The Masters is actually in Ethics but it’s still a branch of philosophy so totally counts — Mark Dennis

I always thought that ethics was not defined and it is undefineable. Because it is societal indoctrination, which does not even stick with everyone, and it can hugely differ from society to society, as it is culture-dependent. So how do you prepare to defend a thesis about something undefinable and undefendable?

But I guess the same can be said of Ethics, and metaphysics. So 'tis a go, after all. Just don't try to apply ethical theories to something in the real world.

I always thought that ethics was not defined and it is undefineable. Because it is societal indoctrination, which does not even stick with everyone, and it can hugely differ from society to society, as it is culture-dependent. So how do you prepare to defend a thesis about something undefinable and undefendable? — god must be atheist

Most people who do defend and define ethics just outright don't buy your initial premises.

Something is only then indoctrination when critical thinking is not allowed.

The answer to the problem of different cultural ethical norms is simply that different cultures are (or were at some point in history) wrong about different things.

And anywhere in the world you find the same underlying principles to ethics: don't cause unnecessary suffering, for example.

And anywhere in the world you find the same underlying principles to ethics: don't cause unnecessary suffering, for example. — Artemis

That's not a view I agree with. So how would it be the case that you find that everywhere in the world?

the majorities of most countries would agree with at the very least, not having unnecessary suffering inflicted upon themselves individually, as a community, as a country. — Mark Dennis

Maybe most people in most countries would agree with that, although we never actually did an empirical study to discover whether that's the case, and I'd suspect that we'd need to clarify the terms for most people in order for them to give an answer that isn't fleeting or easily so ambiguous because of different semantics that the response wouldn't actually tell us much. We'd need to clarify just what counts as unnecessary, just what counts as suffering, etc.

The more important point though is what does it matter for the sub-discussion that was occurring?

In other words, suppose that's a fact. What would you say the relevance of it is to Artemis' response to god must be an atheist's comment?

It matters because while a places culture and history factor into the moral ecology of said place, it isn’t the only factor.

For example, there is plenty of empirical evidence to suggest that most views reside within most places regardless of culture or tradition of those places. Demographic ratios may show a differing majority but nevertheless the views still exist within that culture. Actually the most substantial empirical evidence you could hope to find. Schools. Schools have records of their graduates core beliefs in every field you could imagine. Including ethics.

It also matters because it relates to the pragmatic definition of truth and the data found in Descriptive Moral relativism which takes into account these demographics and is an amazing data tool for ethics.

Thank you, and yes.



Well, respectfully Terrapin, you may not be the best example to use in this argument because (and correct me if I'm wrong) you have in previous threads claimed to outright reject any overarching princples in ethics. Which really leads to you not having an "ethics" per se.

If you look at any system of ethics, I think you will find (semantics and details of the hows and whys aside) that there are some universal themes.

you have in previous threads claimed to outright reject any overarching princples in ethics. — Artemis

That's right. I wouldn't say I don't have an ethics, but it's not any sort of systematic ethics, sure.

I'm not sure I understand how you can have an "ethics" of any sort without some principles you fall back on?

Like, you previously stated something along the lines of judging each situation individually, but on what basis do you make a judgement?

We're free! Free at last!

The answer to the problem of different cultural ethical norms is simply that different cultures are (or were at some point in history) wrong about different things.

And anywhere in the world you find the same underlying principles to ethics: don't cause unnecessary suffering, for example. — Artemis

:up:

I always thought that ethics was not defined and it is undefineable. Because it is societal indoctrination, which does not even stick with everyone, and it can hugely differ from society to society, as it is culture-dependent. So how do you prepare to defend a thesis about something undefinable and undefendable?
— god must be atheist

Most people who do defend and define ethics just outright don't buy your initial premises.

Something is only then indoctrination when critical thinking is not allowed.

The answer to the problem of different cultural ethical norms is simply that different cultures are (or were at some point in history) wrong about different things.

And anywhere in the world you find the same underlying principles to ethics: don't cause unnecessary suffering, for example. — Artemis

The way I see it, the idea that there is an objective or universal sense of ethical principles is sound. That such principles can be stated, however, is inaccurate. A stated or defined ethical principle is going to be wrong about something from some perspective of the universe. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t strive to approach a universal sense of ethics. But I don’t think it comes down to ‘DON’T’ statements, to be honest.

