I think you're just saying that relativity doesn't entail an arrow of time, nor is it dependent on there being one. Nevertheless, relativity is consistent with there being an arrow of time. Relativity is not a theory of everything. — Relativist

I agree, and I think that this is an underappreciated point. Note that relativity is compatible with absolute simultaneity as well* - it just doesn't require or entail or suggest one. Just as the arrow of time would be an extra structure not licensed by the theory, so would simultaneity.

Does the fact that a feature is not required by a theory, even such a universal and well-supported theory as the Theory of Relativity, imply that it is not a real feature of the world? Not necessarily. It depends on whether the theory was constructed and tested in a way that would be sensitive to the existence of this feature. Since Relativity is agnostic about simultaneity, it doesn't give us an unambiguous answer. But this does put the pressure on the A-theorist to supply a justification.

* Time loops that are possible in GR make global simultaneity problematic. But first, we don't know if they actually exist - all we know is that they are compatible with GR. And more importantly, I don't think that global A-properties should be a requirement for A theories; local properties should be enough, given the phenomenology to which their proponents appeal.

This is more evidence for eternalism if you ask me. E.g., why is it that "metaphysical time" just happens to agree with the arrow of time placed by the direction of increased entropy? What a fortunate coincidence, since it would be a crazy world otherwise.

For eternalism, there is no problem here.

On the other hand, I guess presentists could just say that the world had a 50/50 chance, and fortunately, it came up heads. — Douglas Alan

Not sure what distinction you are drawing here. Are you suggesting that, unlike the presentist, for the eternalist the nature of space and time contains nothing over and above that which follows from the theory of relativity? (And so for the eternalist there is no such thing as the arrow of time.) I am not so sure. At least I don't see why the eternalist has to be so exclusively committed to the relativistic spacetime.

But yeah, the arrow of time is another can of worms.

Not sure what distinction you are drawing here. — SophistiCat

Alas, I'm not sure where the confusion is arising. If you believe that GR entails eternalism, the forward direction of time is given straight-forwardly by the direction of increasing entropy. (Modulo situations in which there is no such clear direction, such as post-heat death of the universe. But since there won't be philosophers existing then to worry about the problem or to experience what it is like to live in this time, this would seem to be moot to an eternalist.)

If you are a presentist, you could, it seems to me, be possibly be living in an unfortunate world where the time that exists is moving in the direction opposite to the direction of increasing entropy. The laws of physics work either way, so how could you know that this isn't the case?

|>ouglas

Except that an arrow of time assumes a dynamic world? — Luke

An arrow for time does not preclude eternalism. It is the direction of increasing entropy.

|>ouglas

I can only refer you to the first article cited in the OP which I quoted that says otherwise.

An arrow for time does not preclude eternalism. It is the direction of increasing entropy — Douglas Alan

Why is it not the direction of decreasing entropy? What difference does an arrow of time make in a static world?

No.

Matter is not only material but logical, meaning that there is, inter alia, some weight.

Doesn't this imply at least a second mechanism as part of the universe?

Block universe is material only, and this block would have no strength to contain weight.

Metaphorically, the way is part of the universe shape. You would think more abstractly but also accurately.

In my language, universe being super massive means massive-mark or wound. You would think of the universe as something you know in districts, not as 1, it's too massive. It's a freak of size but not of technicality. Even one perception proves districts, because you would at least have to look around to get a full view of all stars.

We are giant creatures who traverse even their bodies.

When you imagine the universe for it's all you imagine a wound in your mind and this is more directly is an accidental hit of a mental goldmine, when purposefully exposed is a grade lower.

It's coming off right, wrongly. When you try to come off right, rightly, you approach this moment wrong and thus it's harder to be right and can be less easily maintained. And thus, good thought.

Why is it not the direction of decreasing entropy? What difference does an arrow of time make in a static world? — Luke

Because the way that entropy works implies that people (and computers, animals, etc.) will remember the past and not the future, where the past is defined as the direction of decreasing entropy and the future is defined as the direction of increasing entropy. This is just how physics works, emergently.

|>ouglas

Graphical weights flinging away at high speeds.

