That you think you're providing a theory neutral description of phenomenal character is part of the problem. — fdrake

You were hinting at concepts. I'm not talking about concepts. I'm not saying something about it being theory-neutral. I'm just saying that I'm not talking about concepts.

I just answered this: the perspective of being those states. — Terrapin Station

But where is that perspective if not in "Particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc"? I'm afraid "At various reference points, including the reference point of being the thing in question." isn't really a coherent location for me.

What? I'm not saying anything about language. What the answer to a question would be is irrelevant. — Terrapin Station

I'm trying to explain why I can't make sense of there being an answer to that question, and as such can't make sense of there being such properties.

You were hinting at concepts. I'm not talking about concepts. I'm not saying something about it being theory neutral. I'm just saying that I'm not talking about concepts. — Terrapin Station

I know you are not talking about concepts, you are being influenced by ones which you have that you are not articulating.

Yeah, that's a property. In fact, even a homogeneous soup that's indeterminate would be properties. Since properties are simply ways that things are. — Terrapin Station

This is concept talk.

But where is that perspective if not in "Particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc"? I'm afraid "At various reference points, including the reference point of being the thing in question." isn't really a coherent location for me. — Isaac

So forget about talking about mind for a moment.

Take a coin for example. There's a frame of reference that is the coin itself, and there's a frame of reference that's not the coin itself, but that's relative to the the coin from some other position, right?

That's fine. Nevetheless, I'm not talking about concepts.

If I tell you that the cat ran outside when you opened the door, I have to employ concepts, as you do in order to understand what I'm saying, but what I'm saying isn't about concepts.

Take a coin for example. There's a frame of reference that is the coin itself, and there's a frame of reference that's not the coin itself, but that's relative to the the coin from some other position, right? — Terrapin Station

No. I don't see how there can be a frame of reference that is the coin itself. Just identifying it as a coin requires a person. With no one to identify it, it is just stuff, nothing more. (by stuff here I'm referring to whatever it is our perception arise from, noumena, if you like).

No. I don't see how there can be a frame of reference that is the coin itself. — Isaac

There's a coin, and it has a location, right? I have to use the word to refer to it on a message board. I'm not talking about the concept, or identifying it, or anything like that. Just "that lump there" or whatever. (Again, I need to refer to it here so you know what I'm talking about)

There's a coin, and it has a location, right? — Terrapin Station

Nope. There's no coin without a person to decide 'this bit of matter ends here and I shall call it a coin'. There's no location without a person to construct a 3d model of a reality which might well have 20 dimensions or none at all (dimensions just being some model we made to help us live).

I'm not saying anything about where it begins or ends or whether it's separated from anything else. Again, I'm not talking about the concept as such.

I'm not saying anything about where it begins or ends or whether it's separated from anything else. Again, I'm not talking about the concept as such. — Terrapin Station

But 'coin' and 'location' are both concepts. Physical matter is a concept.

Apparently you are incapable of understanding language usage without thinking that we're necessarily talking about concepts as such. Re the use/mention distinction, you must think it's incoherent. We can only do mention.

But 'coin' and 'location' are both concepts. Physical matter is a concept. — Isaac

There are concepts, but the concepts are not about themselves.

Again, it's hard to believe that you'd not just be trolling in not being able to disentangle concepts from what the concepts are about or in response to.

I don't really talk in terms of qualia, but if I had to define them I'd say they're just facets or aspects of subjective, first-person, phenomenal experiences. I don't think they (either experiences or qualia) are "things", separate ontological objects apart from the objects that those experiences are of. That kind of separate-ontological-stuff talk is the sort of assumption I've been explicitly denying. — Pfhorrest

This seems agreeable to me. I'm still curious over exactly what kind of stuff counts as a 'facet of experience'; where are the boundaries? How did the boundaries get there? But given a suitable (pragmatic or conceptual) reason to demarcate between different facets, we probably agree.

There are concepts, but the concepts are not about themselves. — Terrapin Station

No, but the stuff they're about doesn't actually have the properties we phenomenological conceive them having, all 'properties' are concepts related to the stuff (again, presuming there is even 'stuff' at all). I can't see how stuff could have properties. Any time I think about those properties (shape, location, colour..) they're all concepts, some of which I even know to be shaky at least because modern physics can't seem to fit them together.

No, but the stuff they're about doesn't actually have the properties we phenomenological conceive them having — Isaac

How in the world would you know this?

Presumably you wouldn't say that other people exist outside of your concept of rhem, right?

