Either explain why being morally valuable does not involve being the object of a valusing relation or explain how something objectivery can value something. — Bartricks

An objectivist would counter that there is a relevant sense in which something can be valuable without being the object of a valuing relation; i.e., regardless of whether any subject actually values it. — aletheist

In any case, again, the objectivist denies #1 because actually being valued (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be morally valuable. — aletheist

An objectivist would claim instead that to be valuable is a quality that an object possesses in itself, thus requiring no valuing subject. — aletheist

Rather, as I have stated repeatedly, an objectivist rejects #1 because "being valuable" does not entail "being valued." — aletheist

look up 'Socrates fallacy' — Bartricks

So, Geach's misconception becomes an excuse for not having to define essential terms in a proposition? It is trivially easy to connect the one ambiguous term to the other and then conclude whatever you want.

Things of value are hard and take serious effort. Otherwise, everybody and their little sister can do it; and that is not progress. When it is just too easy to do what you are doing, then we must safely conclude that it has no value.

You're telling me 'about' objectivists, but you're not actually explaining anything.

For instance, look at what you say here:

An objectivist would counter that there is a relevant sense in which something can be valuable without being the object of a valuing relation; i.e., regardless of whether any subject actually values it. — aletheist

What sense? I mean, literally 'what sense'? Make sense of it. I can't. I mean, there's a clear and distinct sense in which I can value something. But it isn't that sense, is it. So, what sense? And explain without begging the question.

In any case, again, the objectivist denies #1 because actually being valued (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be morally valuable. — aletheist

Same here. Exactly the same. It is necessary, as the argument demonstrates. Question begging.

So, construct an argument in which the negation of one of my premises is the conclusion and then let's look at the assumptions you need to make to get to it (they'll be batshit crazy, I reckon)

An objectivist would claim instead that to be valuable is a quality that an object possesses in itself, thus requiring no valuing subject. — aletheist

Question begging.

Rather, as I have stated repeatedly, an objectivist rejects #1 because "being valuable" does not entail "being valued." — aletheist

Question begging.

Make sense of it. I can't. — Bartricks

If I rejected your argument by simply claiming that I could not make sense of it, what would be your response?

So, construct an argument in which the negation of one of my premises is the conclusion and then let's look at the assumptions you need to make to get to it. — Bartricks

I am confident that if I were to construct such an argument, you would immediately reject it by denying one or both of the premisses. As I keep saying, the disagreement is about the premisses, not the arguments.

Question begging. — Bartricks

Question begging. — Bartricks

Question begging. — Bartricks

To which I respond ...

But just saying something doesn't make it so. — Bartricks

Stop being tedious. — Bartricks

I've just spotted this thread which seems to hinge on the straw man dichotomy of 'subjective-objective'. Straw man because all concepts are socially acquired.. a point particularly relevant to morality which involves relationship with others. The futility of the 'debate' is further underscored by the notion of 'self' being a social phenomenon.
Apologies to anybody who has already raised this in the multiple pages.

If I rejected your argument by simply claiming that I could not make sense of it, what would be your response? — aletheist

At first I would charitably take you to be being dishonest, for someone who cannot see that the argument is valid is quite stupid in my opinion. I know you think I'm quite stupid - but I think anyone who thinks the argument is invalid is quite stupid.

Likewise, if you don't know what a valuing relation is, then I would ask you to notice that you value things - that if asked "do you value anything" you would, in other contexts, answer "yes" - and ask you to notice that those valuings are valuing relations.

At that point even if you don't think that moral values are valuing relations of that kind, you could not longer pretend that you do not know what I am talking about.

And if you didn't know what a subject of experience is, I would ask you to inspect yourself, for you are one.

Probably none of that would work and by that point I'd have peppered what I said with little insults here and there as payback for subjecting me to your dishonest attitudes, and you'd be all uppity and tell me what a terrible person I am and give me some advice on how to be a better person, and that would make me even more angry and it would all end badly.

All of that is hypothetical, of course.

I don't understand what objection you're raising. I am not attacking a straw man - I am attacking moral objectivism, a view subscribed to by most contemporary moral philosophers.

I also don't know what you mean by the 'objective/subjective' straw man dichotomy. Are you claiming that moral values are inter-subjective? That is, are moral values like, say, the value of money?

I am confident that if I were to construct such an argument, you would immediately reject it by denying one or both of the premisses. As I keep saying, the disagreement is about the premisses, not the arguments. — aletheist

Why not test that thesis? Note, I don't just deny things, I argue them. Unlike you Argue!!