Because the way that entropy works implies that people (and computers, animals, etc.) will remember the past and not the future, where the past is defined as the direction of decreasing entropy and the future is defined as the direction of increasing entropy. This is just how physics works, emergently. — Douglas Alan

This seems to assume that "entropy works" in a dynamic way with a moving present moment, and that we are able to remember past times but not future times relative to that moving present moment. That is a presentist assumption. What is the eternalist account?

What is the eternalist account? — Luke

The eternalist account is that at every point in time, a cognitive entity can remember events from the past and cannot remember events from the future, relative to that point in time. (Modulo certain time-travel scenarios, which are very unlikely in reality.)

|>ouglas

Imagine really fast blue and yellow flashing, crackling almost in harmony. Like the energy of a disc reader. This flashing maintained past and future.

The eternalist account is that at every point in time, a cognitive entity can remember events from the past and cannot remember events from the future. — Douglas Alan

Okay then, how are events 'made present' for a cognitive entity, such that they have a relative past to remember? I'm finding it odd for an eternalist to be using such presentist terms.

Okay then, how are events 'made present' for a cognitive entity, such that they have a relative past to remember? I'm finding it odd for an eternalist to be using such presentist terms. — Luke

I don't understand your question. In an eternalist world, I exist right now, as I am typing this, and I can remember events that happened before right now and I can't remember events that are going to happen in an hour.

There is also a version of me existing who resides at a point in time 15 minutes ago. That version of me can't remember what I am typing right now, because that is in his future, but he can remember my previous response to you.

|>ouglas

My apologies for the lack of clarity. I guess what I'm getting at is that we have dynamic accounts for how memory and other bodily functions work (neurons fire, light enters the eye, blood circulates, etc), but I don't see how this could work in a static world.

My apologies for the lack of clarity. I guess what I'm getting at is that we have dynamic accounts for how memory and other bodily functions work (neurons fire, light enters the eye, blood circulates, etc), but I don't see how this could work in a static world. — Luke

I don't really know what to say. It works exactly the same. The only difference is whether you consider the past and future to not exist, which is presentism, or whether you consider that everything that ever happened to still exist and everything that has yet to happen to already exist. If you believe this, then you are an eternalist.

Other than these differing metaphysical theses, which may not be at all provable either way, everything remains the same.

|>ouglas

According to the Kristie Miller article cited in the OP, the difference between Presentism and Etetnalism is not only their differing views on existence, but also their staticity/dynamism.

You seem to want to have your cake and be able to move to eat it too!

I don't have time to read Miller right now. I have actual work to do, which is towards trying to cure cancer. So please forgive me if I'm erring on the side of brevity at the moment.

I did quickly read that staticism is the thesis that the present doesn't move. I find this to be a bit misleading with respect to eternalism. In eternalism, all times are the present in the sense that all places are "here", if that's where you happen to be.

There's nothing in eternalism that precludes things from evolving over time, since in eternalism there is definitely time, and at any given point in time, there are future times and a past times. And things will be different in those future and past times. Hence things change as time changes.

|>ouglas

No offence, but I think I'll take the word of the associate professor over yours.

No offence, but I think I'll take the word of the associate professor over yours. — Luke

No offense, but I think that you have taken what has been written at a superficial level and haven't done the work to actually understand it.

If you do understand it correctly, you should probably make yourself aware that this is a philosophical debate that has raged on for decades at least, and there are many full, tenured professors who agree with me. And in fact, some of those full tenured professors taught me what I know about the subject. Which was at MIT, which is considered, last I checked, to have the fourth best Philosophy department in the world.

So if you don't want to take my word for it, take the word of some tenured MIT full professors.

|>ouglas

I'd be happy to read any articles by these other professors that provide an alternate definition of Eternalism, if you can direct me to them?

