Does a robot that determines what it will do based on random nuclear decay have free will? — khaled

The action is free, but it wouldn't have anything to do with will unless we have some reason to believe that the robot is conscious and has the mental phenomenon of a will.

But why couldn't the universe just have infinite possibilities in any given moment, but only some actually occur? — ZhouBoTong

because probabilities is a human-only oriented knowledge prediction. A mind could potentially foreknow or precognize all events in the future, but a human mind can't as its lack of ability to encompass all that is to know to know the future manifests in less and less accurate predictions with each iteration of the causation process; the further into the future, the less accurate the prediction, the less probable that a foretelling is precise. But it is only from the point of view or from the limited capacity of the human mind. In effect, the future is knowable, and precisely knowable, since there is no cause without an effect, and no effect without a cause.

Your opinion extrapolates from what is knowable by humans, to what is theoretically knowable. That is a mistake.

The ‘infinite possibilities in any given moment’, for me refers to the fifth dimension. — Possibility

The fifth dimension? Wouldn't we just call it abstract thought?

We can only verify the existence of one ‘actual’ moment because to do so it must be measured/observed in relation to the rest of the 4D structure of our experience. — Possibility

Isn't science a LONG way from being able to explain everything about "the existence of one 'actual' moment"?

Once science has completed the chain of determinism then I will be able to get behind these sorts of ideas. Until then I will struggle to accept 'proof' of an absence of choice.

For most of the universe, the infinite possibilities in each moment are not only beyond awareness, but they’re also beyond any deliberate interaction. — Possibility

Aren't imagination and abstract thinking a method of deliberately interacting with possibilities?

And yet they exist, otherwise you wouldn’t be asking the question, would you? — Possibility

Well the possibilities certainly exist in the abstract. I can admit that we can not know (yet?) whether they could have existed tangibly.

How are you vaguely aware of them? — Possibility

I am acutely aware of the possibilities that "I" can imagine. I am vaguely aware that there may be infinite possibilities that I have never imagined.

Was there a possible moment that you would have preferred to have occurred, instead of what actually occurred? Can you experience this preferred moment occurring in your mind? Does that impact on physical events in your bodily systems, even though it didn’t actually happen in time and space? Perhaps the un-actual moment wasn’t so much ‘preferred’ or more valued as calculated to be more probable. Different value/significance system, same dimensional relation - interacting ‘outside’ spacetime, in the fifth dimension. — Possibility

This to me this portion has gone beyond knowing if there are possibilities. You seem to be suggesting that for me to "know" possibilities exist that I would have to "know" the exact outcome of every possible possibility. That is omniscience. Seems different.

Well, what if instead of the regret of experiencing a preferred unactual moment, you had been aware of and been capable of interacting with what you could do differently prior to the moment you did it? — Possibility

Isn't this why we read/watch fiction? It allows us to experience emotions and events we typically never experience. We can then imagine the decisions we would make in those scenarios. Discussing philosophy also brings up many hypothetical situations where we can prepare our wills.

The action is free, but it wouldn't have anything to do with will unless we have some reason to believe that the robot is conscious and has the mental phenomenon of a will. — Terrapin Station

What reason do you have to believe anyone other than you is conscious

Also, defining will as a mental phenomena seems weird to me. Because it is not clear then how it relates to the physical phenomena resulting(?) from it. Do you mean to say that the “will” somehow results in a different physical causal chain or that the feeling/mental phenomena of will results from a physical causal chain?

because probabilities is a human-only oriented knowledge prediction. A mind could potentially foreknow or precognize all events in the future, but a human mind can't as its lack of ability to encompass all that is to know to know the future manifests in less and less accurate predictions with each iteration of the causation process; the further into the future, the less accurate the prediction, the less probable that a foretelling is precise. But it is only from the point of view or from the limited capacity of the human mind. In effect, the future is knowable, and precisely knowable, since there is no cause without an effect, and no effect without a cause. — god must be atheist

So because I can't know all the possibilities, they can't exist? I don't get it.

Your opinion extrapolates from what is knowable by humans, to what is theoretically knowable. That is a mistake. — god must be atheist

I think it mostly extrapolates from an understanding of the common usage of infinite (which is certainly not exactly right...but I am still Ok with it). If a centimeter can be infinitely divided (in the abstract) then so can possibilities. Wouldn't any single 'possibility' have infinite variability (one atom out of position, etc)?

