Cool essay, short & meandering. It has academic elements, and a loose structure, but it feels most to me like listening to someone who's comfortable enough not to have to prove anything, allowing himself to wander with whatever comes to mind.

"Shame is definitely not a matter of choice: it falls upon us, invading us – our bodies,
our feelings, our thoughts – as a sudden illness. "

A weird coincidence (maybe?) I had a thought like this today, at work, feeling a little guarded and out of place, thinking : my shame feels a little like a flu right now, or a viral infection. It's not totally separate from me, but it still feels like something alien that I have to contend with. And I'd like not to pass it onto others.

But that's my shame, and that makes it different from the collective shame he's talking about. Maybe what I'm talking about is what he would describe as guilt? I'm not sure.

I've definitely read something, somewhere, about sacrifice functioning as a dark emotional glue bonding the sacrificers together - but that reading is horrible in this context. But, then, he's not really talking about the shame of the 'sacrificers' but the shame of those who couldn't prevent it.

Thinking about the Anscombe piece. I still have to finish reading it, I got up right to the end so far. Certainly, her characterization of fallen ethicists bracketing the immediate moral valence of any given act to focus on extrapolated consequences seems like one ingredient in the dehumanization and rationalization that leads to mass atrocity. I can't get all the ingredients here to coalesce into one idea though.

I don't see the link between Ginzburg and Anscombe. Can you clarify, please?

Going back to Ginzburg, he poses a problem with shame. Shame is usually considered to be raised by being seen by a member of my reference group (imaginary or real). Guilt is the voice of an internal judge. But if shame is a personal feeling, how is it possible to feel shame for others? To feel shame for something I have not done seems contradictory.
I think the answer is not in the structure of shame, but in empathy. I feel shame for the ridiculous friend because I am able to put myself in his place.

The problem of being ashamed of my own country is more complex.
I am actually ashamed of the ruling class or - more commonly - most of my fellow citizens. But it is not clear which reference group "sees" me. An abstract international community? How do I imagine this abstract community?

Actually, I think that "shame for my country" is a rather rhetorical expression, which responds to a moral rejection rather than to a feeling of shame itself.

Shame, in my view, relates to an internal error of contradiction between values and behaviour. We feel shame when our actions contradict the values of a group with which we strongly identify. But we also feel shame when this group with which we strongly identify act collectively in a way that contradicts our personal values.

I think it’s an awareness that my perspective is not identical with the group’s perspective - which in relation to ‘shame for my country’ is not so much of a paradigm shift these days as it might have been for Levi, perhaps. National identity is not so strong anymore (or is it just that I’m not American?). We seem more inclined to criticise our own country now (at least politically) than prior to WWII, I think.

I’m not sure that we ever recover from shame felt towards an extended identity, such as a country or religion, or even the company we work for. Once aware that our value systems don’t match, how likely is it that we’ll continue to submit? And if we do, how quickly would that shame turn to self-loathing, especially if “the perpetrators and their accomplices were not ashamed”?

National identity is not so strong anymore (or is it just that I’m not American?). — Possibility

Have you ever seen the Super Bowl? It’s the most widely watched television event in the US. Ever see the fighter jets fly over the stadium and hear the crowd roaring after the national anthem before the game starts?

Yes. It’s because you’re not American.

“Love it or leave it” is a ubiquitous refrain in America. I’ve also heard “It’s one nation under God or get the fuck out.”

Anyway, I found your analysis on shame to be spot on.

But we also feel shame when this group with which we strongly identify act collectively in a way that contradicts our personal values. — Possibility

This is Cordelia's situation in King Lear. She rejects the dishonourable conduct of her brothers and the nobles towards her father. And she feels shame because they consider her one of them.
In this circumstance, the group of brothers and nobles is no longer her reference group.

In the same way, someone may feel shame because they are identified with the (dishonest) stereotype of their country. For example, an anti-bullfighting Spaniard. Or a German resistance fighter against the Nazis. But that shame disappears - or should disappear - when he makes clear his opposition to the stereotype with which he is associated. In the name of a new reference group (animalists or the resistance).

I don't see the link between Ginzburg and Anscombe. Can you clarify, please? — David Mo

Well this is my suggested starting point, aligned with the story of the fall and thus the divine law source,
for an investigation of the philosophy of psychology, as prescribed by Anscombe.