Note too that for hundreds - literally hundreds - of posts now I have been saying time and time and time again that the argument is valid and that one needs to attack a premise. If you have only just cottoned on to that, well done. But yes, to refute the argument you need to attack a premise. Not just nay say. You need to construct a valid argument with the negation of one of my premises as a conclusion and then what I'll do is see if your premises are more prima facie plausible than mine. If they're not - and I'm currently confident they won't be, but am perfectly happy to end up with egg all over my face - then your argument fails to challenge the soundness of my argument.

And as for all of those 'question begging' accusations I made above - we both know what begging the question involves, yes? It involves assuming the truth of the thesis you are trying to prove. So, if you just blithely assume that moral value is objective, then you have 'begged the question'. And that's what you did. You just said "an objectivist will say this". Yes, defend it though.

If you think that something can be valuable without being the object of a valuing relation, show it. Give a non-moral example of it. Can a cup value being full of tea, for instance?

If you give a moral example you've - guess what - begged the question. YOu need to 'conclude' that moral value is objective, not assume it.

My premise says that being morally valuable involves being the object of a valuing relation. Now it is beyond question that valuing relations exist, and beyond question that when something is featuring as the object of one it is being 'valued'. Hence why the burden of proof is on you if you think there is some other way in which something can get to be valued. Again, don't invoke moral values as your example - why? Because it'll be question begging!

If you think that something other than a person can have an attitude towards something, then provide a non-question begging example. I've got plenty of examples of persons adopting attitudes. You give me a non-question begging example of something that is not a person valuing something.

Don't mention moral value though - don't use that as your example. For that'll be - you guessed it - question begging.

And if you can't do those things, then that's because my argument is a proof. It proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that objectivism about moral values (and prescriptions) is false. If you don't believe me, try and refute the argument.

I do not understand you, as ever. And what I am doing is not easy. If you think it is, just construct a refutation of my argument.

...to be defined is to be conceived, which is always the primary ground for some immediate and subsequent mediate cognizant ability... — Mww

As to first cognitions....just because a subject doesn’t recognize a particular terminology for his conscious mental machinations, isn’t sufficient reason to suppose he isn’t doing the same thing he’d be doing if he did. — Mww

If definitions are required for cognizant ability... He couldn't possibly be doing the same thing.
— creativesoul

I didn’t say definitions were required, you did: — Mww

To be defined is always the primary ground for some subsequent cognizant ability.

That's your words. Primary ground is required for what subsequently follows. That's - purportedly - a cognizant ability in this case.

What you said presupposes that definition is required for some subsequent cognizant ability.

...a subject doesn’t recognize a particular terminology for his conscious mental machinations, isn’t sufficient reason to suppose he isn’t doing the same thing he’d be doing if he did. — Mww

If one is using common language to take account of one's own mental ongoings, then one needs to recognize a particular terminology. If one cannot recognize that particular terminology, one cannot possibly be thinking about it.

And what I am doing is not easy. If you think it is, just construct a refutation of my argument. — Bartricks

The meaning of your argument depends on the meaning of the terms that it uses. By not strictly defining these terms first, you refuse to make a commitment as to what these terms mean in your argument. The result of doing that, is that your argument does not necessarily mean anything in particular. How could I refute an argument which could have lots of different meanings? Which arbitrary meaning would it be about?

When you precisely define terms, you will discover that it is actually quite hard to discover a non-trivial conclusion that logically connects them. It is certainly not possible to do that on the fly, just like that, between breakfast and lunch. That kind of statements tend to be named after the first person who discovered them. That is how hard it typically is to do that.

There is simply not enough commitment in what you say. You would have to take a real risk by precisely defining every term you use in your argument.

I don't know what you mean. Define 'meaning' first, then perhaps I'll understand you - although I think I will probably be asking you for a definition of whatever terms you use to define meaning. And those. And those. And those. But first please define for me every word you've used so far, because I don't know what you mean.

By your own admission, you're not really familiar with predicate logic, modal logic, etc.--even though your arguments rely on these things (modal logic, for example, is logic centered on things like necessity and possibility). But whenever anyone brings up issues with predicate or modal logic, instead of going, "Geez, let me spend some time trying to learn about that stuff"--even if you were to just quietly think that to yourself -- you basically ignore it and try to "start over," essentially by restating your argument and telling people that they really need to learn logic better, so they can someday achieve your level of knowledge about it.

Well, I am aware that some people here seem to be working with different systems of logic. — Bartricks

Right, and there is a reason for that. I, like you, am ignorant of the specifics of anything other than simple predicate logic, but it's important to know that these other systems exist and that predicate logic is limited.