I always thought that ethics was not defined and it is undefineable. — god must be atheist

1. moral principles that govern a person's behavior or the conducting of an activity.
2. the branch of knowledge that deals with moral principles.
(Courtesy of our friend the internet.)

Now you know.

A few simple, common sense, defensible, and easily teachable ones...


What would happen if everyone acted like that?

Be helpful.

Do what's good for goodness sake.

I could swear I saw a post in here I wanted to reply to later, and now it's gone. It was something to the effect of "even though there is no objective morality, it's still useful to debate moral topics so we can come to an agreement on what we will subjectively take to be morality just for practical purposes of getting along". I can't remember who wrote it.

In response, I wanted to submit the idea that that is all that it takes to develop an objective morality. If there are reasons that could persuade someone to prefer something, with the likes of which you could conduct such a debate as above, then working out what all of those reasons taken together say we should prefer just is figuring out what is objectively moral. (If there are no such reasons, then such debate is doomed to failure regardless, and we're doomed to a world where everyone does whatever they want and can't be persuaded to do otherwise, so might substitutes for right and there's no point debating why the guy with the sword shouldn't gut you if he feels like it).

"Objective morality" doesn't have to entail that there be ontological moral objects, moral facts that are true in the same way that non-moral facts are. Moral claims are not descriptive, they're prescriptive, so why would you expect them to be made true by, justified by the same kind of reasons as, descriptive claims? They don't need that to be objective claims. They just need to be unbiased; "objective" just means "unbiased". There just need to be something in common to our experiences that we can point to and say "because of that" as a reason to reject the supposed morality of something, and so begin narrowing in on what the remaining possibly-moral options are, in the same way that we point at disagreement with empirical experiences as reasons to reject descriptive claims and narrow in on the truth.

It seems that hedonic experiences serve that function perfectly well: we demonstrate the falsehood of descriptive claims by saying in effect "stand here and look that way and you'll see that that's false", and we can likewise demonstrate the badness (analogous to falsehood) of prescriptive claims by saying in effect "stand here and feel this and you'll feel that it's bad". Sure, someone can always say "I don't want to stand there and feel that and you can't make me so I don't have to agree that that's bad" (the "somebody else's problem" response), but that's just ignoring relevant evidence in the same way that someone refusing to look at empirical evidence of a descriptive claim would be.

Moral claims are not descriptive, they're prescriptive... — Pfhorrest

What makes a claim moral in kind?

Its prescriptivity, which can be elaborated upon in terms of direction of fit. A descriptive claim is like a detective's list of the things a man he's investigating bought at the grocery store; a prescriptive claim is like the shopping list the man's wife gave him. The lists might be exactly the same, but they are for different purposes: if the things the man bought disagree with the detective's list, the detective's list is wrong, but if the things the man bought disagree with his wife's list, the things the man bought are wrong instead.

If there are reasons that could persuade someone to prefer something, with the likes of which you could conduct such a debate as above, then working out what all of those reasons taken together say we should prefer just is figuring out what is objectively moral. — Pfhorrest

But it seems fundamental that there are not 'resaons' why we prefer things. We do not prefer things for reasons. Can you convince someone to prefer green, prefer chocolate to vanilla? Can you convince an arachnophobe to prefer spiders?

Where would you start? "We shouldn't prefer to cause unnecessary harm because..." (ignoring for now the ambiguity in both 'unnecessary' and 'harm'). What could your 'because' possibly be?

