But what I'm saying doesn't have to be objectively correct for it to be right over and above the opinion of someone who says something completely barmy, and in addition to that, erroneously suggests that all opinions are equal, when they're not. — S

I'm not saying anything like "all opinions are equal." I'd say that they're objectively equal, but that's a category error. Nothing objective evaluates opinions.

They're subjectively unequal. But that doesn't make one subject correct versus another subject when it comes to opinions.

The problem clearly isn't that the opinion of someone who thinks that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "M" is different to mine. I don't believe for a second that you can't see what the actual problem is. Think about the consequences! — S

They'd have a different opinion than you about the consequences. That's the whole point.

I have a different opinion than you do about the consequences of not having any crimes based on "psychological harms," and I have a different opinion than you do about the consequences of not banning any speech. (Not in the sense of disagreeing about consequences; in the sense of disagreeing about whether the consequences are acceptable, desirable, etc.)

I'm not saying anything like "all opinions are equal." I'd say that they're objectively equal, but that's a category error. Nothing objective evaluates opinions.

They're subjectively unequal. But that doesn't make one subject correct versus another subject when it comes to opinions. — Terrapin Station

You suggested that they're equal when you suggested that anything goes. And you suggested that when you said that the view that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "m" would pass the test, along with all kinds of nonsense.

They'd have a different opinion than you about the consequences. That's the whole point. — Terrapin Station

Their opinion wouldn't matter. And that's the whole point. It would cause problems in terms of the consequences whether they recognise that or not. They'd need an argument against it, not just irrational denial.

I have a different opinion than you do about the consequences of not having any crimes based on "psychological harms," and I have a different opinion than you do about the consequences of not banning any speech. — Terrapin Station

I already know that you have a different opinion. The problem isn't that I don't understand that we have a difference of opinion.

But the problem is now apparently that you don't understand that that in itself is not the problem.

You suggested that they're equal when you suggested that anything goes. — S

Anything goes when it comes to opinions not being correct or incorrect. That doesn't imply that I agree with them all. My disagreement, that I feel a different way, that I prefer something else, doesn't amount to me being correct.

And you suggested that when you said that the view that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "m" would pass the test, — S

It could pass the test of really being how an individual feels. That certainly wouldn't be impossible.

Their opinion wouldn't matter. — S

Wouldn't matter to whom/for what?

It would cause problems in terms of the consequences whether they recognise that or not. — S

There's no correct claim re "This is a problem." It's a subjective opinion whether something is a problem. Different people think that different things are a problem or not. They can't get that correct or incorrect. It's not a matter of rationality. It's a matter of someone's disposition, how they feel, what they prefer.

It's a subjective opinion whether something is a problem. — Terrapin Station

How subjective of a problem is drowning, for instance?

There isn't anything objective about whether drowning is a problem. How would you think that whether it's a problem is somehow found in the extramental world?

It's objectively problematic in terms of vitality. Everyone who values their health finds it a problem.

"Someone valuing their health" is something that only obtains subjectively.

Thus, it's not objective that it's a problem. A person has to value particular things for it to be a problem. That makes it subjective. Drowning is an objective fact. Whether it's a problem to S depends on what S values, what S's dispositions are, what S prefers.

(Not our S -- S is a generic variable for a subject)

Re-read:

It's objectively problematic in terms of vitality. — Shamshir

It's a problem for and of every living person.
Consequently those who want to live will stray from it, and those who do not, will not.

When I wrote, "There's no correct claim re 'This is a problem.' It's a subjective opinion whether something is a problem."

What was the definition of "problem" I was referring to?

(As an aid, maybe look up "problem" in a dictionary and see if you can figure out what definition I might have been using)

Anything goes when it comes to opinions not being correct or incorrect. That doesn't imply that I agree with them all. My disagreement, that I feel a different way, that I prefer something else, doesn't amount to me being correct.

It could pass the test of really being how an individual feels. That certainly wouldn't be impossible. — Terrapin Station

You're completely missing the point, and going back over our discussion, I think I've found where the problem originated. It should have been very obvious from the start that with my talk of tests, I wasn't merely talking about whether a statement, such as, "There shouldn't be any crimes beginning with the letter 'm'", matches someone's feeling that it's right. That's a really stupid way to interpret what I was getting at. What's wrong with you? I'm talking about a proper test, and one regarding the acceptability of the proposition. A test which passes anything at all, no matter how barmy, so long as it matches a feeling, is no test at all. It's clearly not fit for purpose.

There's no correct claim re "This is a problem." It's a subjective opinion whether something is a problem. Different people think that different things are a problem or not. They can't get that correct or incorrect. It's not a matter of rationality. It's a matter of someone's disposition, how they feel, what they prefer. — Terrapin Station

Those are just unfounded assertions, whereas I can easily point to the overwhelming evidence of how much mayhem the implementation of legalising all crimes beginning with "m" would cause. Again, you'd need an argument against that, not just irrational denial.