Yes, I have been collecting modal cars for years. Joke. No, I am not sure exactly what it means, which is why I don't use it. I've getting from its use here that it means something like "I am about to confidently start talking nonsense". Is that right? That's how I interpret it. You, for instance, are about to talk nonsense, I think. — Bartricks

Modal comes from mode. Modal statements are one where the predicate is modified in some way. Say if the predicate is "blue" and the subject is the sky, a normal predicate statement is "the sky is blue". Statements such as "the sky is usually blue" or "the sky is necessarily blue" are modal. The terms "usually" or "necessarily" are modal, because they modify.

Am I talking nonsense to you?

Anyway, do you think the argument is valid? The superman one. Is it, or is it not, valid? — Bartricks

Simple predicate logic doesn't function correctly with modal statements. Like others, I'll attempt to illustrate, but I'll use standard language.

Let's start with the simple "Socrates is mortal" syllogism, but with a modal component:
1. All humans are mortal.
2. Socrates is not necessarily mortal.
3. Therefore Socrates is not human.

This is invalid, the conclusion doesn't follow. It would have to read "Socrates is not necessarily human", but he could be, because he could be mortal.

What works is structuring the syllogism so the modal component is effectively "bracketed out"
1. All beings that are necessarily human are necessarily mortal.
2. Socrates is not necessarily mortal.
3. Therefore Socrates is not necessarily human.

Now, your argument is:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore, moral values are not my values.

Let's change the terms:
1. If men are mortals, then if Socrates is a mortal, necessarily he is a man.
2. If Socrates is a mortal, he is not necessarily a man.
3. Therefore, men are not mortals.

It is immediately apparent that this isn't valid. If Socrates is a cat, premise 2 is true, but the conclusion is nevertheless false. In fact, premise 1 is also invalid in it's internal structure. This is merely less visible in your example.

So what's up with your superman example?
1. If S is B, then If S is at G, necessarily, B is at G.
2. If S is at G, B is not necessarily at G.
3. Therefore, S is not B.

This is valid, but it is valid because of a special circumstance: That S and B are identical. This has the effect of "bracketing out" the modal statement again, due to the following:
If S is identical to B, then S is necessarily B and B is necessarily S.

We can therefore add an additional step between 2. and 3.:
2a. Therefore, S is not necessarily B.
From this 2a., 3. follows. But in our earlier Socrates example, it did not.

A final example:
1. If Bartricks is a superhero, then if Bartricks is at the grocery, necessarily a superhero is at the grocery.
2. If a superhero is at the grocery, Bartricks is not necessarily at the grocery.
3. Therefore, Bartricks is not a superhero?

I'm not sure where you got the 'most' from. From a pragmatist pov, most dichotomies tend to be futile...this one in particular which refers back to the more basic one of 'realism-antirealism'. in fact the key issue in 'morality' is more usually 'relative vs absolute' which tends to involve religion.
My objection is that you tend to play logic games with shaky axioms. This may be traditional in 'analytic philosophy' but the latter has taken quite a few body blows in recent years which cumulatively devalue the applifation of traditional logic, based on fixed set membership, since it cannot handle dynamic state transitions in cognition.

So you are rejecting my argument as part and parcel of rejecting analytic philosophy - okay!

The rest of what you said was ignorant gibberish. Continental philosophy is where you belong!

Sorry for not making myself more clear.

For objectively, I used the definition given by Bartricks in his original argument.

For immoral, I mean the opposite of moral and I feel like it would be insulting your intelligence to define what that is. If you do actually want me to define it check the first entry in Webster’s.

For inherent, I mean something that is characteristic of a thing from the moment it comes into existence or a characteristic that is part of its core being, so just as one might say that God (if you were to believe in one, I don’t know your religious beliefs) is inherently omnipotent, I am thus saying that human life is inherently good.

Good, as I briefly mentioned in the post you quoted and more directly in the following one, I define as something that is an attribute of the Form of the Good. You seem to have a deeper knowledge of Plato then I do and I don’t claim to have a ton of experience with platonic writings so I feel as though you can understand what I mean by that probably better than I can put it into words but I feel like I was pretty explicit about what I meant on that topic in my second post.

And as for value, I would define it just as Webster does I believe, as the worth or importance of a particular thing.

I don’t think any of those definitions end up changing the validity of my argument but I would be happy to address any objections you have to the argument itself.

Define 'meaning' first — Bartricks

There is a definition possible for the term "definition". The definition for term X is a predicate function that accepts arbitrary input S and will return yes, if S is an instance of X, and no, if it is not.

So, the term "definition" refers to a purely mechanical procedure that can distinguish between members and non-members of a class. So, a definition is also a set membership function.

