I've nothing more to say until more is presented.

It's bad philosophy. That doesnt mean it's not food for thought or that cool stuff couldnt be inspired by it. The rose grows from poop, you know. — frank

Ow!

Well, I certainly do not think that it's a shit argument, despite my intuitive disagreements. I mean, those very well may be based up a slight misunderstanding... although, I find Davidson a bit confused and/or confusing to begin with even when I accept the notions he works with/from. That could be me though.

I like what I've seen of Soames... just so ya know. Are you Kelvin from the other site per chance?

Could that be done in common ordinary language?
— creativesoul

The argument I posted is as close as I could get to ordinary language. — frank

I think we can get closer still to an acceptable robust enough position using a more common - fairly ordinary - language. I mean, I think we need to further simplify, but not in mathematical terms such as a logician. Rather, I'm confident that we could much better discuss the role that meaning and truth have/play in all meaningful statements by using some of the most common words and statements.


Generally speaking, logical notation is existentially dependent upon something else being taken into account. When regarding Convention T, that something else includes any of the meaningful statements that permit it's use. I suspect that we may agree here.


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The problem is that Davidson's argument against untranslatability contains concepts that are artificial (the Tarski stuff). — frank

I think that perhaps a much broader based underlying problem is at hand; one of which that delves the understanding much deeper than just Davidson's argument. The approach is fraught from the tip-off(from the very beginning of the process).

Convention T is a logical notation practice that uses pre-existing meaningful statements. Convention T is inherently incapable of taking proper account of either the meaning or truth of the statement being rendered for it can say nothing at all about meaning and truth that are prior to meaningful statements.

Some alternative Convention T practice is existentially dependent upon different languages already talking about the same things in different terms, and our already knowing that much. It's not a process and/or method for translation so much as a display of that which has been already effectively/affectively translated. Be that as it may, there's more to be gleaned here...

When using two different languages, it's little more than an equivalency of meaning being drawn. That is possible because of shared truth conditions. The very same circumstances, situations, happenstances, events, states of affairs, and/or facts make both true. We check to see if they are by virtue of looking for and/or at the same actual scenarios/events. Think of some of the most common renderings of Convention T; the ones using both English and German. Both languages have already long since been being used in order to pick out and subsequently describe the very same directly perceptible thing as well as their directly perceptible characteristics.

This merely reminds us that the meaning and truth of statements are forever entwined. Davidson knew this, as do we all, I suppose? He certainly helped me to realize it.


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Logical notation is itself only one way that we attribute meaning. There is some sort of meaningful value given to each previously undefined term solely by virtue of our drawing a correlation between the term and it's value - whatever that may be. Convention T is itself existentially dependent upon language use, for it is existentially dependent upon pre-existing meaningful statements. Meaningful statements existed in their entirety prior Convention T.

If it is the case that both truth and meaning exist in their entirety prior to statements, then it is the case there are instances of both that Convention T cannot possibly take into account; but Nor can any other logical notation, for that matter, for much the very same reasons.

When using two different languages, it's little more than an equivalency of meaning being drawn. That is possible because of shared truth conditions. The very same circumstances, situations, happenstances, events, states of affairs, and/or facts make both true. We check to see if they are by virtue of looking for and/or at the same actual scenarios/events. — creativesoul

Yep. In light of this, think about how we might translate this sentence into Sumerian: "The town incorportated in 1925."

The concept of a corporation didn't exist in ancient Sumeria, which is to say we won't be able to find shared truth conditions. Incorporation is a legal concept that was created by the Romans. It means that a group of people can be treated as one person before the law. This concept was revived by medieval Europeans as a way for cities to negotiate with the nobility.

If we had a time machine, could we explain all of this to a Sumerian? I think so. It would be a matter of piecing together concepts that she already has and providing truth conditions in the form of a historical narrative.

The important point is that we have to help our Sumerian create the concept of a corporation for herself before we could expect her to understand usage of the word. IOW, because we can't rely on her own experience with incorporation, we'll have to rely heavily on her ability to generalize from what she does know. Her ability to generalize is something she shares with other animals.

The point I just made was actually made very succinctly by Harry Hindu earlier in the thread.

When using two different languages, it's little more than an equivalency of meaning being drawn. That is possible because of shared truth conditions. The very same circumstances, situations, happenstances, events, states of affairs, and/or facts make both true. We check to see if they are by virtue of looking for and/or at the same actual scenarios/events.
— creativesoul

Yep. In light of this, think about how we might translate this sentence into Sumerian: "The town incorportated in 1925."