Problems are undesirables. Drowning is undesirable to one's health.
That someone might be suicidal, doesn't make drowning desirable to one's health, but makes one's health undesirable.

The flaw here is that you think that people can't desire problems.

I wasn't merely talking about whether a statement, such as, "There shouldn't be any crimes beginning with the letter 'm'", matches someone's feeling that it's right. — S

I didn't say that's what you had in mind. I said that that was the only thing that I would think would work as a "test." I was explicit about that. I figured that that was NOT what you had in mind, and that you'd detail the sort of test you'd have in mind instead, but you didn't do that, and you said that what I had in mind would work. So what the heck would a "proper test" be?

whereas I can easily point to the overwhelming evidence of how much mayhem the implementation of legalising all crimes beginning with "m" would cause. — S

A person who believes there should be no crimes starting with the letter "M" wouldn't agree that the objective facts re consequences are undesirable.

That's just like I don't agree that the objective facts re consequences of not banning speech, or not having crimes based on psychological harm are undesirable.

Problems are undesirables. Drowning is undesirable to one's health. — Shamshir

So the world, aside from minds, has desires in your view?

I didn't say that's what you had in mind. I said that that was the only thing that I would think would work as a "test." — Terrapin Station

But it very obviously wouldn't work as a test, because it would allow all kinds of nonsense, such as no crimes beginning with "m". And if you're taking what I said out of context and talking instead about a test of whether that matches someone's feeling, then you're committing a fallacy of relevance. That's not the purpose of the test.

So what the heck would a "proper test" be? — Terrapin Station

Obviously something other than a "test" which passes literally anything conceivable, so long as it matches someone's feeling. That's a minimal requirement that you're failing on. I don't have to provide you with a more detailed proposal of how a test should be performed to be right about that. This is what we're arguing over for now. Are you going to concede or try to defend your absurd position? Those are your only two options. Red herrings don't count.

A person who believes there should be no crimes starting with the letter "M" wouldn't agree that the objective facts re consequences are undesirable. — Terrapin Station

Irrelevant.

That's just like I don't agree that the objective facts re consequences of not banning speech, or not having crimes based on psychological harm are undesirable. — Terrapin Station

Also irrelevant.

Things desire to move. That's obvious.

But it very obviously wouldn't work as a test, because it would allow all kinds of nonsense, such as no crimes beginning with "m". And if you're taking what I said out of context and talking instead about a test of whether that matches someone's feeling, then you're committing a fallacy of relevance. — S

Another way to look at it is that I think that the idea of a "test" for one's moral stances is incoherent if one is a metaethical subjectivist/noncognitivist. Or it's incoherent aside from "testing" that one's stances are really how one feels. I didn't expect that's what you had in mind. But who knows what you have in mind, because as I said, I think the idea is incoherent. When I suggest something that I would think would work as a "test" I'm being charitable.

Obviously something other than a "test" which passes literally anything conceivable, so long as it matches someone's feeling. That's a minimal requirement that you're failing on. I don't have to provide you with a more detailed proposal of how to a test should be performed to be right about that. — S

So why should I believe that there's some sort of "test" for moral stances where the idea of that would be coherent, if you don't even know an example of one?

All this is amounting to is that some stances are really, really different than anything you'd think, and you can't accept that someone might think something, feel some way, that's really, really different than how you are.

Irrelevant. — S

??? That's the whole nut of whether they'd think it's a problem or not. This is just the same as the discussion we've been having with schopenhauer. There are plenty of people who don't see hunger as a moral problem. schopenhauer doesn't care about that. It's a moral problem simply because HE says it is. That's the same thing you're doing here. Whether something is a problem to someone depends on how they feel about it.

Things desire to move. That's obvious. — Shamshir

So desire isn't a mental phenomenon in your view, or are you asserting something like panpsychism?

I don’t think either of them are referencing an objective world with desires/subjective feeling, but rather an objective standard that makes sense from a premise or axiom.
So you are focused on how one values or feels about, say, not dying. They are talking about what makes sense (regardless of feeling) with the subjective value as the premise or axiom. Once you (subjectively) determine the value of not dying, certain things either make sense to that end or do not, and can be correct or incorrect on whether it leads to dying.
In moral terms, replace “not dying” with something like “flourishing well being of mankind” or “maximum happiness”. Even if you think those terms are nebulous, what is meant by each can be refined case by case and what it means to achieve or service that premise either makes sense or it doesnt.