We feel shame when our actions contradict the values of a group with which we strongly identify. But we also feel shame when this group with which we strongly identify act collectively in a way that contradicts our personal values. — Possibility

I don't want to get too rigid too early, and I don't much like the language you use here because it is confusing more than illuminating. "We" identifies 'a group with which one identifies' and substituting one gets a mess... Perhaps it is pedantic but I think "One feels shame ..." is much preferable.

I'd rather start with Adam and Eve and the shame of nakedness and sexuality. Nothing to do with acting in one way or another, but a state of being other. It is surely in the first place a condition of self-consciousness. Adam is suddenly conscious of his difference from Eve (and vice versa). Thus the swimming pool changing rooms allow for shameless nakedness amongst those of the same sex.

I had a thought like this today, at work, feeling a little guarded and out of place, thinking : my shame feels a little like a flu right now, or a viral infection. It's not totally separate from me, but it still feels like something alien that I have to contend with. And I'd like not to pass it onto others. — csalisbury

So you have not said (perhaps you are too ashamed) what you were ashamed of, what puts you out of place. Perhaps it was of being a philosopher amongst plebeians - then here is the place to strip off - but you express rather well the personal yet impersonal, social yet antisocial nature of the beast.

I feel shame when I pass by a homeless person. I am ashamed of being a member of a society so rich and so uncaring that it can let people sit in the snow outside an empty building and die of cold. Now I think this is almost universal, and in particular, I want to draw attention to those who actively persecute and further humiliate the homeless - you will have seen the stories. Why do they care so much as to set people on fire in their sleeping bags or urinate on them or whatever? It is surely their own shame that they cannot bear, and project as hatred onto the immediate cause. And thus perhaps Primo Levi was wrong about the perpetrators - they felt the shame but projected it back as hatred and anger, shaming the cause of their shame.

I don't want to get too rigid too early, and I don't much like the language you use here because it is confusing more than illuminating. "We" identifies 'a group with which one identifies' and substituting one gets a mess... Perhaps it is pedantic but I think "One feels shame ..." is much preferable. — unenlightened

I tend to use ‘we’ because I find ‘one’ to be impersonal, and I acknowledge my inclusion in the description. But you have a point, and I agree that it can be confusing here.

I'd rather start with Adam and Eve and the shame of nakedness and sexuality. Nothing to do with acting in one way or another, but a state of being other. It is surely in the first place a condition of self-consciousness. Adam is suddenly conscious of his difference from Eve (and vice versa). Thus the swimming pool changing rooms allow for shameless nakedness amongst those of the same sex — unenlightened

I’m always intrigued by interpretations of Adam and Eve in relation to shame, because I tend to disagree with the common assumption that their shame has anything to do with sexuality. I agree that it is a condition of self-consciousness, but in my view, it’s more to do with an awareness of their fragility than a state of being other. Adam and Eve’s nakedness displays their vulnerability and openness to the world - which contradicts the assumption that they are whole, complete or impenetrable. It is this contradiction or prediction error between what they think or expect of humanity and what they experience in reality that results in shame.

I want to draw attention to those who actively persecute and further humiliate the homeless - you will have seen the stories. Why do they care so much as to set people on fire in their sleeping bags or urinate on them or whatever? It is surely their own shame that they cannot bear, and project as hatred onto the immediate cause. And thus perhaps Primo Levi was wrong about the perpetrators - they felt the shame but projected it back as hatred and anger, shaming the cause of their shame. — unenlightened

I agree with this, too. I think people often hate or attack what draws attention to their shame, in the same way as they hate or attack what draws attention to their humility, or their pain or lack or loss.

Why do you think abusing the homeless is born out of the homeless causing them to feel shame?

I think it something else altogether. It seems to me that it has to do with social hierarchies, and the idea that it is ok to vent frustrations (also born out of the same sort of abuse) onto those that are lower in the hierarchy, with the homeless being deemed the lowest.

I tend to disagree with the common assumption that their shame has anything to do with sexuality. — Possibility

And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons. — King James version

Well they didn't make shoes or headscarves. I think it's pretty clear what they were covering if not why. But it's not my main point at the moment. Rather it is to note the tradition that shame is the primary mark of humanity, and that it results in the urge to hide, to self efface.

