I’m not ignoring the evidence - you only think I’m ignoring it, because I’m not giving it the same weight as you are. — Possibility

You're not even addressing it. Have I committed a fallacy? No. But by all means correct me on that and point one out.

Have I made a false assumption? No. I have assumed this: I have assumed that all reasonable people will agree that they have acquired the true theory of truth when it is clear to the reason of all of them that the theory in question is asserted by Reason. Is that assumption false? Well, you've said precisely nothing - nothing - to challenge it. You don't seem even to be aware of it. But it is true, is it not? I mean, what more could a reasonable person want before they will be assured of the truth of a thesis?

I have also assumed this: that if all reasonable people will be satisfied that they have acquired the true theory of truth when and only when it seems clear to them all that Reason asserts it to be true, then - other things being equal - it is reasonable to suppose that this is what truth itself consists of. That is, that truth itself is composed of Reason's assertions, given that this and this alone is what assures us we have it.

Have you said anything at all to challenge that assumption? No.

Now, if you consider that an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises does not constitute good - I mean, the best - evidence that a thesis is true, then what else do you consider relevant? I'm intrigued. Does it, perhaps, also have to be a theory that your gran approves of? Does it also have to be a theory that, when described to your cat, produces a meow? I mean, what the hell else carries weight, in your view?!

You have said precisely nothing in objection to that view — Bartricks

Another accounting malpractice...

You're attributing the capability of making assertions to that which does not have what it takes. You're assuming that Reason makes assertions. That is false, by definition. We make assertions. Language users make assertions. All assertions are made in language.

Reason is not the sort of thing that uses language as a means to make assertions.

We are.

Note: objecting to a view, or to the holder of it, does not an objection make. — Bartricks

More of the same meaningless incoherent nonsense.

Not very good at that are you? — creativesoul

Zip.

Assertions are made with language use. Reason is not the sort of thing capable of using language. Reason cannot make assertions. — creativesoul

Whiz.

Cakes are made with ovens. Cakes are not ovens, though.

I use language to make assertions. But language asserts nothing. I make the assertion, not the language.

Again, for the point is subtle and you're not a subtle thinker. I use language to make an assertion. But I - I - am the maker of the assertion, language asserts nothing.

I use my sight to see things. But my sight sees nothing. I see by using my sight. But my sight sees nothing.

I learn by reading books. But books learn nothing. And on and on.

Now, do up your flies, put the pieces back on the board and start recognising these things.

More of the same meaningless incoherent nonsense. — creativesoul

Whiz

It depends on what the quality is. — Bartricks

Not at all.

For example, take the quality of self-approval — Bartricks

Self-approval is not a quality. It is a noun. Adjectives describe quality.

To be reasonable essentially involves caring what Reason says and believing things precisely because she says to believe them (so, it matters not just what you believe, but how you believe it). As such someone who does not care that much about what Reason has to say on a given matter - someone who, for instance, will not believe something Reason says if it conflicts with something they care about more - is not as reasonable as someone who cares more about what Reason says. So it does follow and you're wrong. — Bartricks

You realize that this second quote by you is bad fantasy, gibberish, nonsense.

Aside from your non-sequitur nonsense, you should know that Reason is not a female person. It is not a person. The reason you use female gender for reason is that in German the word "Vernunft", which is the German word for reason, is of feminine gender. It is also capitalized in German, as all nouns are capitalized in German. You simply copied and pasted some passages from the English translation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" too many times, and it mesmerized you to believe that the proper use of reason in English is to capitalize it and use it as a feminine-gender noun.

You are precisely as ridiculous as the translators of the works of Immanuel Kant, who translate by the letter, literally. If you read the instructions in the immanual for translators of Immanuel, then you must realize that the text of Immanuel is gibberish etc etc etc

I use language to make assertions. I make the assertion, not the language. — Bartricks

Assertions require a language user, something to talk about, and assertions about that something.

Reason is not a language user. Reason does not have what it takes to make assertions.

Have I made a false assumption? No. I have assumed this: I have assumed that all reasonable people will agree that they have acquired the true theory of truth when it is clear to the reason of all of them that the theory in question is asserted by Reason. Is that assumption false? Well, you've said precisely nothing - nothing - to challenge it. You don't seem even to be aware of it. But it is true, is it not? I mean, what more could a reasonable person want before they will be assured of the truth of a thesis?

