Lovely.

I said all those things in my reply to you above, it's just that now I've numbered them so that you can recognise them as an argument.

said all those things in my reply to you above, it's just that now I've numbered them. — Bartricks

Cool. I'm just curious what this thread really is. Psychology experiment?

Why think it is not what it appears to be? Do you often think psychologists are experimenting on you?

It appears to be a person wanting to explore an argument, but the insults come out of nowhere. And the support for reason being the source of morals just has the flavor of an intelligent person trying to write nonsense.

You know that's an insult, right?

No, you insulted me by not coming up with better answer.

Zinger!!

Look, the insults are not coming out of nowhere. You. Just. Insulted. Me. I politely, efficiently, answered your questions.

You then told me that I had not argued anything.

I had.

You then contemptuously kept sending the same messages when I called you on your ignorance.

I went to the trouble of explaining to you what a 'fallacy' is. I went to the trouble of outlining the argument that you thought was not there. The argument that was there. I numbered it so you could recognise it as an argument.

And now, rather than addressing that argument, you decide - as so many others do - to focus elsewhere. To focus on me. To insult me.

The insults are not coming out of nowhere. They are coming out of you and your attitudes and the attitudes of others.

Now, focus on the argument and either highlight an error in the reasoning or make a case against one of the premises.

So not an experiment? Then I don't know what.

Respect the appearances. Not my advice; Aristotle's. It is what it appears to be. Like most things.

And it appears to be a thread in which someone is presenting a proof of a god. Deal.

Aristotle's proof of God is fascinating.

Yes, there is a distinct argument for that. Here:

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued. (That is, being morally valuable must involve featuring as the object of a valuing relation - it is to be the object of a valuing)
2. Only a subject can value something (anything can be valued, but only subjects are capable of doing any valuing)
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject.

That is the argument that refutes all objectivist views - or so I believe (and I would run the same argument for moral prescriptions - so the whole show, moral values and moral norms, are the values and norms of a subject). I don't think it is the only way to refute them - I think the Euthyphro does too - but it is sufficient.

Then I take some arguments that the objectivists standardly use to refute subjectivist views, and use them to refute all bar one subjectivist view: the view that moral norms and values are the norms and values of one subject, Reason.

Possibly that is why so many are finding me a bit bewildering. I am using the other side's weapons.

For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued — Bartricks

That is the premise I think I would disagree with, for the same (or at least an analogous) reason that I disagree with Berkeley's principle that "to be is to be perceived". Yet like Berkeley I am also a radical empiricist: I don't think there is anything to reality besides the observable properties of things. Observation is a "subjective" relationship just like valuing is, but nevertheless I still hold that there is an objective reality. That's because I think there's a difference between something being observable, and something being observed; and also a difference between observation and perception.

I take an analogous approach to morality. I would break down "valuing"-like attitudes into three types -- intentions, desires, and appetites -- that are analogous to belief, perception, and sensation (or observation), and say that just as reality consists in whatever satisfies all observations (but not necessarily all perceptions or all beliefs, and it continues to be real even if no observation is actively happening), likewise morality consists in whatever satisfies all appetites (but not necessarily all desires or all intentions, and it continues to be moral even if no appetites are actively happening). That is "subjective" in the sense that you use in the OP, but still "objective" in the sense that there is single common unbiased truth that in principle everyone could agree upon following sufficient investigation via the correct methods. Just like the scientific view of reality.

I recently wrote about this view in more detail in my essay On Teleology, Purpose, and the Objects of Morality, which you will find refers back to my earlier essays Against Nihilism and Against Transcendentalism for most of its support.

It is not clear to me on what basis you reject that premise, though.

I have a lot of time for Berkeley, but I don't think he subscribed to that principle. He does not say that 'to be' in general is to be perceived, only that the objects of sense are made of sensations and thus that the objects of sense cannot exist objectively (he says of them - of trees and such like - that their essence is to be perceived, but he does not claim that it is the essence of everything that exists to be perceived). For instance, he does not believe that minds themselves exist subjectively, for minds are not objects of sense.

But anyway, you are quite right that my principle is similar, namely that to be valuable is to be being valued. However, I do not see - not yet, anyway - on what rational basis you are rejecting it (or Berkeley's principle - but I put that aside).

I am a valuer. Valuing things is something I can - and do - do. Those things I value can correctly be said to be 'valuable to me'.