So this is the beginning of psychological conflict, that what I am ought not to be.

It seems to me that it has to do with social hierarchies, and the idea that it is ok to vent frustrations (also born out of the same sort of abuse) onto those that are lower in the hierarchy, with the homeless being deemed the lowest. — ChatteringMonkey

You may be right, it is a common explanation -- 'the pecking order'. But the need to assert one's superiority over a homeless beggar in such graphic ways seems disproportionate. A Nelson-like "haha!" would be sufficient. It is a very fragile superiority that has to literally piss on its inferiors.

And it is just that psychological fragility that needs to be examined and accounted for.

Sure it's a fragile superiority, born out of feeling inferior to a large part of the rest of society (and being treated as such). The place in the hierarchy right above a homeless isn't that high, right. This is where shame plays a role I think, not because the beggar causes them to feel ashamed, but because they are ashamed of their position in society. And abusing the beggar can give them a short relieve from that feeling of inferiority.

Thread theme tune:

So you have not said (perhaps you are too ashamed) what you were ashamed of, what puts you out of place. Perhaps it was of being a philosopher amongst plebeians - then here is the place to strip off - but you express rather well the personal yet impersonal, social yet antisocial nature of the beast. — unenlightened

Well once upon a time it was shame at being unpresentable or unincludable, and that took any number of guises (poor, ugly, awkward etc depending on my age). Now, it feels like the habits of interacting with others I developed in my childhood-to my 20s are 'locked in'. It feels like I never learned the nuances of social interaction through the long delicate process of trial and error that most do & that I instinctively, in a hard to override way, tend toward a certain kind of self-concealment. So I am ashamed at being ashamed But I also learned that you can't literally hide when, as an adult without a specific skillset, you have to work with others or die. So, overtime, I learned that an effective way to hide in the open is to just let people talk to you about what they want to while you smile and nod and ask occasional clarifying questions- people don't see you when they're talking about themselves, or if they do, its a weird transferential way where they see the you they need you to be to hear what they're saying. This brings its own level of shame, because I'm selfishly allowing an asymmetric bond to develop in order to hide. (It's probably also why I talk so much about myself on here, or about other things bombastically - I spend most of my irl time either listening to others, or speaking with quiet self-effacement)

(I'm not ashamed about 'being a philosopher among plebians', but my social difficulties do tend to draw into stark relief the fact that at least half of my interest in philosophy is compensatory, and then I feel dumb about feeling smart.)

In any case, all of the above is a certain kind of shame that is solitary and narcissistic (or at least self-centered.) On the other hand :

I feel shame when I pass by a homeless person. I am ashamed of being a member of a society so rich and so uncaring that it can let people sit in the snow outside an empty building and die of cold. Now I think this is almost universal, and in particular, I want to draw attention to those who actively persecute and further humiliate the homeless - you will have seen the stories. Why do they care so much as to set people on fire in their sleeping bags or urinate on them or whatever? It is surely their own shame that they cannot bear, and project as hatred onto the immediate cause. And thus perhaps Primo Levi was wrong about the perpetrators - they felt the shame but projected it back as hatred and anger, shaming the cause of their shame. — unenlightened

I'm trying as accurately as I can to think about my reaction to passing by homeless people. There's definitely shame, but I don't know for sure if, for me, its about being a member of a society so rich and uncaring etc. I rarely give money, but about half of the time I give cigarettes. One weird day, I split a sixpack of heinekens with a guy, sitting on a stoop outside a bar, and we talked about whatever he wanted to. I felt good about myself for doing that, but I was also quick to message a couple of friends about this experience afterward, so what's that about. I think the closest thing I can come to is I don't feel enough distance between myself and the homeless to feel guilt on behalf of society for leaving them out(was homeless briefly, in NYC -a few weeks, sleeping on benches, parks etc. But was I really homeless? Not really. I could have gone home. It feels to me like I still learned some very very small inkling of what it's like, but I'm sure someone in severe straits would laugh me out of the room. That said, I've spent a lot of time around the very desperate, as one of the desperate, and my social safety net has dwindled. Whether I'm deluding myself or not, I do feel like I 'get' in some way that experience of helplessness)

I think for me the passing-by-homeless shame is as simple and stupid as not wanting them not to like me, which is shallow, but that's what it is.