How in the world would you know this? — Terrapin Station

1. That conception is done in our minds and I can't think of a single reason why we would, by chance, construct the exact properties that somehow reality has (if maybe you take a Berkelean view that God conceives of properties).

2. Physics has demonstrated to my satisfaction that many of the properties I think objects have cannot be reconciled with each other.

3. Different people seem to have different phenomenological conceptions and so it seems impossible that the 'real stuff' is some way or other, that someone is just right about some of it.

4. I think it's impossible to even think without foundational model, concepts on which to base thought. So I can't conceive of anything without those models.

Presumably you wouldn't say that other people exist outside of your concept of rhem, right? — Terrapin Station

Yes, that's right. The idea of 'a person' is something I've constructed.

1. That conception is done in our minds and I can't think of a single reason why we would, by chance, construct the exact properties that somehow reality has (if maybe you take a Berkelean view that God conceives of properties). — Isaac

Why would you think it's by chance? We seem to have access to the world, right? Via our senses. So you'd need a reason to believe that that's not in fact the case.

2. Physics has demonstrated to my satisfaction that many of the properties I think objects have cannot be reconciled with each other. — Isaac

Physics can't demonstrate anything if you think we can't tell at all what the world is like. Besides, you have to conclude that you made all of physics up.

3. Different people seem to have different phenomenological conceptions and so it seems impossible that the 'real stuff' is some way or other, that someone is just right about some of it. — Isaac

You'd need a reason to believe that (a) the world can't be different from different perspectives, and (b) that some people can't be wrong while others are right

4. I think it's impossible to even think without foundational model, concepts on which to base thought. So I can't conceive of anything without those models. — Isaac

If you need to construct a foundational model in order to think, then how would you even get started? Don't you need to think in order to construct a foundational model? Otherwise it would be the case that you could think without a foundational model.

Yes, that's right. The idea of 'a person' is something I've constructed. — Isaac

Right. So essentially you're a solipsist--at least an epistemological solipsist. So why would something like hate speech ever be a problem? You're just constructing the other people anyway, and can't you construct them however you'd like to construct them?


In short, your ontology is a complete mess, and I'm guessing there are psychological reasons behind it. It probably stems from needing a way to cope with things that you otherwise feel you can't cope with. Keep in mind that apparently this is your concepts telling you this.

Ok, and "yellowness" might be a property of my experience while perceiving an object reflecting a certain wavelength?
— bongo fury

Right, it's a property of that object reflect[ing] that wavelength of EMR, and it's also a property of your experience per se (which is what qualia are). — Terrapin Station

I want to ask: is it a disposition or ability to reflect the certain wavelength?
— bongo fury

With respect to the object (the objective stuff), it's the fact that it reflects that wavelength of EMR, sure. That's not what it is with respect to our experience, though--our mental phenomena don't reflect that wavelength of EMR. In terms of our experience, it's a particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc. — Terrapin Station

Particular in the sense of general but awaiting a clear physical definition (which would decide if a particular brain state was an instance of it)?
— bongo fury

Say what?

No, particular as in particular. And it has nothing to do with definitions, etc. — Terrapin Station

Ok, but I thought you were happy to at least class all the particular cases of yellow-wavelength-reflection together as cases (albeit different particular cases) of possession of "yellowness" (in the objective sense) by an object?

So I thought you would be happy to form a corresponding class of cases (each of them particular and different of course) of possession of "yellowness" (in the mental sense) by a brain state?

So the trouble with this line of argument is an absence of these properties also amounts to concepts.

How can we say there are an absence of these properties when we aren't even taking in the part of the world in question?

There is nothing wrong with supposing an absence of certain properties of course, the unobserved world might exist without them. The trouble is this commits to as much of a postion of what is there, nothing with these properties, as claiming everything we see was there when no-one was looking.

Either way, our concepts are not just our own, they are of what the world is doing.

Ok, but I thought you were happy to at least class all the particular cases of yellow-wavelength-reflection together as cases (albeit different particular cases) of possession of "yellowness" (in the objective sense) by an object?

So I thought you would be happy to form a corresponding class of cases (each of them particular and different of course) of possession of "yellowness" (in the mental sense) by a brain state? — bongo fury

"Classing all the cases together" is a way of talking about the concepts we formulate as such--those are abstractions that range over a number of unique instances. And sure, insofar as we're talking about concepts, that's fine.

What those concepts are in response to, though, what any occurrence of yellow is in an object, or in experience is a particular state, a particular brain state (on my view) in the case of experience, or a particular object (reflecting EMR) state in the case of the external thing we're perceiving.

. . . or in other words, I'm a nominalist, so the only "reality" of types is as concepts (and even there, every instance of the concept in someone's mind is unique). But types make sense as a particular occurrence of a construction that abstracts certain features from particulars to range over a number of them.

Why would you think it's by chance? We seem to have access to the world, right? Via our senses. So you'd need a reason to believe that that's not in fact the case. — Terrapin Station

See 2-4.

Physics can't demonstrate anything if you think we can't tell at all what the world is like. Besides, you have to conclude that you made all of physics up. — Terrapin Station

I said "to my satisfaction". I prefer consistency, I can't really conceive of a reality that can be two ways at once, so two apparently conflicting models are sufficient to convince me that they can't both be right.

You'd need a reason to believe that (a) the world can't be different from different perspectives, and (b) that some people can't be wrong while others are right — Terrapin Station

For (a) we're talking about some way the world really is, so perspectives don't enter into it. The fact that they do is the very reason I don't trust 'there is a coin' type foundations. For (b) if it is possible for someone to be wrong, then our brains are not inevitably arranged to reflect reality accurately. Therefore it seems to me to follow from that that anyone doing so would do so by chance. That seems prima facae unlikely.

If you need to construct a foundational model in order to think, then how would you even get started? Don't you need to think in order to construct a foundational model? Otherwise it would be the case that you could think without a foundational model. — Terrapin Station

I think genetics wires models into our brains. We're born with a basic model.

So essentially you're a solipsist--at least an epistemological solipsist. So why would something like hate speech ever be a problem? You're just constructing the other people anyway, and can't you construct them however you'd like to construct them? — Terrapin Station

The fact that I'm constructing people does not lead to the fact that I can construct them however I'd like to construct them.

In short, your ontology is a complete mess — Terrapin Station

Yes. I think everyone's ontology is a mess.

I'm guessing there are psychological reasons behind it.... — Terrapin Station

Yeah, we can all play that game. You like to cling to strong libertarianism (probably fear of being constrained), the only way you can maintain strong libertarianism without becoming a sociopath is to convince yourself that you do not have a direct effect on others. This requires a strong sense of disconnected 'other' and a model where other people are in full control of their mental events. We can all play pop-psychologist.

So the trouble with this line of argument is that an an absence of these properties also amounts to concepts. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I didn't say the absence of properties wasn't a concept. There's a difference though between positing the absence (or skepticism) of properties and the positing of some particular property (light, location, shape etc) as being real.

One is simply agnosticism, the other dogmatism.

We're getting way off topic with fundamental ontology. I want bring you back to the question this whole sideshow seemed to distract from

what is missing from the third party account? — Isaac


I just answered this: the perspective of being those states. — Terrapin Station

But where is that perspective if not in "Particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc"? I'm afraid "At various reference points, including the reference point of being the thing in question." isn't really a coherent location for me. — Isaac

My point was rejecting these properties is to suppose a world of a certain form (absence of these properties) exists. It's actually proposing the world is things which do not have these properies.

As such, the rejection of properties is not an agnostism, but an alternative emprical account. It is a claim that, when no-one is around, things exist without these properties.

Yes, but a default position that no thing exists that we do not require as a necessary contingent fact is not the same as saying some thing exists which just happens to seem to me as if it does.

I'm not even favouring one over the other here, but a model with the absence of all features is not of the same dogma as a model with some given feature, despite the fact that both are conceptual commitments, they are not both of the same class.

Take a coin for example. There's a frame of reference that is the coin itself, and there's a frame of reference that's not the coin itself, but that's relative to the the coin from some other position, right? — Terrapin Station

Subjects are points in spacetime?

I'm pointing out this is mistaken.

Claiming some properties are absent when we aren't looking is commiting oneself to a presence of contingent states without these properties. It functioning on the same level as any claim for a state with those properties. Both arguments are claiming contingent states of certain properties. My point is they are of the same class.

Claiming some properties are absent when we aren't looking is commiting oneself to a presence of contingent states without these properties. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The claim is that properties are incoherent without a person to define them thus. Not that they aren't there. You're looking at this as if it were an unknown sheet of paper, I'm saying there's no words on it, you're saying that's no less a commitment than saying there are words - we're both committing to what the paper looks like.

But this is not what I'm trying to say.. . Firstly, the right analogy would be between assuming the paper is blank and assuming it has the soliloquy from Hamlet written on it. The soliloquy from Hamlet is just as good a guess as 'blank', but a different type of commitment, it has baggage. Secondly, to continue the metaphor, we're talking about what the paper is without people. The soliloquy from Hamlet is not the soliloquy from Hamlet without people. It is not even marks on paper (marks are only distinct to people who can distinguish black from white).