When we talk about something being 'morally valuable' what reason is there to think that we are not talking about something being 'valuable' in exactly the same sense in which something that is 'valuable' to me is valuable - namely, valuable by being the object of a valuing attitude?

The ITALICS MINE tag is not a 'bellow' but a standard convention in academic correspondence when a quotation is modified by the citer. But being ignorant of the literature you would not know that.

On the basis of contemporary philosophical developments which transcend 'classical'logic', your 'argument' has been consigned it to the 'folk psychology/philosophy bin'.

I imagine you know a lot about bins.

It is you - not I - who keeps mentioning God. My argument leads to the conclusion that moral values are the values of a subject, Reason.

She is a god. Why? Because she's Reason. It's that way around. She's a not a god and so she's Reason. She's Reason and so she's a god. 'A god' not 'God'. Again, it is you - your ears - that are hearing 'God' every time I say 'a god'. It derails things as it invites a discussion of religious matters not relevant to my case.

I am interested in what's true. I am interested in what moral values and prescriptions are. I have simply discovered that they are the values and prescriptions of a person. And because moral prescriptions are just a subset of the prescriptions of Reason, I have discovered that Reason is a person.

That person, precisely because she is the one whose values constitute moral values, and precisely because she is the one whose prescriptions constitute the prescriptions of reason, is a god. I mean, she determines what's morally valuable. We have reason to pursue our own interests because and only because she says so. And what's true seems to be constitutively determined by her as well. For what is truth apart from what Reason asserts to be the case?

So Reason, this agent, this subject who is herself and not anyone else, seems to me to be omnipotent. She can make anything true. She can do anything. So, I think it is beyond dispute that she's a god. But 'God'? Well, I don't know and I don't care. But 'a god' certainly.

And as for the Euthyphro question, well I have started a thread on it as it is the only concern that, in my view, is capable of raising a reasonable doubt about my case's soundness. Ultimately it fails to do this, I think, but for not-immediately-obvious reasons. On its face, then, it seems like a good objection.

The answer to the Euthyphro question is, of course, not open to negotiation - the god determines what's right. I mean, that's just the view.

The 'problem' that this raises is that it means that moral values and prescriptions (and the other prescriptions of Reason) will be variable.

I don't think that is a problem, but I admit that it appears to be. — Bartricks

You're reifying Reason, even going so far as to call it a she.

I can understand why though. You need a subject for moral values. However you deny subjecthood to humans because just the simple act of valuing something doesn't make something morally valuable. According to you there has to be Reason.

To prevent further needless repetition can you kindly define Reason and god. Thanks.

Yeah, that's valid, like your other superman example.

I'm not 'reifying' Reason. To reify something is to 'mistakenly' think of it as an object. Reason is an object - a subject, a mind. If you think not, then refute my argument. Just insisting that Reason is not a person is not good enough - that's just you expressing a conviction. it doesn't count as evidence.

Where have a denied subjecthood to humans?? That's total nonsense. You're a subject. I am a subject. We're humans. We're subjects.

No, I am not defining 'God' as I didn't mention God. And Reason is the subject whose values are moral values and whose prescriptions are the prescriptions of Reason, a subset of which are moral prescriptions. That's what the argument establishes.

To prevent further needless repetition just follow the argument.

So this argument:

1. if being loved by Superman is one and the same as being loved by me, then if I love you necessarily Superman loves you
2. If I love you Superman does not necessarily love you
3. therefore being loved by Superman is not one and the same as being loved by me. — Bartricks

Is valid. Right. And that is my argument. That. Is. My. Argument. Note, to be loved is to be the object of an attitude. To be morally valuable is to be the object of a valuing attitude - that's what my first argument established. Then the thesis under consideration was whether I could be the valuer whose values constitute moral values. That is the thesis my argument was addressing - and refuting.

Here:

1. If being morally valuable is one and the same as being valued by me, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore, being morally valuable is not one and the same as being valued by me.

And that argument works for any subset of my values. And it works for your valuing attitudes too. All of them, and any subset.

Premise 1 can just as accurately be expressed this way:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable.

That's the same exact premise.

The argument is valid, then. And it is sound. And it refutes all subjectivist views bar mine.

And it refutes all subjectivist views bar mine. — Bartricks

But no-one claims that:

being morally valuable is one and the same as being valued by me, — Bartricks

That would imply me liking cats more than dogs is a moral stance, but it clearly isn't. What this argument establishes is trivial.