Now active persecution. I think I agree with you that it's rage-reaction to their own shame and impotence, because fucking with someone helpless makes you feel powerful. I think there's a strong case to be made that a huge aspect of the appeal of fascism for Germans was the military and economic humiliations of WW1 and its aftermath, and I think you're right that it seems off to say the nazis couldn't feel shame. But maybe it is correct to say that they failed to feel shame about what they most should have felt shame about?

I feel shame when I pass by a homeless person. I am ashamed of being a member of a society so rich and so uncaring that it can let people sit in the snow outside an empty building and die of cold. Now I think this is almost universal, and in particular, I want to draw attention to those who actively persecute and further humiliate the homeless - you will have seen the stories. Why do they care so much as to set people on fire in their sleeping bags or urinate on them or whatever? It is surely their own shame that they cannot bear, and project as hatred onto the immediate cause. — unenlightened

Anger - vis-a-vis the homeless - may well be, for some substantial proportion of folks, the primary reactive emotion, unmediated by shame.

It's a bit over-charitable to suggest that anger in every case plays second fiddle to shame. It's a token of a good, and of a naive, heart.

Plenty of folks have been taught that the homeless are scammers, moochers and parasites. Anger is a natural response.

These Randian notions are extremely widespread in the United States.

Well they didn't make shoes or headscarves. I think it's pretty clear what they were covering if not why. But it's not my main point at the moment. Rather it is to note the tradition that shame is the primary mark of humanity, and that it results in the urge to hide, to self efface. — unenlightened

I agree that shame as a consequence of self-awareness is the primary mark of humanity - but the urge to hide relates specifically to the difference between a relation to others that we expect and the relation to others we experience in reality. There’s no urge to hide when we feel shame with regard to a homeless person, but I think there is an urge to determine or initiate action that manifests either an awareness/connection/collaboration or ignorance/isolation/exclusion of this difference. In the same way, Adam and Eve hiding is also an urge to manifest ignorance/isolation/exclusion of the difference between expectation and reality.

Martha Nussbaum mentions fragility.

Well this is my suggested starting point, aligned with the story of the fall and thus the divine law source, for an investigation of the philosophy of psychology, as prescribed by Anscombe. — unenlightened

But the perspectives are different. Anscombe is searching for a theological justification of morality and Ginzburg is making an anthropological analysis of shame.

How can you relate these different points of view?:

I'm trying as accurately as I can to think about my reaction to passing by homeless people. There's definitely shame, but I don't know for sure if, for me, its about being a member of a society so rich and uncaring etc. — csalisbury

I don't think that is shame. It is guilt. It basically depends on whether you feel shame when someone sees you or whether you feel guilt inside yourself. If you're ashamed, you can identify the group that defines what should be done. If you feel guilty, you can identify the rule you have broken. If you feel ashamed, you think you are not comme il faut. If you feel guilty, you think you have done something wrong.

These are the main differences. They are often confused.

Let's look at an example: Carlo Levi is embarrassed because he and a fellow concentration camper drank some putrid water they found in a pipe without sharing it. But it is not clear what he feels. Guilt or shame? In fact, he calls it one thing sometimes and the other at other times. In my opinion they're mixed, but he's basically talking about guilt. Because he feels inwardly that he has done wrong by violating the moral standard of cooperation. That's why he confesses in his book.

There's lots of interesting stuff here, not least the question of distinguishing shame from guilt, which is something that has exercised many before us. But I will let all the comments lie for now and make a slight turn towards 'identification'.

But the perspectives are different. Anscombe is searching for a theological justification of morality and Ginzburg is making an anthropological analysis of shame. — David Mo

The perspectives are indeed different, but Anscombe is not looking for a theological justification, but a psychological one. So the connection is in the philosophy of psychology according to her specification. Fools rush in, and I am proposing to start doing the work she says is required before we can sensibly discuss morality.

So the Genesis origin myth is one of many but uniquely infects Western thought, and it seems to identify shame as central to the uniquely human psyche. Shame is presented as the psychological marker of the fall from Nature. Not anger, or fear, or joy, or ecstasy, not even pride, - shame. Why? Why is shame the fruit of the tree of knowledge?

