• jgill
    3.9k
    But perhaps someone reading this took a course in groups, rings, and fields but forgot this beautiful construction, which we can sum up in one equation:fishfry

    My very first course in abstract algebra (taken in my first semester in grad school) did something like this. Not being conversant with the various concepts, even groups, made it very challenging and also meaningless. Afterwards I took a course in group theory which was illuminating. Thereafter I avoided abstract algebra. :brow:

    A mistake, looking at current complex variable theory!
  • fishfry
    3.4k
    Thereafter I avoided abstract algebra.jgill

    Difficult to take abstract at grad level without undergrad. Abstract algebra shows up everywhere. Physics is a lot of group theory these days.
  • fishfry
    3.4k
    I think we agree that it's bad pedagogy to simply posit the reals with no explanation and no time or ability to answer very expected and natural questions.boethius

    The opposite argument is that it's bad pedagogy to expect high school students to understand the sophisticated constructions of higher math. It's true in all disciplines that at each level of study we tell lies that we then correct with more sophisticated lies later. It's easy to say we should present set theory and a rigorous account of the reals to mathematically talented high school students. It's much less clear what we should do with the average ones. Probably just do things the way we do them now.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    Seems that way to me too. Our friend Metaphysician Undercover, who must be a neo-Pythagorean, is mightily vexed by the fact that the square root of 2 is (a) a commonplace geometric object, being the diagonal of a unit square; and (b) doesn't happen to be the ratio of any two integers.

    What of it? Humans got over this about 2500 years ago.
    fishfry

    Human beings may have gotten over this, but they did not resolve the problem. Consider the problem this way. Take a supposed "point". Now measure a specific distance in one direction, and the same distance in a direction ninety degrees to the first. Despite the fact that you use the exact same scale of measurement, in both of these measurements, the two measurements are incommensurable. Why is that the case?

    Doesn't this tell you something about the thing being measured (space)? What it tells me, is that this thing being measured (space), cannot actually be measured in this way. The irrational nature of pi tells us the very same thing. Two dimensional objects have a fundamental problem which demonstrates that space cannot actually be represented in this way.

    We see a very similar problem in the relation between zero dimensional figures (points), and one dimensional figures (lines), as discussed in the other thread. So if we get done to the basics, remove dimensionality and focus solely on numbers, we can learn to understand first the properties of numbers, quantity, and order, without applying any relations to spatial features. Then we can see that it is only when we apply numbers to our dimensional concepts of space, that these problems occur. The problems result in establishing a variety of different number systems mentioned in this thread. None of these numbers systems has resolved the problem because the problem lies within the way that we model space, not within any number system. We do not have a representation of space which is compatible with numbers.

    It was quite a shock to them when they came to realise that the square root of two could not be expressed as a fraction! There was no alternative except to introduce real numbers.A Seagull

    The problem though is that introducing real numbers does not actually solve the problem, it just offers a way of dealing with the problem. So the problem remains and mathematicians simply work around it with increasingly complex number systems.

    So, my challenge is if someone can construct the real numbers in a concise and clear way that the average student starting calculus in high school would easily understand for then transcendental constants like pi to make perfect and clear sense and all the tricky questions above perfectly clear answers (just as clear as in geometry or proofs about discrete numbers).boethius

    So you ought to see, that there is no clear and concise way to construct the real numbers. "The real numbers" is an extremely complex way of working around a very simple problem. The problem, as explained above, is that we do not model space properly. This creates problems with applying numbers to spatial representations. So instead of addressing the real problem, which is our representation of space, mathematicians continue to create exceedingly complex number systems in an attempt to work around the problem. Of course the problem remains though, so new issues pop up, and mathematicians continue to layer on the complexity.

    As philosophers, who have met the problems of mathematicians and have chosen philosophy instead, we might focus on the real problem.
  • jgill
    3.9k
    Human beings may have gotten over this, but they did not resolve the problemMetaphysician Undercover
    . . . "Two dimensional objects have a fundamental problem which demonstrates that space cannot actually be represented in this way . . . We see a very similar problem in the relation between zero dimensional figures (points) . . . Then we can see that it is only when we apply numbers to our dimensional concepts of space, that these problems occur. . . None of these numbers systems has resolved the problem because the problem lies within the way that we model space. . . . The problem though is that introducing real numbers does not actually solve the problem, it just offers a way of dealing with the problem."


    Forgive me, but what is the problem, again? :worry:
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k

    The incommensurability which produces irrational numbers.
  • fishfry
    3.4k
    Human beings may have gotten over this, but they did not resolve the problem.Metaphysician Undercover

    The context is that "this" is the discovery by the Pythagoreans that for any pair of integers, the ratio of their squares can not be 2.

    @Meta as I mentioned I've been working on a response to something you wrote in the bijection thread, and I'm taking my time to sort out my thoughts. In fact many of my ideas have been leaking into my recent posts; and clearly I've spilled the beans that it's your paragraph about Pythagoras that really caught my eye.

    I have a lot to say on the subject of the square root of 2 and I don't want to say it all here. I'll keep my remarks here brief, and please be aware that I am going to offer a more detailed response to your point about Pythagoras soon.

    Consider the problem this way. Take a supposed "point". Now measure a specific distance in one direction, and the same distance in a direction ninety degrees to the first. Despite the fact that you use the exact same scale of measurement, in both of these measurements, the two measurements are incommensurable. Why is that the case?Metaphysician Undercover

    Because not every number that pops up naturally is rational. This is just a fact of life. I could push a philosophical point and say it's a fact of nature; and that some mathematical facts, abstract though they may be, are nevertheless forced on us somehow; and that it's the job of the mathematical philosopher to figure out how that miracle occurs. 5 is prime even though there is no 5 and there aren't any primes. It's not fiction. We can make up our own math but some things are not negotiable. There are mathematical truths. "5 is prime " is one; "the square root of 2 is irrational" is another.

    But your stance here is literally pre-Pythagorean. The Pythagoreans threw some guy overboard for making the discovery, but they accepted the fact of the irrationality of . You refuse even to do that. You're entitled to your own ideas, but to me that is philosophical nihilism. To reject literally everything about the modern world that stems from the Pythagorean theorem. You must either live in a cave; or else not live at all according to your beliefs. You must reject all of modern physics, all of modern science and technology. You can't use a computer or any digital media. You are back to the stone age without the use of simple algebraic numbers like .

    Doesn't this tell you something about the thing being measured (space)?Metaphysician Undercover

    No of course not. It tells me something interesting about abstract, idealized mathematical space. It tells me nothing about actual space in the world. Since all measurement is approximate, even in classical physics, we can certainly take all physical measurements to be rational numbers if you like. It's ok by me. There are no irrational distances in physical space for the simple reason that there are no exact distances at all that we can measure. So it's not meaningful to talk about them except in idealized terms.

    Math Physics. When you get that you will be englightened.

    What it tells me, is that this thing being measured (space), cannot actually be measured in this way. The irrational nature of pi tells us the very same thing. Two dimensional objects have a fundamental problem which demonstrates that space cannot actually be represented in this way.Metaphysician Undercover

    You're confusing physical measurement of the real world, with abstract idealized lengths in mathematics. It's an elementary error, easily corrected. Especially now that I've corrected it for you.


    We see a very similar problem in the relation between zero dimensional figures (points), and one dimensional figures (lines), as discussed in the other thread. So if we get done to the basics, remove dimensionality and focus solely on numbers, we can learn to understand first the properties of numbers, quantity, and order, without applying any relations to spatial features. Then we can see that it is only when we apply numbers to our dimensional concepts of space, that these problems occur. The problems result in establishing a variety of different number systems mentioned in this thread. None of these numbers systems has resolved the problem because the problem lies within the way that we model space, not within any number system. We do not have a representation of space which is compatible with numbers.Metaphysician Undercover

    That's a little word-salady for my taste. Couldn't parse it. But I gather from your Pythagoras paragraph in the bijection thread that you object to n-dimensional Euclidean space as well, for the same reason. It logically follows that if you don't like irrational distances you wouldn't like the n-dimensional Euclidean distance formula, so I don't think this is a separate issue.

