Not because I know any better but because perfectly intelligent people possessed of all the same facts nonetheless disagree. — Isaac

Right. Take "The snow is white", for example. So we can all agree it's true in one sense when looking at a patch of white snow. But then turn it into a debate between a color realist and a scientific one, and there's no longer agreement. The statement is no longer trivially true, because we move beyond an agreement on how snow appears to human eyes to one over what properties snow actually has.

And here it seems that the intent of the speaker matters. — Marchesk

Yes, that's exactly what I'm trying to say. The proposition "The sun is settling" is true if the sun is setting. It's entirely linguistic and to say "it is true that the sun is setting" is prosentential (not that that makes it useless, we could still say "that last statement was true" and the term serves some purpose). But...

To ask if John's belief that the sun is setting is true... That requires that we consider the success of John's actions in respect to that belief.

My own personal disagreement is laid out way back on page 5, but I still don't know if it's flawed, or misunderstands Davidson completely because, as I said, I'm no expert myself. — Isaac

My own objections - that without a some way to verify access to the "content" portion of the scheme-content dyad there's no basis for claiming the absence of a conceptual scheme - haven't been addressed either. Davidson claims to have "reestablished unmediated touch with objects." I don't see any basis for this claim.

Davidson claims to have "reestablished unmediated touch with objects." I don't see any basis for this claim. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That sure would make deflation easier.

My own objections - that without a some way to verify access to the "content" portion of the scheme-content dyad there's no basis for claiming the absence of a conceptual scheme - haven't been addressed either. — ZzzoneiroCosm

The claim that there are no conceptual schemes would have to come from a transcendent vantage point. That would also represent the beginnings of a philosophical project of the sort that's anathema to analytical philosophy.

Davidson claims to have "reestablished unmediated touch with objects." I don't see any basis for this claim. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Davidson didn't reestablish anything. He just pointed out a flaw in the idea of conceptual schemes. Although for reasons Harry pointed out, the very idea of conceptual schemes is still useful, if problematic in some respects.

Davidson didn't reestablish anything. He just pointed out a flaw in the idea of conceptual schemes — frank

I'm curious about this because the quote is taken directly from the closing paragraph: "reestablished unmediated touch with... objects.."

So he's opened the doors of his time machine and invited us to return to the way things were before Descartes speculated that nerves are like strings that the world plucks (which is an amazingly good guess, actually).

To travel this distance, we have to get super deflationary about truth, meaning, reference, concepts, etc. And then yes, we find ourselves back where it all began.

The world is too much with us; late and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers;
Little we see in Nature that is ours;
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon:
This Sea that bares her bosom to the moon,
The winds that will be howling at all hours
And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers,
For this, for everything, we are out of tune;
It moves us not. -- Great God! I'd rather be
A Pagan suckled in a creed out-worn;
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn.

--Wordsworth, quoted by Nietzsche at the beginning of On Truth and LIes in a Nonmoral sense

My own objections - that without a some way to verify access to the "content" portion of the scheme-content dyad there's no basis for claiming the absence of a conceptual scheme - haven't been addressed either. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Some approaches here are more exegetical than discursive. They can still be quite interesting but, often not being clearly labelled as such, one can often expend a bit of time and effort finding out which it is. Your objection seems not far from mine - that Davidson has merely assumed a commensurability of experience.

Everyone seems to be conflating commensurability with translatability as if the two were equal.

'Sun setting' talk may well be translatable to 'earth rotation' talk, and 'prevailing wind talk' may well be translatable to 'coriolis force' talk, but in one conceptual scheme the two are linked. How do you translate that link without simply changing beliefs? — Isaac

Suppose we have two conceptual schemes, such that some things are accounted true in one, but not in the other - the idea being that what is to count as true depends on what scheme one is using.

And yet already we have translation - because we have talked about the very same thing being true in one, but not in the other...

What could the claim that two conceptual schemes are incommensurable amount to, if not that there are things that can be true in one, but not in the other? What sort of things are true, if not statements?

