Your argument may be sound, but it has nothing to do with your life. It's forever esoteric. Think about it.

Good night.

I was nauseated by your attempts to bait the phantom Christian. You have to admit, that was ugly.

I am literally the only one who is not confused. — Bartricks

I don't know if he's confused, but some combo of delusional, trolling, irrationally stubborn, etc. might be the case.

If I value something necessarily it is morally valuable.
If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable.

:worry:

Question....just because:

Given herein that the principle of necessity makes explicit that for which contingency is impossible. What is it for any rational agent that it is absolutely impossible not to value, such that it must be valued necessarily?

the first premise says 'if' my valuings are morally values (so not 'they are' but 'if') then if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable.

Analogy - if water is made of gold then if I have some water necessarily I have some gold.

Then the next premise says that if I value something it won't necessarily be morally valuable.

Analogy - if I have some water I do not necessarily have some gold.

Both premises are consistent with each other, because the first does not assert that moral values 'are' my values. It says 'if'.

They are also both true. Like the water/gold ones.

Together they entail that moral values are not my values.

not sure I follow you. But I don't think there's any particular thing a subject must value. But even if there were, that would not make that value a moral value.

yes, it is sound. So its conclusion is true.

As for it having no practical implications - well you are incredibly bad at discerning implications so you have no reliable basis for drawing that conclusion. And it's wrong.

But anyway this is philosophy and we're interested in what's true, yes? Not what's therapeutic. What's 'true'.

What is truth?

Are you Pontius Pilate now? Jesus didn't answer, but I will. It is whatever Reason sincerely asserts to be the case.
But I thought you a) didn't care as it has no practical import (according to you) and b) I make you sick.

I am not making the claim, you are. It a sign of a poor argument that you make outlandish claims and then pass the burden of proof to anyone opposing them. — Isaac

It is not the one making a claim who has the burden of proof - that's only something those who get all their information from youtube videos think. No, it is the one who says things that are contrary to appearances who has the burden of proof. After all, if you claim that the one who has made a claim has the burden of proof then you have made a claim yourself and have a burden of proof. And you are not going to be able to discharge that burden without appealing to other claims, and so nothing turns out to be justified. Which is really stupid, because that means you're not justified in thinking nothing is justified.

Anyway, you don't know what you're talking about. That's the message here.

Go to a bookshop. Pick up an introductory book on ethics - one written by a professional philosopher and published by a reputable academic publishing house, not one written by a scientist or a psychologist - and read what it says about divine command theories and the primary reason they should be rejected.

It isn't 'atheism'. After all, if divine command theory is true, then guess what - atheism is a very unreasonable position. That's something most atheists realize, hence why they typically argue 'against' divine command theory.

And guess what else - atheism and divine command theory are....compatible! Atheism says no gods exist. Divine command theory says that for morality to exist, a god needs to exist. Those are compatible beliefs. Nietzsche and Hobbes held this combination of beliefs.

What's not compatible with divine command theory is - wait for it - the conclusion of the Euthyphro argument!! Hence why that - and not atheism - is the main reason why divine command theories are rejected.

Again, because you have such a poor grasp of the dialectic here, let's go through it (pointless, I know, so determined are you that you're right, despite having no arguments to offer for anything).

Here are two arguments. Argument A.

1. If moral values and norms exist, a god exists
2. Moral values and norms exist
3. Therefore a god exists

Argument B

1. If moral values and norms exist, a god exists
2. No god exists
3. Therefore no moral values and norms exist

Which is the stronger argument, other things being equal?

A.

Why?

Because both are valid and share the same first premise. But they contradict, so we know that at least one premise is false.

As they only differ in terms of their second premises, it is those we must compare to judge their relative strength.

2A is self-evident to reason. That is, it is supported - extremely well supported - by rational representations.

2B, by contrast, is not. It is just a belief.

Furthermore, argument B entails a conclusion that conflicts with rational appearances.

Thus only a fool would endorse argument B over argument A, other things being equal.

And that - that - is why it is the Euthyphro, and not atheism, that is the main reason why divine command theories are rejected. For atheism is more reasonably believed to be false, if premise 1 is true.

And thus for atheism to be credible, premise 1 needs to be challenged.

You can't challenge it by just insisting atheism is true.. I mean, you would and so would most others here, becsaue you think if you think something it is true. But a competent arguer would not do that.