    As I say I am working on a more comprehensive response to your Pythagorean lament, which will be forthcoming soon. Meanwhile let me just note some key points.

    * only encodes a finite amount of information. It's true that its decimal representation is infinite, but that's an artifact of decimal representation. There are many finite characterizations of .

    * It's computable, so its decimal digits can be completely described by a finite-length computer program. Therefore a constructive mathematician would accept its existence and properties.

    * It's algebraic, so it can be realized in a finite extension field of the rational numbers, . I outlined this mathematical construction in the second half of this post ... https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/368048

    * Euclid's proof of the irrationality of requires only PA (Peano aritmetic) and not ZF. Therefore a mathematical finitist would accept its existence. The last time I tried to explain the Peano axioms to you, you were so triggered by a little symbology that you were unable to engage. I hope you'll grow past that. You can't be a philosopher of math without rolling up your sleeves and dealing with a little symbology now and then.

    * has a continued fraction representation of . In other words it has a repeating pattern that can be described finitely: "one followed by all 2's."

    For all these reasons, is essentially a finite mathematical object. You're simply wrong that it "introduces infinity," because you have only seen some bad high school teaching about the real numbers. Decimal representation is only one of many ways to characterize , and all the other ways are perfectly finite.

    Finally, if you said, "Math says there are noncomputable real numbers and that must be nonsense," I would still disagree with you but you would still have a much stronger case. All the constructivists and neo-intuitionists would agree with you. That argument would have the benefit of being a sophisticated attack on standard set theory.

    But to simply say that you don't like ; that's just a hopelessly naive viewpoint. shows up in many different finite constructions, from Turing machines to continued fractions to finite degree extension fields in abstract algebra.

    has very solid mathematical existence. You're simply wrong that it doesn't.

    If you said that you don't like noncomputables you'd have a better case. And if you said you don't like transcendentals, you'd still be wrong but it would be a slightly better case. But to reject the mathematical existence of a harmless algebraic number like is just a lack of sufficient mathematical understanding. You have no defensible philosophical point. It's too easy to construct by finitary means. Like ... um ... the diagonal of a unit square.

    Well actually those were most of the points I'm making in my post-to-be. Most of it's just drilldown of these bullet points. Maybe I'm done now. I'll have to go back and look.

    Let me ask a larger question. Is it mathematical abstraction that bothers you? Of course there's no physical length that can be measured as . But there's no physical length that can be measured as 1 either. Don't you know that?

    Two dimensional objects have a fundamental problem which demonstrates that space cannot actually be represented in this way.Metaphysician Undercover

    I just noticed this. It's the heart of your confusion. A representation is not the thing itself. We can and do "represent" space as the real line or pi or whatever. But we don't actually think space IS that mathematical representation. It's just a representation, imperfect from the start. It's an approximation at best, a convenient lie at worst.

    Everybody knows this. Or at least I know this. And now that you know I know this, maybe you'll stop holding me responsible for opinions I don't hold. Your argument is with someone else.

    ps -- Tegmark's wrong. Is this what you're on about? The world isn't literally math. A representation of reality is not reality. The map is not the territory. And not even Tegmark takes his own idea seriously, as witnessed by his rapid retreat from the mathematical universe hypothesis to the computable universe hypothesis, which is actually inconsistent with known physics. Don't worry about people who say the physical world "is" math. The physical world is only represented by math. Not the same thing.

    It's feeding time in my vat now.
  • jgill
    3.9k
    Comment: The identity generates a periodic continued fraction

    from which can be calculated by iteration. This might be the algorithm used to obtain square roots on simple calculators. Or it may have been some time ago, replaced by better algorithms. CS people out there?

    This expansion may be due to Omar Khayyam, the poet, rug maker, and mathematician from around 1100AD. :cool:
  • Mephist
    352
    I'm not building with infinite integers, I'm building with the infinite decimal expansion representation of real numbers and simply pruning off the decimal symbol. Sure, if we simply define integer as "not this" then it's not building an infinite integer, but it is building something that I can then do things with if I'm not prevented from doing so.boethius

    The decimal symbol is the thing that says which digit of the numerator matches which digit of the denominator. If you prune off the decimal symbol you have to specify in which sequence you add up digits up and down to "build" your infinite fraction. If you add one digit at a time up and down, you get a sequence of fractions that is (converges to) a well defined real number.
    The difficult point to clarify here is that infinite expressions are not simply the set of symbols (or digits) that compose them, but that set of symbols PLUS the algorithm that says in what sequence you have to add them. And if you change the sequence you get a different result.

    However, if we switch regimes to one where we now have access to the infinite digit expansion of real numbers, we can revisit every proof in the previous regime with our new objects; and now, revisiting the root 2 proof is irrational I am able to solve it with these new objects and not arrive at a contradiction as oddness / eveness is no longer defined upon which the classic proof by contradiction depends. This is what I am doing.boethius

    There is a much simpler proof for the irrationality of roots: take a fraction and write numerator and denominator as product of prime factors. Then square it. It's evident that every prime factor appears at least twice both in numerator and denominator. It means that every fraction squared has this characteristic of doubled prime factors. It follows (from "A ==> B" follows "not B ==> not A") that if a fraction is not done in this way, it cannot be the square of another fraction. Therefore, the square root of any fraction not containing doubled prime factors must be irrational. This proof has even the advantage to clarify how to check if a square root is irrational (not only root of two), and works even for cube roots, etc..
    Now, the problem doing this with infinite integers is that you have to specify how to decompose them in prime factors. If you have an algorithm that decomposes the "partial" integer generated at every step (by the algorithm that specifies the sequence used to build the infinite number), the proof will work at the same way, and the result will be correct.


    Am I prevented from doing this full stop? Am I unable to find a "suitable decimal expansion" to solve my problem? What exactly is preventing me from doing this, that is what I would consider a suitable answer in the context of learning maths. Given these infinite decimal expansion, I want to use them as what ways I see fit, unless I'm prevented by some axiomboethius

    Perfectly right. Not sure if the previous explanation is enough... The problem with proofs by contradiction (the reason why it's easy to make mistakes using them) is that you should have only ONE assumption, and then if you reach a contradiction you know that THAT ONE assumption was false. Using them with infinite objects you very often introduce hidden assumptions about uniqueness of those objects that are not true.

    Broad features and themes involved in rigorous proofs elsewhere I do not consider a good answer for learning math. For me, "learning math is" understanding the proof oneself, not understanding that others elsewhere have understood something.boethius

    I agree.

    Moreover, your approach, would seem to me, to imply that the decimal expansion representation of a real number cannot be counted; is this your implication? or would you say the digits in a real number are countable?boethius

    No, the infinite decimal expansion of a real number is a perfectly good real number: it's the limit of a convergent power series: 1.3762.... = 1 + 3/10 + 7/100 + 6/1000 + 2/10000 + ....
    The digits in a real number should not be countable, but you have to say which algorithm you use to generate them, since they are infinite. Or, put in another way, you have to specify in same way a function "F: natural number ==> digit" that for each position (power of 10) says which digit to put in the numerator.
    ( or maybe I didn't understand your objection.. )

    Also, how do you maintain infinite sequences can be completed, there are no infinite integers, the sequence of integers is infinite, simultaneously within the system suitable for high school level maths. Do we simply elect not to use our "complete the infinity tool" on the integers, and add this axiomatically?boethius

    I would say:
    - infinite sequences are the same thing as functions from integers to sequence elements.
    - functions from integers to sequence elements are surely well defined if the rule to produce the Nth element is clear (is an algorithm)
    ( maybe explain that you can even assume the existence of non-algorithmic functions, with the axiom of choice, but you cannot use it freely without making use of formal logic )
    - integers are defined as sums of powers of 10 (that is the DEFINITION of an integer in the standard notation, not some strange property. So, 2 is 1 + 1 BY DEFINITION: nothing to be proved). The problem with infinite integers is that you don't know which powers of 10 it's made of. If you have an infinite decimal expansion, you know the powers of 10 and everything works. If you are not convinced, try to write infinite integers in Peano notation: 1+1+1+1+.... (or SSSSS..0 - same thing): they are all the same number.
    - the sequence of integers is infinite because is constructed by adding +1 at each step, and this is a non terminating algorithm that produces a well defined result at each step, so it's allowed as an algorithm.

