I do think and would strongly argue that language is necessary. — creativesoul

Yet all you've given thus far is...

they are further thought of as being unfair. — creativesoul

This implies some sort of agreement — creativesoul

it requires some measure of morality(what ought happen) — creativesoul

I'd agree with all of those (with the same caveats as you). But you've not demonstrated any of them are necessarily dependant on language, so I don't see how they're relevant to your argument.

When we're claiming that some non human creature has a sense of fairness/justice, we're saying something about that creature's mental ongoings(thought and belief). Thus, it behooves us to know what all thought and belief consist of, lest we have no way to know whether or not some creature or another is capable of forming/holding those kinds of thought and belief. — creativesoul

Yes, but this just goes over the ground we've already covered with regards to terms. There isn't something which just is what thiugh/belief consists of. There are just the phenomena we observe, how we choose to group them and what we choose to call those groups is arbitrary. I've already defined what I'm referring to by belief and thought. I've not heard (or perhaps not understood) how you're using those terms.

I'm having trouble with the equivalence being drawn between clear discontent due to false belief about what's going to happen(accompanied by and exemplified after unexpected events/results), with complaining and taking restorative action. There's no issue with discontent being characterized as showing negative emotion. However, not all discontent and negative emotion are equivalent to complaining and/or taking restorative actions. — creativesoul

Well, why don't you start with what you would expect to see. If taking restorative action is not sufficient, then what, by your measure, would be sufficient. Say someone says to you "hey that's unfair", but you think they might be lying, what behaviour would you look for to confirm that they did genuinely believe it to be unfair?

Which experiments show conclusively that those animals are acting out of a sense of what ought be done as compared to what was? — creativesoul

As I've said, I don't believe in experiments showing anything 'conclusively'. They might overwhelmingly contradict a theory, in which case it should be rejected, absent of that you're free to continue rationally believing any of the huge range of beliefs the experiments does not actually contradict.

Thst being said, Franz dWaal has placed a large bowl of grapes within reach during the reward experiments, and has given grapes/cucumbers in different combinations in prior exchanges. Together these satisfy me that simple expectation frustration is not the explanation (otherwise prior priming of expectation would have made a difference), nor is it simple greed (otherwise the larger available reward would have made a difference). It does seem to be related to a social peer getting a better reward, so if there's expectation involved, it's an expectation of equal distribution of rewards. I'm happy to call that a belief in fairness.

What's the difference between behavioural discontent as a result of the cognitive dissonance that takes place when expectations are dashed by what happens and having behavioural discontent as a result of thinking, believing, and/or 'feeling' like what happened is unfair/unjust, or ought be somehow corrected? — creativesoul

Nothing. The expectation that rewards be distributed equally is what a belief in fairness is.

If you thought I was talking about that you completely missed the point. It’s all too common and precisely the exact thing I wasn’t saying.

I am talking about subjective experience. People here seem to be talking about subjective experience by attaching their position to a physical realist position that is only ground in scientific investigation. Be clear, VERY clear, science sets out to reduce the ‘subjective’ in favour of the ‘objective’.

Talk about eyes, occipital lobes and retinas is not an experiential investigation.

To avoid a semantic debate over the word seeing, we can distinguish a red perceptual experience from an internally generated one. This demonstrates that red experiences come from us and not into the eyes riding on light waves, as if the red somehow jumps onto electrons and enters the visual cortex. — Marchesk

No it doesn't. It demonstrates that red experiences require both, red things and the ability to see them as such. It also demonstrates that the internal/external and objective/subjective dichotomies are inadequate for taking proper account of experience.

...we don’t experience an apple or a chair, we experience our intentionality constituted through intersubjective perception. — I like sushi

That's probably closer to my view, but still not on par with it. Thought and belief. That is what all experience consists of. Much of it is socially mediated. Some of it is internal. All of it consists of meaningful correlations drawn between different things.