To me, this whole discussion feels like philosophy has delved far further into words like 'possibility' and 'choice' than their definitions can possibly encompass. It is not wrong, but it begins to lose meaning ("there are no possibilities because there is only one reality" suggests that the words possibility and choice should not exist - if I say pick a number between 1 and 10...you are making a 'choice' by defintion...even if determinism suggests there is only one possible answer you could give).

I guess I am saying that science and philosophy need to be far more careful with their words if they expect a significant percent of the population to understand them. Heck I just learned from @Terrapin Stationthat in this discussion "free" means 'not causally determined' but I doubt I could find a dictionary that includes that meaning (the plato.stanford philosophy site suggests Terrapin is right, but they keep it vague and refuse to even say anything as clear as "not causally determined").

I guess I should learn a lesson from some of my other discussions to accept "better than the alternative." I vastly prefer that people believe there is no free will, than believing there is. So even if I think you are too absolute, I should just be happy you are not absolute in the opposite direction :smile:

"Free" in this case means "not causally determined." If you can choose between two options you have a free--that is, not a causally determined--choice. — Terrapin Station

I still doubt whether that makes will free, but I am happy to be given a definition - so I won't bug you along those lines again.

This is a good post and I agree with you. though I am still skeptical that this is an issue amenable to philosophical resolution. — Arne

That is certainly the struggle I am having. I find myself agreeing quite often (with both sides), but still being thoroughly unconvinced.

Years ago I read someone on another site who said something along the lines of, "it seems likely there is no free will, but life operates better if we act as if there is" - they were more eloquent but you get the idea. I am still basically stuck in that view.

I’m trying to work out what you’re arguing with me about. I agree with pretty much everything you’ve written here.

The fifth dimension? Wouldn't we just call it abstract thought? — ZhouBoTong

Sure, but does that help us to understand how it happens and how it interacts with everything else? I’m using ‘fifth dimension’ because it relates to other discussions and other areas of philosophy, where ‘abstract thought’ is too vague a concept. For instance, I’m of the belief that a sixth dimension (also involving abstract thought) structures our interactions, too - but that’s off topic here.

Once science has completed the chain of determinism then I will be able to get behind these sorts of ideas. Until then I will struggle to accept 'proof' of an absence of choice. — ZhouBoTong

I’m not arguing for absence of choice, and I certainly don’t believe there is any proof. All I have are my subjective experiences in relation to those of others.

Well the possibilities certainly exist in the abstract. I can admit that we can not know (yet?) whether they could have existed tangibly. — ZhouBoTong

That they exist ‘in the abstract’ is enough. Whether they could/would/should have existed tangibly is something we think/believe subjectively based on value/significance/logic/moral structures, and we internally interact with these abstract possibilities and integrate related information accordingly - even though they may have never had a tangible existence.

I am acutely aware of the possibilities that "I" can imagine. I am vaguely aware that there may be infinite possibilities that I have never imagined. — ZhouBoTong

Exactly.

This to me this portion has gone beyond knowing if there are possibilities. You seem to be suggesting that for me to "know" possibilities exist that I would have to "know" the exact outcome of every possible possibility. That is omniscience. Seems different. — ZhouBoTong

I’m not talking about ‘knowing’, though - I’m talking about subjective experience: awareness, connection and collaboration. Recognising that there are always infinite possibilities that we may never have imagined precludes any claim to ‘knowledge’. As Rovelli says in relation to QM and Information Theory: ‘There is always more information to be obtained about a system’. So i’m not suggesting that we have to know the exact outcome of every possible possibility - only that it’s out there as information to be sought.

I guess I am saying that science and philosophy need to be far more careful with their words if they expect a significant percent of the population to understand them. Heck I just learned from Terrapin Stationthat in this discussion "free" means 'not causally determined' but I doubt I could find a dictionary that includes that meaning (the plato.stanford philosophy site suggests Terrapin is right, but they keep it vague and refuse to even say anything as clear as "not causally determined"). — ZhouBoTong

This is part of the reason for this discussion. The dictionary definition of WILL says: ‘the faculty by which a person decides on and initiates action’, with these obvious assumptions built in that I’ve been trying to eliminate. The dictionary definition of FREE is ‘unconstrained’, and this is the one I have been working with throughout this discussion, despite the tendency for contributors to bring their own meanings with them - include conceptual definitions of ‘free will’ that allow them to delve into apologist style arguments to support its apparent existence.