    What axioms do they have to work with? Do they know enough set theory do make a model that avoids all these problems, or do they have another suitable basis?boethius

    I would avoid set theory without speaking of logic before. Of course, you can do the set theory of FINITE sets without logic, but that is not useful to explain real numbers, or anything related to analysis.
  • Mephist
    352
    I think we agree that it's bad pedagogy to simply posit the reals with no explanation and no time or ability to answer very expected and natural questions. Instead of curiosity leading to better understanding, it leads to confusion and a sense maths is "because we say so", which is the exact opposite sense students should be getting.boethius

    Perfectly agree.

    Students would be better served by a less ambitious (not actually having irrationals and transcendentals as objects) but more rigorous calculus in the numerical regime, which would make a much more solid foundation for students going on to use applied maths, who can simply stay in this regime (as they will likely be solving every problem with the computer), and better serving pure maths students as well (that mathematics is rigorous, and extensions are made to do new things in a rigorous way).boethius

    Well, I think a lot of interesting calculus at Euler's level could be done in a enough rigorous way, and just make the students aware of what are the really rigorous parts and which ones are the most "doubtful", when reasoning about infinities. But the most doubtful ones are even the most interesting! And if you explain that we don't know everything, that's the part that makes the subject of math worthy of studying. What for should I (as a student) loose time in a subject where everything hast just been discovered long time ago, and the only thing I can do is to learn by mind what others did? Math becomes interesting when you see that you can use it do discover new things that nobody said you. And there are still a lot of things to be discovered; only that you have to learn how to reason about them in the right way!
  • boethius
    2.3k
    The digits in a real number should not be countable, but you have to say which algorithm you use to generate them, since they are infinite.Mephist

    I agree this solves the problem, and this is for me the essence of what I've called conceptual inversion. Starting calculus with uncountable digit expansions as essentially prior knowledge isn't a good setup.

    However, the other problem I've been alluding to is revisiting all previous theorems proven in a finitist regime; which is also essential part of understanding the infinite regime. Some theorems are abandoned. Choices must be made.

    For instance, in Euclidean geometry we can have a theorem that sphere represented by an arbitrary amount of components, but not infinite, cannot be turned into 2 equal spheres of equal volume. We can also have a theorem that arbitrary amounts of lines never completely fill up area or volume. Going to the standard infinite regime we can revisit these theorems and prove them "false" in the sense that what we thought we couldn't do before we can do now in this new system. This, for me, these "side-affects" features that we didn't expect and didn't set out to make, is what makes these areas of mathematics difficult, even more than being able to construct objects we're intending to make like the real numbers, and high school students. So, even if there was time to explain infinite digit expansion is uncountable in some actual mathematical way involving definitions and proofs, and it's due to this uncountability that's we can assert they cannot be converted into integers ... while still having infinite integers but no "infinite integer" available to put in our set of rationals ... neither asserting that all integers in our set are finite in a sense of having a finite amount of them, which would be clearly false. Even if this was time to do this, it's still not a good understanding of this infinite regime with real numbers without reversing previous intuitions we'd have built up with finitist concepts.

    I would say:
    - infinite sequences are the same thing as functions from integers to sequence elements.
    - functions from integers to sequence elements are surely well defined if the rule to produce the Nth element is clear (is an algorithm)
    ( maybe explain that you can even assume the existence of non-algorithmic functions, with the axiom of choice, but you cannot use it freely without making use of formal logic )
    - integers are defined as sums of powers of 10 (that is the DEFINITION of an integer in the standard notation, not some strange property. So, 2 is 1 + 1 BY DEFINITION: nothing to be proved). The problem with infinite integers is that you don't know which powers of 10 it's made of. If you have an infinite decimal expansion, you know the powers of 10 and everything works. If you are not convinced, try to write infinite integers in Peano notation: 1+1+1+1+.... (or SSSSS..0 - same thing): they are all the same number.
    - the sequence of integers is infinite because is constructed by adding +1 at each step, and this is a non terminating algorithm that produces a well defined result at each step, so it's allowed as an algorithm.
    Mephist

    Yes, I'd pretty much agree with your program here.

    By "numerical regime" I mean focus on these objects as algorithms and not "real numbers" that we simply have by writing down pi or e.

    I think potential infinity is an intuitive concept. Though it may help some students to know that applied mathematics can also be done with only needing to imagine "what one could practically represent in our universe".

    Well, I think a lot of interesting calculus at Euler's level could be done in a enough rigorous way, and just make the students aware of what are the really rigorous parts and which ones are the most "doubtful", when reasoning about infinities. But the most doubtful ones are even the most interesting!Mephist

    I'd definitely be in favour of bringing everyone up to Euler's level.

    I'm not advocating ultra-finitism in secondary education, mainly opposing the positing of real numbers as a "starting point" to doing calculus; I'd be willing to compromise on how rigorous the alternative can and should be.

    I would take seriously ultra-finitist arguments that they have an even better educational setting to start, for I could be biased by my own familiarity with the subject matter and so think just potential infinity is easier than it is.

    In either case, it makes perfectly good subject matter to discuss along with discussion of the kinds of problems one faces with infinities in your program. That there is diversity of perspective even among professional mathematicians I think is inspiring and engaging stuff to talk about.

    But, when it comes to actually doing math to solve problems, building up the "intuition of what rigor is" in my view is paramount, and without it the average high school teacher is in a much worse position; in a rigorous system there really is answers to every question that can simply be looked up; which is a better position to be in than needing to say that one doesn't have the answer but "you'll understand when you do pure maths in university" or worse provide a wrong answer as you note is often the case.

    I would also not be opposed to a pure maths course that build the real numbers, introduce uncountability, for students interested in pure maths. I'm not underestimating the capacities of high school students to engage with concepts from pure maths. However, it's a disservice to applied maths students to abandon reason for madness, simply because historically we went through lot's of mathematical ideas that turned out to go crazy (in the sense of proving A does not equal A).

    What for should I (as a student) loose time in a subject where everything hast just been discovered long time ago, and the only thing I can do is to learn by mind what others did? Math becomes interesting when you see that you can use it do discover new things that nobody said you. And there are still a lot of things to be discovered; only that you have to learn how to reason about them in the right way!Mephist

    Although I agree with your sentiment here, I would argue such interesting questions are best approached from a rigorous foundation, which I don't think your contradicting.

    For instance, the real numbers are best approached from a good understanding of natural numbers, integers, rational numbers and finite sets, and what limits these concepts have but also a good understanding of their intuitive strengths that may fail in different systems (what you see is what you get in finitist maths), as your program suggests to do.

    So, infinite sets and real numbers could be something introduced at the very end of secondary maths when these foundational concepts are more familiar. But to start, understanding divergence and convergence and tangents and how series and sums and derivatives and integral functions relate to each other (and how to solve real problems with them), is challenging enough to learn in a finitist regime; my intuition is that doing this also with the conceptual challenge of infinity makes it much harder to "see" and to "get" what's going on, and students who start asking questions, even just pondering to themselves, that have no good answers available will much more easily get lost or believe their questions are seen as stupid by the mathematical community, simply because their teacher can't deal with them.
  • Mephist
    352
    Ehm, sorry but I am afraid I made a mistake in what I wrote. Better to fix it before it goes too far...
    I wrote "The digits in a real number should not be countable". Well, the digits of (the decimal representation of) a real number are countable, since they are determined by a function of type "natural-number ==> digit".
    It's the set (the totality) of all real numbers that is uncountable: meaning that there is no surjective function of type "natural-number ==> real-number".

    But notice that even the set of all functions of type "natural-number ==> boolean" (for example) is uncountable. And Cantor's diagonal argument can be applied to whatever function of type "something ==> something else" to show that there are more functions than objects, even if the functions are simply well defined terminating algorithms: there's no need to use formal logic or set theory to prove this.