If there are no such reasons, then such debate is doomed to failure regardless, and we're doomed to a world where everyone does whatever they want and can't be persuaded to do otherwise — Pfhorrest

Why would we be in such a world? We can persuade people not to do what they want by all sorts of means. It's not a case of saying "If we can't persuade them to actually prefer not to do X we might as well just let them do X"

There just need to be something in common to our experiences that we can point to and say "because of that" as a reason to reject the supposed morality of something, and so begin narrowing in on what the remaining possibly-moral options are, in the same way that we point at disagreement with empirical experiences as reasons to reject descriptive claims and narrow in on the truth. — Pfhorrest

This is very much the myth of moral realism writ large. Note the vague hand-waiving when it comes to the really important bit. Yes, we can point to some things in our common experience, we're all humans and biologically we have some pretty similar gut feelings about stuff, but they're just that - vague gut feelings. the really important bit is the bit you simply assumed, the "begin narrowing in on what the remaining possibly-moral options are". I'm afraid in most cases, the 'remaining possibly-moral options' are almost anything we would realistically be arguing about anyway. It doesn't really get us anywhere.

we demonstrate the falsehood of descriptive claims by saying in effect "stand here and look that way and you'll see that that's false", and we can likewise demonstrate the badness (analogous to falsehood) of prescriptive claims by saying in effect "stand here and feel this and you'll feel that it's bad". — Pfhorrest

Again, this only works where some degree of 'bad' is universally agreed on, and some long-term lack of compensatory benefit is universally agreed upon and they never are. How would it help getting someone to imagine themselves to be a 'rank-and-file' soldier in the German army 1940. "would you like to be in his position, would you like to be shot at?", "No", "Well then you shouldn't shoot German Soldiers in World War Two". Where would that have got us? A lot of innocent people were killed in World War Two. They were killed because many people thought the long-term good outweighed the bad.

What you're describing is simply empathy. Over reliance on empathy is what makes people donate to sick-donkey sanctuaries that they happen to have visited but still maintain consumer practices which contribute to the suffering of thousands (who they can't see).

But it seems fundamental that there are not 'resaons' why we prefer things. — Isaac

There are raw experiential feelings of “preferring”, hedonic experiences of something just seeming good or bad, that are not had for reasons; but then there are also things that we instrumentally prefer for reasons grounded in exactly those experiences.

We can persuade people not to do what they want by all sorts of means. — Isaac

If we are the ones in power and so can create circumstances that they’ll consider reasons to behave like we want (like “I’ll hurt you if you don’t“), sure. If they are the ones in power then we’re fucked. That’s why in absence of any way to persuade anyone, might supplants right.

Yes, we can point to some things in our common experience, we're all humans and biologically we have some pretty similar gut feelings about stuff, but they're just that - vague gut feelings. — Isaac

I’m not talking about floofy gut feelings about what circumstances we instrumentally prefer, but about the experiences that lead us to prefer them. It’s like I’m talking about comparing empirical observations and you think I’m talking about comparing people’s beliefs. Beliefs and desires don’t matter, they are subjective interpretations of experience; it is the experiences we have in common that matter.

(And biological similarity is not strictly necessary. We can account for differences in people’s senses when taking empirical account of the world, and we can do likewise with peoples’ appetites when taking hedonic account of it).

How would it help getting someone to imagine themselves to be a 'rank-and-file' soldier in the German army 1940. "would you like to be in his position, would you like to be shot at?", "No", "Well then you shouldn't shoot German Soldiers in World War Two". Where would that have got us? A lot of innocent people were killed in World War Two. They were killed because many people thought the long-term good outweighed the bad. — Isaac

Ideally we would not shoot soldiers in wars. That is bad. But if something else bad will happen if we don’t, if we’re forced to choose between two bad options because we can’t find an all good one, then we choose the least bad of course. You say nothing here that shows that it is not possible to compare options to see which is less bad.

There are raw experiential feelings of “preferring”, hedonic experiences of something just seeming good or bad, that are not had for reasons; but then there are also things that we instrumentally prefer for reasons grounded in exactly those experiences. — Pfhorrest

OK, I see what you mean.

If we are the ones in power and so can create circumstances that they’ll consider reasons to behave like we want (like “I’ll hurt you if you don’t“), sure. If they are the ones in power then we’re fucked. That’s why in absence of any way to persuade anyone, might supplants right. — Pfhorrest

But if we resort to persuasion, aren't the ones with the most persuasive rhetoric in power? I don't see how, by using persuasion, you've bypassed power structures. We already live in a situation where people can be persuaded to vote one way or another. The people with the best access to, and control of, the media tend to do better.