I find myself agreeing quite often (with both sides), but still being thoroughly unconvinced.

Years ago I read someone on another site who said something along the lines of, "it seems likely there is no free will, but life operates better if we act as if there is" - they were more eloquent but you get the idea. I am still basically stuck in that view. — ZhouBoTong

I can relate to this, too. My aim here is not to argue one way or the other, but to tease out Hegel’s idea of dialectic process and reach some level of synthesis that is more convincing than compatibilism. I’ve found there are may people who’ve reached an externally manageable/arguable viewpoint that is nevertheless internally unconvincing.

What reason do you have to believe anyone other than you is conscious — khaled

Similarity of structure and behavior. Your antinatalism sure wouldn't make sense if you don't believe that others are conscious, by the way.

Also, defining will as a mental phenomena seems weird to me. — khaled

It seems weird to me that that would seem weird to you. If you don't consider will a mental phenomenon, what the heck would you think it is?

Do you mean to say that the “will” somehow results in a different physical causal chain or that the feeling/mental phenomena of will results from a physical causal chain? — khaled

I'm not sure what you're asking here. If you're suggesting (strong) determinism, I don't buy that idea in general.

Your antinatalism sure wouldn't make sense if you don't believe that others are conscious, by the way. — Terrapin Station

I never said I don’t believe others are conscious I said you can’t know they are. In which case it still makes sense. Though I agree antinatalism wouldn’t make sense if I was the only conscious person but neither would any ethics

It seems weird to me that that would seem weird to you. If you don't consider will a mental phenomenon, what the heck would you think it is? — Terrapin Station

I meant weird as in it could be said by a hairline determinist or someone who believes in free will. Ambiguous would have been a better word

I'm not sure what you're asking here. If you're suggesting (strong) determinism, I don't buy that idea in general. — Terrapin Station

Yes that is what I’m suggesting. I’m asking whether the mental phenomena “will” is the cause or result of physical phenomena in your view and in either case how. How does your “will” physically move your arm. Or if you’re a determinist how (which I know you’re not) how would physically moving your arm cause the subjective experience of “will”.

Similarity of structure and behavior. — Terrapin Station

That’s awfully vague. What if said robot I was talking about looked human and acted like a human but essentially just had silicon replace carbon. Let’s say it was so good at acting and looking like a human you couldn’t tell it apart from one just by interacting with it. In that case is it conscious? (Which would also mean it has free will)

So because I can't know all the possibilities, they can't exist? I don't get it. — ZhouBoTong

I think it's more like: only one possibility exists, but you don't know what it is, therefore you imagine all kinds of different possibilities exist. (You meaning the general you; human.)

I think it's more like: only one possibility exists, but you don't know what it is, therefore you imagine all kinds of different possibilities exist. (You meaning the general you; human.) — god must be atheist

Kind of like picking out which porn video to watch. There seems like endless variety and options, but for some reason it was determined at the Big Bang that I would pick the redhead today. :grin:

Yes that is what I’m suggesting. I’m asking whether the mental phenomena “will” is the cause or result of physical phenomena in your view and in either case how. How does your “will” physically move your arm. Or if you’re a determinist how (which I know you’re not) how would physically moving your arm cause the subjective experience of “will”. — khaled

I'm a physicalist. In my view, mental phenomena are not caused by or the result of physical phenomena. They're rather identical to mental phenomena. Will is a subset of brain states. It's the properties of the brain states in question from the reference frame of being the brain in question.

I never said I don’t believe others are conscious I said you can’t know they are. — khaled

Knowing they are is just a belief that they are where (a) you feel you have a justification for the belief, and (b) you assign "true" to the proposition "Other people are conscious."

I meant weird as in it could be said by a hairline determinist or someone who believes in free will. — khaled

Sure. Will would still be a phenomenon that occurs even if strong determinism were true. Hence the need for the "free" adjective.