    In my opinion, the thing that makes real numbers more difficult to grasp intuitively is that they don't have a normal form: there is no way to create an algorithm that decides if two arbitrarily defined real numbers are the same number or not, and that's because there are "too many ways" to build a real number (basically, you can use whatever algorithm you want, and in general there is no way to decide if two given algorithms produce the same output or not).

    However, the other problem I've been alluding to is revisiting all previous theorems proven in a finitist regime; which is also essential part of understanding the infinite regime. Some theorems are abandoned. Choices must be made.

    For instance, in Euclidean geometry we can have a theorem that sphere represented by an arbitrary amount of components, but not infinite, cannot be turned into 2 equal spheres of equal volume. We can also have a theorem that arbitrary amounts of lines never completely fill up area or volume. Going to the standard infinite regime we can revisit these theorems and prove them "false" in the sense that what we thought we couldn't do before we can do now in this new system. This, for me, these "side-affects" features that we didn't expect and didn't set out to make, is what makes these areas of mathematics difficult, even more than being able to construct objects we're intending to make like the real numbers, and high school students.
    boethius

    Well, I wouldn't start from the "pathological" cases to show that volume additivity doesn't work any more. On the contrary, I would start from the fact that you can calculate the volume of curved figures as if they were make of infinitesimal polyhedrons, and it always works! (Archimedes' volume of the sphere is very intuitive and beautiful).
    OK, then there is this little "glitch" in the fabric of the universe named Banach Tarski theorem... :smile:
    It doesn't work because in integral calculus you have to take "open sets" as infinitesimal pieces ( but I would prefer to not go into details about this issue, because surely @fishfry will read this and will not agree :wink: )
    Anyway, the fact that infinite additivity works as if infinitesimal geometrical objects existed in reality is the really interesting and useful fact. The fact that it's so difficult to prove why it works and why in some cases it doesn't, maybe makes the problem even more interesting..

    So, even if there was time to explain infinite digit expansion is uncountable in some actual mathematical way involving definitions and proofs, and it's due to this uncountability that's we can assert they cannot be converted into integers ... while still having infinite integers but no "infinite integer" available to put in our set of rationals ... neither asserting that all integers in our set are finite in a sense of having a finite amount of them, which would be clearly false.boethius

    Sorry, but I don't understand when you say "due to this uncountability..." why is uncountability a problem?

    So, infinite sets and real numbers could be something introduced at the very end of secondary maths when these foundational concepts are more familiar. But to start, understanding divergence and convergence and tangents and how series and sums and derivatives and integral functions relate to each other (and how to solve real problems with them), is challenging enough to learn in a finitist regime; my intuition is that doing this also with the conceptual challenge of infinity makes it much harder to "see" and to "get" what's going on, and students who start asking questions, even just pondering to themselves, that have no good answers available will much more easily get lost or believe their questions are seen as stupid by the mathematical community, simply because their teacher can't deal with them.boethius

    I think more than the "finitist" regime they should be teached before in the 18th century "Eulerian" regime, where functions always work as if they were infinite polynomials and derivatives are made of infinitesimals. You have to see that all this staff with infinities really works before starting to wonder how is it possible that it works if infinities don't really exist. Then you have a motivation to study formal logics and set theory. More or less, following the historical development of mathematics. I think there is no sense in creating a theory of infinite sets if you don't see what for all this infinity staff is good for.
  • jgill
    3.9k
    What about inverses? It's not immediately obvious, but in fact if
    then .
    fishfry
  • jgill
    3.9k
    :roll: Oh oh. It sure isn't. :cool:
  • fishfry
    3.4k
    OK, then there is this little "glitch" in the fabric of the universe named Banach Tarski theorem... :smile:Mephist

    Banach-Tarski means nothing about actual space. It's a valid technical result that applies to mathematical Euclidean space. There's no reason to believe that the universe behaves exactly the way Euclidean space does. This seems to be a common theme here lately, but I think it's mostly a strawman argument. I don't think there's anyone seriously suggesting that the actual universe is exactly like the mathematical real numbers. I for one don't believe that in the slightest. I think mostly that the people who think that haven't given the matter much thought; and once you start thinking about it, it becomes perfectly clear that the real numbers are a mathematical model that works amazingly well, in spite of the fact that it's so unlikely to be anywhere near close to the "truth," if there even is any such thing as a truth of the matter. Most likely it's turtles all the way down.

    There aren't any analogs of mathematical "points" in the real world, little zero-dimensional zero-sized thingies that somehow occupy a "location" in space. I don't believe that for a moment. I really don't think anyone else who's thought about the matter seriously does either. That's my opinion anyway. I like math but I never confuse it for reality. I think a lot of people in online forums are angry at math for making the claim of being a perfect representation of the universe; but math does not make that claim. Math asks to be taken on its own terms.

    Banach-Tarski is a valid theorem. I heard that John von Neumann was the one who first noticed it in the 1920's. They were looking at how group theory interacts with geometry and measure theory, and this little paradox shows up. Mathematicians tend to delight in such results. They don't throw up their hands and go, "Oh woe is us, the physicists will make fun of us. Or even worse, the philosophers will!" They don't think that way. A cool result is a cool result. As Russell noted, math is about investigating the logical consequences of various sets of premises. It's not necessarily true or meaningful. Sometimes it is. Depends on what you use it for.

    I'm with Hardy, who held that the the more useless a branch of math, the more beautiful it was. He applied this to his beloved number theory, which for over 2000 was regarded as a supremely beautiful and supremely useless part of math. How would Hardy feel if he came back and found out that in our very lifetimes, starting in the 1980's, number theory became the basis of Internet security, and is now the most applied branch of math you can imagine! I hope he'd have a sense of humor about it; and also a sense of wonder at how purely abstract math, considered useless for millennia, one day becomes the very heart of world commerce.

    Hardy was the guy played by Jeremy Irons in The Man Who Knew Infinity, which if you haven't seen it, please do immediately. Besides being a mostly true account (for a Hollywood movie) of the miraculous and tragically short life of Ramanujan; it's also a meditation on the relation of intuition to formalism in math. Visions from the Goddess versus formal proof.
  • fishfry
    3.4k
    It doesn't work because in integral calculus you have to take "open sets" as infinitesimal pieces ( but I would prefer to not go into details about this issue, because surely fishfry will read this and will not agree :wink: )Mephist

    Oh gosh. Thanks for mentioning it.

    I was idly skimming through the many posts in this thread that I hadn't read. And I swear this is how my brain works. I zeroed in on this particular comment like a laser. That's not an especially good quality because I often miss the larger points people are making. I'm an excellent proofreader too. Grammar and spelling errors literally jump right off the page as I read. Terrible affliction in a day and age when nobody gives a shit about spelling or grammar. Spelling and grammar are tools of patriarchical and colonial oppressors. Such is the zeitgeist.

    You mentioned integrals. A lot of people think of an integral as the sum of the areas of infinitely many infinitely thin rectangles. I have no problem with that. That's how everyone thinks about them and that's perfectly fine. Professional physicists do in fact think exactly this way all the way up to the highest levels. It doesn't matter.

    I have no beef with how anyone thinks about math or visualizes it or simplifies it in their minds.

    But you did give a wrong and misleading definition of an open set. I do have to say that. Open sets are really important. An open set in the reals is just like an interval without its endpoints. What matters about it is that "all its points are interior points." It doesn't include any points of its boundary. That's what makes open sets have the interesting properties that they do.

    They're not really infinitesimal. They can be arbitrarily small. But they aren't "infinitely" small. In fact that is the great "arithmetization of analysis," the great founding of the continuous world of calculus on the discrete world of set theory. Instead of saying things are infinitely small, from now on say they're arbitrarily small. For every epsilon you can go even smaller. But in any individual instance, still nonzero. That's the essence of open sets.