Also, on the slightly less cynical side, there's more than just "I'll hurt you if you don't", there's things like ostracisation which can persuade people to act against their preferences. We don't always have to choose between a dispassionate rational debate and a fight. There's the whole of politics in between.

It’s like I’m talking about comparing empirical observations and you think I’m talking about comparing people’s beliefs. Beliefs and desires don’t matter, they are subjective interpretations of experience; it is the experiences we have in common that matter. — Pfhorrest

I don't understand what you're saying here, could you try and explain it again?

if something else bad will happen if we don’t, if we’re forced to choose between two bad options because we can’t find an all good one, then we choose the least bad of course. — Pfhorrest

No, it's not about the least bad, it's about what will or will not come to pass. The issue with the Second World War was not "which is worse, killing some innocent Germans or being taken over by Hitler?", it was "is killing some innocent Germans a necessary act in preventing us from being taken over by Hitler?". That question is not resolvable by empathy.

But if we resort to persuasion, aren't the ones with the most persuasive rhetoric in power? — Isaac

I suppose I misspoke; by "persuasion" I meant more specifically "reason". You're absolutely right that there are other influences between reason and physical violence, but my point was to distinguish between reason and all of those other non-rational influences, with physical violence just being the clearest exemplar of them. (Something like "if you don't I'll make you feel embarrassed" is still the same kind of "create a reason they'll pay attention to" use of power as "if you don't I'll hurt you", albeit softer of course).

It’s like I’m talking about comparing empirical observations and you think I’m talking about comparing people’s beliefs. Beliefs and desires don’t matter, they are subjective interpretations of experience; it is the experiences we have in common that matter. — Pfhorrest

I don't understand what you're saying here, could you try and explain it again? — Isaac

Gladly, this is the most important part of my whole ethical model really.

When it comes to investigating reality, we don't just ask people what they believe (what they think is true or false), and try to come up with something that's true according to everyone's beliefs. That would be ridiculous and is obviously almost guaranteed to be impossible. Instead, we ask people what looks true or false to them, what they observe. (And it's important to highlight the difference here also between perception and sensation, where perception is of something like "a ball", and sensation is of something like "a pattern of light"; sensation is raw sense data, akin to the pixels of an image displayed on a screen, while perception is interpreted sensation, akin to a vectorization of that pixel data. Perception is "feeling" like something is true, sensation is raw phenomenal experience with implications on truth). Observation is not about perception, which has all the same problems as belief, but rather about sensation). And then we don't just take their word for it, we go and stand in the same circumstances they said they observed it and see if we observe it too, and if we don't we try to account for differences between each other (and of course, first, double-checking for differences in the circumstances) to see if that can explain the differences in observation. Once we have an agreed-upon set of observations, we try to come up with models that satisfy all of them, which may or may not be what anybody initially believed or even perceived on account of those observations.

My ethical model hinges upon making a similar distinction as that between belief, perception, and sensation: instead of just wants or preferences, we need to distinguish between what I term intentions (thinking that something is good, "moral beliefs" some would say), desires (feeling that something is good, analogous to perceptions), and appetites (experiences of things like pain, hunger, etc, with implications about what to feel or think is good, but no propositional content to that effect as such yet). Just as in investigating morality we don't care about what people believe or even what they perceive but about their senses, their empirical experiences, and then we try to replicate those and build up from them to a model that satisfies them all even if it's not what anybody initially believed, so too in investigating morality we shouldn't care about what people intend or what they desire but about their appetites, their hedonic experiences, and then try to replicate those (stand in the same circumstances and see if we experience the same, try to account for differences between us and double-check for differences in the circumstances), and then try to come up with models that satisfy the set of everything that survives that process, which models may or may not be what anybody initially intended or desired on account of those appetites.

There's a whole lot more philosophy and what I'd call "ethical sciences" needed to build from that basic criteria to a complete understanding of what in particular is morally right, just like we can't just say "Empiricism is reality. There, all of the physical sciences are complete, everyone can go home now, we know everything about reality, it's just whatever you observe!" But this at least gives you criteria by which to start making prescriptive judgements.