That’s awfully vague. What if said robot I was talking about looked human and acted like a human but essentially just had silicon replace carbon. — khaled

Then it's not very similar structurally. It doesn't have a brain made out of the same materials that human brains are made out of. (And contingently, we haven't made things that are structurally and functionally similar to brains, just out of other materials, either.)

I think it's more like: only one possibility exists, but you don't know what it is, therefore you imagine all kinds of different possibilities exist. (You meaning the general you; human.) — god must be atheist

Would there be any way to prove or test this idea? (saying "there is only one reality" is a type of reasoning but a long way from actual evidence) Is it any different in actual practice from "there are many possibilities but only one is actualized"? I mean, wouldn't I act the same either way?

This all just feels like a debate about what exactly we all mean when we say 'choice' or 'possibility'. If I eliminate those words and put in 'decision making process', are we good to go? Can we admit that whether or not there are actual possibilities and therefor an actual choice would be made, our minds go through a decision making process? Wouldn't hard determinism include that decision making process?

"there is only one reality" is a type of reasoning but a long way from actual evidence — ZhouBoTong

That there is only one reality is not a reasoning, but an observation. It can only be false if you can show me that there is more than one reality.

Please show me more than 1 reality. Please show me that reality is a multiplicity by and in itself. Evidence suggests there is only one reality.

Kind of like picking out which porn video to watch. There seems like endless variety and options, but for some reason it was determined at the Big Bang that I would pick the redhead today. :grin: — Noah Te Stroete

You almost got it; the sad truth is that it had been predicated by events from prior to the Big Bang. In fact, if time and existence of matter in time is infinitely old, then the history of events by causation has never had a "beginning" point of determinant quality; it has been going on from the infinite past.

Would there be any way to prove or test this idea? (saying "there is only one reality" is a type of reasoning but a long way from actual evidence) Is it any different in actual practice from "there are many possibilities but only one is actualized"? I mean, wouldn't I act the same either way? — ZhouBoTong

It's tough. We can't run the universe again to see it anything different happened, and even if we could, the difference might have mostly been at the beginning where some 'random' happening might have gone a long way, or way later on, some unwashed out 'random' held some big sway, but randomness hurts the will and so we don't care much about that something could be different via randomness in the re-run.

We can, though, say that what did happen, non randomly, trumps as actuality the claims such as "should have", making those to be of a fantasy world stance.

Can we admit that whether or not there are actual possibilities and therefor an actual choice would be made, our minds go through a decision making process? Wouldn't hard determinism include that decision making process? — ZhouBoTong

Yes.

I’m trying to work out what you’re arguing with me about. I agree with pretty much everything you’ve written here. — Possibility

That seems possible. It likely stems from some misunderstanding on my part. When I am confused, I argue until the point is clarified :grimace:

Sure, but does that help us to understand how it happens and how it interacts with everything else? I’m using ‘fifth dimension’ because it relates to other discussions and other areas of philosophy, where ‘abstract thought’ is too vague a concept. For instance, I’m of the belief that a sixth dimension (also involving abstract thought) structures our interactions, too - but that’s off topic here. — Possibility

Prime example. But I will do a bunch of reading on this topic before I continue to bug you, haha.

That they exist ‘in the abstract’ is enough. Whether they could/would/should have existed tangibly is something we think/believe subjectively based on value/significance/logic/moral structures, and we internally interact with these abstract possibilities and integrate related information accordingly - even though they may have never had a tangible existence. — Possibility

Now this I can get. Sounds good.

I’m not talking about ‘knowing’, though - I’m talking about subjective experience: awareness, connection and collaboration. Recognising that there are always infinite possibilities that we may never have imagined precludes any claim to ‘knowledge’. As Rovelli says in relation to QM and Information Theory: ‘There is always more information to be obtained about a system’. So i’m not suggesting that we have to know the exact outcome of every possible possibility - only that it’s out there as information to be sought. — Possibility

I may have some minor quibbles/clarification with this portion, but I think you are right that I mostly agree with your overall position (I think if I argued my quibbles we would see that again it was just a minor misunderstanding on my part).

The dictionary definition of WILL says: ‘the faculty by which a person decides on and initiates action’, with these obvious assumptions built in that I’ve been trying to eliminate. — Possibility

hahahahah. And here I am trying to ensure everything matches definitions perfectly. "So there's your problem!"...thank you for clarifying.