Does.

It also refutes any subset of human valuings that you may care to try and identify moral values with. — Bartricks

No, because premise 2 doesn't work for those subsets.

Edit: which is to say the justification for premise 2 would be a matter for debate, defeating the purpose of the argument.

Identify a subset then - a subset of your values - and let's see if it works. I can't fight fog.

Here are your words, in the specific order you presented them.

...to be defined is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground for some immediate and subsequent mediate cognizant ability... — Mww

I want you to keep the above in mind. It is the standard by which we now compare my report of what happened with yours. That's what's in question. You are claiming that what I reported as your words were not your words. You then offer your own report on what you said earlier, and it is guilty of exactly what you're charging me with.

Very odd. Look for yourself...

To be defined is always the primary ground for some subsequent cognizant ability. That's your words.
— creativesoul

No, actually, they are not. Not quite.
(To be defined).....is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground.....

Those are my words. Please recognize the temporal displacement native to the statement.
——————— — Mww

This strikes me as very very problematic.

Edit: which is to say the justification for premise 2 would be a matter for debate, defeating the purpose of the argument. — Echarmion

No, any and all subsets. It works for them all. Try it.

Identify a subset then - a subset of your values - and let's see if it works. — Bartricks

Ok:
1. If being morally valuable is one and the same as being morally valuable to me, then if I morally value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If something is morally valuable to me, it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore, being morally valuable is not one and the same as being morally valued by me.

Premise 2 requires justification, as it is essentially what you mean to establish, i.e that me valuing something as a moral value is not sufficient to establish it's moral value.

1. Humans valuing something doesn't make that thing moral
2. Therefore humans are NOT the subjects of moral values
3. Reason determine moral value
4. Reason = god, a she the subject of moral values

The above is your argument.

Now, if this she-god is a person having her own will the question that arises is:

Is moral value determined by what this she-god likes/dislikes or by reason?

If moral value is determined by what this she-god likes/dislikes then you contradict your claim 3 above. If you say moral value is reason-based then this she-god is unnecessary.

Euthyphro dilemma!!!

Say which subset of your values you want to identify moral values with and we'll take it from there. — Bartricks

@Echarmion is already following this exact same line of argument. I won't bother duplicating unless I think I have something different to add. The subset of my values which I would identify with moral values are my moral values (ie those values which relate to the treatment of others particularly where I value their welfare). This is as any subjectivist would, but I don't even agree with your definition of morality as a set of values in the first place, I'm a virtue ethicist, so I'm already having to talk hypothetically to fit your axioms.

And I've been saying OVER AND OVER that I'm talking about whether it's physically possible for there to be something not "able" to be either positively or negatively valued. — Terrapin Station

I already answered that. With examples.

The brain (which does the valuing) is just a machine. I can't think of any good reason at all not to think that the limits and trends we observe in psychology are limits and trends imposed by the physical make up of that machine.

Valuing is a thing that machine does, so I don't see any reason not to presume that the limits and trends we observe (with respect to valuing) are not limits and trends imposed by the machine.

We have not yet observed an undamaged brain morally valuing a pile of sick, we have a sound theory as to the mechanism that might cause such a limit, so it's completely reasonable to hold the theory that a pile of sick is not morally valuable (ie cannot be valued by the machine that does valuing). — Isaac

I asked you why you were bringing up the idea of "healthy"/"undamaged" (I know why, but I want you to address the crap you're trying to "sneak in"), and you first responded with some oblique nonsense without answering the question, and here you bring it up again. — Terrapin Station

I already answered that too.

I'm saying that moral valuing can reasonably be said to be an activity that healthy, undamaged minds do. Healthy, undamaged minds are machines, the range of possible functions of which are limited. It is not unreasonable to form theories about what those limits might be based on our observations. One of those theories might well be to do with the limits of what it is possible for these brains to morally value. — Isaac

Your latest question was

So what would be something that you believe it would be physically impossible to positively or negatively value? — Terrapin Station

So I answered that too.

I'd say it's impossible for an undamaged infant brain to negatively value it's caregiver. — Isaac

Then you start in with...

all of this Aspieish crap, and you don't answer one friggin question. — Terrapin Station

...in response. Hence my reasonable assumption that things had got a bit heated.

Now, do you have a question that I haven't already answered, or is there some answer I've given that you find unsatisfactory?