Talk about eyes, occipital lobes and retinas is not an experiential investigation. — I like sushi

By that token no talk can be an experiential investigation. Talk requires referring terms which requires agreement as to the referrent, which, by definition, cannot be subjective in the sense you're using the term. To say anything at all is an engagement in collective agreement about referrents, so the only completely subjective investigation by your standards is entirely silent meditation. A great idea, but doesn't work very well on an Internet forum.

It demonstrates that red experiences require both, red things and the ability to see them as such. — creativesoul

What on earth are 'red experiences'? I've certainly never had one.

What on earth are 'red experiences'? I've certainly never had one. — Isaac

You and I are in near complete agreement on that. I was just following suit(so to speak).

Our difference seems to be regarding what counts as warrant for concluding that the animal has a sense of fairness. I've just read your latest reply to our ongoing discussion about the experiments. I think I'm recognizing the sticking point(s).

No it doesn't. It demonstrates that red experiences require both, red things and the ability to see them as such. It also demonstrates that the internal/external and objective/subjective dichotomies are inadequate for taking proper account of experience. — creativesoul

So you think that the colors we experience are out there in the world? Are they attached to photons or molecules? How do they get into our brains?

Does this also apply to sound, taste, feels? Does 2 degrees celsius air molecules feel objectively cold? How do you reconcile different sensations among animals or even humans? Maybe I'm from a cold climate and find that warm.

I know that there can be no hallucination, dream, and/or illusion of red if there is no red. I do not work from the dichotomies underlying your account. Rather, I reject them as inadequate.

I know that there can be no hallucination, dream, and/or illusion of red if there is no red. — creativesoul

Would you say the same thing about pain?

No.

I know that there can be no hallucination, dream, and/or illusion of red if there is no red. — creativesoul

Simple. Take a sensation, call it 'red'. Job done. 'Red' isn't out there waiting for us to find it, we experience things and give some of them names, the names have to be related to some external behaviour otherwise naming fails (no one else knows what we're talking about). So examining this external behaviour is adequate for examining the referent of the name.

No. — creativesoul

So you're a color realist. Alright, fine. But at least with pain we have something clearly subjective.

It might help if you talk about what constitutes specific experiences. Already mentioned this. For example think about what you can imagine and can’t imagine about some ‘object’ of experience (be it a sound, shape, colour etc.,.). You can’t imagine a sound with no frequency, a colour with no shade or a shape with no angles. If you see a chair you don’t hold hold the entirely of the chair in the moment as your scope is limited. Everything is ‘face on’

Simple. Take a sensation, call it 'red'. Job done. 'Red' isn't out there waiting for us to find it, we experience things and give some of them names, the names have to be related to some external behaviour otherwise naming fails (no one else knows what we're talking about). So examining this external behaviour is adequate for examining the referent of the name. — Isaac

Reminds me of Quine, Witt, and Kripke all rolled into one - aside perhaps from the use of "sensation".

For example think about what you can imagine and can’t imagine about some ‘object’ of experience (be it a sound, shape, colour etc.,.). — I like sushi

We've been through this, I don't see any reason to presume that the 'object' comes first. What I can and can't imagine comes first, then I divide that up into objects according to how useful I find each division. Whether I can think of a shape with no angles is about the meaning of the word 'shape'. If the word 'shape' means 'things with angles' then no, I can't. But that's just deductive tautology, I haven't learnt anything.

...with pain we have something clearly subjective. — Marchesk

What good is that notion of subjective?

at least with pain we have something clearly subjective. — Marchesk

No, we don't, otherwise the word wouldn't mean anything. If any subjective experience counted as pain without any objective measures, then how would we ever learn what the word meant?

What good is that notion of subjective? — creativesoul

To denote that our experiences are not mirrors of reality, and thus when we create explanations of reality, we have to take that into account. A physicalist is going to miss out on something if they don't include our experiences, since we are part of the world.