    Ok I quibbled again. I had a great course in Real Analysis with a gifted professor. Open sets are very near and dear to my heart. But if you substitute "infinitely small" with "arbitrarily small," each time you do there will be that much more clarity and correctness in the universe. We can literally reverse entropy by fixing typos. Think about that.
  • Mephist
    352
    It was a joke! Yes, of course I don't believe there's something wrong with physical universe because of this theorem.
  • Mephist
    352
    I really didn't want to enter in the discussion about Banach-Tarsky theorem again :worry:
    I found what I wrote about six months ago:
    What's wrong with the Banach-Tarsky paradoxMephist
    . It's still valid!
  • Mephist
    352
    But you did give a wrong and misleading definition of an open set. I do have to say that. Open sets are really important. An open set in the reals is just like an interval without its endpoints. What matters about it is that "all its points are interior points." It doesn't include any points of its boundary. That's what makes open sets have the interesting properties that they do.

    They're not really infinitesimal. They can be arbitrarily small. But they aren't "infinitely" small. In fact that is the great "arithmetization of analysis," the great founding of the continuous world of calculus on the discrete world of set theory. Instead of saying things are infinitely small, from now on say they're arbitrarily small. For every epsilon you can go even smaller. But in any individual instance, still nonzero. That's the essence of open sets.
    fishfry

    OK, I think I should give some explanation on this point:

    I wrote you have to take "open sets" as infinitesimal pieces
    What I meant is you should impose the restriction that the infinitesimal pieces are also "open sets"

    The definition of open sets is of course what you wrote: "all its points are interior points", or "there are not isolated or border points in the set", or "each point of the set is surrounded by other points"

    Now, if I wanted to explain under what assumptions additivity of volumes (or surfaces, or segments) works without using a formal logic system, I would say that it works even if you consider infinitesimals as really existing entities (with the appropriate rules of calculus: for example: integrating over a line, dx squared is zero), but you cannot take as dx isolated points: you have to take pieces that don't contain points that are isolated from each-other, because otherwise the topology of the object is not preserved (the functions are not continuous), and you can build a sphere using the points of a line, or two equal spheres using the points of one sphere. As I wrote in my explanation about Banach-Tarski mounts ago, the theorem works because it uses isometric transformations, but applied to set of points that are isolated from each other (not on open sets). If you impose the restriction that your isometric transformations should be even continuous (going from open sets to open sets), you can't do it any more.
  • boethius
    2.3k
    I wrote "The digits in a real number should not be countable". Well, the digits of (the decimal representation of) a real number are countable, since they are determined by a function of type "natural-number ==> digit".Mephist

    Yes, I think this is the normal situation and what I was expecting. But now I believe the task is even more difficult as one now needs to explain to high school level math students that both the digits in integers "can be counted" and the digits expansion of real numbers can be "can be counted" (assuming they stick with you on what counting infinities mean), but you cannot count on making an infinite integer to make rationals.

    The purpose of my series of questions is not to build ZFC or some analogue, but to demonstrate that without the context of ZFC there are no "simple answers" to questions about the real numbers. That there is no simple story to tell nor easy proofs to put on the board in the context of what high school students level.

    I think this thread establishes pretty well that the average high school class room doing calculus for the first time would not be able to follow almost any of this conversation.

    Well, I wouldn't start from the "pathological" cases to show that volume additivity doesn't work any more.Mephist

    My point is that these unexpected and non-intuitive theorems exist when going from the finite to the infinite regime.

    Understanding infinite regimes means understanding these non-intuitive, arguably "undesirable" in some sense results, and doing that isn't achievable if students have not yet built up an intuition of the finite regime to be able to contrast with unintuitive results in the infinite regime.

    Banach-Tarski is for me no less strange than being able to in some sense "stretch" the points in the interval 0,1 to cover 0, a billion; it only seems more strange if one has already gotten accustomed to the run-of-the-mill real number properties. But that's not understanding the real number system to just be given the real numbers and said "these numbers have these properties we want because we're doing calculus now".

    The opposite argument is that it's bad pedagogy to expect high school students to understand the sophisticated constructions of higher math. It's true in all disciplines that at each level of study we tell lies that we then correct with more sophisticated lies later. It's easy to say we should present set theory and a rigorous account of the reals to mathematically talented high school students. It's much less clear what we should do with the average ones. Probably just do things the way we do them now.fishfry

    Yes, if we agree there's no simple enough answers to questions about the real numbers (defined as an appropriate amount of time for average teachers and students), your point here is a valid perspective that I'm not dismissing prima faci; certainly this has been the justification of doing calculus with real numbers.

    My argument against this is that it breaks the chain of intuitions required to understand math. One step to the next should be clear, this is the "method" of mathematics; the rigor. With all the courses you mention needed to understand the real numbers well, this is the "method" employed, and the goal of these courses is to render what seems at first unintuitive (because they are not consequences of living in the real world) to something that is, step by step, intuitive consequences of the mathematical system.

    In science classes, things are over simplified compared to advanced science, but the goal is to stick to the experimental and critical method (I would also argue this could be done a lot better). When this method is abandoned, I think we'd agree here on PF that it's not good science pedagogy. For instance, that creationism taught as a valid scientific theory is bad pedagogy because it is not verifiable by experiment; not that creationism should be "hidden" from students, but that it is doing philosophy and not science.

    Also, in science there is no way to avoid starting with simpler "wrong" beliefs about the world that get fixed later. This isn't a requirement in math, there is no externally determined mathematical framework of truth determined by nature. Every step one takes in mathematics can be "true" in the sense of following from the previous steps. The infinite regime is, in my view, basically a restart with a new set of axioms; it is a different mathematical journey than the finite regime that students are naturally on due to living in a finite world and familiar only with finite objects.

    My other argument would be purely practical, that focus on transcendentals and "exact" analytical solutions is a product of history due to 1. a lack of calculation ability, so analytical solutions were often the only practical way forward and 2. belief in a Newtonian world of a physical continuum (not to say that we can easily now do without a continuous mathematical framework in which to model discontinuous phenomena; just that we do not think that underlying framework is physical, as I believe you would agree).

    However, with ubiquitous and incredibly powerful computing and no need for physicists to believe in a physical continuum, I would argue the average student is much better served by focusing on "what can the computer do for me", viewing constants algorithmically with arbitrary (to a physical limit of computation) precision potential determined in practice by one's problem, and building up intuitions around machine calculation (and analytical work including error bounds, computational complexity, along with analytical proofs of convergence when available, just in the "arbitrarily close to the limit" finitist framework); rather than, what we seem to all agree here, building up wrong intuitions about the real number system. Such a "numerical regime" can be made as rigorous as any part of pure maths, and so is also teaching (what is to me) the critical essence of pure mathematics, although of course additional material introducing infinity could be available for those interested in higher pure maths (whether starting from Euler or introducing ZFC; I don't have a strong opinion; my concern here is not serving those with mathematical aptitude heading for pure maths, but rather that everyone else has the best chance to be mathematically literate and also served by the mathematical community).
  • Mephist
    352
    However, with ubiquitous and incredibly powerful computing and no need for physicists to believe in a physical continuum, I would argue the average student is much better served by focusing on "what can the computer do for me", viewing constants algorithmically with arbitrary (to a physical limit of computation) precision potential determined in practice by one's problem, and building up intuitions around machine calculation (and analytical work including error bounds, computational complexity, along with analytical proofs of convergence when available, just in the "arbitrarily close to the limit" finitist framework); rather than, what we seem to all agree here, building up wrong intuitions about the real number system.boethius

    Yes, I see your point. Maybe you are right.
  • fishfry
    3.4k
    I would say that it works even if you consider infinitesimals as really existing entitiesMephist

    LOL Now you're trolling me seeing if I'll take the bait. There are no infinitesimals in the real numbers. If you're working in some other number system please say that. As I said earlier I have no problem with people informally thinking in terms of infinitesimals; but I do object to muddying the official formalism.


