:up:

But when I say it, they are "doing bad philosophy" and "talking nonsense".

Profundity lays here.

Worthwhile insofar as we can ascertain and crystallize and circumscribe a set of persons in cahoots. A precarious agreement contingent on some notion of "a reasonable person" and possibly a surreptitious notion of the sane. Watch for: 1) Exclusivity of outliers deemed not reasonable (those "doing bad philosophy"; those "talking nonsense"). 2) In-group and out-group exclusivity to ensure the world-as understood-by-us retains primacy in experimental-to-farflung discourse. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That which is common to all views. <-------That's what I'm fostering. None of the proposed attitudes above are inevitable as a result of pursuing such a notion, so...

This is the first real criticism of my approach that we've had here - so thanks.

There's a point to the notion of the view from nowhere that doesn't gain purchase within the analysis in which I indulge. Existentialism is seen as better at bringing this out. But I'm not so sure.

The silence at the end of this analysis is quite on philosophical issues, but not on what is to be done. It's not "shut up and do nothing", but "shut up and get on with it".

I think Rogerian agreements are the most fruitful.

I'm told it is a Celtic characteristic.

The silence at the end of this analysis is quite on philosophical issues, but not on what is to be done. It's not "shut up and do nothing", but "shut up and get on with it". — Banno

Is there a benefit to doing that?

Do you think that all words gain their meaning form the thing they refer to? Is that where we disagree? — Banno

I dont know where we agree or disagree because you won't answer my questions.

Yep. I'm going to plant some peas.

I dont know where we agree or disagree because you won't answer my questions. — Harry Hindu

And I can't answer your questions because I can't see what you are asking. Hence, our conversations remain unproductive, and a bit frustrating.

The thing you might consider is, I'm apparently not the only one who has this problem with your posts.

Go back to this:

So there's no distinction between "I feel like I need to vomit" and "I'm vomitting"? — Harry Hindu

Now to me you might as well have asked me what colour my car is. Your question has nothing to do with what we were talking about.

But in the interests of furthering the discussion, here's a direct answer: Of course there is a distinction between "I feel like I need to vomit" and "I'm vomitting".

Now, show me what this implies.

Plant peas. After journeying through your body, they'll just end up back in the dirt where they started.

I'm not suggesting that it's a categorical imperative.

That's the point.

*shh*

I dont understand. What's the point?

Meaningless! Meaningless!”
says the Teacher.
“Utterly meaningless!
Everything is meaningless.”

3 What do people gain from all their labors
at which they toil under the sun?
4 Generations come and generations go,
but the earth remains forever.
5 The sun rises and the sun sets,
and hurries back to where it rises.
6 The wind blows to the south
and turns to the north;
round and round it goes,
ever returning on its course.
7 All streams flow into the sea,
yet the sea is never full.
To the place the streams come from,
there they return again.
8 All things are wearisome,
more than one can say.
The eye never has enough of seeing,
nor the ear its fill of hearing.
9 What has been will be again,
what has been done will be done again;
there is nothing new under the sun.
10 Is there anything of which one can say,
“Look! This is something new”?
It was here already, long ago;
it was here before our time.
11 No one remembers the former generations,
and even those yet to come
will not be remembered
by those who follow them.

--Ecclesiastes 1:2-11. NIV

When someone makes a claim, are they making a claim that only applies to them, or applies to everyone, or what? In other words, are they referring to some characteristic of reality that is true, accurate, or that their words symbolize the true nature of reality, whether there is an observer or not, or whether someone believes it or not? If not, then why say anything? What would be the purpose? If the only purpose is to make sounds with our mouths, or scribbles on a screen, then is not that a true characteristic of reality - that the only purpose for using words is to make sounds and scribbles? Is that not a truth regardless whether anyone reads it or believes it?