What could the claim that two conceptual schemes are incommensurable amount to, if not that there are things that can be said in one, but not in the other?

The claim that there are no conceptual schemes would have to come from a transcendent vantage point. — frank

Davidson claims to have "reestablished unmediated touch with objects." I don't see any basis for this claim. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Fucksake. As if the article, and this thread, didn't happen. I'm nonplussed. At least for now.

Suppose we have two conceptual schemes, such that some things are accounted true in one, but not in the other - the idea being that what is to count as true depends on what scheme one is using. — Banno

I'll see where this goes, but want to get in here that I don't see something being 'true' in one scheme but not 'true' in another as necessarily the distinction between schemes that I would personally make. Notwithstanding...

And yet already we have translation - because we have talked about the very same thing being true in one, but not in the other... — Banno

Yes, we have translated the objects of one to the objects of another. Have we translated their relations?

What could the claim that two conceptual schemes are incommensurable amount to, if not that there are things that can be true in one, but not in the other? What sort of things are true, if not statements? — Banno

As Ramsey argues, beliefs can be considered 'true' too. One can say another's belief that the pub is at the end of the road is 'true' if, when wishing to visit the pub, and walking to the end of the road, one finds there what services as a pub. A belief can be true if it functions.

What could the claim that two conceptual schemes are incommensurable amount to, if not that there are things that can be said in one, but not in the other? — Banno

That there are beliefs which function in one which would not function in another.

That there are relations in one which do not exist in another.

That some behaviour resultant from one cannot be produced by any stimuli through another.

As if the article, and this thread, didn't happen. I'm nonplussed. At least for now. — Banno

The exegesis was interesting and I understand the translatability and T-sentence bit. But the question of the possibility of a single, or no, scheme isn't something you or Davidson have spent time on.

Also you said it's a joke but you didn't expand.

And you didn't address my objection directly.

As if the article, and this thread, didn't happen. I'm nonplussed. At least for now. — Banno

You suggested it could be a play on "basis" but you didn't expand. Interested to hear a direct response to my objection.

As if the article, and this thread, didn't happen. I'm nonplussed. At least for now. — Banno

If your response to my objection is something like: All that business deflates to T-sentences and T-sentences are all we have and all we should want... then I understand your position and your nonplussedness...

he's opened the doors of his time machine and invited us to return to the way things were before Descartes speculated that nerves are like strings that the world plucks (which is an amazingly good guess, actually).

To travel this distance, we have to get super deflationary about truth, meaning, reference, concepts, etc. And then yes, we find ourselves back where it all began — frank

I get the deflation thing. It's almost a kind of anti-philosophy.

I get the deflation thing. It's almost a kind of anti-philosophy. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Banno stated in this thread he's convinced philosophy is bunk, so the goal would be to deflate/dissolve philosophical discourse.

Banno stated in this thread he's convinced philosophy is bunk, so the goal would be to deflate/dissolve philosophical discourse. — Marchesk

It takes a lot of philosophical discourse to dissolve philosophical discourse. Reminds me of Samuel Beckett's wordy obsession with going silent.

I get the deflation thing. It's almost a kind of anti-philosophy. — ZzzoneiroCosm

It appears that truth is a concept too basic to analyze. We just know what it is.

Some people see the T-sentence as saying that the truth predicate is redundant. Just assert your proposition and we know you're telling us it's true. So it's just an aspect of human behavior.

There are other views.

As if the article, and this thread, didn't happen. I'm nonplussed. — Banno

Really? Sounds a little naive. Since when has one article and a few laconic remarks ever acted as some philosophical fait accompli?

It takes a lot of philosophical discourse to dissolve philosophical discourse. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yeah, I don't know. An interesting question that comes to mind is to ask whether it's true that philosophy is bunk, and how we would know that to be case.

Maybe i'm just biased toward wanting to think philosophical problems are legitimate.