We are not bible literalists, so Adam and Eve are stand-ins for our prehuman ancestry, and there is a fairly uncontroversial notion that a highly social species in a complex and perhaps unstable environment needs a big brain to become adaptable over short timescales, and to succeed in a social group. And on the social side, an acute sensitivity to other individuals' emotional state, together with the ability to control one's own emotional expression is important. So a large part of this big brain is concerned with social matters of hierarchy, sexuality, emotion, status, and so on. And out of these concerns develops the skill, or habit, or disease, of identification.

By which I do not mean plant identification or any other externality, but self-identification. In order to feel ashamed, one must identify some aspect of oneself and take a negative attitude to it. One is ashamed of some aspect of one's being. I think, purely for the purposes of this thread, I will stipulate at this point that the shame under discussion is some kind of unhappiness with the image one has of oneself, and that guilt is a possibly and possibly not associated kind of unhappiness with (the image one has of) what one has done or not done. Obviously that is not a universal definition and distinction, and potentially still a bit blurred at the margin.

And this allows to a complex brain, that one can be ashamed of one's privates (for example) in one context and proud of them in another. {An aside for linguists, chauvinists and sex addicts: to stand proud is to stick up above the surface, to be erect, and to think well of the image one has of oneself. Women have to make do with breast implants.}

Anyway, Adam has fallen into his own head. He has become his image of himself, and to that extent lost contact with reality. As far as any individual is concerned 'I am what I think I am'. And I must think that (and so must you) because I didn't think I was what I thought i was then I would think otherwise. But at the same time, and from the same source, my understanding of other individuals in society, I can see that everyone is much more than, and often quite different to what they think they are.

If you are following, you should now be feeling 'cognitive dissonance'. I'll pause while you smooth over the cracks.

So we already have the conflicted tripartite psyche that is a feature of every psychological theory: mind body spirit; ego id superego; parent child adult; take your pick. In this case, it is myself, my self-image, my feeling about my self-image. And this puts the pride/shame dimension centre-stage.

Now pride is personally unproblematic, but socially conflicting. I am a jolly fine fellow smart, handsome articulate, and an asset to the forum and society in general. In myself I am unconflicted, undivided, at least between my self-image and the self image I would be happy with. The only potential source of conflict is reality. In my own mind I am the greatest, and there is no need or desire for me to question that until reality bites.

Shame, by contrast, is personally conflicted, but socially conducive.

I think for me the passing-by-homeless shame is as simple and stupid as not wanting them not to like me — csalisbury

Shame is social glue, that makes me care what others think of me.

And so from the social view, we arrive at the vice of pride and the virtue of humility. From this, as the Ginzburg piece suggests, one can arrive at other virtues and vices quite easily. The social image of virtue is conveyed by social myths and parental approval, so one learns for instance to be ashamed of one's fear, and hides it with a performance of bravery. And so on.

@unenlightened as a christian existentialist?

Sartre sets shame as the way the in-itself becomes the for-others. One sees oneself as being objectified by the other when one feels shame.

Presumably if one learns to live authentically one no longer feels shame.

I suppose the christian myths give another way to say something similar. The trouble is that they are open to so many other interpretations.

Nussbaum sees this vulnerability not as a threat but as an admission of fragility, and hence of worth.

Perhaps that's a take-away from feminism: the capacity to see our objectification as valuable.

I'd rather start with Adam and Eve and the shame of nakedness and sexuality. Nothing to do with acting in one way or another, but a state of being other. — unenlightened

I think that an important aspect of shame is the attention which others give to the shamed person. This is why shame and embarrassment come together in the same package. Shame is what is given to you by the others, and embarrassment is how you feel shame.

It is also how we can understand the difference between shame and guilt. We can feel guilt without embarrassment, without showing it, and some guilty people become very good at hiding their guilt. They have no shame. So shame is not a self-recognition of guilt. Shame only comes when the guilt is recognized by others, the nakedness is a revealing of guilt, and this necessitates embarrassment.

I do not know if you can take "shame" to the extent implied above. Simply being another, not the same as someone else, is insignificant to produce shame. We are all different in our own ways. However, if the others are all the same in some way (clothed), and you are different from them (naked), this may be sufficient to produce shame, as you are recognized as outside the norm.