I have also assumed this: that if all reasonable people will be satisfied that they have acquired the true theory of truth when and only when it seems clear to them all that Reason asserts it to be true, then - other things being equal - it is reasonable to suppose that this is what truth itself consists of. That is, that truth itself is composed of Reason's assertions, given that this and this alone is what assures us we have it. — Bartricks

Well, if you really need me to reduce my level of reasoning to yours...how about we start with the ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy? There are a number of reasonable posters here who object (and have made reasonable objections) to your assumptions. Appealing to Reason as you see it is not the same as being reasonable. So are you the only one here who is being ‘truly’ reasonable?

It depends on what the quality is. — Bartricks
Not at all. — god must be atheist

Yes. It. Does. See earlier example.

Self-approval is not a quality. It is a noun. Adjectives describe quality. — god must be atheist

Irrelevant, but glad English course well going

You realize that this second quote by you is bad fantasy, gibberish, nonsense. — god must be atheist

Hmm. I spoke too soon.

Aside from your non-sequitur nonsense, you should know that Reason is not a female person. It is not a person. The reason you use female gender for reason is that in German the word "Vernunft", which is the German word for reason, is of feminine gender. It is also capitalized in German, as all nouns are capitalized in German. You simply copied and pasted some passages from the English translation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" too many times, and it mesmerized you to believe that the proper use of reason in English is to capitalize it and use it as a feminine-gender noun. — god must be atheist

Ah, well, you got me bang to rights there. Reason ist not eine lady, but ist eine pig-dog.

I validly concluded that Reason, being an asserter of things, must be a person, a person I refer to as 'she' because that's how she's been traditionally referred to (not just by Germans) and because calling her 'him' might make people identify her with the god of an extant religion.

But meh.

Well, if you really need me to reduce my level of reasoning to yours...how about we start with the ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy? There are a number of reasonable posters here who object (and have made reasonable objections) to your assumptions. Appealing to Reason as you see it is not the same as being reasonable. So are you the only one here who is being ‘truly’ reasonable? — Possibility

What is the 'no true Scotsman fallacy' and how have I committed it. Remember, I'm a dumbo so I not be understanding this stuff.

Explain.

There are a number of reasonable posters here who object (and have made reasonable objections) to your assumptions — Possibility

No, that's false. Name one. There hasn't been a single good objection yet. Not one. And I haven't encountered anyone reasonable who's objected to my view.

But do correct me. Identify a reasonable objector and then explain to me how their objection is reasonable - that is, how it either identifies a fallacy in my reasoning or raises a reasonable doubt about the truth of one of my assumptions.

I validly concluded that Reason, being an asserter of things, must be a person — Bartricks

All asserters of things are Reason... it would follow... not a person. All people who assert.

All asserters of things are Reason... it would follow... not a person. All people who assert. — creativesoul

Eh? What are you on about?

Pointing out the problem in that argument.

Reason, being an asserter of things, must be everyone who asserts.

It makes no sense to pick out an individual, which is what you've done on multiple occasions. Reason, being an asserter of things, need not be a single asserter. Rather Reason must be all that assert(everyone who asserts).

Well that's really no clearer.

Here is the relevant argument:

premise 1: Reason makes assertions
premise 2. Persons and only persons make assertions
Conclusion: therefore Reason is a person.

Now, which premise are you taking issue with?

Here is the relevant argument:

premise 1: Reason makes assertions
premise 2. Persons and only persons make assertions
Conclusion: therefore Reason is a person.

Now, which premise are you taking issue with? — Bartricks

Now we've gotten somewhere. The conclusion does not follow.



Therefore Reason is persons and only persons...

...that's what follows.

With me?

:brow:

No, premise 2 refers to individual persons, not groups of persons.

Groups of persons - not being persons themselves - cannot assert anything.

It is persons - individual persons - and those alone who can assert things.

The conclusion does follow. Reason has to be a person - not a group of persons.

Again, persons - not groups of persons, but persons - and persons alone assert things.

Reason, then, must be a person.

If you think groups of persons can assert things, that's because you've committed the fallacy of composition.

A group of persons is not itself a person, anymore than a group of sharks is a shark.