You need to dispatch 1 on independent grounds.

Most philosophers currently - I stress, 'currently', not historically - think that there are good rational grounds for rejecting premise 1. The....EUTHYPHRO. Deal.

Suppose Bartricks is right, and what is good is exactly what is demanded by reason.

Even then, each of us must decide whether to do what is demanded by reason.

So, even then, we must each decide whether to follow the divine command or no.

Hence Divine Command Theory is of no use in helping us decide what to do. — Banno

Yes, and the further problem is how do we, with our fallible reason, know what is demanded by Divine Reason?

Apparently we ask @Bartricks.

Suppose Bartricks is right, and what is good is exactly what is demanded by reason.

Even then, each of us must decide whether to do what is demanded by reason.

So, even then, we must each decide whether to follow the divine command or no.

Hence Divine Command Theory is of no use in helping us decide what to do — Banno

What's that got to do with the price of tea in China? Whatever theory of Reason is correct, that remains true. That is, whatever Reason is you still have to decide whether to follow Reason's prescriptions. So your point is utterly irrelevant.
The issue is what moral values are. And moral values are - demonstrably are - the values of Reason, and Reason is demonstrably a subject, a subject who is utterly herself and not you or I.

Be indifferent to that conclusion all you want, that won't affect its truth. Reality doesn't work like that.

↪Janus Apparently we ask Bartricks. — Banno

That is sooo not my position! Just barmy.

And guess what else - atheism and divine command theory are....compatible! Atheism says no gods exist. Divine command theory says that for morality to exist, a god needs to exist. Those are compatible beliefs. Nietzsche and Hobbes held this combination of beliefs. — Bartricks

If one theory says that gods do not exist and the other says that gods exist, how can they be compatible?

Some textual evidence from Hobbes and Nietzsche is required else there is no reason to think your claim about them is anything but another empty assertion.

And, granting for the sake of argument that there is a Divine Reason that issues moral commands how do we, with our fallible reason, know what Divine Reason commands?

I'm not providing references - this is the internet!! Just look them up if you don't believe me. I mean, Nietzsche is probably the most famous atheist in the world - and he was writing his works precisely in order to prepare people for the realization that as 'God is dead' there are no moral values, just our own - and Hobbes, well, Hobbes was a thoroughgoing materialist who, though he could never say explicitly that he did not believe in any gods (that would literally have cost him his life), was known as the 'beast of Malmesbury' precisely because everyone nevertheless thought (no doubt correctly) that he was an atheist.

And, as ever, you just don't understand these positions. Divine command theory is not a theory about what exists. It is a theory about what would need to exist for morality to exist. Hence it is compatible with atheism (which is a theory about what exists).

Atheist divine command theorists are nihilists. Not the only way to arrive at nihilism, but one way.

As to how you might know what Reason prescribes and values - you consult your reason. The faculty designed to give you insight into what Reason prescribes and values. The faculty that, if you would but consult it, will tell you that my arguments are sound.

And, as ever, you just don't understand these positions. Divine command theory is not a theory about what exists. It is a theory about what would need to exist for morality to exist. Hence it is compatible with atheism (which is a theory about what exists). — Bartricks

No, your position is self-contradictory. Divine Command theory claims that morality exists. Divine Command theory claims that if morality exists then gods exist. Therefore Divine Command theory claims that gods exist. Atheism claims that gods do not exist. Therefore atheism cannot be compatible with Divine Command theory.

As to how you might know what Reason prescribes and values - you consult your reason. The faculty designed to give you insight into what Reason prescribes and values. The faculty that, if you would but consult it, will tell you that my arguments are sound. — Bartricks

And if my reason prescribes something different than yours? What then? How could we know whose reason is in accordance with Divine Reason? What if my reason tells me (which it does) that there is no Divine Reason?

I'm not familiar with Hobbes' work, but I am familiar with Nietzsche's, and he was certainly no Divine Command theory adherent, or even sympathizer; quite to the contrary.

Okaay. Whatever!

Whatever theory of Reason is correct... — Bartricks

There are theories of reason? So we need to decide which is right. How? By reason...

Doubtless that's not a problem, either.

It's a bit manic in here, isn't it.

I think moral values are demonstrably subjective. Here is my simple argument:

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject. — Bartricks

To present your argument, this argument needs to be reworded, as it is rather sloppy as presented.