He has become his image of himself, and to that extent lost contact with reality. — unenlightened

Everyone is an image of themselves. First of all, your consciousness is a project that it is not in reality because it is in a future that is uncertain. Secondly - but simultaneously - one is what is seen by the Other. Every time I feel seen (in a real or imaginary way) I have to accept the reification that the look of the Other put on me. This is shame: I am what I am not because shame and the project are entangled in what I am by filling me with a void of being consistent.

Pure individuality is a false image = bad faith. A phenomenon more universal than one would like to admit.

Yes, Sartre.

Presumably if one learns to live authentically one no longer feels shame. — Banno

No. Authenticity is about recognizing yourself in the other's eyes. The woman who abandons her hand in the hand of a seductive jerk because she doesn't want to give it any importance/significance lives in the bad faith of the one who denies her exteriority. All of us who take refuge in an inner world are denying our condition of being thrown into the world.

I think that an important aspect of shame is the attention which others give to the shamed person. This is why shame and embarrassment come together in the same package. Shame is what is given to you by the others, and embarrassment is how you feel shame. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that might be a better way to put things, but it is almost too precise for me here. It smacks of abstract theory rather than the way we actually live and talk.

I wonder if there is more to say about the conflict. I feel this is important but no one is mentioning it.

If I was an existentialist, I would bring in Laing as the avowedly existential psychologist.

Pure individuality is a false image = bad faith. — David Mo

You have leaped over what I want to look at. Sartre is moralising here for reasons of his own. There is a sense in which every image is false, and there is a sense in which every self-image must be distorted. But why is that such a problem? I have an image of myself as a smart cookie, and then David comes along and shows that I am an idiot. "Ok, I'm not as smart as I thought." *shrugs*.

But it's not like that - it hurts! Why does it hurt, when all that has been damaged is an idea?

Yes, that might be a better way to put things, but it is almost too precise for me here. It smacks of abstract theory rather than the way we actually live and talk. — unenlightened

It is the way we use "shame". "Shame on you!" Shame is what is cast on to others, not what one feels. We feel embarrassment upon being shamed. We also call this feeling ashamed. Shame is meant to be the objective description of the situation rather than the subjective feeling. That's why we've developed statements like "It's a shame". Shame as part of the shaming, is disassociated from the feeling one gets from the shaming, which is embarrassment.

You might call this abstract theory, but it is important as you say, because the abstract theory helps us to understand the mechanisms of guilt, and how one can successfully conceal guilt. There are two distinct aspects of guilt, the judgement of "guilty" passed by others, and the guilt one holds within when knowingly acting wrongly, with or without judgement from others. If the guilt within can be successfully concealed, there may be no shame whatsoever associated with that guilt. That's the important point. When the shame is successfully prevented, in this way, there is no embarrassment and no bad feelings involved with that guilt within. Then the person can knowingly proceed in doing what is wrong without any "guilty feelings".

On the other hand, one might try to hide one's own guilt, but self-reflection, introspection, could reveal the guilt to oneself, causing embarrassment from within (we ought not confuse this with "shame" which comes from others). The blush of embarrassment, or other consequent changes in the person's actions, could reveal the guilt to others, and shame would follow, increasing the embarrassment.

It is the way we use "shame". — Metaphysician Undercover

It may be the way most people use the word, and it may be the conventional meaning of the word, and you may have a superior understanding of the relation of that usage to guilt or any other term; but there is also a usage that treats it as a feeling, and that is how I have stipulated it to be used in this thread. So in this thread you are wrong. Shame is a feeling and I cast shame on you for attempting to prevent the discussion from taking place in the terms I have already set out. It's equivocation. You don't have to like it, but then you don't have to participate. If you do participate, then you need to use the word the way I am using it, or you will confuse an already difficult topic.

No. — David Mo

Ah. Ok, I'll take your word for that.

It is left to modern moral philosophy-the moral philosophy of all the well-known English ethicists since Sidgwick-to construct systems according to which the man who says "We need such-and-such, and will only get it this way" may be a virtuous character

-Anscombe

SO is Satre's existentialism to be counted here along side Sedgwick? One is free to choose authenticity at the expense of justice, after all.

Is shame to be counted amongst the virtues?