No, it's not about the least bad, it's about what will or will not come to pass. The issue with the Second World War was not "which is worse, killing some innocent Germans or being taken over by Hitler?", it was "is killing some innocent Germans a necessary act in preventing us from being taken over by Hitler?". That question is not resolvable by empathy. — Isaac

That is a descriptive question. All actions hinge on making both descriptive and prescriptive judgements (usually called "beliefs" and "desires" in traditional philosophy of action, but I'd say "beliefs" and "intentions" instead, per the above). To know whether we ought to kill some innocent Germans, we both need to answer the descriptive question of whether that is necessary (or even sufficient) to prevent us from being taken over by Hitler, and the prescriptive question of whether some innocent Germans being killed is better or worse than us being taken over by Hitler. And any judgements on either of those questions are fallible, and might be wrong, so we might end up doing the wrong thing, but just because we can't be completely certain what the correct answer is to something doesn't mean that there is no correct answer, whether we're talking about reality or morality.

I just remembered a comment from another thread I recently made that may also be helpful describing my view here:

as far as I'm concerned, "needs" as I would construe them technically cannot conflict, in the same way that observations of the world technically cannot conflict. They can suggest interpretations about what is or ought to be that conflict, but what actually is must account for all observations, even if it's a really difficult creative task to figure out how to do that, and what actually ought to be must account for all needs, even if it's a really difficult creative task to figure out how to do that.

(Consider the parable of the blind men and the elephant. Each one feels a different thing and interprets that as meaning there's a different object, and while all three of those interpretations cannot be simultaneously true, the actual reality is nevertheless compatible with the different things each of them feels to prompt those interpretations. Analogously, people's different feelings may prompt them to want different states of affairs, and those states of affairs may be incompatible, but what's actually a moral state of affairs will nevertheless account for everyone's different feelings, even if it means nobody gets any of the states of affairs that those feelings prompted them to want). — me in another thread

But I don’t think it comes down to ‘DON’T’ statements, to be honest. — Possibility

Wouldn't any positive statement imply a negative one?

What makes a claim moral in kind? — creativesoul

Its prescriptivity, which can be elaborated upon in terms of direction of fit. A descriptive claim is like a detective's list of the things a man he's investigating bought at the grocery store; a prescriptive claim is like the shopping list the man's wife gave him. The lists might be exactly the same, but they are for different purposes: if the things the man bought disagree with the detective's list, the detective's list is wrong, but if the things the man bought disagree with his wife's list, the things the man bought are wrong instead. — Pfhorrest

Are all prescriptive claims moral in kind?

More or less. There is not a clear distinction on my account of prescriptive claims that are moral versus ones that are not moral, but sometimes in writing about it I get the feeling that using the word "moral" in place of just "prescriptive" might confuse some part of the audience, so I'm not certain that for all speakers they are synonymous.

The sense I get from those who might make such a distinction is between other-directed action and self-directed action, though on my account there is no need to make that distinction for the claims to be broadly speaking "moral": I'd say one ought not, for example, literally beat oneself up (like punch oneself in the face) over one's failures, and that "ought" is prescriptive, and therefore on my account the same kind of claim as a claim that one ought not beat up overs over their failures, but I get the sense that others would say that only the latter claim about interpersonal action is "moral" and the first is... something else, I guess? I would make a distinction between self-directed and other-directed action when it comes to procedural justice, saying that someone has the right to beat themselves up but not the right to beat someone else up, but that's only a subset of moral concerns, and in the broader sense I'd say that the first is moral too.

Something is only then indoctrination when critical thinking is not allowed. — Artemis

Single-concern bullshit is not the same as critical thinking.

Demanding evidence within a system for system-wide axioms is not the same as critical thinking. On the contrary, it is just stupid, infinite regress.

Seriously, all of that amounts to system-less nonsense and not to critical thinking. What these people are doing, is easy. It does not require any skill. It is inferior nonsense.

They think that they are doing logic, but they have absolutely no clue about systems of logic. Why don't they try to reason within or about e.g. Hilbert-Ackermann calculi, if logic is so important to them?

These people are just a bunch of idiots.