Take this for instance:

The "view from nowhere" underscores an essential realism at the core of (reasonable or sane (as understood by the in-group)) human interaction. It's an antidote to armchair fables. But armchair fables are fun and fascinating and have a deeper purpose than the (generally fruitless and divisive) quest for Truth: obliteration of psychic boundaries and a suspension of dogmatic endstops. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Does the view from nowhere really underscore an essential realism at the core of human interaction? Is it really a fact that armchair fables are fun and fascinating and have a deeper purpose than the quest for Truth? Is what is being said here hold true for everyone whether they read this post or not, or whether a reader believes it or not? If not, then what is the point in saying it?

Is the above quote an armchair fable or a truth that is the case for everyone? If it is only applicable to some then, why? What makes a statement about some state-of-affairs applicable, or useful, to some but not others, and isnt that just another state-of-affairs that can be talked about and is the case whether everyone believes it or not?

But in the interests of furthering the discussion, here's a direct answer: Of course there is a distinction between "I feel like I need to vomit" and "I'm vomitting".

Now, show me what this implies — Banno

Are you saying the distinction lies in the pattern of scribbles, or what the scribbles symbolize - like the actual state-of-affairs of there being a feeling of needing to vomit, and the actual state-of-affairs of vomitting?

I don't see how volition makes sense without belief. How can you will some act unless something is taken o be the case? How does one will oneself to get a glass of water unless there are glasses and water that one believes in? — Banno

If words are used, then volition must be involved.

It seems to me that it requires volition to have a belief. Beliefs are constructed from observations.

Yes, Shh.

That which is common to all views. <-------That's what I'm fostering. None of the proposed attitudes above are inevitable as a result of pursuing such a notion, so... — creativesoul

Positing a "view from everywhere" is an act of circumscription and exclusion: that which is thought of as unreasonable or insane must be excluded. Always: the-view-from-everywhere-minus-X. I think of the brilliant schizophrenics peopling Louis A. Sass's Madness and Modernism. The far-flung world-structures described by these schizophrenics would have to be excluded. At the same time there may be elucidation of profound mystery in the insights of these madmen. I imagine the terror of a schizophrenic confronting a map fashioned by a stranger; or vis-a-vis the prospect of a physician snipping his appendix. I mention this as a limit case. But there will be more minor and possibly unnoticed circumscriptions and exclusions in classifying human notions and interactions as within or not within a "view from everywhere." That which is considered unreasonable would have to be excluded: for example, eating the flesh and drinking the blood of christ. Consuming christ-blood and -flesh may well be central to the world-structures I inhabit, but it would be considered an unreasonable notion and centerpiece by an atheist logician, and excluded. Which says nothing at all about the real but says a good deal about the in-group.

So, always: the-view-from-everywhere-minus-X: X signifying that which is thought of as unreasonable or insane.

If not, then what is the point in saying it? — Harry Hindu

I say what I say because it gives me pleasure to exercise my mind and imagination and interact with smart strangers. Why do you say what you say?

What to do with you, Harry.

You do not inspre me to put in the effort needed to reply to you. Take:

When someone makes a claim, are they making a claim that only applies to them, or applies to everyone, or what? In other words, are they referring to some characteristic of reality that is true, accurate, or that their words symbolize the true nature of reality, whether there is an observer or not, or whether someone believes it or not? If not, then why say anything? What would be the purpose? If the only purpose is to make sounds with our mouths, or scribbles on a screen, then is not that a true characteristic of reality - that the only purpose for using words is to make sounds and scribbles? Is that not a truth regardless whether anyone reads it or believes it? — Harry Hindu

They might be making the claim so it only applies to them, or so it applies to everyone, or something in between; they might be referring to reality, and yet also have their words symbolise reality; they might be the observer, they might not...

and so on.

You just have not said anything.

there is nothing new under the sun...
No one remembers the former generations,
and even those yet to come
will not be remembered
by those who follow them. — frank

It's a peaceful thing to be named among the unremembered. It gives me peace to think of it and I think of it often. The peace of world-decay.