1. For something to be morally valuable, that something needs to be morally valued.
2. Only a subject can value something.
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable, that something must be morally valued by a subject.

(Reason for improvement in wording: A spoon can be valued at 44 cents, so valuing in and by itself is not sufficient. It needs to be valued MORALLY.)

You say the premise and the logic are infallible, so your argument is infallible.

But they are not. Placing a moral value on something by a subject could be universal, that is, absolute or else the placing could be subjective. The stipulation in 1 and 2 do not exclude the possibility that the moral value the subject places on something is universal. NOT every subject must place a moral value on a universal moral value; it is sufficient if only some subjects place a moral value on a universally valuable morality.

Think of it this way: Two blind chickens are pecking at the ground, picking up small pebbles, hoping that one of the pebbles will be an edible piece of grain. One will find grain pieces repeatedly, the other will never find the grain. (Say, within a time period of an hour.) Do the grain exist, and its nutritional value exist? Yes. Does the one chicken that finds it see it justified to believe that the grain and its nutritional value exist? Yes. Does the second one find that? No. Yet the grain exists.

Two people valuate their actions for morals. Neither of them is on the opinion that universal morals exist. They just blindly, haphazardly keep changing behaviour, trying to find the ultimately absolute moral behaviour. One repeatedly finds this behaviour; he will feel good, he will feel that he acted morally. The other never finds this behaviour. He will not have the experience of feeling good due to moral behaviour. But absolute morality, despite not having been found by the second subject, exists.

---------------------

P.s. I don't believe in absolute morals. But I am also on the opinion that your argument is not fool proof or irrefutable, as I have shown it above.

I'm not providing references - this is the internet!! Just look them up if you don't believe me. I mean, Nietzsche is probably the most famous atheist in the world - and he was writing his works precisely in order to prepare people for the realization that as 'God is dead' there are no moral values, just our own - and Hobbes, well, Hobbes was a thoroughgoing materialist who, though he could never say explicitly that he did not believe in any gods (that would literally have cost him his life), was known as the 'beast of Malmesbury' precisely because everyone nevertheless thought (no doubt correctly) that he was an atheist. — Bartricks

These: Hobbes and Nietzsche are far from being far as a representative sample of atheists viewing morality.

Question....just because:

Given herein that the principle of necessity makes explicit that for which contingency is impossible. What is it for any rational agent that it is absolutely impossible not to value, such that it must be valued necessarily? — Mww

It needs only to meet our definitions.

the first premise... — Bartricks

...is missing some necessary quantification.

As already stated, not all value is moral value.

the first premise says 'if' my valuings are morally values (so not 'they are' but 'if') then if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable. — Bartricks

The first premiss needs to say 'if all'...

Because if some values are not, then the first premiss is false on it's face.

Analogy - if water is made of gold then if I have some water necessarily I have some gold.

If some water is not... the premiss is false on it's face.

Does the one chicken that finds it see it justified to believe that the grain and its nutritional value exist? Yes. — god must be atheist

The chicken sees the grain. Chickens do not see in terms of justification, nor are they even capable of thinking in such terms. Seeing belief as justified is to isolate that belief and apply a standard.

A belief being justified(well-grounded) is another matter.

I see neither in the example. Chickens do not know about the nutritional value of grain. Chickens do not have such thought/belief about the grain.

Together they entail that moral values are not my values. — Bartricks

I reject entailment. Following the rules of entailment is the foothold of Gettier. It is to mistakenly connect claims that have nothing to do with one another. If I believe that I am going to get a job as a result of being told so, the number of coins in my pocket is utterly irrelevant. If I think to myself "I am going to get the job, oh... hey, I have ten coins in pocket... So, the man with ten coins in his pocket is going to get the job" then I am referring to myself. The man with ten coins in his pocket - in my mind - is me!

As aside. Worth a brief mention.

No, your rewording is wrong and far from improving on mine, it makes the premise into a tautology.
My argument is fine as it is, you just don't understand it.

Clue: the whole point of the argument - the whole point of it - is to establish that my valuing something (or your valuing something) is not sufficient for it to be morally valuable!!

I think you don't understand arguments.

I do not understand your chicken/pebble analogy.

They are both good examples of prominent thinkers who are both atheist (certainly in Nietzsche's case, and almost certainly in Hobbes's) and divine command theorists.

They were not supposed to be representative of the views of athiests, but good examples of atheist divine command theorists!