    As I wrote in my explanation about Banach-Tarski mounts ago, the theorem works because it uses isometric transformations, but applied to set of points that are isolated from each other (not on open sets). If you impose the restriction that your isometric transformations should be even continuous (going from open sets to open sets), you can't do it any more.Mephist

    I'm not sure what you mean. Can you please link your earlier post on B-T? The point sets in B-T are not isolated from each other, in fact the orbits are dense. They're disjoint from one another but not isolated. We should have a nice Banach-Tarski thread sometime, the subject keeps coming up.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    But your stance here is literally pre-Pythagorean. The Pythagoreans threw some guy overboard for making the discovery, but they accepted the fact of the irrationality of 2β€“βˆš2. You refuse even to do that. You're entitled to your own ideas, but to me that is philosophical nihilism. To reject literally everything about the modern world that stems from the Pythagorean theorem. You must either live in a cave; or else not live at all according to your beliefs. You must reject all of modern physics, all of modern science and technology. You can't use a computer or any digital media. You are back to the stone age without the use of simple algebraic numbers like 2β€“βˆš2.fishfry

    I accept the fact that the square root of two is irrational. That's not the issue. And I actually use the Pythagorean theorem on a regular basis working in construction, laying out foundations. The issue is that I am inclined to ask why is it the case that the square root of two is irrational, and in doing this I need to consider what it means for a number to be irrational.

    To simply say as you are saying, that some numbers are rational and some numbers are irrational, and that's a brute fact, does not express an understanding of what a "number" is. But then, to ask why is it that some numbers have the property of being rational and other numbers have the property of being irrational requires asking what it means to be an irrational ratio, and one might be faced with the prospect that what we call an "irrational number" ought not even be called a "number". Perhaps the Pythagoreans threw the baby out with the bathwater, saying we can't resolve this problem so let's just call them all "numbers" anyway, and get on with the project.

    So, let me state clearly and concisely what the situation is. We have a very simple looking problem of division which cannot be solved because there is no "number" which can represent the solution. You say, the problem can be solved, the resolution is an "irrational number", so just forget about that problem, it's not a problem at all. And, you say it's just "a fact of life" that some numbers are irrational. I say it's a simple fact that a so-called "irrational number" is not a number at all, because it's quite obvious that there is not a definite number which expresses the resolution of the irrational ratio. See, the very simple looking problem of division has not been resolved, and it is a pretense to claim that it has been resolved to an "irrational number".

    No of course not. It tells me something interesting about abstract, idealized mathematical space. It tells me nothing about actual space in the world.fishfry

    If idealized mathematical space tells us nothing about space in the world, then physics has a big problem. But of course this is nonsense. That the square root of two is irrational, and that pi is irrational tells us something about idealized mathematical space, and that is that there is a problem with commensurability in idealized mathematical space. And, since idealized mathematical space is the tool by which we make measurements in real space, the problem of idealized space is simply ignored in application

    There are no irrational distances in physical space for the simple reason that there are no exact distances at all that we can measure. So it's not meaningful to talk about them except in idealized terms.fishfry

    OK, let's talk about "irrational distances" in idealized terms then. Lets take a point A. Lets make a point B at a specific distance from point A, and a point C at the very same distance from point A, but in a direction at a right angle to the direction of point B. Do you agree that there is no definite distance between B and C? If you disagree then you are simply denying the fact. if you agree, then you might be inclined, like I am, to ask why this is the case. And so it appears to me, like there is a very real problem with "idealized mathematical space", making it less than ideal.

    For all these reasons, 2β€“βˆš2 is essentially a finite mathematical object. You're simply wrong that it "introduces infinity," because you have only seen some bad high school teaching about the real numbers. Decimal representation is only one of many ways to characterize 2β€“βˆš2, and all the other ways are perfectly finite.fishfry

    You might say "√2" is a finite mathematical object, but until you define what a mathematical object is, it's you who's just typing word salad. In reality "√2" is an unresolved mathematical problem. That you call it a "mathematical object" doesn't mean that it is a "number", nor does it mean that it actually is an object. And, when one attempts to represent this so-called object as a number, infinity is introduced

    However, I didn't say that it "introduces infinity" on this thread. If I mentioned that, it was another thread in another context. Perhaps I said that in a thread on infinity. What I am focused on here is simply the meaning of an irrational ratio, and whether it is appropriate to claim that the ratio has been resolved to a "number", called an "irrational number".

    But to simply say that you don't like 2β€“βˆš2; that's just a hopelessly naive viewpoint.fishfry

    It's not "√2" that I dislike, it's what it represents that is what I dislike. And it's not that I am simply saying this, I am giving you the reasons for my dislike. But you seem to be good at ignoring reasoning.

    It's just a representation, imperfect from the start.fishfry

    Right! That's why we ought to seek a better one! That's exactly what I'm arguing. Don't you agree?
  • Mephist
    352
    I'm not sure what you mean. Can you please link your earlier post on B-T?fishfry
    I linked it in the post just before this one. Here's the link:
    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/302364
  • jgill
    3.9k
    Mathematics (what is called mathematics today) is the research of "models' factorizations" that are able to compress the information content of other models (physical or purely logical ones).Mephist

    I don't know what this means. Matrix factorization? That's all there is to mathematics research these days? Surely you jest. :cry:
  • fishfry
    3.4k
    I am satisfied with this principle if we can apply it consistently. We do not measure mathematical "objects", they are tools by which we measure objects. That's why I argued that they are not proper "objects".Metaphysician Undercover

    Ok. First, if you have been talking about mathematical objects and not physical space, my misunderstanding. But then all your mathematical objections will collapse.

    Secondly, a terminological quibble. In math there is a thing called a measure. It's a generalization of the idea that the unit interval has length 1, and a rectangle of sides 2 and 3 has area 6, and so forth. So it's a little better not to use that word.

    If you're talking about distances, better to use the word metric. A metric is a distance function. For example in the Euclidean plane, the metric, or distance function, is given by the usual Pythagorean formula of the square root of the sum of the differences of the respective squares of the coordinates. That is, if and are points in the plane, their distance from one another is

    . In n dimensions the formula is analogous. But there are also weirder metrics. A metric is the general name for any distance function.

    Now back to your quote. Of course we measure mathemtical objects. A unit square has side 1, area 1, and its diagonal ... well you know what its diagonal is. In fact it falls out of the Euclidean distance formula as the distance between the origin and .

    Now let's apply this to set theory. Cardinality, for example is a measure.Metaphysician Undercover

    Cardinality is not a measure in the technical sense. It's a way of assigning a size to a set. I don't think there's a name for it.

    If the applicable principle is that we do not measure mathematical "objects", then why allow this in set theory? It's inconsistency.Metaphysician Undercover

    Of course we can assign a length or area or volume to mathematical objects. The unit interval has length 1, the unit square ... oh we've been over this already.

    So either we can measure mathematical objects, like squares, and the sides of squares, just like we can measure the cardinality of sets, or we cannot measure these so-called mathematical objects.Metaphysician Undercover

    Of course we can measure, or assign a length/volume/area to, or find the distance between pairs of, mathematical objects.

    If I earlier thought you were objecting to physical measurement, my misunderstanding.

    But of course we can measure or assign size to mathematical objects in many different ways, depending on context.


    I'm fine with the latter principle so long as we maintain consistency.[/quote]

    We do. The rules are laid out in the articles on measure theory and metric spaces that I linked.


    But if we allow that we can measure these so-called objects, then we can measure a square, and find that the diagonal cannot be measured.Metaphysician Undercover

    You are painfully misinformed about this. The square of the diagonal of a unit square is . It's a perfectly good real number; and metrics, or distance functions, are defined as functions between pairs of objects and the nonnegative real numbers (satisfying some distance-like properties).

    It's what we call an "irrational number", implying an immeasurable length. Are you familiar with basic geometry?Metaphysician Undercover

    You keep saying an irrational number is "immeasurable" but that's simply false. You're just wrong about that. You're still humg up on decimal representations but I'll show you soon that you're wrong about this.


    This is not at all what I've been saying, so I think we might not really be making any progress.Metaphysician Undercover

    No we're good, I thought you were saying physical distances can't be measured. But if you're talking about mathematical objects, my misunderstanding. And now that I understand what you're talking about, you're just wrong. We can use metric spaces or measure theory to measure distances and generalized volumes (length, area, volume, etc.)


    Neither you nor I is talking about physical objects here. What we are talking about is the "made-up gadgets" which you describe here.Metaphysician Undercover

    Understood.