Also, because it raises the possibility of skeptical scenarios we have to deal with in philosophical discussions. And along with that the possibility of some sort of idealism as a response to skepticism. But that can also be motivated by cognitive concerns as well as experiential ones.

No, we don't, otherwise the word wouldn't mean anything. If any subjective experience counted as pain without any objective measures, then how would we ever learn what the word meant? — Isaac

Turn that around and you have the same problem. If there were no subjective experiences of pain how would we ever learn the word? We wouldn't, because it wouldn't be an experience for us.

Yes, pain and other sensations are accompanied by objective measures, which helps us know when people are in pain. But not always.

I never said object. I said ‘object’, as in intentionality, ‘conscious of’, not some noumena fancy. ‘Object’ in the sense of this discussion isn’t an existent object, ‘existence’ is an ‘object’ of intentional experience.

I find this whole thread kind of strange when the primary questioning is of the phenomenal, of subjective experience, and of consciousness. Phenomenology (Husserlian) is precisely a field of philosophical thought that came into being to deal with these questions.

Instead a see the same old repetition where people get bogged down in arguments about dualism, reality, and naive realism.

Turn that around and you have the same problem. If there were no subjective experiences of pain how would we ever learn the word? We wouldn't, because it wouldn't be an experience for us. — Marchesk

Yes, but why does it have to be a subjective experience for this to be the case? 'Pain' we all learn, is the word we use to indicate whatever it is that motivates us to those particular sorts of actions. There need not be any subjectivity to it (as in inaccessible to physicalism). I could be a robot and still learn to label the tweaking of my diodes which causes me to writhe about and cry 'pain'.

(notwithstanding the fact that we all know robots are prone to pain, especially in all the diodes down their left side)

What does that mean? ‘Thought and belief’? Go intricate, give me more. I used to say something similar myself, but it’s hardly revealing anything much to anyone.

Yes, but why does it have to be a subjective experience for this to be the case? 'Pain' we all learn, is the word we use to indicate whatever it is that motivates us to those particular sorts of actions. — Isaac

That's not why I use the word pain, but okay, maybe the rest of you zombies use it that way. I use it to refer to feeling pain, not my resulting actions.

I could be a robot and still learn to label the tweaking of my diodes which causes me to writhe about and cry 'pain'. — Isaac

But only because humans who do feel pain first coined the word. But okay, let's go with the p-zombie robot world with no humans. They coin a word pain-z which means writhing about and crying when diodes are tweaked. That isn't what we mean by pain.

Why not? Because I can writhe around pretending to be in pain, or maybe for some other reason like a seizure. Or I might be stoical about it. Not all pain manifests in some observable action. Behavior itself is not enough.

...meaningful correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

I said ‘object’, as in intentionality, ‘conscious of’, not some noumena fancy. ‘Object’ in the sense of this discussion isn’t an existent object, ‘existence’ is an ‘object’ of intentional experience. — I like sushi

It's existence makes no difference, 'unicorns' don't exist, the idea of 5 dimensional space doesn't exist... None of this makes them immune from the fact that in order to talk about them we must agree on a referent for the term. None of this makes them immune from the requirement to delineate things along the same lines as others in order to talk to them about those things.

Phenomenology (Husserlian) is precisely a field of philosophical thought that came into being to deal with these questions. — I like sushi

The mere existence of a field which aims to do something does not in any way constitute evidence that it succeeds in that task.

That isn't what we mean by pain.

Why not? Because I can write around pretending to be in pain, or maybe for some other reason like a seizure. — Marchesk

How would you know?

I don't understand why is a reply to me? Doesn't seem to have anything to do with anything I was talking about.

Instead a see the same old repetition where people get bogged down in arguments about dualism, reality, and naive realism. — I like sushi

So how does phenomenology help avoid those topics? So we start with our experiences of being in the world. But at some point don't those old questions rear their heads?

How would you know? — Isaac

How would I know that people can pretend to be in pain, like actors or liars? Is that really going to be your argument?