Here is the relevant argument:

premise 1: Reason makes assertions
premise 2. Persons and only persons make assertions
Conclusion: therefore Reason is a person.

Now, which premise are you taking issue with? — Bartricks

I've already adequately refuted the primary premiss.

I'm now granting it and focusing upon the invalid inference. After you grant that mistake, I'll continue along the path of showing you how a valid inference results in being a problem with your analysis of truth.

If you think groups of persons can assert things, that's because you've committed the fallacy of composition. — Bartricks

Rubbish. If groups cannot assert things there could be no groups asserting things. But there are, and they are everywhere asserting all sorts of things.

I've already adequately refuted the primary premiss. — creativesoul

No, premise 2 is true, you just don't understand what it means. It doesn't mean that groups of persons can assert things, only that persons - minds - and minds alone can assert things.

Now, that's true, not false.

And it entails that Reason is a person. Not 'a persons' - that's just bad grammar.

I've already adequately refuted the primary premiss.
— creativesoul

No, premise 2 is true, you just don't understand what it means — Bartricks

Irrelevant.

'm now granting it and focusing upon the invalid inference. After you grant that mistake, I'll continue along the path of showing you how a valid inference results in being a problem with your analysis of truth. — creativesoul

The argument is valid, the problem is that English is not your first language and so you have not realized that "persons and only persons" refers not to groups, but individual persons.

No, relevant. It means the premise is true. Or do you think something other than a person can assert something? If so what?

No, relevant. It means the premise is true. — Bartricks

The first one is not. You're talking about something other than the first one. Thus...

Irrelevant.

I've refuted the first. Whether or not the second is true is irrelevant. The argument is refuted.

Where is your refutation of premise 1?

Lay it out. A valid argument with the negation of premise 1 as its conclusion please.

So, we will be happy we have the true theory of truth when our question "what is truth?" is answered with proposition whose representative contents seems to all rational reflectors to be something Reason is asserting to be the case.

If that's true - and I don't see how a reasonable person could deny it - then that itself should be what we consider truth to be. That is, truth is the property of being a proposition that Reason asserts to be the case. When Reason asserts that something is the case, it is the case. Her asserting it, and its being true are one and the same. — Bartricks

Isn't that like saying that the solution to world peace is what Reason asserts it is?

Also capitalized Reason is poetic, but what does it refer to? Our everyday reasoning? A God's-eye view?

it entails that Reason is a person. Not 'a persons' - that's just bad grammar. — Bartricks

The rules of entailment allow the truth conditions of a belief to change. That's just bad logic.

Here is the relevant argument:

premise 1: Reason makes assertions
premise 2. Persons and only persons make assertions
Conclusion: therefore Reason is a person.

Now, which premise are you taking issue with? — Bartricks

The conclusion does not follow.



Therefore Reason is persons and only persons...

...that's what follows.

Also capitalized Reason is poetic, but what does it refer to? Our everyday reasoning? A God's-eye view? — Andrew M

No, Reason would have to be a person - a mind - because Reason asserts things (and values things, and prescribes things) and minds and only minds can assert things (and value things, and prescribe things). So Reason, capital R, is a person (and we learn this by reasoning - that is, by consulting our reason - the faculty that gives us insight into what Reason prescribes, asserts, values and so on).

Isn't that like saying that the solution to world peace is what Reason asserts it is? — Andrew M

What could the solution to world peace be if not whatever Reason asserts it to be? I mean, when we try and figure out what the solution to world violence is, what are we doing? Consulting our reason, surely? We are consulting our reason and trying to discern the answer, because at some level we recognise that we will only be satisfied we have the true answer to any question when we are sure that Reason asserts it to be true.

Note too that an analysis of truth is not going to give you the answer to substantial questions about what's true. For an analogy, figuring out what water is - that is, what it is made of - does not amount to knowing where there is water. If there are two people in a desert, one of whom is aware that water is made of tiny molecules whereas the other believes (incorrectly, of course) that water is a basic substance that is made of nothing more basic than itself, the one with the correct view is not necessarily in any better position to know where there is any. Likewise, someone who realizes that truth is made of Reason's assertions is not necessarily in any better position to know the solution to world violence than someone who believes (incorrectly) that truth and the property of 'being useful to believe' are one and the same.