Yeah, I don't know. An interesting question that comes to mind is to ask whether it's true that philosophy is bunk, and how we would know that to be case. — Marchesk

I don't expect big answers from philosophy. (I used to.) Just interesting tidbits and brain-aerobics. The word "a-telical" comes to mind. Not to diminish its value: Philosophy, in its capacity to create psychological potence, is as valuable as psychological potence.

I don't expect big answers from philosophy. (I — ZzzoneiroCosm

i don't expect answers, but I do expect big questions.

An interesting question that comes to mind is to ask whether it's true that philosophy is bunk, and how we would know that to be case. — Marchesk

Yeah, that's an interesting one.

1)?
2)?
3) Therefore, philosophy is bunk.

Using philosophy to prove philosophy is bunk proves philosophy isn't bunk.

bunk — Marchesk

Just to be precise: What Banno said to me was: Philosophy amounts to nothing.

Using philosophy to prove philosophy is bunk proves philosophy isn't bunk. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Its philosophical bunk all the way down.

Just to be precise: What Banno said to me was: Philosophy amounts to nothing. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Right, I take it by that he means there's nothing meaningful to philosophy that can't be addressed by either science or ordinary language use, with the possible exception of ethics, and maybe aesthetics, but here I'm reaching.

And I don't know whether that's true or not. But I want it not to be. It offends my need to scratch the itch.

So I set out to try and do as you did and summarize the argument Davidson is making into as brief a post as possible. Just to make sure I'm tracking.

He opens with some examples of the phenomena under consideration, and accepts the doctrine that languages differ -- ala Whorf -- with conceptual schemes, or having a conceptual scheme is the same as having a language with the exception that speakers of different languages could share a conceptual scheme provided we are able to translate from one language to another.

He briefly rejects mental phenomena sans language to get underway with what he's interested in focusing on -- translation between conceptual schemes. He also briefly denies the possibility that a person could shed their point-of-view in order to compare conceptual schemes. Kind of interesting there. In short these aren't argued for as much as they are setting out the landscape of interest for Davidson, with particular names that he's targetting: Kuhn, Quine, Whorf, and Bergson being the named culprits at this point.

Then the part where he begins to talk of total failure of translation and in reading closely felt like this was a doozy of a sentence.

: nothing, it may be said, could
count as evidence that some form of activity could not be interpreted in our language that was not at the same time evidence
that that form of activity was not speech behavior.

Philosophers, if nothing else, are demons of theses.

Attempting a bit of an untangle:

In indicating (through evidence) an activity is interpretable into English we also indicate, every time, that this same activity is speech behavior.

What a tongue twister! But what Davidson says is he does not wish to take this line, though he believes it to be true, but wants an argument for it.

In effect it seems that Davidson is trying to find a way of identifying what counts as a language at all, and does not want to simply assert that translation into English is the criterion of language-hood because he thinks that simply asserting it somehow compromises his argument, or at least is unsatisfactory as fiat and needs an argument.

The next paragraph reads like a digression to me where he talks about the closeness of translatability to being able to understand another person's beliefs, like a person who believes that perseverance keeps honor bright -- up to a point that there cannot be doubt, so Davidson says, that translating someone else's language is a very close relation to attributing complex attitudes like this to someone else. But he admits this is just to improve the plausiblity of the position he wants to argue for first rather than just take as true, and that he needs to specify more closely what this relationship is before making a case against untranslatable languages.

So he takes on a counter-argument to the notion that translatability cannot count as a criteria of languagehood -- that language translation is not transitive, at least in a hypothetical telephone-game sort of way. He states this is not a good argument because we would be unable to tell if the Saturnian was translating Plutonian when we ourselves could not translate Plutonian (harks back to the part of the essay where Davidson says we cannot relieve ourselves of our point of view) -- that we need not even have a chain of hypothetical languages, but rather that the problem is introduces in the very first case where there is not a transitive relation between two languages. If we speak English, and Whorf speaks German, and the Hopi speak Hopi, then how are we to know that Whorf is translating Hopi into German when we only speak English? How is it that Whorf is able to speak all three and we are not?


And then the gear change.