Of course it's false to say the generations are unremembered but it will possibly be true post-supernova or post-crunch.


As to the nothing-new: I'm not sure what sun you're looking under. Not my sun.

But when I say it, they are "doing bad philosophy" and "talking nonsense". — Banno

That's a fact if I ever smelt one.

What to do with you, Harry. — Banno

Answer my questions. I'm not asking for much really.

You do not inspre me to put in the effort needed to reply to you. Take: — Banno

But you skipped over the actual posts specific to your replies to take on a post that was asked in general of everyone. If that post was uninteresting to you, ignore it and address the others. I was simply trying to point out how we seem to take for granted how we use language to refer to reality in a way that we expect others to agree with us - as if they have the same view and that the same conclusions about reality can be reached independently without collaboration between ourselves. Take the theory of natural selection. It was reached independently by two different people - Darwin and Wallace came to the same conclusions independently by making similar observations.

I say what I say because it gives me pleasure to exercise my mind and imagination and interact with smart strangers. Why do you say what you say? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Is it the language use that exercises your mind, or the things you think about before you start typing that exercises your mind?

On a philosophy forum, I typically say things to try and get logical responses or criticisms to fine tune my understanding of reality.

Answer my questions. — Harry Hindu

No. I am under no obligation to you.

Yeah, I wasn't talking about 'define' in terms of language. But anything less than a very superficial reading of what I wrote would reveal that, so I'm not sure it's worth my time pursuing this.

Briefly then, I'm using the word define as in to categorise. A and B in the example do not 'see' @, they 'see' every photon of light that makes it onto their retina from the scene. To see @ requires that they have a prior view as to what might be @ and what might be 'not@'. Their occiptial cortex then receives signals with prior filters applied by the vorbis based on their expectation of what @ looks like. Information wildly opposing that expectation is not given high focus, sometime completely ignored (there's been some delightful experiments on this where people have ignores such things as changes of colour, shape, even large object appearing and disappearing, simply because the scene is set up to create a strong expectation). So I'm just pointing out that what A and B are exchanging is their prior-dependant models of @, not @ itself.

I'm not disputing that A and B can talk to each other about their perspectives, even when there are language barriers to doing so, I'm disputing that A and B are thereby approaching @.

Yeah, not so much. The idea of models is fraught, and ultimately fails, for reasons outlined by Davidson in On the very idea of a conceptual schema. — Banno

Really, so what's the alternative?

https://www2.southeastern.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/conceptualscheme.pdf

In giving up dependence on the concept of an uninterpreted reality, something outside all schemes and science, we do not relinquish the notion of objective truth -quite the contrary. Given the dogma of a dualism of scheme and reality, we get conceptual relativity, and truth relative to a scheme. Without the dogma, this kind of relativity goes by the board. Of course truth of sentences remains relative to language, but that is as objective as can be. In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but reestablish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false.

If folk are interested, it might be worth a seperate thread to work through this.

It seems we are talking about quite different things. I, about conceptual schema, you, about something to do with perception.

If folk are interested, it might be worth a seperate thread to work through this. — Banno

Thanks for the link, an interesting article which I hadn't read (although I have been peripherally aware of the idea). I seems to nicely intersect with what @fdrake and I have been discussing about how the distinction between the model, that which is modelled, and that which does the modelling affects ideas of model-dependent realism. I've been reluctant to give it up purely on the grounds of what seems to be a necessary distinction because the alternative seems even less plausible. Something like what Davidson is saying here is what I've been looking for, that we can talk across schemes (what I'm calling models).

What I'm not getting from the article is why you think the very idea that we experience reality through models is fraught. I get why the idea of incommensurability is fraught, but all this seems to require is some 'translating' model with a language which can fit one scheme to the most effective equivalent in another. After all, nothing is available to measure if we've got the translation 'right', so it's appearing to work doesn't mean anything beyond pragmatism.

But it's fine if explaining would take you further off topic than you'd like, we can just shelve it there.