I'd be happy to read any articles by these other professors that provide an alternate definition of Eternalism, if you can direct me to them? — Luke

There is no need. I have read the article by Katie Miller and she has done a perfectly good job of explaining all the issues. I agree with everything she says, except for one paragraph:

For the eternalist, the key challenge lies in explaining temporal phenomenology and
in explaining the apparent directionality of time. There has been significant work in
this area, but questions still remain: why do we have such a different relationship
with the future than with the past: why is it that effects typically precede their causes
when the laws of nature are symmetric: why do we remember the past, but not the
future

I don't believe that anyone on the planet has offered a satisfying explanation for phenomenal consciousness, so eternalists are in no worse shape here than anyone else.

As for why we remember the past and not the future, this follows plainly from thermodynamics. When a computer program runs, it follows the laws of thermodynamics. Computers, like people, remember the past and not the future. This fact is true in either eternalism or presentism because these different metaphysical theses do not at all affect physical law.

|>ouglas

Then I take it you agree with all of the following:

Eternalists, then, hold that the world as a whole is static in two senses: which events
exist does not change, and there is no sense in which the present moves. [1]

Eternalists accept what is known as the B-theory of time. This is the view that the
world is a static block of events ordered by the earlier than, later than, and simultaneous
with, relations. [1]

Presentists endorse the A-theory, since they hold that it is a genuine feature of a
presentist world which moment is present, and that this fact changes over time so that
different moments are present at different times. To say that a view accepts the A-theory
is really to say that it endorses the dynamical thesis, and to say that it endorses the
B-theory is to say that it rejects the dynamical thesis. [1]

Eternalism, on the other hand, is a static view that rejects temporal flow. Since it certainly
seems to many that there is temporal flow and change, this is a cost to eternalism.
At the least, the eternalist owes us an account of why it should seem that there are
such features in the world when there are not. [4.2]

My apologies for the lack of clarity. I guess what I'm getting at is that we have dynamic accounts for how memory and other bodily functions work (neurons fire, light enters the eye, blood circulates, etc), but I don't see how this could work in a static world. — Luke

You need to read Miller again. Presentism and eternalism are metaphysical theses. They do not affect physical law. Physical law is exactly the same with either metaphysical thesis. If you understand how physical law works under eternalism, you understand how it works with presentism and vice versa.

Physics itself is completely agnostic about whether eternalism or presentism is true. Though I'd hazard a guess that most physicists would side with eternalism.

(Actually, what I said above is not quite right about Physics being agnostic, since certain aspects of Special and General relativity present serious issues for presentism. Though a presentist can fudge answers that I find completely unsatisfying and ad-hoc. Also the fact that physics is almost completely symmetric with respect to time is another problem for presentism. At least in my opinion. If presentism were true, I think it would be very surprising for the laws of nature to be time-symmetric.)

|>ouglas

Then I take it you agree with all of the following: — Luke

Yes, I do.

|>ouglas

So you accept that "Eternalism...is a static view that rejects temporal flow...and change." Could you explain how that is consistent with your earlier statement:

There's nothing in eternalism that precludes things from evolving over time, since in eternalism there is definitely time, and at any given point in time, there are future times and a past times. And things will be different in those future and past times. Hence things change as time changes. — Douglas Alan

You appear to be claiming that things can change and evolve over time, while also agreeing that nothing changes?

You appear to be claiming both that things can change and evolve over time, but also that nothing changes? — Luke

You just don't understand these metaphysical distinctions. As I mentioned physical law is identical under both of them. If you don't believe me, write to Miller and ask her yourself. She'll tell you just what I have.

PHYSICAL LAW IS IDENTICAL UNDER BOTH ETERNALISM AND PRESENTISM.

Repeat that to yourself 1,000 times until you understand it. There's no point in having a discussion when you don't understand the basics of the distinctions that are being made.

|>ouglas

I'm not talking about physical law here; I'm talking about whether things can evolve and change. This is not about Darwinian theory, but more generally about time.

You asked how things like bodily functions can work under eternalism. They work under eternalism for the same reason they work under presentism. I.e., physical law (and hence biological law) is the same with either!

|>ouglas

Right, that was in response to your statement that entropy has implications for memory, which I viewed as merely avoiding the larger issue, which is better worded by Miller here: "the eternalist owes us an account of why it should seem that there are such features [of change, temporal flow] in the world when there are not."