Another way to look at it is that I think that the idea of a "test" for one's moral stances is incoherent if one is a metaethical subjectivist/noncognitivist. — Terrapin Station

It's not. That suggests that anyone who is a metaethical subjectivist or noncognitivist must adhere to the senseless 'anything goes' version which you yourself adhere to. That suggestion is false. That is very much not the case at all, otherwise I wouldn't be a metaethical subjectivist.

Or it's incoherent aside from "testing" that one's stances are really how one feels. — Terrapin Station

That was a really unhelpful and distracting aside which you shouldn't have even brought up. There's no disagreement here that one can check how they feel about something. The next time you have one of those thoughts, maybe keep it to yourself.

So why should I believe that there's some sort of "test" for moral stances where the idea of that would be coherent, if you don't even know an example of one? — Terrapin Station

I do, and that should be obvious by now. A test which fails to rule out the proposition that crimes beginning with "m" should be legalised is not a test fit for purpose.

You have a burden to either argue against that or concede, and if you only respond with red herrings seeking additional unnecessary details, then I will be justified in taking that as tantamount to you conceding.

All this is amounting to is that some stances are really, really different than anything you'd think, and you can't accept that someone might think something, feel some way, that's really, really different than how you are. — Terrapin Station

No, that's a fundamental misunderstanding on your part. I've already made it crystal clear that I understand and accept that there are different stances, including those which are really, really different.

In response to that, I repeat that that in itself is not the problem. Why are you making me repeat myself?

??? That's the whole nut of whether they'd think it's a problem or not. This is just the same as the discussion we've been having with schopenhauer. There are plenty of people who don't see hunger as a moral problem. schopenhauer doesn't care about that. It's a moral problem simply because HE says it is. That's the same thing you're doing here. Whether something is a problem to someone depends on how they feel about it. — Terrapin Station

Something can be a problem in different respects, and all I'm saying in the case of you merely pointing out a disagreement is that the disagreement that you're pointing out is irrelevant in this case because it's a problem beyond the disagreement you're pointing to. It doesn't even have to be objective for that to be the case. Come on, surely you're capable of seeing that.

I don’t think either of them are referencing an objective world with desires/subjective feeling, but rather an objective standard that makes sense from a premise or axiom.
So you are focused on how one values or feels about, say, not dying. They are talking about what makes sense (regardless of feeling) with the subjective value as the premise or axiom. Once you (subjectively) determine the value of not dying, certain things either make sense to that end or do not, and can be correct or incorrect on whether it leads to dying.
In moral terms, replace “not dying” with something like “flourishing well being of mankind” or “maximum happiness”. Even if you think those terms are nebulous, what is meant by each can be refined case by case and what it means to achieve or service that premise either makes sense or it doesnt. — DingoJones

There are two problems there: one, the fact (if it is one, more on this in a moment) that one would only see drowning as a problem if one does not want to die makes "drowning is a problem" subjective.

Two, if someone says, "I value living," but also says, "I don't see drowning as a problem," this is no way implies that they're incorrect. Because there's no objective fact that says that one either has to have dispositional/feeling-oriented stances that are consistent or that at least seem consistent to other people. (A fortiori because there are no objective normatives period.)

That's suggests that anyone who is a metaethical subjectivist or noncognitivist must adhere to the senseless 'anything goes' version which you yourself adhere to. — S

Descriptively, at least potentially anything could go. In other words, someone could have just about any imaginable stance.

Evaluatively, no one thinks "anything goes," because people always have preferences. Our preferences can't serve as a test of correctness for other people unless we're unbelievably egotistical/self-centered.

In terms of correct/incorrect, we could say "anything goes," but the realm of "correct/incorrect" is the wrong realm for this stuff. That's the whole idea of noncognitivism.

You have a burden to either argue against that or concede, — S

Based on . . . .?

No, that's a fundamental misunderstanding on your part. I've already made it crystal clear that I understand and accept that there are different stances, including those which are really, really different. — S

The test you proposed above has no motivation or support behind it aside from the fact that you find the idea of that stance too different.

because it's a problem beyond the disagreement you're pointing to. It doesn't even have to be objective — S

So what's the beyond? Is this just you kowtowing to the crowd again?

Descriptively, at least potentially anything could go. In other words, someone could have just about any imaginable stance. — Terrapin Station

You're talking past me again, and that's a problem. I agree with that, but that's beside the point. I wasn't using the phrase "anything goes" in that sense. Are you even trying? It's like you're doing this on purpose.

I am of the position that what's required here is a test which doesn't pass just about any imaginable stance. I'm against 'anything goes' strictly in that sense, not some other sense you can come up with. And I know that that's possible, because my own position doesn't go by a test like that. The example I've given fails that test.

