Oh my bad. I must not have caught that typo. Self-Consciousness possesses the ability to contradict the natural law because it manifests the will. But it Isn't inherently contradictory. As in "if this then that." It is also a non-sequitor to think that this disproves teleology and such. Considering they are not logically opposed. — Riley

Okay, but the nature of anything is always any and everything it can do. So if teleology is the same thing (any and everything something can do, which is its nature), and natural law is an expression of teleology, then how could self-consciousness or will do anything contrary to natural law?

The problem with using the GTA is that anti-natalism bases itself in the objective idea that it is immoral to have children. The GTA is a goal-oriented model (which is in its early stages), and has nothing to do with intrinsic evils. Penn state likes to quote 'what does not kill you simply makes you stronger' when referring to GTA. For the sole fact that it requires pain .GTA is also pro change through suffering and the like. It is also referred to PTG as well. Funny enough, Penn State quotes St. Paul when speaking of Growth through adversity."Suffering produces endurance, endurance produces character and character produces hope." An odd quotation if the view can be opposed to it, eh? UH also seems opposed to the GTA idea as a stand-alone concept.

Your combination of the two is interesting. What would prove difficult would be to define Undue hardships. As well as to not contradict the two.

By the shear manifestation of choice.

We should not confuse the end of a thing with another. As I said before. Rather we should focus on the parts to the whole than the whole to the parts.

Self-consciousness is that which simultaneously allows myself to be aware of my own individuation from an other, and be aware that they are aware of their own individuation and of me. The production of this is unknown to me.

However ...

Teleology should also be understood in two ways:

(1) by the end of an object or part. I.e the eyes, ears, heart.

(2) By the end of a collective goal.

Im speaking of number 2. You can never will to stop your heart from beating or your mind from thinking. However, you can stop the goal of this species (Its telos), which is its survival. Hence why I related it to anti-natalism.

I never said anything one can do is with the natural law- — Riley

I thought that’s what you said here

"There's nothing that the eyes can do that's not part of their nature."

Hmmm.... you just accepted the idea of teleology. Teleology is that which is the end of something in relation to it's ontology. Which you just verified — Riley

What did you mean then

And no, that is a false-comparison to say appealing to teleology is equal to appealing to god. — Riley

I never said equal, I said same “class” of argument. By that I mean you appeal to some unproven concept to justify having children. Some do so with god. You do so by saying that reproduction has some “purpose” or teleology though you never explained what that might be. You just asserted that it’s idiotic to argue otherwise

The problem with using the GTA is that anti-natalism bases itself in the objective idea that it is immoral to have children — Riley

I would say “intersubjective” because I don’t think morality can ever be objective but go on

However, you can stop the goal of this species — Riley

Only individuals have goals.

If a goal can be stopped, then it's in the nature of whatever is stopping it to be able to stop it.

Thats false in the way I used the word. And I specifically added 'telos' as well. We already discussed that the eyes are for seeing, the heart for pumping - in which you made no objection. Unless you desire to take Hume's approach of causation, I see no reason for you to object either.

I don't know. Typically, anti-natalism argues that it is intrinsically evil rather than relatively evil or subjectively evil.

Thats false in the way I used the word. And I specifically added 'telos' as well. We already discussed that the eyes are for seeing, the heart for pumping - in which you made no objection. Unless you desire to take Hume's approach of causation, I see no reason for you to object either. — Riley

So, again, I think you're making a naturalistic fallacy here. Just because we have capacities to reproduce, why should we? That huge loose end hasn't been tied. Also, if we as creatures of "nature" have the ability to not reproduce, what makes that unnatural? You may need a good dose of Sartre and the existentialists. We are condemned to be free. Tying yourself to some Idea (like Natural Law), is just a decision on your part. We are not dictated by nature as what to do, because we have capacities that are derived from nature. That is indeed a naturalistic fallacy. I agree to some extent that we have a human nature, but human nature is of a broad extent- we have needs and wants that are universal, but to what specific actions we take to satisfy them, it is pretty numerous. There is no one action that nature dictates is the "right" action.