The dictionary definition of FREE is ‘unconstrained’, and this is the one I have been working with throughout this discussion, despite the tendency for contributors to bring their own meanings with them - include conceptual definitions of ‘free will’ that allow them to delve into apologist style arguments to support its apparent existence. — Possibility

Yep, your position definitely seems close enough to my own that I should not be arguing.

I can relate to this, too. My aim here is not to argue one way or the other, but to tease out Hegel’s idea of dialectic process and reach some level of synthesis that is more convincing than compatibilism. I’ve found there are may people who’ve reached an externally manageable/arguable viewpoint that is nevertheless internally unconvincing. — Possibility

Sounds great (and a rather interesting approach). If I have time, I may even do some extra reading so I can actually add something of value to the discussion.

That there is only one reality is not a reasoning, but an observation. — god must be atheist

Have you 'observed' everything? "There is only one reality" is not an observation the same way "the sun will rise in the east" is an observation. Is 'reality' a thing? or a concept?

Show me more than 1 reality. Show me that reality is a multiplicity by and in itself. Evidence suggests there is only one reality. — god must be atheist

Well grammatically that seems easy. If yesterday's reality was different from today's, haven't we described multiple realities? Is "my" reality the same one as "yours"? What EXACTLY do we mean by "reality"? Can we describe reality IN ANY WAY outside our subjective experience of that reality?

Time to consider sober, reasonable thinking. I don't mean to be mean or demeaning or insulting, but it is an insult to intelligence to claim that reality exists in more than one expression of itself. — god must be atheist

Sober, reasonable thinking...in Philosophy? Aren't most of the topics being discussed considered nonsense to 90%+ of humans?

This seems about as sober and reasonable as one could get:

The way I see it, it boils down to one assertion: I have and can make a choice. — Terrapin Station

And yet we both disagree with it to some extent.

We can, though, say that what did happen, non randomly, trumps as actuality the claims such as "should have", making those to be of a fantasy world stance. — PoeticUniverse

That seems fine to me. But I would struggle to add: "so there is no choice/decision/other possibility". I think I am viewing these things as existing in reality the same way I view all thoughts as existing in reality. The thoughts are unquestionably part of "reality", even if what is being imagined is not.

Yes — Noah Te Stroete

:up:

Thanks for helping me think this through. Thanks to @god must be atheist, @PoeticUniverse, and @Terrapin Station as well (although I think Terrapin has solidified his stance on this issue enough that he could have the discussion in his sleep, he still makes a great foil)

I'm a physicalist. In my view, mental phenomena are not caused by or the result of physical phenomena. They're rather identical to mental phenomena. Will is a subset of brain states. It's the properties of the brain states in question from the reference frame of being the brain in question. — Terrapin Station

But you haven’t answered whether or not they CAUSE physical phenomena. Looking at your answer it seems the answer is “no”, but then it becomes pretty weird to have a definition of “will” that doesn’t include “causes physical changes”. Because a “will” that can’t actually DO anything wouldn’t be called “will” by most. Most people I’ve talked to define will as a CAPACITY to enact physical changes (somehow) based on mental phenomena. It seems your definition of will is that it’s no different from an emotion or a mental phenomena such as hunger or exhaustion. It seems that having your definition of “will” doesn’t grant the subjective entity that has it any agency.

So in my reading your definition of free will would be something like “the emotion resulting from feeling like one has made a decision among many decisions” which says nothing about whether or not people have a CAPACITY to choose based on their mental phenomena (what most would call free will)

Knowing they are is just a belief that they are where (a) you feel you have a justification for the belief, and (b) you assign "true" to the proposition "Other people are conscious." — Terrapin Station

K. I was thinking knowing as in “absolutely” knowing, with no room for error (which I think is impossible)

Then it's not very similar structurally. It doesn't have a brain made out of the same materials that human brains are made out of. — Terrapin Station

So ONLY humans can be conscious? What about other animals? Going from “I am conscious and these people are similar to me so they are probably conscious” to “only people similar to me are conscious” seems like a big leap to me.