    You seem to imply that there is a difference between these funny gadgets, and "first-rate mathematical objects"Metaphysician Undercover

    No, I'm pointing out that there only seems to be a difference depending on what age one lives in. If you live in the age of integers you don't believe in rationals. You're stuck in the age of rationals and don't believe in irrationals. Matter of history and psychology.

    I deny such a difference, claiming all mathematics consists of made-up gadgets, and there is no such thing as mathematical objects.Metaphysician Undercover

    We're in agreement then. But that's what a mathematical object is. A made-up gadget that, by virtue of repetition, gains mindshare.



    But this is contrary to set theory which is based in the assumption of mathematical objects.Metaphysician Undercover

    I've studied set theory and read a number of set theory texts. I've never read or heard of any such thing. Set theory in fact is the study of whatever obeys the axioms for sets. If you ask a set theorist what a set is, they'll say they have no idea; only that it's something that obeys whatever axiom system you're studying.

    You're making stuff up to fill in gaps in your mathematical knowledge. Set theory doesn't assume anything at all. It doesn't assume it's "about" anything other than sets; which are things that obey some collections of set-theoretic axioms.


    If you really think that a "funny gadget" becomes a "mathematical object" through use, you'd have to demonstrate this process to me, to convince me that this is true.Metaphysician Undercover

    But I already did. From the naturals to the integers to the rationals to the reals to the complex numbers to the quaternions and beyond. At each stage people didn't believe in the new kinds of number and though it was only a kind of "calculating device." Then over time the funny numbers became accepted. This is a very well known aspect of math history.

    How can you not see that this is a problem for set theory?Metaphysician Undercover

    Because I'm not making up wild stories about set theory as you are.

    Set theory assumes that it is dealing with real, actual mathematical "objects".Metaphysician Undercover

    Not at all. I know that in high school they tell you that a "set is a collection of objects." Nothing could be further than the actual truth. Sets as mathematicians understand them are very strange. They're simply abstract thingies that satisfy some axioms that we write down.


    That is a fundamental premise.Metaphysician Undercover

    It's something you made up. Or maybe someone told you that. They were wrong. Set theory doesn't assume any objects at all. In fact ZFC is a "pure" set theory, meaning that the only things that can be elements of sets are other sets. There are no other types of objects at all! Only sets, and we don't even know what those are!

    For the record there are also set theories with urelements, meaning things that can be members of sets that are not themselves sets.


    Now you agree with me, that mathematics can never give us this, real or actual things being represented by the symbols.Metaphysician Undercover

    What do you mean by real or actual things? In the physical world? Well, physicists use math to model electrons and gravity and quarks and stuff. Maybe you should ask a physicist.

    But do you mean how can sets be used to model mathematical objects like numbers, functions, matrices, topological spaces, and the like? Easy. We can model the natural numbers in set theory via the axiom of infinity. Then we make the integers out of the natural, the rationals out of pairs of integers, the reals out of Cauchy sequences of reals, the complex numbers out of pairs of reals, and so forth. If you grant me the empty set and the rules of ZF I can build up the whole thing one step at a time.


    So why don't you see that set theory is completely misguided?Metaphysician Undercover

    You haven't made any such case. On the contrary, your questions all have straightforward answers.

    So your argument is that the "funny gadget" gets made into a "first-rate mathematical object" through convention, just like driving laws.Metaphysician Undercover

    No, I took pains to make a distinction. Driving laws are completely arbitrary. But many mathematical ideas are forced on us somehow, such as the fact that 5 is prime.


    But those are ";laws", not "objects". Let's suppose that the mathematical symbols referred to conventional laws instead of "objects", as this is what is implied by your statement. How would this affect set theory? Remember what I argued earlier in the thread, sometimes when a symbol like "2" or "3" is used, a different law is referred to, depending on the context.Metaphysician Undercover

    Yes, I thought at that time that either yu were making a point of great subtlety, or else that you were insane. By reading your posts I have determined the latter. I don't mean to be pejorative here. But you said at one point that when we say "4 + 4 = 8", the two instances of the symbol '4' mean or refer to different things. That's ... Look man that's just bullshit. I can't be polite about this. That's a very bizarre idea.

    I don't see how "the square root of 2 exists" could possibly be true, It is an irrational ratio which has never been resolved, just like pi.Metaphysician Undercover

    You're still hung up on decimal representations; which I've said (several times now) are NOT determinative of whether a given real number has infinitary nature.

    Here's an example. Take 1/3 = .333333.... Would you say that 1/3 is not resolved or requires an infinite amount of information? But it doesn't. I could just as easily say, "A decimal point followed by all 3's." That completely characterizes the decimal representation of 1/3. I don't have to physically be able to carry out the entire computation. It's sufficient that I can produce, via an algorithm, as many decimal digits as you challenge me to.

    Likewise there is a finite computer program that completely characterizes . I don't have to write out all the digits. I only have to write down a FINITE description of an algorithm that produces as many digits as you like. This is easily done.



    How can you assert that the solution to a problem which has not yet been resolved, "exists"?Metaphysician Undercover

    It has been completely resolved. You can't write down infinitely many digits any more than you can write down all the digits of .333... But in the case of 1/3, there's a finite-length description that tells you how to get as many digits as you want. And with square root of 2, there is ALSO such a finite-length description. Would you like me to post one?

    Isn't this just like saying that the highest number exists?Metaphysician Undercover

    No.

    But we know that there is not a highest number, we define "number" that way.Metaphysician Undercover

    Bad analogy, nothing to do with the fact that computable numbers like 1/3, , and only require a finite amount of information to completely determine their decimal expressions.

    Likewise, we know that pi, and the square root of two, will never be resolved,Metaphysician Undercover

    I showed how to characterize pi a few days ago as the Leibniz formula. The square root of 2 has a very easy program to calculate its digits.

    I really hope you'll consider the example of 1/3 and the fact that we can predict or determine every single one of its decimal digits with a FINITE description, even though there are infinitely many digits. Square root of 2 and pi are exactly the same. They are computable real numbers. There is a finite-length Turing machine that cranks out their digits.

    Here's a Python program that prints as many digits of as you like. It uses a simple high/low approximation method. We know because . So we split the difference and guess 1.5. But 1.5 squared is 2.25, a little too big. So we split the difference between 1 and 1.25 and try that. The longer we run the algorithm the more digits we get. Just like the longer we write down 3's, the more decimal digits of 1/3 we get.


    #!/usr/bin/python3
    
    low  = 1
    high = 2
    
    loops = 1000
    
    for i in range(loops) :
        lowsq  = low * low
        highsq = high * high
    
        trial   = (low + high) / 2
        trialsq = trial * trial
    
        if trialsq < 2 :  # too small
            low = trial
    
        else :   # too big. 
            high = trial
        
    print(trial)    
    

    This simple little FINITE STRING OF SYMBOLS cranks out successively better and better approximations to the more iterations you do. Of course we can't physically write down all the digits because physical computations are resource-limited. But in principle we can; just as "keep writing threes" is a recipe for the decimal representation of 1/3.
  • fishfry
    3.4k
    I linked it in the post just before this one. Here's the link:
    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/302364
    Mephist

    I made some comments in the other thread so as not to pollute this one.

    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/368991
  • Mephist
    352
    By "models' factorizations" I mean finding the right definitions that allow you to describe some complex (containing a lot of information) models in a simple way, or that allow you to prove something that was too complex to prove without these definitions.
    In a sense, this is a form of compression of information: understanding something means compressing the information contained in something in a new simpler way (by using a different point of view, or definitions). That's mainly what mathematicians are doing today.
  • sime
    1.1k
    IMO, the heart of the problem is that the notations of both classical and constructive logic do not explicitly demark the analytic or a priori uses of logic pertaining to activities of computable construction in which every sign is used to refer to a definite entity or process, from logic's a posteriori or empirically-contigent uses in which some or all of it's signs are not used to denote anything specific a priori but whose meaning is empirically contigent upon nature providing some (possibly non-existent) outcome at a future time.