Evaluatively, no one thinks "anything goes," because people always have preferences. Our preferences can't serve as a test of correctness for other people unless we're unbelievably egotistical/self-centered. — Terrapin Station

The results are all that matter, not your opinion about how egotistical it is. If the results include stuff like the example, then that reflects poorly on the test.

In terms of correct/incorrect, we could say "anything goes," but the realm of "correct/incorrect" is the wrong realm for this stuff. That's the whole idea of noncognitivism. — Terrapin Station

You would need to successfully argue the point that those terms can't apply in the way that I think they can. You haven't provided any argument at all for that in this discussion from what I recall.

Based on . . . .? — Terrapin Station

Based on proper conduct relating to the burden of attempting adequate justification (more commonly known as the burden of proof, but I know how easy it for you to get distracted) or of being intellectually honest enough to admit that you can't provide a justification, and based on logic, and things like that.

Do you value intellectual honesty? Yes or no?

The test you proposed above has no motivation or support behind it aside from the fact that you find the idea of that stance too different. — Terrapin Station

That's not true. Do I really need to elaborate on why a test fit for purpose would need to rule out stuff like my example?

So what's the beyond? Is this just you kowtowing to the crowd again? — Terrapin Station

Why would you think that it's not a problem just because a single person is wilfully blind to it? We call things problems if they're generally considered problematic based on a number of things a large enough number of people have in common. You're doing that thing again where you act as though you haven't a clue about ordinary language use. Your default assumption shouldn't be that I'm speaking Terrapinese, it should be that I'm speaking normally. The former would be idiotic and will cause a lot of problems.

You are just referencing back to the subjective premiss. Sure, if you dont want to be consistent, or be rational, or operate within reason then there is nothing that forces you to do so. These are things that are subjective, choices based on how you feel about something if that's the way you want to put it.
Im not talking about that, and I dont S is either.

You are just referencing back to the subjective premiss. Sure, if you dont want to be consistent, or be rational, or operate within reason then there is nothing that forces you to do so. These are things that are subjective, choices based on how you feel about something if that's the way you want to put it.
Im not talking about that, and I dont S is either. — DingoJones

Yes, that's more or the less a problem we've been having. I'm saying, sure, metaethical subjectivism, but let's be sensible. He's basically saying, no, that's not metaethical subjectivism, metaethical subjectivism must not be sensible. Some people aren't sensible, and a test fit for purpose should pass those views, not reject them as sensible people would.

So he has a misunderstanding of what metaethical subjectivism entails, and he isn't really making any sense regarding his views on a test fit for purpose.

You're talking past me again, — S

I addressed different senses you might have had in mind, because I wasn't sure. Again, it's being charitable. If I were to just ask you what sense you have in mind, I'm guessing you'd not just straightforwardly answer, because that keeps happening. So I addressed multiple senses to avoid having to ask you.

You would need to successfully argue the point that those terms can't apply in the way that I think they can. — S

I'm not sure how you think they can. The only things I can imagine are that you're either (1) egotistically asserting your view as correct and anything too different from it as incorrect, (2) appealing to common or consensus opinion and equating that with "correct," which is the argumentum ad populum fallacy, or (3) saying that it either matches or fails to match what the world is like, but factually, the extramental world (extramental because otherwise then we either have (1) or (2) above) doesn't contain moral stances--hence why objectivism is wrong (it fails to match what the extramental world is like).

Based on proper conduct — S

Seriously? You think that I'm going to go, "Proper conduct? Alrighty then" ?

That's not true. — S

Then support it better.

We call things problems if they're generally considered problematic based on a number of things a large enough number of people have in common. You're doing that thing again where you act as though you haven't a clue about ordinary language use. — S

So yeah, you are just kowtowing to the crowd again. ಠ_ಠ

There's nothing else to talk about, though. Again, there are no factual normatives.

This means that it is not correct/incorrect to not have (seemingly) inconsistent dispositions, feelings, etc.

Yes, that's more or the less a problem we've been having. I'm saying, sure, metaethical subjectivism, but let's be sensible. He's basically saying, no, that's not metaethical subjectivism, metaethical subjectivism must not be sensible. Some people aren't sensible, and a test fit for purpose should pass those views, not reject them as sensible people would. — S

"Sensible" is simply "something not too far removed from my own or from the consensus view" --that is, something not too different. Where the only thing motivating that is whether it matches oneself or the norm (which are more or less the same thing if one tempers one's views to the norm).

There's nothing else to talk about, though. — Terrapin Station

There is though, and thats what other people are talking about when you think (or pretending to think) they are talking about the subjective premiss.

There is though, — DingoJones

I mean (and this should be clear from context) there is nothing else to talk about that aren't confused fictions.

I think you are talking about two different things, and thats why it seems confused fiction to you.