The concept of a corporation didn't exist in ancient Sumeria, which is to say we won't be able to find shared truth conditions — frank

I mentioned shared truth conditions as simple yet effective explanation of what's required for translatability as can be shown by Convention T practices. You've turned our attention to the opposite...

Looks like a modus ponens...

I'm working on an adequate refutation concerning the reliability and/or trustworthiness of modus ponens. I've recently realized that it allows false premisses to result in true conclusions and I've an issue with the very idea. I'm finding out that I'm in the minority on that.

The non translatability and lack of shared truth conditions would both directly result from different languages lacking a common referent. The concept/notion of corporation would be lacking in Sumerian. As already noted however...

If the Sumerian language is capable of talking about the elemental constituents that when combined qualify as a corporation, then I see no reason to deny the translatability of that sentence from English into Sumerian.

I would deny the interpretation of English into Sumerian, for there is no semantic equivalent of corporation. Connecting all the dots mentioned above would count as the translation, but in doing so it would add meaningful content to pre-existing Sumerian terms. That process would result in creating a notion of corporation in Sumerian language.

If the Sumerian language is capable of talking about the elemental constituents that when combined qualify as a corporation, then I see no reason to deny the translatability of that sentence from English into Sumerian. — creativesoul

That would just be a question of what counts as translation. Note that we haven't been talking about Davidson's article. We're talking about the importance of generalization in learning. Cause that's what I'm pondering these days. :)

If the Sumerian language is capable of talking about the elemental constituents that when combined qualify as a corporation, then I see no reason to deny the translatability of that sentence from English into Sumerian. — creativesoul

That would just be a question of what counts as translation. — frank

Knowledge of which is most certainly rightfully applicable to Davidson's article. Are you agreeing or disagreeing or uncertain?

Note that we haven't been talking about Davidson's article. We're talking about the importance of generalization in learning. Cause that's what I'm pondering these days.

Not I...

I've been setting out an acceptable method/standard by which to judge the quality of Davidson's article. I've been setting out what all translation is itself existentially dependent upon, at a bare minimum. I do not see how adding yet another abstract entity such as generalization helps us to simplify and clarify what needs to be simplified and clarified.

What does all successful translation require? What does the very act of successful translation consist of? What do all examples of translation share? Are these common denominators sufficient/adequate enough, in and of themselves, to result in a case of translation?

These are the kinds of questions I'm carefully considering here.

I'm also attempting to set out the relevance of some of things Davidson says... particularly the bit about common referents... and the claim of reconnecting to an unmediated world... or words to that affect/effect.

Knowledge of which is most certainly rightfully applicable to Davidson's article. Are you agreeing or disagreeing or uncertain? — creativesoul

Translation, meaning, and Tarski's truth predicate are in a fixed relationship for Davidson. We can venture off contemplating what counts as translation, but we won't be discussing the article.

I've been setting out an acceptable method/standard by which to judge the quality of Davidson's article. I've been setting out what all translation is itself existentially dependent upon, — creativesoul

It's like you're looking for a backdoor into the article through your own intuitions.

Earlier I suggested that Davidson needs Convention T to be an adequate means for translation... Banno seemed to agree.

What do you think?

Earlier I suggested that Davidson needs Convention T to be an adequate means for translation. — creativesoul

Tarski's truth predicate is part of an artificial scheme involving two languages: one that has a truth predicate and one that doesn't. How would you relate that to what we normally think of as translation?

Davidson talks of radical interpretation, not radical translation - That was Quine.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/davidson/#RadiInte

Earlier I suggested that Davidson needs Convention T to be an adequate means for translation.
— creativesoul

Tarski's truth predicate is part of an artificial scheme involving two languages: one that has a truth predicate and one that doesn't. How would you relate that to what we normally think of as translation? — frank

Artificial? I'm not sure what that's supposed to add here.

Just to make sure I understand, are you referring to the common language on the left and the meta-language on the right? Are those the two languages? If so, the meta language would have to be the one that does not have truth conditions, because the common one does.

Is that about right?

I've already rejected Convention T as a means for translation, and offered reasoning/argument in support of that rejection.

It's like you're looking for a backdoor into the article through your own intuitions. — frank

I am constantly applying and/or comparing/contrasting my own philosophical principles to everyday life... including when I'm attempting to understand some academic well respected philosopher or an other.

Intuition is overrated.

Thanks for that link Banno...

The basic problem that radical interpretation must address is that one cannot assign meanings to a speaker’s utterances without knowing what the speaker believes, while one cannot identify beliefs without knowing what the speaker’s utterances mean. It seems that we must provide both a theory of belief and a theory of meaning at one and the same time.

:smile:

Glad to know that I've been on the right track all along...

:wink:

...while one cannot identify beliefs without knowing what the speaker’s utterances mean.