    This is why I consider communication games to be the most important interpretation of logic. For it identifies the constructive content of logic with the permissible sequences of actions that can be taken by player A, and the 'non-constructive' content of logic with message-replies that A receives from a player B as a result of A messaging B. The existence of a message-reply from B is not-guaranteed a priori, and A's message to B is only said to be meaningful as and when A receives a reply from B.

    A constructive real number refers to an algorithm constructed by A for generating a sequence of integers. In the case of a non-constructive real number, A invokes the "Axiom of Choice" , which is interpreted as A 'outsourcing' the creation of the real number, by sending B a message requesting B to send A an arbitrary sequence of integers. The sign for a non-constructive real number has no specific meaning or referent until A receives a stream of integers from B.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    Now back to your quote. Of course we measure mathemtical objects. A unit square has side 1, area 1, and its diagonal ... well you know what its diagonal is. In fact it falls out of the Euclidean distance formula as the distance between the origin (0,0)(0,0)and (1,1)(1,1).fishfry

    OK, so we agree that if so-called "mathematical objects" are things which can be measured, Euclidian geometry creates distances which cannot be measured by that system. That agreement is a good starting point.

    As a philosopher, doesn't the question, or wonderment, occur to you, of why we would create a geometrical system which does such a thing? That geometrical system is causing us problems, inability to measure things, by creating distances which it cannot measure.
    No, I'm pointing out that there only seems to be a difference depending on what age one lives in. If you live in the age of integers you don't believe in rationals. You're stuck in the age of rationals and don't believe in irrationals. Matter of history and psychology.

    …

    We're in agreement then. But that's what a mathematical object is. A made-up gadget that, by virtue of repetition, gains mindshare.
    fishfry

    Maybe we can take this as another point of agreement. A "mathematical object" is nothing other than what you called a "funny gadget". Let's simplify this and call it a "mental tool". Do you agree that tools are not judged for truth or falsity, they are judged as "good" in relation to many different things like usefulness and efficiency, and they are judged as "bad" in relation to many different things, including the problems which they create. So a "good" tool might be very useful and efficient, but it might still be "bad" according to other concerns, accidental issues, or side effects. Bad is not necessarily the opposite of good, because these two may be determined according to different criteria.

    Let's look at the Euclidian geometry now. In relation to the fact that this system produces distances which cannot be measured within the system, can we say that it is bad, despite the fact that it is good in many ways? How should we proceed to rid ourselves of this badness? Should we produce another system, designed to measure these distances, which would necessarily be incompatible with the first system? Having two incompatible systems is another form of badness. Why not just redesign the first system to get rid of that initial badness, instead of creating another form of badness, and layering it on top of the initial badness, in an attempt to compensate for that badness? Two bads do not produce a good.

    I've studied set theory and read a number of set theory texts. I've never read or heard of any such thing. Set theory in fact is the study of whatever obeys the axioms for sets. If you ask a set theorist what a set is, they'll say they have no idea; only that it's something that obeys whatever axiom system you're studying.

    You're making stuff up to fill in gaps in your mathematical knowledge. Set theory doesn't assume anything at all. It doesn't assume it's "about" anything other than sets; which are things that obey some collections of set-theoretic axioms.
    fishfry

    Come on, get real fishfry. Check Wikipedia on set theory, the first sentence states that it deals with collections of "objects". Then it goes on and on discussing how set theory deals with objects. Clearly set theory assumes the existence of objects, if it deals with collections of objects.

    This is why it is so frustrating having a conversation with you. You are inclined to deny the obvious, common knowledge, because that is what is required to support your position. In the other thread, you consistently denied the difference between "equality" and "identity", day after day, week after week, despite me repeatedly explaining the difference to you.

    But I already did. From the naturals to the integers to the rationals to the reals to the complex numbers to the quaternions and beyond. At each stage people didn't believe in the new kinds of number and though it was only a kind of "calculating device." Then over time the funny numbers became accepted. This is a very well known aspect of math history.fishfry

    You have not explained how acceptance of a mathematical tool, through convention, converts it from a funny gadget, to an object. If you cannot demonstrate this conversion, then either the tool is always an object, or never an object. Then an extremely bad tool is just as much an object as an extremely good tool, and acceptance through convention is irrelevant to the question of whether the mental tool is an object.

    But do you mean how can sets be used to model mathematical objects like numbers, functions, matrices, topological spaces, and the like? Easy. We can model the natural numbers in set theory via the axiom of infinity. Then we make the integers out of the natural, the rationals out of pairs of integers, the reals out of Cauchy sequences of reals, the complex numbers out of pairs of reals, and so forth. If you grant me the empty set and the rules of ZF I can build up the whole thing one step at a time.fishfry

    Until you recognize that an "element", or "member" of a set is an "object", you are simply in denial of the truth, denying fundamental brute facts because they are contrary to the position you are trying to justify.

    You haven't made any such case.fishfry

    The case I made is very clear, so let me restate it concisely. You appear to agree with me that mathematical tools are not objects, they are "mind" gadgets, yet you defend set theory which treats them as objects.

    No, I took pains to make a distinction. Driving laws are completely arbitrary. But many mathematical ideas are forced on us somehow, such as the fact that 5 is prime.fishfry

    Mathematical ideas such as "5 is prime" are forced on us by the rules (laws) of the mathematical system, the definition of "prime" and "5" with deductive logic. So there is no difference. We create mathematical rules arbitrarily, as they are required for our purposes, just like we create driving laws arbitrarily as required for our purposes.

    Here's an example. Take 1/3 = .333333.... Would you say that 1/3 is not resolved or requires an infinite amount of information? But it doesn't. I could just as easily say, "A decimal point followed by all 3's." That completely characterizes the decimal representation of 1/3. I don't have to physically be able to carry out the entire computation. It's sufficient that I can produce, via an algorithm, as many decimal digits as you challenge me to.fishfry

    This is nonsense. I can very easily say "the highest number". Just because I say it doesn't mean that what I've said "completely characterizes" it. We can say all sorts of things, including contradiction. Saying something doesn't completely characterize it.

    It has been completely resolved.fishfry

    Unjustified, and false assertion.

    It has been completely resolved. You can't write down infinitely many digits any more than you can write down all the digits of .333... But in the case of 1/3, there's a finite-length description that tells you how to get as many digits as you want. And with square root of 2, there is ALSO such a finite-length description. Would you like me to post one?fishfry

    if you switch to a different number system, one which is incompatible with the first from which the irrational number is derived, like switching from rational numbers to real numbers, this does not qualify as a resolution, if the two systems remain incompatible.

    For instance, if there is infinite rational numbers between any two rational numbers, and we take another number system which uses infinitesimals or some such thing to limit that infinity, we cannot claim to have resolved the problem. The problem remains as the inconsistency between "infinite" in the rational system, and "infinitesimal" in the proposed system.

    I really hope you'll consider the example of 1/3 and the fact that we can predict or determine every single one of its decimal digits with a FINITE description, even though there are infinitely many digits. Square root of 2 and pi are exactly the same. They are computable real numbers. There is a finite-length Turing machine that cranks out their digits.fishfry

    This has no relevant significance. To say "the square root of two", or "the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter" is to give a 'finite description". We've already had the "finite description" for thousands of years. And, this finite description determines that the decimal digits will follow a specific order, just like your example of 1/3 determines .333.... The issue is that there is no number which corresponds to the finite description, as is implied by the infinite procedure required to determine that number.

    So my analogy of "the highest number" is very relevant indeed. Highest number is a "finite description". And, the specific order by which the digits will be "computed" is predetermined. However, there is no number which matches that description, "highest number", just like there is no number which matches the description of "the square root of two", or "the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter", or even "one third".

    This demonstrates that there is a problem we have with dividing magnitudes, which has not yet been resolved.

    It's just a representation, imperfect from the start.fishfry

    Let me return your attention to this remark. If you agree with me, that the representations are "imperfect" from the start, then why not agree that we ought to revisit those representations. Constructing layer after layer of complex systems, with the goal of covering over those imperfections, doing something bad to cover up an existing bad, is not a solution.
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