I argue it is evil relative to the moral principles almost everyone on this subreddit employs. I believe antinatalism is the logical conclusion to the moral premises employed by almost everyone.

I have read Camus, Sartre, Kierkegaard and many others. Some of what they say is good.. and others is absolute rubbish.

Again: this is an argument based on ontology. It is not a naturalistic fallacy. Saying it is over and over has no foundation and gets us nowhere.

You should also understand the differences between teleology as I noted... we may not be forced to do anything but the parts to the whole are.... as I said for the 100th freaking time.

So for the last time: This is an 'ONTOLOGICAL' idea. Not one based In the perceptions of nature itself. Rather the end of a thing based in its ontology. If you cannot understand that this isn't a naturalistic fallacy- and yet you keep repeating that it is.. I'm going to have to end the conversation. Repetition is only good when the thing repeated is good. Right here is not an example.

You seem concerned with what everyone else believes. You aren't trying to make the silly argument from popularity are you?

We already discussed that the eyes are for seeing, the heart for pumping - in which you made no objection. — Riley

What I said is that the nature of eyes is any and everything that eyes can do. That includes things like being blind. Everything.

Same goes for hearts. They can stop beating. That's part of their nature.

I don't know if you didn't understand my comment, but you said that per my comment, I accepted teleology. So that would imply that teleology simply says that the nature of things is any and everything that the things in question can do.

It's either: 1. The nature of the heart is to beat until it no longer can. Or 2. The nature of the heart is to beat, and by some other cause it stops it from doing so.

Either way, we must accept teleology in those regards.

No longer beating is something a heart can do. At which point it might start decaying, for example, which is something else it can do.

Both of those things are part of its nature. The nature of anything is any and everything it can do. You can't name anything that something can do, some state it can be in, etc. that's not part of its nature.

Why are you certain that it is something that it can do, rather than it is lacking in what it can do.. being caused by some other alternative cause to stop it from beating? If I squeeze a heart and crush it, is it lacking in its capability to beat, or is it simply stopping due to its nature?

When we talk about what things can do, states they can be in, we're not talking about them in isolation from the rest of the world. I have no idea why you'd be thinking something like that.

Being crushable is something that's in a heart's nature. Otherwise you wouldn't be able to crush it.

Again,. ANY and EVERYTHING that something can do, ANY state it can be in--being crushed is a state that something can be in--is part of its nature. That doesn't imply that there was no interaction with other things. There's always interaction with other things.

"No idea why I would think that."

What kind of stupid answer is that? Where did I isolate the object from the rest of the world?

And in any other sense... you accepted teleology 50 times over. If only you understood the concept of teleology, ontology and the natural law in relation to those two things- you'd be aware of it.

What kind of stupid answer is that? Where did I isolate the object from the rest of the world? — Riley

You're seeing x being in state y due causal interaction with z as indicative of something not in x's nature.

I'm fine with saying that I'm accepting teleology. It simply implies that teleology is positing that any and everything that something can do, any state in can be in for any reason, is teleology. You agree with that, right?

Secondly: you commit a fallacy in presuming that the state in which it can be in is teleological.. Or presumed to be intrinsic to it's nature on its own self. Which is blatantly incorrect.

Which is why I gave you the choice. A things nature is that which it ends itself towards. If it's end was to stop beating, it would stop. If it was to beat, it would beat. You also cannot account for substantial change in these regards.. Which is another error.

Another error you commit is when saying, "Being crushable is something that's in a heart's nature. Otherwise you wouldn't be able to crush it."

"Is in a hearts nature." Really? In what way is it IN it. As a secondary or primary mode of its ontology? Or is it substantial or accidental? Because the way I see it is: 1. The thing is stopped not by it's own nature and end to stop, but rather another cause. 2. I'm not saying that is not anything it can do.. I'm simply questioning this presumption you make without stating In which way it relates to it's ontology. I don't see any reason to believe that it isn't anything It has the possibility to do. However, I do not see any reason to believe that these things are the ends themselves. To stop beating and such.

Let's just look at this for a moment:

"A things nature is that which it ends itself towards."

I don't agree with that. Do you understand that I don't agree with it?