The term "purely mechanical" is a synonym for "objective" in this context. The only reliable way of guaranteeing objectivity is to hand over the input data and the algorithm to a machine. If that is not possible, then such classification could in fact be subjective, i.e. dependent on the opinion of the person carrying out the classification.

There are weaker meta-definitions possible, but they tend to be less effective in stamping out ambiguity or in guaranteeing objectivity.

I think that the problem of the meta-definition is indeed an interesting one.

Not to detract from your generally good post, but to add one small point: I think it's important to quantify the terms in the arguments there. When you say that the statement "If men are mortals, then if Socrates is a mortal, necessarily he is a man" is invalid in it's internal structure, that suggests you are imagining the quantification as "all men are mortals", but I take Bartricks' antecedent of "moral values are my values" to mean "all and only moral values are my values", a bi-implication, in which case the consequent "if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable" would be a valid inference from that antecedent (although I think it would be better constructed with the necessity attached to the implication itself, rather than just the consequent: "necessarily, if all and only A are B, then if B(x) then A(x)").

"if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable" would be a valid inference from that antecedent — Pfhorrest

The problem is that the clause after the modal only follows if we're saying morally valuable to me, but he's not saying that, he's saying morally valuable intransitively.

I don’t think anyone here is in the process of writing their dissertation on this topic and if they were they wouldn’t be coming here to banter. I think the point of this page is to informally bounce ideas off of each other and while I 100% agree that in formal philosophy (if I was writing an article or finishing a paper for a masters program etc) I would definitely make sure that every word was carefully defined and understood but since we are not doing any of those things here and because these are the between lunch and dinner kind of comments that you expressed disdain for earlier, I feel like it is reasonable to just give each other the benefit of the doubt and deduce meaning through context unless there is clearly equivocation going on. If that’s not your style no problem but this just may not be the place for you.

For immoral, I mean the opposite of moral and I feel like it would be insulting your intelligence to define what that is. If you do actually want me to define it check the first entry in Webster’s. — username

Morality can be a body of standards or principles derived from a code of conduct from a particular philosophy, religion or culture, or it can derive from a standard that a person believes should be universal.

A morality is a system of rules, i.e. a theory. Therefore, the terms moral and immoral must always be understood in reference to such system/theory. If a system of morality specifies a list of forbidden behaviours, then immoral means behaviour in violation of this system. Which system is it about?

There is an interesting twist to this. Atheists generally reject religious systems of morality but pretty much never propose an alternative. From there on, they often construct theorems outside any possible theory, even though it is mathematically not allowed to do that. Hence, the essential question: Within the confines of which theory are you operating?

And no, "no theory" is not a legitimate theory.

Thanks! You're right that there are more problems with the statement than just that the second premise is modal. I only realized the issue with the internal structure of the first premise when I wrote it down with changed terms.

Of course, if all and only moral values are my values, we have a case of identity again.

Also, re all of these comments about his argument re predicate logic, etc., those only matter if we focus on the natural language semantics of the argument. . . which is an issue that Bartricks apparently doesn't understand (hence why he ignored my question about semantics and its relation to validity). He's simply reducing things to propositional logic, a la modus ponens, modus tollens, etc. in a manner where the natural language sentences he's typing might as well simply be really long variable names (substituting for P, Q, etc.).

Even with his nested conditionals (P-->(Q-->R)), he's reducing Q-->R simply to Q in his mind, so that it's just a simple, not a nested conditional, for modus tollens etc. purposes. So in other words, what reads as if it's a conditional he's basically thinking of as if it's just a long-string variable name for Q.

That is a good point, but if I may be charitable to Bartricks again, I think perhaps what they're aiming for is something along the lines of "if and only if anyone values something, it is morally valuable", and therefore that if he values something, and he is someone, then someone values it, and it is therefore morally valuable. The antecedent "moral values are my values" would have to be changed to "moral values are someone's (such as my) values", and then it would follow necessarily that "if I (or anyone) value something, it is morally valuable".

Haven't read this whole thread yet, not sure if I want to defend Batricks on the whole, just nit picking logic stuff for now.

That is a good point, but if I may be charitable to Bartricks again, I think perhaps what they're aiming for is something along the lines of "if and only if anyone values something, it is morally valuable", and therefore that if he values something, and he is someone, then someone values it, and it is therefore morally valuable. The antecedent "moral values are my values" would have to be changed to "moral values are someone's (such as my) values", and then it would follow necessarily that "if I (or anyone) value something, is is morally valuable". — Pfhorrest

Yeah, but just to the same someone. That's not what he's saying though. He wants the consequent to be the claim that it's morally valuable in general, universally, not just to the people who value it. Because this is all just an ad hoc argument designed to "prove" that morality can't be only a matter of individuals valuing whatever they do.