account for this.

What is done cognitively with sensory information appears to depend on the complexity of the nervous system. — Txastopher

The cognitive processing of the sensory information does lead to a 'image' so to speak being formed in our minds. When we process certain wavelengths of light, a particular image with a distinct feel and experience emerges in our mind.

it's not necessary whereas in humans it appears to be a useful evolutionary adaptation. — Txastopher

Would you please elucidate how being aware of my existence is beneficial to me. Birds, according to you, are not aware of their existence, they seem to survive just fine.

I meant entirely, since Txastopher didn't seem to believe in phenomenal conscious experiences.

You either are aware of your existence, or you are not. Hence, birds are either conscious or not.(If only self awareness is considered)

I am unsure that consciousness can be anything but self-consciousness. — Txastopher

Also, the thought experiment 'Mary's Room' does establish the existence of phenomenal experiences

You either are aware of your existence, or you are not — StarsFromMemory

If you had no language, would you be aware of your own existence? No matter the answer, how could you know?

Would you please elucidate how being aware of my existence is beneficial to me. Birds, according to you, are not aware of their existence, they seem to survive just fine. — StarsFromMemory

On the first point, reflexively, you should be able to answer your own question. On the second, I was unaware that I had opined on birds' self-consciousness.

What do you make of qualia then? You can't deny that there is indeed a subjective experience when we look at ,say, a colour. Surely self-awareness alone can't account for this. — StarsFromMemory

Self awareness + sensory information = quale.

Okay, I did read your essay (nice read) and I have a couple of question :

"I think nothing wholly new emerges out of nothing like magic when physical things are arranged in the right way, only abstractions away from the lower-level, smaller-sccale physical properties that ignore the many details that are irrelevant on a higher level or larger scale."

What about properties like fluidity or rigidity that don't exist on the small scale but exist when the individual particles combine in a fixed way?

I understand that emergentism has major flaws and is not widely accepted, however, I don't think your objection is justified. What is objectionable is that emergentism claims irreducibility of those properties. That is simply unjustifiable to believe in.

Also, why don't you consider the possibilty that phenomenal experience arise from the processing of sensory input by the brain as detailed by 'The Integrated Information theory' and Global Workspace theory?

They do hold some principles in common with panpychism.


Also, what do you make of the Combination Problem that threatens the idea of panpychism and the conceivability of a P-Zombie that experiences the same physical states without any mental states. You do state that you think they are not possible, any concrete reasons for that belief?

On the first point, reflexively, you should be able to answer your own question. On the second, I was unaware that I had opined on birds self-consciousness. — Txastopher

So, birds do have self awareness?

And I don't seem to find a reason for why consciousness gives me a survival advantage over an ameoba, which you say has no consciousness. I suppose there are none, but you could help me find some and establish your point.

As a side note, when I began this thread, I too hoped to prove that consciousness is a product of evolution. But even then, I was fairly sure it was not a product of natural selection.

It seems that the writer is trying to imply that since many single-celled organisms respond to light, heat and vibrations, they must havee some corresponding degree of consciousness. (He doesn't claim so but also doesn't deny it) — StarsFromMemory

How different are other non-human organisms from humans themselves in this respect? The bottomline is that consciousness in people other than ourselves is not known directly as in we're aware of their consciousness but through behavior and if so to what extent does human behavior parallel the behavior of non-human organisms from blue whales down to bacteria? Does a bacteria not forage for food, seek a mate, etc.? Do we not do the same, the difference in complexity set aside for the moment?

If behavior is all we have access to and we do, continually, infer consciousness from it when it's other humans then what reasonable objection could be raised against inferring consciousness from the "behavior" of other organisms?

That said, consciousness may not be an all/nothing phenomenon but may come in degrees; bacterial consciousness may not be at the same level as human consciousness.

Perhaps the behavioral pattern in non-human organisms are of a kind that doesn't permit an inference of consciousness. I mean our behavior, despite clear similarities, does differ significantly from the behavior of non-human organisms and perhaps consciousness, its presence/absence, depends on this difference. At this point a real difficulty emerges: what are the sorts of behavior from which we may conclude the existence of consciousness?

If behavior is all we have access to and we do, continually, infer consciousness from it when it's other humans then what reasonable objection could be raised against inferring consciousness from the "behavior" of other organisms?

That said, consciousness may not be an all/nothing phenomenon but may come in degrees; bacterial consciousness may not be at the same level as human consciousness. — TheMadFool

I think we should consider that consciousness is a product of information integration by a complex nervous system. I am not really convinced by this but it can be seen as a source of consciousness.

What would it mean for a human to be more conscious than other organism? Like someone rightly pointed out, only the degree of sensory input can vary, however consciousness seems rather same that is, there is nothing to say that birds have less intense experience than us, less detailed perhaps, but not less intense. Again someone else in this thread pointed this fact out.

I think we should consider that consciousness is a product of information integration by a complex nervous system. I am not really convinced by this but it can be seen as a source of consciousness.

What would it mean for a human to be more conscious than other organism? Like someone rightly pointed out, only the degree of sensory input can vary, however consciousness seems rather same that is, there is nothing to say that birds have less intense experience than us, less detailed perhaps, but not less intense. Again someone else in this thread pointed this fact out. — StarsFromMemory

Perhaps this is solipsistic in character but from the viewpoint of an individual all that we can observe is the behavior of other organisms, other humans included. In that case there must be some standard or criteria by which you can infer/conclude consciousness from behavior. In short, as far as any individual is concerned, other humans and non-humans are in the same boat insofar as detecting consciousness is concerned: we can only observe their behavior.

If so, the problem we face is delineating a set of behavioral criteria which can help us unambiguously identify the conscious from the non-conscious. What would such a criteria look like? Thinking? Not observable. Goal-directed behavior? Bacteria move towards light. Language in a broad sense? Bacteria use chemical signalling. I have a feeling that we will fail to identify a behavior or even a group of them that can help us determine the presence/absence of consciousness because every behavior humans are capable of has a parallel in non-human organisms and I'm going out on a limb here, even even in bacteria. So, either we must conclude that all organisms are conscious or that no organism is conscious.