But you have previously denied this - for example, you claim that dumb animals have beliefs.

This is a tough paper. Like many analytic papers of its time, it expects the reader to do a lot of the heavy lifting, and prefers to slyly imply that an argument has been made, and that the work has already been done somewhere else (where is a good question).

Interesting, but it's hard to put too much stock in it. (I get confused as to what exactly is being attacked or rejected in these high-level debates anyway).

Yeah. it makes you think.

We don't want none of that 'round 'ere.

There are more and less productive ways to make people think. I can't shake the feeling that a lot of analytic philosophy from this period didn't go anywhere, because nobody could ever figure out what the arguments were, or where they went. It is interesting, but often being interesting just isn't enough.

...while one cannot identify beliefs without knowing what the speaker’s utterances mean.

But you have previously denied this - for example, you claim that dumb animals have beliefs. — Banno

I've denied no such thing. You seem to think that I must on pains of coherency. I'm under no such obligation to the best of my knowledge.

Statements are utterances of thought and belief. Davidson's article is about the interpretation of statements/utterances(linguistically mediated/informed thought and belief).

Not all belief is existentially dependent upon language. All utterances thereof are.

So, surely you'll see here that I'm fine believing both. They are not mutually exclusive options. The quote at the top of this post is about utterances of belief. Dumb animals have beliefs. They do not have utterances thereof.

We cannot interpret a dumb animal's utterances(statements), for they have none.

From the SEP article

The basic problem that radical interpretation must address is that one cannot assign meanings to a speaker’s utterances without knowing what the speaker believes, while one cannot identify beliefs without knowing what the speaker’s utterances mean. It seems that we must provide both a theory of belief and a theory of meaning at one and the same time.

Guess what I've already done?

:grin:

The important point is that we have to help our Sumerian create the concept of a corporation for herself before we could expect her to understand usage of the word. IOW, because we can't rely on her own experience with incorporation, we'll have to rely heavily on her ability to generalize from what she does know. Her ability to generalize is something she shares with other animals. — frank

Yes. So... prior to performing such work... prior to helping the Sumerian connect all the dots by virtue of drawing all the correlations underlying our notion of incorporation, there is no meaningful equivalent notion in the Sumerian's language tool box. So, interpretation from English to Sumerian is impossible until there is a meaningfully equivalent notion in Sumerian. Translation is able to performed by first performing the practices roughly outlined heretofore.

Probably. :)

https://www.sciencealert.com/love-means-different-things-depending-on-your-language?fbclid=IwAR0yYcV8YZGW7axeIH6CKPDx00c_5nqMaiB89qd-nE-W5nTfIJopK6GBAbM

If you can identify a problem with translation, you apparently dont have a problem with translation. Is that the takeaway for you?

What's the difference between translation and interpretation? Is translation where a word or phrase in one language is globally replaced by a word or phrase in another, while interpretation takes an utterance and produces another utterance that has the same meaning?

Is translation where a word or phrase in one language is globally replaced by a word or phrase — Banno

"Translate the thought, not the words."

That rule holds for languages as closely related as English and Spanish. I imagine its even more true for distantly related ones.

If you translate words, you'll get gibberish. So you have to be looking at context to translate "Jim likes Susan" into Spanish. Is Jim fond of Susan? Or does he find her sexually attractive?

"Translate the thought, not the words." — frank

A side issue, perhaps, but that's a nonsense, isn't it? The thought just is the words, surely? I could go with "Translate the sentiment, not the words"; or taking meanign as use, "do the same thing, but in English".

Are you monolingual?

how do we learn our first language? Surely we don't translate back into some more primitive language through the T-sentence, or some formulation like that. Obviously we wouldn't do it explicitly, but we could claim implicitly that it's so -- but then we'd have to have some proto-language or something going on to allow that to be the case. — Moliere

No, we don't translate back into a more primitive language - a "mentalese". That would lead to a regress - a language in which to translate mentalese, and so on.

It's tempting to speak of there being only one language, since any language can be interpreted in another. But that's not right, either. It's not that there is only one interpretation of reality, so much as that there is no interpretation... Or rather, that interpretation is the wrong notion to use when looking at how the world links to words.

Interpretation works from words to words, not from words to world. The 'unmediated touch' between language and the world is not an interpretation.

Hence, learning a first language is not an act of interpretation.

I'd submit that there's a far simpler explanation -- that we learn the meaning of a language through using it. But if that be the case then the T-sentence provides a hopping-over point for learning some phrases within another language through the "...is true" predicate -- but there comes a time in learning another language that we simply know how to use said language. — Moliere

So, yes, we learn a language by using it.