Well grammatically that seems easy. If yesterday's reality was different from today's, haven't we described multiple realities? — ZhouBoTong

No, sir, yesterday's reality being different from today's reality is still just one reality. If you need to work this out, I may not want to help you. If you can't see that reality is a continuum on a time scale, which is the fourth dimension of spacial reality, then I am sorry, I believe your ability to access the concept of reality is not complete.

This is not something I wish to argue for. If someone does not see this, then I consider that person lost to the world of sufficient insight which mutually comprises itself with philosophy.

No discrimination or exclusivity here; It is the farthest from my intentions to want to label you, @ZhouBoTong, or ostricise you, but with all due respect, I am also unwilling to teach you insight on such basic level.

But you haven’t answered whether or not they CAUSE physical phenomena. — khaled

Sure, will causes physical phenomena. All physical phenomena cause other physical phenomena, unless they occur in a vacuum, but your brain isn't in a vacuum.

What about other animals? — khaled

Other animals have brains that are very similar to our own.

I think Terrapin has solidified his stance on this issue enough that he could have the discussion in his sleep, — ZhouBoTong

Haha--that's the case for a lot of this stuff. I've had more or less the same views about a lot of philosophical issues for 30 to 40 years, and even longer for a few things. And I've been talking about that stuff with others in the manner that we do here for just about that long, including remotely via computer, starting almost 40 years ago via BBSs, and then for the past 25+ years on the Internet.

Sure, will causes physical phenomena — Terrapin Station

So will causes physical phenomena but is not caused by it? You seem to be describing something akin to magic here. Is not caused or explained by the laws of physics yet can directly apply a force here or there. What exactly do you think gives us humans this magical power? Not trying to be a prick but I don’t find this “one way street” causality convincing.

So will causes physical phenomena but is not caused by it? You seem to be describing something akin to magic here. Is not caused or explained by the laws of physics yet can directly apply a force here or there. — khaled

So:

(1) I'm not a realist on physical laws,

and

(2) I'm not a strong determinist in general, in other words, not just when we're talking about free will, but when we're talking about physical phenomena in general.

I think it's possible for there to be ontological free--or random/stochastic--phenomena in general. That's not a rejection of causality in the determinist sense, it's just not a thoroughgoing, "strong," universal acceptance of it. Some phenomena involve freedom/randomness, which is sometimes biased so that it's not just a .50-.50 or .33-.33.-.33 etc. equal chance of all possibilities.

So will would be an example of a phenomenon that's not strongly deterministic. But phenomena that are not strongly deterministic can cause other phenomena without freedom/randomness being a factor.

(2) I'm not a strong determinist in general, in other words, not just when we're talking about free will, but when we're talking about physical phenomena in general. — Terrapin Station

Me neither. But I have a bad habit of saying “determinism” in place of “no free will”

So will would be an example of a phenomenon that's not strongly deterministic. But phenomena that are not strongly deterministic can cause other phenomena without freedom/randomness being a factor. — Terrapin Station

I think there was a huge amount of handwaving in the dash in freedom/randomness. What you’ve said so far is that you believe that there are random and determined events. But we can both agree that a random event doesn’t amount to a choice right? So now are you saying causality is a mix of random, deterministic AND “free” decisions whatever the latter means. Please tell me what the difference between a “free” and a random event is.

Reading about quantum mechanics, the idea of truly random events is no surprise to me, but randomness =\= free will. Me rolling a die that determines what you will do next hardly amounts to a “choice” by you does it. But you suddenly introduce “freedom” to the mix with a single dash so now there are 3 types of links between one physical phenomena and the next? Or are you saying that freedom somehow arises from a mix of random and deterministic occurrences?

I think there was a huge amount of handwaving in the dash in freedom/randomness. What you’ve said so far is that you believe that there are random and determined events. But we can both agree that a random event doesn’t amount to a choice right? — khaled

Again, "some phenomena involve freedom/randomness, which is sometimes biased so that it's not just a .50-.50 or .33-.33.-.33 etc. equal chance of all possibilities."

That's not at all controversial scientifically, by the way. For one, it's standard in quantum mechanics.

Just to clarify, I use "free will" so that it's referring to will phenomena, where ontological freedom obtains (ontological freedom involves randomness, but not necessarily equiprobable-among-possibilities randomness). And free will seems to involve non-equal biasing of the possibilities.