I have to say, up to this point I've sort of wondered what all this is for really. It's a bit messy and all over the place upon a closer reading. But there has been some term-setting, some brief mentions of different approaches that Davidson thinks problematic but not being focused on at this time, and some clarification of his own intentions.

I think we can summarize by saying that there are some adherents to conceptual schemes that Davidson wants to address, that he wants to address these adherents through the lens of translation and intertranslatability of languages, and that this naturally raises to the question of what counts as a language at all, and why translation should be seen as important for a criteria of language-hood in spite of arguments otherwise.


I think I'll save the gear change for my next post. But tell me if you think I'm totally off please.

...talk about the truth of beliefs (as opposed to the truth of statements) cannot be encompassed in prosentential theories, which is why I don't think Davidson does away with conceptual schemes simply by declaring them necessarily translatable...but that argument seems to be falling on deaf ears, so I suspect perhaps I'm wasting my time... — Isaac

Depends upon who you talk to about it. I see I'm not the only one who agrees with you here. :wink:

I also do not think that Davidson is doing away with conceptual schemes. Rather, it seems he's rejecting the idea that two schemes talking about the same world are not translatable one to another.

Philosophy isnt bunk. Philosophy is a science. The conclusions reached in one domain of investigation shouldn't contradict those in another.

A new culprit emerges in the next paragraph -- Strawson. This by way of introducing two different sorts of conceptual schemes, the contrast point being Kuhn, so Davidson may focus on Kuhn's conceptual schemes.


The difference, as Davidson sees it, is in the kind of dualism proposed by the conceptual scheme. Strawson's is one between concept and content within language, where some statements are true by virtue of their meanings, and some are true because of the way of the world -- and that the synthetic statements are the one's of interest in talking about possible worlds, ala Strawson's take that we are imagining possibilities.

Kuhn's is one between language and uninterpretted content -- and is an approach that Davidson describes as giving up the analytic/synthetic distinction which Strawson's relies upon. And he lays out how an adherent to Kuhn might attack Strawson in order to introduce a way of telling when a new conceptual scheme comes about -- or for generating new conceptual schemes.

We get a new out of an old scheme when the speakers of a language come to accept as true an important range of sentences they previously took to be false (and, of course, vice versa) . . . A change has come over the meaning of the sentence because it now belongs to a new language.

Which is Davidson's parsing of Feyerabend's argument against meaning-invariance, the attack against what Davidson characterizes as Strawson's conceptual scheme.

What we get in the argument for the ministry echoes the argument against transitivity. How would we know that our New Man spoke with the new words of materialism but did not speak with the old meanings of mental furniture? We wouldn't. Speaking some words does not give us evidence of this cleaning up, of coming to a new conceptual scheme from our point of view as ministers -- again restating a theme about how we cannot come to some position outside our own in judging what others mean. So this other approach does not provide us with a means for determining a difference in conceptual schemes, either, though it does give up the analytic/synthetic divide.

This bit is weird to me:

So what sounded at first like a thrilling discovery - that
truth is relative to a conceptual scheme - has not so far been
shown to be anything more than the pedestrian and familiar fact
that the truth of a sentence is relative to (among other things) the
language to which it belongs. Instead of living in different worlds,
Kuhn's scientists may, like those who need Webster's dictionary,
be only words apart.

But, at the level of essay at least, it at least explains what Davidson believes and provides a bridge to his next point: introducing the third dogma of empiricism, the dualism between conceptual scheme and empirical content.

And here, I think, we can say Davidson changes gears again.

In summary what Davidson was doing here is quoting some of the culprits of conceptual schemes, and leading them down his line of thinking for why it is they are not adequate to the task of delineating conceptual schemes one from another. And the conclusion to this bit is that in the background there is a third dogma of empiricism, which he wishes to demonstrate as having the dual properties where it must either be intelligible or defensible, but cannot be both of these at once -- and so should be rejected.



So we move onto characterizing this dualism of scheme-content. In the next post. Might call it a night here? Starting to get tired.

Well done.

:clap: