But isn't there an extra step required to extend concerns from people who already exist to people who might potentially exist? — Echarmion

Future me doesn't exist yet but I care about him. I also care about other people generally. It just follows from the two that I would care about future other people who don't exist yet.

(I also care about people who are already dead, but I've been thinking that that might be a mistake, or at least dwelling excessively on the bygone tragedies of the past may be a mistake, since there's nothing that can be done about it now, unlike future people. I still have to keep myself in check from excessively caring about future people, or other existent people, disproportionate to my influence on them, though).

Well cognitive psychology and myself both disagree with the Freudian conceptualisation of the unconscious, there is a lot of empirical evidence which suggest we have an automatic or implicit consciousness which does contribute toward our behaviour. We can’t keep everything within our cognitive awareness.

But who knows, maybe all sleepwalkers are faking it and are all awake the whole time.

But who knows, maybe all sleepwalkers are faking it and are all awake the whole time. — Mark Dennis

Sure, so take sleepwalking. Evidence that sleepwalkers have mental content that isn't conscious? What would count as that?

The fact that they aren’t conscious and have even been recorded saying things out of character for the conscious personality.

How do we check whether they're conscious while they're saying something?

That question needs clarified and if you have a point to make I suggest you make it soon. We are getting too far away from the topic of conversation here and you’ve not answered very many of my questions, yet expect me to answer question after question that doesn’t even deal with the main meat of what I have said.

The only question I noticed that you asked that I didn't answer (I just searched for it--I found a post I overlooked) was about common moral theories. I mean that literally. So not something highly idiosyncratic--something unique to one person, or to some small cult or something. Common moral theories include contractarianism, divine command theory, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, etc.

Re the question above that you feel needs to be clarified:

The idea is that we have someone who is sleepwalking and who says something while sleepwalking. You said that this is indicative of unconscious mental content. I'm asking how we're checking whether they're conscious or not when they say something while sleepwalking. If you're positing that they're unconscious, presumably we'd have some evidential support of that, no?

So you’re trying to say sleep walking disorder isn’t real and that we should ignore sleepwalkers as evidence of sleepwalking? By very definition of sleep they are not conscious because we are not conscious when we sleep. I shouldn’t have to explain the concept of sleep for you. Your fight is with the evidence of the medical profession that says sleep walking disorder is real.

“So would it be fair to say you are a moral relativist? You believe that morals and value are relative based on things like culture, nationality, religion?” One of the other questions I asked which you conveniently ignored. If you can’t answer questions and you can’t make a point that actually relates to echarmions point then you shouldn’t be on this discussion thread.

Any system of morals that deals with rights of children and acknowledges a parent responsibility to safeguard their children’s future that right there is a moral system that as the rights of future people’s in mind.

Common moral theories include contractarianism, divine command theory, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, etc.

those are historically common moral theories and each of those has many modern variants. So if you’re suggesting that we are only allowed to discuss the moral theories of long dead people that you respect, then I say I’m done with this argument as you’re not contributing to it. It seems to me, that what you call common moral theories, I call entry level ethics.

Try and keep the discussion on track next time. If you aren’t aware of other philosophies and moral systems that deal with these issues then don’t comment and misrepresent the debate like only the systems you are aware of exist. If you don’t know something say it, it’s just intellectually dishonest to say it doesn’t exist just because you are ignorant.

So you’re trying to say sleep walking disorder isn’t real and that we should ignore sleepwalkers as evidence of sleepwalking? — Mark Dennis

I'm not trying to say anything other than I'm saying. I simply asked you a question. There's no need to get upset over a question.

By very definition of sleep they are not conscious because we are not conscious when we sleep. — Mark Dennis

So if we defined sleep as occurring during consciousness would they be conscious? Surely it's not just a matter of definition, right? We must be saying something different about the ontological facts. The terms are just a name for those facts.

I don't agree that we're not conscious when we're sleeping. For example, when we dream, we're aware of dreaming. Normally we name mental states that we have an awareness of "consciousness." It's not identical to waking consciousness--we're not processing sensory or perceptual information in the same way, although we could say that it's very similar to fantasizing or daydreaming consciousness.

So would it be fair to say you are a moral relativist? — Mark Dennis

I'm a moral relativist, yes. A noncognitivist, and more specifically, a subjectivist.

One of the other questions I asked which you conveniently ignored — Mark Dennis

I didn't see that post.

So if you’re suggesting that we are only allowed to discuss the moral theories of long dead people that you respect, — Mark Dennis

lol--I only mentioned common moral theories because uncommon ones could be anything imaginable. So it's difficult to say anything in general about those.

You're moving towards being very patronizing and pompous. There's no need for that. How about just having an honest, good faith discussion and not getting pissy about anything?

You can't be getting offended that I'm challenging anything from a philosophical perspective, right? You're one of the people who did philosophy at university. Surely you're used to views being challenged.

It seems conceivable that one might argue that future people have no standing at all. This would be unintuitive, but does not strike me as prima facie incompatible with common consequentialist or deontological systems. So, I'd like to use the claim that "future people have no standing at all" as a baseline for discussion and ask for your opinions and reasons as to why this statement is correct of false, given the system of moral philosophy you ascribe to. — Echarmion

This is going to ramble a bit, while I get some ideas down...

If we consider that our behaviour is geared towards survival, then what constitutes our success? If it is our capacity to continue an individual life, then we are doomed to inevitable failure. If it is to extend the survival of our particular genetic code, then we compromise this aim with each ‘successful’ reproduction.

But why should we concern ourselves with ‘future people’ if we are the ones meant to survive? Because we’re not meant to survive, and both the efforts we make in this finite life and the pain, humiliation and loss we endure are not just in pursuit of our own temporary pleasures.

That we are aware of ‘future people’ at all appears to be unique to our species. Our capacity to map causal chains beyond our own physical existence enables us to predict potential effects of certain actions, and even initiate alternative actions in order to knowingly cause a preferred effect much further along the chain - and in time - than we may live long enough to observe.

An awareness of ‘future people’ and the idea that the hardships we endure and the choices we make now are for the benefit of our descendants has been a feature of morality teachings for thousands of years, as have the difficulties we’ve faced in buying into it. The Pentateuch, spanning many generations, attempted to make sense of the causal chains that took the Hebrew people away from a fertile land, into slavery and then the desert, before they returned in force to claim the land as their own. These writings made effective use of ‘divine’ prophecy, promises and punishment to help them join the dots where today we would seek (and have the technology to find) more accurate information. They then used those apparent patterns to try and predict future outcomes of current events, and sought to inform or control ‘future people’ with their theories, hopes, warnings, laws, etc.

The information we have about the universe, as a consequence of our past interactions with it, allows us to predict what will be the result for us of future interactions with the universe.

Mapping causal chains this way is as much a scientific endeavour as it is ethical. Mapping multi-generational casual chains feels ‘right’ - even though it conflicts with a ‘natural’ tendency to think, speak and act primarily in one’s own personal interests. That we are capable of reliably predicting effects hundreds of years into the future from our actions today makes us collectively responsible for those effects - because we can choose to be aware of that information or to ignore it, but we cannot choose that the information doesn’t exist. We cannot absolve ourselves of the harm that occurs beyond our lifetime by simply choosing not to make ourselves aware of the causal conditions we create with every action - or by declaring the information inconclusive.

IMO potential people have as much relevance as any other potential event that may not be as predictable as we’d like. We prefer to control for such uncertainty - to effectively ignore or factor out those variables we cannot control or predict. That’s all well and good, but we cannot pretend we are creating a future where people do not exist. We’re going to have to factor this potential in somehow, and be okay with the uncertainty.

“You can't be getting offended that I'm challenging anything from a philosophical perspective, right? You're one of the people who did philosophy at university. Surely you're used to views being challenged.”

Challenged in methodically correct ways. I’m not offended, I’m frustrated as you aren’t actually refuting my arguments that come with questions. So it’s not really an honest debate as I’m taking in everything you say and challenging it with arguments.

Okay subjectivist; here are some questions for you.

Hitler: What I am doing is morally right
Mother Theresa: What you are doing is morally wrong

Which of them is speaking the truth?
If they are both speaking the truth as you would suggest, then their is no moral asymmetry between them, yet there is significant moral asymmetry between them.

A: it was wrong to invade Iraq
B: it wasn’t wrong to evade Iraq.

Which is the true statement?
If they are both true, then statements A and B don’t mean the same thing by the word wrong
If they don’t mean the same thing by the word wrong then they aren’t really disagreeing. Yet they are both disagreeing. So how can subjectivism be taken seriously? It doesn’t move debate forward because it’s the same as saying everyone is right. It’s intellectually lazy.

You should read up on moral psychology as a field.

“only mentioned common moral theories because uncommon ones could be anything imaginable. So it's difficult to say anything in general about those” not if you have a handful in mind that you’ve studied like Schweitzer’s ethics of reverence for life or the ethics of pragmatism and moral psychology.

Which of them is speaking the truth? — Mark Dennis

Neither. Moral utterances are not true or false. Again, I'm a noncognitivist on ethics. So the same for the second question.

So how can subjectivism be taken seriously? — Mark Dennis

Because it's what's the case ontologically. It's factually correct.

You should read up on moral psychology as a field. — Mark Dennis

You should not be patronizing.

not if you have a handful in mind — Mark Dennis

Sure, if you have specific theories in mind and exclude others, you can say something about less common theories.

@god must be atheist Some of the arguments here might resolve some misunderstandings you have about Cultural relativism. Descriptive relativism would serve you better.

Can we not then, on the same temporal grounds, rationally generalize from this moral (i.e. intrinsic benefit of harm / helplessness avoidance & reduction absent, or independent of, extrinsic benefits (i.e. reciprocality (e.g. quo pro quo)) concern for our future selves [FuS] to moral concern for (our) future populations [FuPop]?

— 180 Proof

Well, for one the whole notion would seem to require a consequentialist approach, since we are talking about benefit and harm, correct? — Echarmion

Yes, but a negative consequentialist approach that prioritizes foreseeable harm (i.e. deprivation misery fear etc) reduction & mitigation over all other moral considerations as the "highest good".

It seems convincing that any consequentialist system has considerations of the future states of current person's build in. To this effect, it requires us to consider persons as stable through time. — Echarmion

We only need to consider that persons have (asymmetrically) 'temporal parts', so to speak, which are simultaneously anterior and posterior (except at both ends) much like the stages of development - infant, toddler, child, adolescent, young adult, middle age adult, elder adult - none of which are "the same person" only bearers of a shared continuity of memories, relationships and embodied perspective (vide Parfit, linked previously).

I view my Future self as an extension of myself, but I wouldn't view my grandchildren in that manner.They have no current personhood which I could extent into the future. — Echarmion

Your children, assuming you're a parent, are persons which (will) have future selves that, ceteris paribus, (will) consist in potentials for parenthood just as your future self (will) consist in a potential for grandparenthood, both of which (convergently) imply potential future grandchildren. How parents raise their children will impact any potential future grandchildren during the upbringing of their future selves by your present children's future selves, no? The moral concern of a present parent for a present child is compounded in large part by the prospective welfare of that future child who's potentialities include being a future parent, etc. Just as the future self does not exist presently yet as an extension of the present self concerns the present self ... I don't see how concern for presently nonexistent future grandchildren differs, except in degree.

180 Proof I was with you up until the conclusion “Present Self implies Future Population.”. Could you maybe expand on that a little and clarify. Or correct my reading of the conclusion if it is wrong. — Mark Dennis

Maybe I shouldn't have used the notation for implication; by " --> " I really only mean 'precedes' (i.e. comes before) e.g.

"Present Self precedes Future Population".

Since, as I claim,

"the Present Self, a member of the Present Population, (which) precedes the Future Self, a member of the Future Population"

implying that concern for ourselves entails, or, less strictly, is indistinguishable from, concern for any population to which we belong. Yeah, population (almost always) survives the demise of selves but that future population is an extension of a past population which included ourselves.

Are you saying; as only the present self has agency, it has an obligation to use some of that agency for a future population? — Mark Dennis

Yes, just as present selves use agency for their future selves - and by "agency for" I mean agency to protect and provision the mitigating (or robustifying) of foreseeable needs (i.e. risks) while cultivating capabilities (i.e. adaptive advantages) - which also constitute future populations.

I submit that we all act in consideration of future people all the time: our future selves. — Pfhorrest

Yes.

You do realise that subjectivism and noncognitivism are contradictory views right? You said you were specifically a subjectivist yet you didn’t answer those questions the way a subjectivist would and instead changed your mind and thought you’d prefer me focusing on the noncognitivist instead.

Also, if you’re a subjectivist how can you claim that subjectivism is factually correct when subjectivists don’t believe in facts? This is what I mean about relativists. They say silly things like nothing is true and then claim “nothing is true” is true.

This is the ultimate flaw in moral relativism and with autodidacts it comes out so much more because you hold onto ideas based on feelings, not logic. There is no prescriptive value in relativism whatsoever. You simply went wow at the idea use that very idea to justify the first wow.

You do realise that subjectivism and noncognitivism are contradictory views right? — Mark Dennis

No. I don't realize that. Because they're not contradictory.

What do you believe the P is that one is affirming and the other denying by the way?

You said you were specifically a subjectivist yet you didn’t answer those questions the way a subjectivist would — Mark Dennis

Since I'm a subjectivist, this isn't the case. Obviously I answered them the way a subjectivist would.

Also, if you’re a subjectivist how can you claim that subjectivism is factually correct when subjectivists don’t believe in facts? — Mark Dennis

Oy vey. We're talking about ethics.

No. we were supposed to be talking about The moral standing of future people, not subjecting people to suspiciously pointless debates on the non existent merits of moral relativism.

I’m going to level with you here; there is one over arching reason why you will never convince me that being a relativist or any form of moral antirealism is The Argument of Trust.

There may or may not be moral truths. If there are though, immoral people will try subversive tactics against that claim.

Individuals who claim there are no moral truths have the potential for a dark hidden bias. A reason why they either hope there are no moral truths or a reason why they want to convince other people of it. Now I’m not suggesting this of you but it’s one that should make you pause when listening to other moral antirealist views.

I’m sorry if I’m sounding patronising, I can’t help it sometimes. See, learning the theory is one thing, but how well do you know the personal history of the individuals behind them and the history of the society they lived in? You’d be shocked at how many people immediately discard Kant at the first reading simply because they didn’t understand Kant as a person based on the historical accounts and they rarely understand the times he was living either.

Thank you for bringing questions about the nature of self into this.

To make a distinction between my own future self and that of a person not yet born, saying that I exist and they don't and that they therefore have no moral standing, while my future self does, since I already exist, involves a faulty conception of self not unlike the traditional Christian soul. I don't believe that there is any such personal self that begins to exist at my birth, has continuity throughout my life, and then either ceases at my death or goes to an afterlife. Such a notion falls apart upon examination. And yet, this is how most people seem to think of themselves, probably mostly because of the way memory works, or more precisely, the way information is integrated. Assumptions of the existence of such personal selves sneak into arguments about the moral standing of potential future persons. I suspect that most people making such arguments don't question the mostly unconscious, common-sense (but wrong) notion of what a person is. But such notions of selves and persons should be questioned in the context of such arguments.

180 Proof, is your position on personhood or selfhood basically in agreement with Parfit's?

Thank you for bringing questions about the nature of self into this. — petrichor

:cool:

180 Proof, is your position on personhood or selfhood basically in agreement with Parfit's? — petrichor

My position has definitely been inspired by Parfit's conception of personal identity but more informed by Thomas Metzinger's phenomenal self-model et al.

Also, if you’re a subjectivist how can you claim that subjectivism is factually correct when subjectivists don’t believe in facts? This is what I mean about relativists. They say silly things like nothing is true and then claim “nothing is true” is true. — Mark Dennis

It is possible to be subjectivist about some matters but not others. Subjectivism is just an empirical conclusion about where a truth-maker might reasonably lie for propositions. The answer to this question might well be different for propositions in different fields of thought. For example the 'truth' of Beethoven is a great composer' is not to be found in the world, but we might reasonably think that the truth of 'I can fly unaided' is definitely to be found in the world. It must therefore be possible to be subjectivist about some matters, but not others.

Individuals who claim there are no moral truths have the potential for a dark hidden bias. A reason why they either hope there are no moral truths or a reason why they want to convince other people of it. Now I’m not suggesting this of you but it’s one that should make you pause when listening to other moral antirealist views. — Mark Dennis

I don't see how this doesn't also affect moral realists who have a strong incentive to appeal to some objective, higher-authority, to get people to behave the way they prefer.

I wasn't trying to persuade you to adopt a different view. I gave my opinion on the initial post, that led to a brief back and forth, you asked some questions about that, and I gave my opinion on some of what you were saying in response. I'm happy to give my view about things and to explain it, especially in contradistinction to other views, especially if someone is curious about it, or if they want to suggest that only their view is workable or anything like that.

The reason I buy moral noncognitivism/subjectivism is that I want to get right what the world is like, and it's clear to me, via empirical and logical/reasoned means, that morality is simply dispostions that people have about interpersonal behavior that they consider more significant than etiquette. Moral stances aren't found in the extramental world, so there's nothing there to match or fail to match (so that utterances can be true or false).

If you have a different view that's fine. Hopefully you're also not looking to persuade me to your view, or you really have your work cut out for you.

In other words, a moral system in which everything is morally permissible unless we specify that it's morally prohibited? — Terrapin Station

That'd be one way to go about it.

Future me doesn't exist yet but I care about him. I also care about other people generally. It just follows from the two that I would care about future other people who don't exist yet. — Pfhorrest

The issue I have with this approach is that I think any moral imperative needs to reference a subject. If we are going with a consequentialist approach, the judgement of benefit / harm needs to be made concerning specific moral subjects.

For the future "selves" of present subjects, I can conceptualise their potential future interests as present interests referencing the future. But if I have no current subject to start with, how do I make sense of the notion that a given action harms someone?

IMO potential people have as much relevance as any other potential event that may not be as predictable as we’d like. We prefer to control for such uncertainty - to effectively ignore or factor out those variables we cannot control or predict. That’s all well and good, but we cannot pretend we are creating a future where people do not exist. We’re going to have to factor this potential in somehow, and be okay with the uncertainty. — Possibility

I agree with the epistemological stance here, but it's not just about whether or not we can reasonably predict future harm to future people. It's about what these future people are supposed to be. Moral rules concern the interactions between moral subjects. The problem I see is that future people aren't subjects at all. They're merely imaginations. Reasonable ones, sure, but that doesn't make them persons.

only bearers of a shared continuity of memories, relationships and embodied perspective (vide Parfit, linked previously). — 180 Proof

Sounds good. This nevertheless seems to supply us with a special relationship to our future selves that is absent when we consider potential future persons that are not part of this continuity.

How parents raise their children will impact any potential future grandchildren during the upbringing of their future selves by your present children's future selves, no? The moral concern of a present parent for a present child is compounded in large part by the prospective welfare of that future child who's potentialities include being a future parent, etc. Just as the future self does not exist presently yet as an extension of the present self concerns the present self ... I don't see how concern for presently nonexistent future grandchildren differs, except in degree. — 180 Proof

My issue is that before I can get into deliberations about how a given action might cause harm, I need to establish the moral standing of the affected subject(s). I don't worry about the effects my actions might have on various bacteria, for example, because bacteria aren't considered moral subjects (usually, anyways).

How do I go about doing this for potential future people? I cannot base it on some list of physical characteristics, or on some communicative act. I cannot engage in any form of reciprocal recognition process.

The reason I buy moral noncognitivism/subjectivism is that I want to get right what the world is like, and it's clear to me, via empirical and logical/reasoned means, that morality is simply dispostions that people have about interpersonal behavior that they consider more significant than etiquette. Moral stances aren't found in the extramental world, so there's nothing there to match or fail to match (so that utterances can be true or false). — Terrapin Station

And.... people agree on certain dispositions and enforce those agreements. Those agreements in turn influence what moral stances people adopt. Moral stances aren't found in the external world, but morality is very real in that there are consequences if you fail to match it.

It seems to me that if you want to get right what the world is like, this should at least be part of your description ;-).

And.... people agree on certain dispositions and enforce those agreements. Those agreements in turn influence what moral stances people adopt. Moral stances aren't found in the external world, but morality is very real in that there are consequences if you fail to match it. — ChatteringMonkey

Sure, no disagreement with that. It just doesn't make any of it true/false, correct/incorrect, etc.

It seems to me that if you want to get right what the world is like, this should at least be part of your description — ChatteringMonkey

It's just that that stuff is irrelevant when we're talking about the ontological status of moral stances re whether they can be true or false. You're not going to say every single thing about every aspect of morality every time it comes up. You'd have to write a book over and over.

Humans do write books over and over and have been for centuries. It’s why we have books.

“That stuff is irrelevant” You do realise, in logic that is like saying “my argument works if you take out all propositions and make it a statement”?

It's just that that stuff is irrelevant when we're talking about the ontological status of moral stances re whether they can be true or false. You're not going to say every single thing about every aspect of morality every time it comes up. You'd have to write a book over and over.

I’m starting to have a better understanding of your problems with some aspects of moral realism. How demanding most moral systems tend to be. Would it be fair to say that you’d call Moral systems inherently demanding?

It's just that that stuff is irrelevant when we're talking about the ontological status of moral stances re whether they can be true or false. You're not going to say every single thing about every aspect of morality every time it comes up. You'd have to write a book over and over. — Terrapin Station

Sure. I happen to think it's a vital aspect though if you want to understand how morality and the world works. It's also the reason why a lot of people believe morality is objective, and can be true or false.... well at least after mere convention becomes tied up into some kind of metaphysics. True or false is the context of morality simply means whether or not it is in accordance with fixed convention... the convention part often gets forgotten.

True or false is the context of morality simply means whether or not it is in accordance with fixed convention... — ChatteringMonkey

That's the argumentum ad populum fallacy, and it results in saying that it's true that it's morally permissible to have slaves (if you're in the US in the 1820s in the South), that it's true that it's morally permissible in certain historical tribal settings to cannibalize neighboring tribes, etc.

That's the argumentum ad populum fallacy, and it results in saying that it's true that it's morally permissible to have slaves (if you're in the US in the 1820s in the South), that it's true that it's morally permissible in certain historical tribal settings to cannibalize neighboring tribes, etc. — Terrapin Station

But it is true that it was morally permissible to have slaves in the South of the US in the 1820's.

What's your point? Let me guess... relativism?