But if there isn't one, and there aren't more than one... the only thing left is none.

It's good to see some serious treatment of an interesting argument going on. thanks, @fdrake, for your summary.

Davidson asserts the absence of a "coordinate system" through which to compare old and new conceptual schemes. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes; this is what those who take conceptual schemes to be incommensurable must be asserting.

But if there isn't one, and there aren't more than one... the only thing left is none. — Banno

Davidson doesn't make the claim that "there isn't one". He says there's no basis (no scheme-content distinction to provide the basis) for making the claim that conceptual schemes exist.

Without a content-identification to refer to there's also no basis for making the claim that there are no conceptual schemes.

There's no basis for making any claim at all.

Davidson makes an unwarranted knowledge-claim, no doubt aligned with his dogmas and presuppositions:

There is no basis for claiming the existence of one X.
There is no basis for claiming the existence of many X.
Therefore I know there are no X.

Check the logic.

Possibly, it should read.

There is no basis for claiming the existence of one X.
There is no basis for claiming the existence of many X.
Therefore, there may be no X.

It's significant that Davidson spends very little time on the possibility of the existence of one conceptual scheme. There is as much of a basis to claim one conceptual scheme as there is to claim no conceptual scheme.

Our experience with dealing with folks around here (from solipsists to direct realists) suggests there may indeed be a variety of conceptual schemes, though we have no scheme-content distinction to assist us in making that claim.

Yes; this is what those who take conceptual schemes to be incommensurable must be asserting. — Banno

Pragmatically perhaps, but not theoretically, which is what Davidson is claiming. You're presuming there's only the possibility of a binary distinction between scheme and content (so if schemes ever are shown to be incommensurable, they must have a commensurable content of one and only one sort).

But this need not be the case. If we were to conceive (as I tried to convey earlier) of reality->perception->schema, then we have a co-ordination system 'reality' which nonetheless is not necessarily the content from which schema are built (perception), yet is linked to it.

But this need not be the case. If we were to conceive (as I tried to convey earlier) of reality->perception->schema, then we have a co-ordination system 'reality' which nonetheless is not necessarily the content from which schema are built (perception), yet is linked to it. — Isaac

Doesn't a conceptual scheme dictate what we call "real"?

If you're talking about a "higher reality" that is beyond conceptual scheme, it looks like you'll have our perceptual apparatus directed at something we can't know or talk about. Is that what you mean?

Doesn't a conceptual scheme dictate what we call "real"? — frank

It does, but what we call real and the concept that there might be hidden states of affairs are two slightly different things. One is the actual content, the other merely the acceptance that there is some content.

Nothing, however, no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, not surface irritations, not the world, can make a sentence true. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Davidson was a meaning holist. He saw the root of meaning in usage throughout a language community.

It makes sense if you consider that you don't control the meaning of the sentences you speak.

It does, but what we call real and the concept that there might be hidden states of affairs are two slightly different things. — Isaac

So you're saying our perceptual apparatus is directed at hidden states? Maybe. If I'm looking at the duck rabbit, I may be aware of the lines that make it up, but my senses lock into the rabbit as soon as I see it.

I think in general, we see what's meaningful to us. Think about music that is meaningless. It's hard to lock on to hearing it.

So you're saying our perceptual apparatus is directed at hidden states? Maybe. If I'm looking at the duck rabbit, I may be aware of the lines that make it up, but my senses lock into the rabbit as soon as I see it. — frank

Yes, that's how I see it. I cited a paper earlier in the thread all about it. Ideas about perception and models of reality based on inference from it seem to be cropping up in a number of related threads at the moment. If you're interested, I strongly recommend the paper.

Yes, that's how I see it. I cited a paper earlier in the thread all about it. Ideas about perception and models of reality based on inference from it seem to be cropping up in a number of related threads at the moment. If you're interested, I strongly recommend the paper. — Isaac

My interests have veered off into nihilism lately, which is a long way from Davidson. Just a last question: if there are differing conceptual schemes, would translatability be necessary?

if there are differing conceptual schemes, would translatability be necessary? — frank

Davidson's point is that we couldn't possibly know they were different without some kind of translatability. To have "a sees p as x, whereas b sees p as y", we must have a 'p' for those two views to be about in order for us to see they are incommensurable, not just different aspects of one coherent theory.

Davidson thinks this means they must be translatable and so not really different according to his dissolution of the model/content distinction (his third dogma), but as I said earlier, that only applies to practice not theory. If 'p' were a hidden state, we could presume there were different models of perception, incommensurable in practice due to the lack of 'accessible' coordinating factor, but nonetheless definitely different by reference to the hidden state 'p'.

This certainly seems to tie in better with modern neuroscience than there being no models at all.

Davidson's point is that we couldn't possibly know they were different without some kind of translatability. — Isaac

I thought it was: if there are different schemes, the very idea of different schemes implies translatability.

if there are different schemes, the very idea of different schemes implies translatability. — frank

Yes, that's his conclusion, but his route there is via what he considers the relativist would have to say about the different schemes by reference to their content. That not making any sense is what leads him to reject the notion of different schemes. What he missed, however, is reference to hidden states, which makes a distinction between differences one can actually talk about (via a coordinating factor - perception) and differences one cannot talk about (not having access to the hidden states) but can nonetheless quite coherently speculate exists.

Yes, that's his conclusion, but his route there is via what he considers the relativist would have to say about the different schemes by reference to their content. — Isaac

I think he was just analyzing the concept of a conceptual scheme. If you accept schemes, you have to accept translatability.

What he missed, however, is reference to hidden states, — Isaac

Transcendentalism? Are you a neo-Kantian?

Hidden states just refers to the fact that we don't have direct access to the causes of our sensations, they are caused by some hidden states of the world, which we can only infer using models. We meta-model things this way because our perceptions seem inconsistent (both intersubjectively, and temporally) in a manner difficult to explain by variations in points of reference.

Garden variety indirect realist, then.

Garden variety indirect realist, then. — frank

Basically, yes.

Garden variety indirect realist, then.
— frank

Basically, yes. — Isaac

Indirect realism has been pretty popular since optics and lenses were the big thing. I think Davidson had probably heard of it. :cool:

Another weakness in Davidson's argument:

"Given the underlying methodology of interpretation, we could not be in a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different from our own."

A clearer statement of the above might be:

"We are not in a position to judge by way of our underlying methodology of interpretation that others have concepts or beliefs radically different from our own."

Fair enough. But since others consistently claim to hold beliefs (radically?) different from our own, what are we to make of their claims? It would be ipsocentric to suggest our own beliefs are the standard by which the existence of other beliefs are to be analyzed or granted existential status.



Also, as a footnote: Why are we suddenly talking about concepts and beliefs? I'll have to take a look at home after work, but it seems that the bulk of Davidson's argument is centered on concepts without making much of a fuss about beliefs.

You are talking about models of perception, yes? The notion that an organism builds an internal image of what is around it, in order to better choose pathways and so on?

This looks promising...

But not right now.

Hm. I've seen more convincing arguments... Is this any more than a play on "basis"?

Doesn't a conceptual scheme dictate what we call "real"? — frank

That's the presumption.... yes.

It does, but what we call real and the concept that there might be hidden states of affairs are two slightly different things. One is the actual content, the other merely the acceptance that there is some content. — Isaac

Mystical, hidden stuff... how do we talk about that?

Yep.

if there are different schemes, the very idea of different schemes implies translatability. — frank

:up:

Hm. I've seen more convincing arguments... Is this any more than a play on "basis"? — Banno

Not sure. Spell it out.

Maybe tomorrow.

Anytime is fine.