Sure. Kant studied/taught math and thought the act of computing mathematics itself was a synthetic a priori exercise in cognition. I tend to agree with him on that.

And I agree with you that propositions, or as you say arguments, relative to EOG are usually for those who already have experienced God or otherwise infer God as a causal agent to their own existence. But the distinction there is a priori v. a posteriori.

In other words, not to detour off topic; deductive reasoning v inductive reasoning. The ontological argument only fails because it's primarily deductive (or analytical as it were).

I think belief in God comes from being aware of the despair we have in our life without God. Only God can cure us from that despair. — Wittgenstein

I think it was Einstein who said basically if human's weren't sentient creatures, Religion would have no meaning. There would not be a need to posit God.

So, using a Star Trek metaphor; we are either Spock or Captain Kirk. Or maybe a combination of both :wink:

That's not what I asked though. I don't think it is obvious that the vast bulk would say that this distinction is necessary to make. — khaled

I think most would consider it incoherent to deny the reality of either or both. They may be right, of course. I am just exploring whether we can do without them, given that I do not really understand how either could be a reality.

Care to elaborate? I think: "I am eating right now" is an example of a proposition that is true at the moment but could very well be false. — khaled

I do not know what 'could very well be false' means here. That is, I do not understand metaphysical possibility. I understand epistemic possibility - that is, not being certain whether something is the case. And I think that often when we say "but it could be false" it is our uncertainty about its actual truth that we are expressing (which is fine). And I understand what it means to say that one can think it false - that is, that it is conceivably false - and I think we sometimes say 'could be false' to express this idea (that is, that though we believe it to be true, we have or are imagining it to be false too). But if one is using the 'could' to express metaphysical possibility, then I do not really know what it means. Which is why I am trying to dispense with the notion.

In a cosmological context, this would be an example of 'why':

1.Every contingent fact has an explanation.
2.There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.
3.Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact.
4.This explanation must involve a necessary being.
5.This necessary being is God. — 3017amen

Er, how on earth does that demonstrate that "always is the case" means the same as "necessarily is the case"??

It just doesn't. For one thing, you're helping yourself to the very notions whose need is in question, and for another you're just not addressing my question, you've just said some things.

Not sure what you're referring to, or are getting at... I'm simply showing you that necessary and contingent truth have their relevance per your OP.

Be well

The feeling is mutual - nothing you're saying makes any sense. Just a sequence of non-sequiturs with added misguided confidence.

I realize you prefer ad hominem when pushed in a corner, but that's ok. (Unfortunately, many people resort to that behavior as a deflection mechanism when denying facts.) It's a cognitive science thing too expansive to unpack here. LOL

You are still misusing ad hominem. I have not been pushed into a corner - I am stood out in the open, naked and proud. You're just locked in a fantasy in which you're Baron Logic and you have a big swishy cloak and a menacing helmet.

and proud. — Bartricks

Well, perhaps a slight teaching-moment detour is in order. How has pride enhanced your cognitive abilities in understanding the distinctions between necessary and contingent truth's?

I don't think you've got anything to teach me. If you could show me how, by denying the reality of necessity and contingency, I am bound to find myself affirming contradictions, then I would revise my view. That is, my pride would take a fall.

don't think you've got anything to teach me. If you could show me how, by denying the reality of necessity and contingency, I am bound to find myself affirming contradictions, — Bartricks

I hate to call you out on this minor detail but you just contradicted yourself by asking for help when apparently your suggesting that you don't need it. That's the second time that happened... .

At any rate, I have demonstrated by that simple syllogism (including of course my other responses) where contingent/necessity is appropriate in (cosmological/metaphysical) discourse, without going into any extraneous explanation that could confuse you.

But to answer your concern, you denying those so-called logical tools of discourse would not present any contradictions. However, with all due respect, by denying them you would also be denying yourself of a higher level of understanding. At the risk of redundancy, theoretical physics uses those tools to help advance various theories about same.

Does that help any?

Saying that a proposition is necessarily true is really no different to writing the word 'true' in capital letters. — Bartricks

I agree, but I wouldn't stop there. I would say: saying that a proposition is true (or TRUE) is really no different to expressing (asserting) the sentence.

And so doing (asserting a sentence) is really no different to pointing the predicate (e.g. adjective) of the sentence at the object denoted by the subject of the sentence.

And so doing is really no different to producing (writing and uttering) tokens of the sentence. It's all hot air.

I don't expect you will approve of any of these steps. From such madness I do get to explain (away?) both truth and necessity. But since you seem to believe in truth on some abstract level, you won't (I expect) like the way I dispose of both. Here goes, anyway.

Truth is unanimity, or consistency of all tokens produced. We've been here before:

"True" is what we call sentence tokens that bear repeating on their own terms, which is to say, without contextualising in the manner of "... is untrue because..." or "... would be the case if not for..." etc.

Such contexts are potential predators, and must be fought off and dominated. — bongo fury

Truth is not the name for some practice of ours - our practice of calling some sentences 'true', for clearly we could have that practice and some of the sentences we call true could be false. — Bartricks

Not without contradicting other sentences we call true. — bongo fury

IOW, I admit that truth is relative to a system: any more or less expansive and enduring but non-ultimate lake or culture of sentence-propagation (and predation). Of which there will many.

Whereas, you envision a singular system overseen by "Reason".

Truth is, as I have argued, the assertive activity of Reason: a proposition is true when Reason asserts it. — Bartricks

And I like the image (by which I might assimilate your vision to mine) of Reason throwing new fish in the water and overseeing a perfect ecology. (Perfectly consistent or at least stable.)

Anyway, necessity then is (potentially, if we have the time and inclination to argue logically or hypothetically) just the claim or observation of some reliable pattern of population growth in some class of systems grown (in petri dish or sandbox) from scratch, from small families of premises, and with clear rules of reproduction and predation.

Although, more usually, we just join the fray of reproduction and predation in a larger and less civilised sea of sentence tokens. But we join it armed (in aid of rhetorical fitness) with more or less clearly formed ecological predictions which we call "truth" and "necessity".

I hate to call you out on this minor detail but you just contradicted yourself by asking for help when apparently your suggesting that you don't need it. — 3017amen

I haven't asked for help, I am testing a thesis. I am seeing if I can do without the notions of necessity and contingency and not thereby commit myself to affirming any contradictions. I am waiting for someone to show me - not just declare - that I will be bound to affirm a contradiction.

At any rate, I have demonstrated by that simple syllogism (including of course my other responses) where contingent/necessity is appropriate in (cosmological/metaphysical) discourse, without going into any extraneous explanation that could confuse you. — 3017amen

No, like I say, you put terms like 'necessary' into the premises, thus presupposing what needed to be demonstrated.

But to answer your concern, you denying those so-called logical tools of discourse would not present any contradictions. However, with all due respect, by denying them you would also be denying yourself of a higher level of understanding. At the risk of redundancy, theoretical physics uses those tools to help advance various theories about same. — 3017amen

Stop talking - it isn't making sense. When I was at school I didn't learn any French because I just cheated by copying my friend's work. When it came to the French oral exam I had no clue what the teacher was asking me, and so I just made some noises in the hope that somehow they might be French sentences. You're doing something equivalent here methinks.

I agree, but I wouldn't stop there. I would say, saying that a proposition is true (or TRUE) is really no different to expressing (asserting) the sentence. — bongo fury

I don't expect you will approve of any of these steps. — bongo fury

I partially approve of them, it is just that I identify 'truth' with an activity of Reason, rather than an activity of ourselves. Our judgements about a proposition's truth or lack of it are then judgements about whether or not Reason is asserting it. In this way I will be able to do everything you can do, yet at the same time respect appearances - for when we judge a proposition to be true we do not appear to be just asserting something (that gets things the wrong way around, for in general asserting something does not make it so; we assert that something is the case because we take it to be the case - that is, we think it is true that it is the case).
So my problem with your view is not that it is fundamentally wrong - for I hold a version of it - but that there is no evidence it (your version, that is) is true.

Of course, one might well say the same about my view that necessity and contingency are not features of reality. For after all, they do appear to be features of reality given that our guide to reality -the representations of our reason - represent many propositions to be true of necessity.

But I have a case for thinking that such representations are likely to be being misinterpreted by us (I haven't made it here, for I am just exploring the coherence of the possibility, rather than the case for its actuality). I think there is no parallel case for thinking that truth is unreal.

I think most would consider it incoherent to deny the reality of either or both. — Bartricks

I don't think so but this doesn't matter

That is, I do not understand metaphysical possibility. — Bartricks

I don't either. I don't know what that is supposed to mean. Care to elaborate?

In what fantasy world did you push me into a corner? — Bartricks

In what of your phantasies did he (he being 3017Amen) say he pushed you in a corner? He said "I realize you prefer ad hominem when pushed in a corner".

He did not say when HE pushed you in a corner. He said when you get pushed into a corner. Get with the program, man.

And I didn't say that he pushed me into a corner. I said "In what fantasy world did you push me into a corner?" A fantasy world is not this world, is it?

So, he did not say that he pushed me into a corner, and I did not say that he did either. All is well.

So, he did not say that he pushed me into a corner, and I did not say that he did either. All is well. — Bartricks

Aw, shucks. I was again foiled by your superior argumenting skills. (S.)

That is, I do not understand metaphysical possibility. — Bartricks
I don't either. I don't know what that is supposed to mean. Care to elaborate? — khaled

Well, it is hard because I don't think it makes sense - so I am explaining something I think is ultimately nonsensical.

Take the proposition that you exist - that is, the proposition "Khaled exists". That is true.

But most philosophers are going to say that though it is true, it is a contingent truth.

And what does that mean? Well, I am not sure. I do not think it is up to me to clarify what it means, given that I do not say that any proposition is contingent. Surely the person who says of a proposition that it is contingent is the one who owes us an explanation of what exactly they mean by the term?

Nevertheless, I'll run through a few candidates.

If someone says of a proposition that it is 'capable' of being false, they might just be expressing their lack of certainty about its actual truth.

But that's not what the philosopher means by 'contingent'. After all, you can be certain that the proposition "Khaled exists" is true, yet they would insist that it remains a contingent truth.

Similarly, someone might say that a proposition is 'capable' of being being and mean by this that they can conceive of its being so. That is, they find they are able to imagine its falsity.

But that isn't what a philosopher means when they say that a proposition is contingent, for there are many propositions that we can imagine being false that (the philosopher would say anyway) are not contingent. For instance, if we are not very good at mental arithmetic we - many of us - might believe that 3 x 18 = 54 yet at the same time be able to imagine that it equals 58 (due to us not being entirely sure what it equals). Nevertheless, the philosopher would insist that 3 x 18 = 54 is not a contingent truth, but a necessary truth.

So what do they mean? Well, again, I stress that it is not up to me to say. But many would say that what they mean is that there is a possible world in which the proposition is false. So, though "Khaled exists" is true in this world - the actual world - there are possible worlds in which it is false (for there are possible worlds in which you don't exist).

Aw, shucks. I was again foiled by your superior argumenting skills. (S.) — god must be atheist

Glad you've finally taken your meds and some of the scales have fallen from your eyes.

yet at the same time be able to imagine that it equals 58 — Bartricks

I don't think anyone can imagine it being 58. We can believe it is 58 momentarily but that doesn't make it true. Once someone has discovered it is 54 he can't imagine a situation in which it is 58. A contingent truth means that even when you are convinced it is true right now you can imagine a situation where it isn't

I don't think anyone can imagine it being 58. We can believe it is 58 momentarily but that doesn't make it true. Once someone has discovered it is 54 he can't imagine a situation in which it is 58. A contingent truth means that even when you are convinced it is true right now you can imagine a situation where it isn't — khaled

This is just clearly false. We can easily imagine sums equalling numbers distinct from those they actually equal - that's what's happening when people get sums wrong. And when we're unsure - as we often are - what a sum equals, we can imagine it equalling 54 or 55 or whatever.

A contingent truth means that even when you are convinced it is true right now you can imagine a situation where it isn't — khaled

Again, clearly false. That's just not what philosophers use the term to mean. Take your own existence. Can you imagine not existing? No. Yet the fact you exist would be described by virtually all philosophers as a contingent truth, not a necessary one (yet by your definition above, it would be a necessary truth).

There is a big debate about the connection between conceivability and metaphysical possibility, with some arguing that if you can conceive of something being the case, then it is metaphysically possible for it to be the case, and others disputing this. The very existence of this debate shows that metaphysical possibility is not considered to be one and the same as conceivability. I mean, even those who think that conceivability is a reliable guide to metaphysical possibility do not think the two are one and the same notion.

We can easily imagine sums equalling numbers distinct from those they actually equal — Bartricks

What we can imagine is someone making a calculation mistake. That's not the same as imagining that 3x18 = 58. Let's make it a bit simpler. 1 + 1 = 2. 1 + 1 = 2 is true no matter what because it's a definition. In the same way that "Married bachelors don't exist" is always true by definition.

You're saying something akin to: "One can forget the definition of bachelor for a moment and thus married bachelors can exist". In this case and the 3x18 case, it's not that someone can conceive of 3x18 =58 or of a married bachelor, it's that someone made a mistake. That's all you can imagine: someone making a mistake and forgetting the definitions.

In other words:
"1 + 1 = 2" is a necessary truth
"When I calculate 1 + 1 I get the sum of 2" is a contingent truth

Take your own existence. Can you imagine not existing? No. — Bartricks

I can easily imagine a world in which I don't exist which makes me existing in this world a contingent truth. I cannot imagine the "experience of not existing" if that's what you're asking but that is not even a coherent concept.

The very existence of this debate shows that metaphysical possibility is not considered to be one and the same as conceivability. — Bartricks

When did I say that?

When did I say that? — khaled

Here:

A contingent truth means that even when you are convinced it is true right now you can imagine a situation where it isn't — khaled

By contrast a necessary truth is a proposition that is true and is incapable of being anything but true — Bartricks

True by definitional fiat.

Definitions of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it can be wrong. If we do not allow for that, if we do not consider that, we find ourselves claiming that falsehoods are necessary truths.

True by definitional fiat. — creativesoul

Er, yes. I am saying they don't exist and we don't need them to exist.

My explanation is better.

No idea what you're on about - what explanation? What are you even trying to explain?

Pay attention.

No, YOU pay attention. You have claimed, apropos nothing, that if one denies that truths of definition are necessary truths

we find ourselves claiming that falsehoods are necessary truths. — creativesoul

Oh really? Explain.