They think that they are doing logic, but they have absolutely no clue about systems of logic. Why don't they try to reason within or about e.g. Hilbert-Ackermann calculi, if logic is so important to them? — alcontali

Why don't they try to reason within or about e.g. Hilbert-Ackermann calculi, if logic is so important to them?

logic is so important to them?

to them?

?

my point was to distinguish between reason and all of those other non-rational influences, — Pfhorrest

Reason is not necessarily a 'rational' influence though. I think 2000 years of debate have pretty firmly established that reason does not deliver one clear answer to complex moral dilemmas, it is highly susceptible to competing theories and competing selections of empirical evidence. Simply presenting to someone a 'reasonable' case for doing X as a moral imperative is to simply bias that person in favour of doing X if one know that there also exists a 'reasonable' case for not doing X. The idea of reasonable debate producing the answer to moral dilemmas, even notwithstanding the possibility of genuine differences in objective, relies on the flawed assumption of full access to relevant empirical data and the pre-existence of all rational lines of thought in each mind (as opposed to having them introduced by persuasive argument). Neither I think are the case.

In addition, I simply do not think it is possible for the human mind to make rational decisions absent of any cultural, or psychological bias. There is an entire field made up entirely of evidence that this is the case and (to my knowledge) zero evidence to the contrary. We can't even take in the basic empirical data without bias, it's ingrained in our entire thinking systems.

___

I'm still not sure I fully understand your ethical theory, but rather than just ask you to write it out again, I'll tell you what I've got so far and you can correct/add.

The moral 'good' can be defined as satisfactory hedonic experiences.

We can determine the states of affairs which bring about those experiences scientifically because (unlike feelings and beliefs about what will bring them about) the experiences themselves are empirically verifiable.

Where people differ in their hedonic experiences in what appear to be the same states of affairs, we can examine closely to find if there are perhaps some subtle differences in those states of affairs.

Upon discovering the ranges of states of affairs which bring about satisfactory hedonic experiences in people we can derive some generalisable states of affairs which we can label 'good' on that basis.

Is that about right?

To know whether we ought to kill some innocent Germans, we both need to answer the descriptive question of whether that is necessary (or even sufficient) to prevent us from being taken over by Hitler, and the prescriptive question of whether some innocent Germans being killed is better or worse than us being taken over by Hitler. — Pfhorrest

OK, that's cleared that up.

Demanding evidence within a system for system-wide axioms is not the same as critical thinking. On the contrary, it is just stupid, infinite regress. — alcontali

No one said anything about demanding such evidence "within" the system. Your error is in presuming there's no wider system of which religious texts are only a part. Most atheists consider themselves to be part of some system of physical, biological, psychological, social...etc system of laws which they refer to to make rational decisions. Religions are not the only systems.

We can't even take in the basic empirical data without bias, it's ingrained in our entire thinking systems. — Isaac

I don't disagree, but we don't use that as a basis to say that nothing is actually real, just that we are bad at figuring out what is actually real. I think the case for figuring out what is moral is comparable: we may be bad at figuring out what is moral, but that's not an excuse to say that nothing is actually moral. And I don't have any particular commitment to contingent particulars about how relatively better or worse we may tend to be at each; just that's it's a task we can undertake, however fallibly, in both cases.

Is that about right? — Isaac

More or less, though I expect some important technical details will probably need clarification in further conversation.

it's a task we can undertake, however fallibly, in both cases. — Pfhorrest

The question (one that I think virtue ethics tackles) is whether the flaws in these calculatory systems are not so massive as to render them less useful than intuition.

More or less, though I expect some important technical details will probably need clarification in further conversation. — Pfhorrest

OK, thanks. So...

1. I don't see the benefit in asserting that the moral 'good' is satisfactory hedonic experiences. So many people would disagree and you get mired in an argument that can't be supported. Why not just say if you want to maximise satisfactory hedonic experience, then it seems empirically indicated that you should do X. Turning it into an if/then statement removes all the mess of the is/ought problem and, if you're right about most people's desires, would still resonate with the vast majority of people.

2. I don't see anything there about judging hyperbolic discounting (future possible hedonic gains are worth less than current definate ones).

There may be more, but let's not get bogged down too much to start with.