Relationship between what is perceived and what exists

I can't help but have that thought in the back of my mind, about how what can't be perceived cannot exist. By perceiving, here, I am referring to both the perception that takes place with our senses, and also whatever piece of machinery allows a phenomenon to be (maybe electronically) measured (and hence, indirectly be known of).

If something can't be perceived and there are no ways to measure it with tools, can it exist? Sure, there likely is a plethora of phenomena that aren't currently measurable and cannot be studied or stated, but they'll eventually be. Think about quantum computers. There are some algorithms that have been shown by means of logical proofs to work, but can't currently be made work yet.

However, can something really exist outside of any organism's field of perception? — Samuele

There will be come a point in time where there will be a very long expanse where a specific attribute of Physics or the laws of physics won't be able to be measured or understood. Then after that lengthy period of time new findings will be available. During that long period of time people and some scientists will make assumptions about reality that aren't coherent. Many "scientists" (people of knowledge) during medieval papal europe did this. This is a common theme all through out history.

Are you familiiar with Pascal's Wager?

So something can exist even if it is not perceived or measured.

This critique is incoherent to me. Are you saying, there's no key under your pinky, only a possible key under your pinky? — InPitzotl

No that's not what I'm saying. You said that the symbol relates to an idea, and the idea relates to a thing. But the idea doesn't necessarily relate to any one thing, the idea may be related to many things, Therefore it relates possibly to many different things, depending on the application.

When I convey ideas to you in the forum, I formulate signs by typing. — InPitzotl

You formulate the signs within you mind, what you will type, before you type it, just like you formulate what you will speak before you speak it. Then the typing is just a representation of what you have already formulated in your mind. The act of formulating the signs occurs within your mind, not on the keyboard.

So formulating the sign is not something you do with your fingers on the key board, it is something you do in your mind, thinking about ideas, trying to determine the best words (symbols) to express your ideas. That is why this is an act of extension. The ideas you mull over in your mind may be expressed in numerous different ways, with numerous different words (there are numerous possible symbols (things) which can be related to the ideas).

...when describing world objects, the extensions are those world objects. When you reason about world objects, those world objects are not symbols, and you don't reason "with" them (I suppose you could; if we want to call that reason... if, say, I'm making use of a calculator, I'm reasoning "with" a calculator, but I suspect this isn't what you mean). You reason with your ideas about those world objects. (Now that can be comprehensions, but it's never going to be an extension, so long as you're talking about world objects). — InPitzotl

Symbols are themselves objects, and we use them in the process of reasoning. For example, 2+2=4. The reasoning is carried out with the symbols, but what the symbols refer to, the meaning, or ideas, is something distinct. We reason with the symbols, not with the ideas, though we are sometimes aware of what the symbols mean when we reason with them.

Well... except that makes the term "sensing" a not so tidy concept. — InPitzotl

"Sensing" is not a tidy concept. That's the problem. If you want to make it into a tidy concept then you are not representing what sensing really is.

How is that different than what's already on the table... just calling it some other thing, like, "perception"? — InPitzotl

What was on the table, is that Samuele wanted to make "perception" into nothing other than sensing. The compromise I suggested places "perception" as something intermediate between sensing and reasoning.

But the an idea doesn't necessarily relate to any one thing, the an idea may be related to many things, — Metaphysician Undercover

FTFY.

Yes, "an" idea may refer to multiple things; for example, by referring to multiple tokens; or, by referring to a type with multiple members.

You formulate the signs within you mind, what you will type, before you type it, just like you formulate what you will speak before you speak it. Then the typing is just a representation of what you have already formulated in your mind. The act of formulating the signs occurs within your mind, not on the keyboard.

I'll grant that you're talking about something that happens, but you're still off on the definitions. Telling me that it happens is beside the point... it is not a sign until it is fixed in a medium. The things you do in your head leading up to the sign comprise intentional actions; that certainly requires goal setting and initiating actions directed towards attaining those goals. The thing you're "thinking of" that you want to type should indeed predate the typing of it. But you're not producing a sign until you actually wind up typing it.

Signs don't even have to be specific results of intentions per se. My DHCP server for example pops up signs like: "Assigning IP Address 192.168.1.201 to ...". I can read and interpret that, even though no person typed it (certainly, no single person as a whole, even if you trace history). Also, signs don't have to be in traditional language; stop lights are signs (in this sense even).

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'll grant that you're talking about something that happens, but you're still off on the definitions. Telling me that it happens is beside the point... it is not a sign until it is fixed in a medium. The things you do in your head leading up to the sign comprise intentional actions; that certainly requires goal setting and initiating actions directed towards attaining those goals. The thing you're "thinking of" that you want to type should indeed predate the typing of it. But you're not producing a sign until you actually wind up typing it. — InPitzotl

That's not true, because we use signs in our minds. A person can make up one's own system of association within one's mind, that's why there can be illnesses like schizophrenia And that's how recognition works, things have significance, one thing is associated with another in the mind. There is no warrant to your claim that signs can only exist in the public medium, and it is not representative of how we actually employ signs in the act of remembering. This is well demonstrated in semiotics.