"You're seeing x being in state y due causal interaction with z as indicative of something not in x's nature."

Perhaps. That isn't isolating it from the rest of the world. Especially if it's possible.

I understand that. You just present zero evidence for the fact that you disagree. Do you understand that?

Evidence that I disagree includes saying, "I don't agree," and includes saying things like, "A thing's nature is any and everything it can do, any and every state it can be in, including states that are caused by other things."

And where did I say I disagree. Why can thing which has an end include that which it can do. Including stopping beating? I just disagree that this is teleological. If anything, that is a secondary principle in its ontology. Which is something that it has the possibility, even necessity to do- however, it does not prioritize it over the primary. For the sake of its teleology and for the sake of the goal of that in-and-of-itself.

1. For it to pump blood

2. For it to keep the person alive by virtue of that.
---

The secondary would be:

1. For it to stop pumping blood when it can no longer.

2. For it to stop keeping the person alive by virtue of that.
---
I don't think there is much to disagree on that notion

Why can thing which has an end include that which it can do. — Riley

Huh?

. . . Including stopping beating? I just disagree that this is teleological. — Riley

Okay, but it's what I've been saying, over and over (that something's nature includes every state in can be in, including things like "not beating" or "being crushed" etc.), and you keep insisting that I'm simply endorsing teleology.

There is no "primary" thing that something does--every and anything that something does is just as "valid." And things like hearts do not have goals. Only people have goals.

So are you still insisting that we agree and that I'm endorsing teleology?

There is no primary thing which something does.
One word... evidence.


It is obvious that this Is the case: if something had two primary modes of teleology... That is to say, that it had two ends for two reasons- they would logically contradict each other in most cases. Especially here.

The heart cannot simultaneously stop beating as it also beats, guaranteed by it's own telos.

I'm actually starting to think a few things. 1. You've only investigation of minute amount of metaphysics. 2. You don't understand the basics of the language to which these topics produce.

*Goal- an end bases in its very own teleology. Also referred to as finale causation.*


As I said before: if you want to do what Hume did, that causes problems. Other than that I don't see any reason for us to disagree. But taking a look at your profile, I can say you like that pitiful thing people call an intellectual haha.

Hume is wrong for a few reasons.

1. A thing which does not have a finale cause is something that is without teleology, and therefore, has no end to which it exists.

2. Causation which does not happen at that level allows for unprovoked change. Both substantially and accidentally. Especially where the accidens have no nature to which it can change at any given moment. Of course, without a cause.

3. Hume's idea of causation and change doesn't allow for a thing to change in-and-of-itself. Considering the action for change is preceded by it's own will to change.

(i) The thing desires to change accidentally

(ii) causation is not required for a thing to change.

(iii) the desire to change itself is preceded by the actual change. Which happens out of change without a required cause.
----
By the mere desire to change, it changes. However, without any reason aa to why it changed other than it's will. Which denies the nature's of things ontologically speaking. This seems to object to much of what is observed and much of what the sciences have disclosed. But that was his point.
----
This is all said if you are leaning on Hume, of course.

Too much stuff to address. One thing at a time.

There is no primary thing which something does.
One word... evidence. — Riley

So, to start off, I have no idea what this is saying. "There is no primary thing [that] something does" is something I said. So basically you're repeating something I said. And then the next line is "One word... evidence." I have no idea what that's saying in context. Are you agreeing with me? Disagreeing with me? Are you saying there's evidence that there's a primary thing that something does? What evidence?

Clearly the ability to detect certain things in language isn't something you possess. I was quoting you. I simply did not add quotations. Quite facetious of you in a way..

I'm asking you to provide evidence. I do not agree nor disagree. I simply won't accept something because you say it is true. So please provide evidence.

I'm asking you to provide evidence. — Riley

Okay. In my opinion, "One word... evidence" doesn't ask that very clearly. It would be better to say something like, "What is evidence that there isn't a primary thing that things do?"

The evidence is that you're using "primary" in the sense of a preference or goal, but preferences and goals are only things that individual persons have. They're mental phenomena. Things like rivers, say, do not have preferences or goals, they do not have mental phenomena.