No, I'm asking you about this part:

if he wants Y he ought to do X — tim wood

How do we get to that part?

Yes, if the means for getting Y are X, then in order to get Y, one must do X.

How does "he ought to do X" enter the picture?

You think that somehow you're avoiding "If one wants, then one ought," but you're not. You have it right there: "If he wants Y, he ought to do X."

That he must do X to get Y doesn't imply that he ought to to X, or that if he wants Y, he ought to do X. We just know that he must do X to get Y. That doesn't tell us anything about what he ought to do.

How does "he ought to do X" enter the picture? — Terrapin Station

As language.

From https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/ought-to
Modal verb:
1) used to show when it is necessary or would be a good thing to perform the activity referred to by the following verb:
2) used to express something that you expect will happen:
He ought to be home by seven o'clock.
They ought to have arrived at lunchtime but the flight was delayed.
If you show the receipt, there ought not to be any difficulty getting your money back.

That doesn't tell us anything about what he ought to do. — Terrapin Station

Yes it does, if he wants it. I think you're adding something to the ought - an implication of moral imperative maybe. It's up to you to make that explicit, so that either I may gently correct you, or you being correct, fall on my own sword.

Yes it does, if he wants it. — tim wood

No it doesn't. Why ought someone do something if they want something?

Basically you're claiming that wanting something implies "a call to action."

Well, on what grounds?

try reading the definitions provided. Try reading my posts, Try for some comprehension.

Maybe this. If you want to saw a piece of wood, than you ought to use a saw.

Why ought someone do something if they want something? — Terrapin Station

If they want to achieve it, maybe that's what you're dropping out.

try reading the definitions provided. Try reading my posts, Try for some comprehension.

Maybe this. If you want to saw a piece of wood, than you ought to use a saw.

Why ought someone do something if they want something? — Terrapin Station

If they want to achieve it, maybe that's what you're dropping out. — tim wood

It seems to me like you're not understanding something very simple, and I suppose it seems like that to you, too (that I'm not understanding something you consider very simple).

If they want to achieve it, then they should do what's necessary to achieve it, because?

I'm not sure how else to ask you. It seems like you just take it as a given that if you want x, you ought to do, or at least try to do, what's necessary to do x . . . but I don't think that's a given at all.

Aside from that, it's worth emphasizing that "y is necessary for x" is NOT the same thing as "one ought to do y (if one wants x)" . . . I mean, you could use language unusually and say that you're using them to mean the same thing, but then it doesn't have anything to do with the normal connotation of "ought," or what anyone is talking about when they say you can't derive an ought from an is.

It's just like you could say that God exists if God is your toilet, but then that wouldn't capture what anyone else is talking about, really. No one was wondering if your toilet exists.

It seems like you just take it as a given that if you want x, you ought to do, — Terrapin Station

if you want to accomplish it!

If you want it, but are not so concerned with accomplishing it, then there's a diminished ought, all the way to no ought at all.

What bridges the gap between wanting and doing something about what you want? All kinds of things. Is that where you are?

Or are you more concerned with ought where there is not only no want, but even opposition? Or want, but opposition? Examples of these are easy enough to think of.

Or perhaps you're somewhere - I don't know where - in a world similar to a relative of mine. That is, there are rules, and there are consequences, and there are things you should do and should want, for the world to work the way it "should." But it was the world of that person. Those "shoulds" - the same as "oughts" - were a kind of shorthand for an essential unreasonableness. I would sometimes say to that person, "There ain't no should." In other words, that there are reasons for doing things, some simple and some not, and neither should nor ought can stand as a shorthand for any of them, excepting in the case where that shorthand is already understood. It was the modal as imperative, and a tyrannical one. In the present case for a good purpose, but clarity is always better and worth the investment.

If you want to go to church, and there's a church you can go to then you ought to go to church. On the other hand, if I tell you to go to church, that's a whole different animal, and by no means a simple one.

So we can dig through the word "ought" - or "should." What we find is some reason-as-cause. Imo, that' what matters. But it is also, at least at first, particular.

I'm a bit lost in most of that. I'm approaching this purely from a skeptical philosophical perspective, where I don't buy a claim that it's somehow a fact that having a want implies any ought, contra a claim that it does.

If it's a fact that there's that implication, then we should be able to support that it's a fact somehow.

So that when Joe says, "I want to eat an ice cream, and it's necessary for me to go to the store to buy an ice cream to be able to eat it, BUT I ought not go to the store," we can say that he's getting a fact wrong, and we can somehow justify that he's getting a fact wrong.

So that when Joe says, "I want to eat an ice cream, and it's necessary for me to go to the store to buy an ice cream to be able to eat it, BUT I ought not go to the store," we can say that he's getting a fact wrong, and we can somehow justify that he's getting a fact wrong. — Terrapin Station

What fact? He identifies a want; he recognizes that in order to indulge this want he most go to the store, but that for some reason, he ought not go. Where is he getting anything wrong?

Let's do it by the numbers:
1) "I want to eat ice cream." By assumption this is a fact, nor is he mistaken about it.

2) "It's necessary for me to go to the store to buy ice cream to be able to eat it." Again true by assumption.

3) "But I ought not to go to the store." For some reason, in which case presumed true. Of course in #3 he may be mistaken - wrong - but then so might he have been in #s 1 and 2. But #s 1 and 2 are given. The "wrong" must then be with #3. What is it?

Where is he getting anything wrong? — tim wood

If it's the case that a fact in this case, "I want x," implies an ought, "I ought to do y," then he'd be getting "I ought not do y" wrong--his logic would be faulty, because supposedly it's a fact that "I ought to do y" is an implication of "I want x"

If I like ice cream, then the moon is made of green cheese. I like ice cream. Implied is that the moon is made of green cheese. I do like ice cream.

It appears you need to work on the meaning and implication of implication.

As to the is-to-ought: that's a can-do, not a necessarily-must-do. It's a bridge, but as option, not requirement.

The only burden in the ice cream example is that if I want, then I shall have to, to get. I don't have to, and I don't have to get.

If it's the case that a fact in this case, "I want x," implies an ought, "I ought to do y," — Terrapin Station

Near as I can tell, then, you're tangled in your understanding of implication, and that you yourself haven't settled on exactly what is mean by "ought," or even what you mean by it.

I can only suppose that is because you have confused the nature of geometry with morality/ethics.. — tim wood

Perhaps I misunderstood what you were up to. I was affected by the comment that if you tell a geometrist that the angles of a triangle don't add up to 180 they won't listen to you. I thought you were heading in the direction of there being some parallel in ethics. It seems not. I don't think the math analogies, if that's what they are, are helping the conversation. And since geometrists would know about non-Euc. geometry I think this led me to beleived you were confused.

I don't think this.....

If there is one, any, universally held value, then the whole field comes into view. It's then your business to show that there is not a single one.

is true and I argued that in my previous post, but you didn't respond to that, I don't think. I take that up again below.

The point here being that the failure to "regularize" mathematics did not cause mathematics to revert to being whatever anyone "felt" like it should be as a matter of personal opinion. 2+2 was, and is, still 4. — tim wood

In certain bases, like base 10, but not in others.

But as with mathematics, that in no way means that morality/ethics becomes free-floating and entirely arbitrary. — tim wood

I don't think I am arguing that. It certainly becomes a rather large range of types and examples: iow what is considered good/bad has tremendous variety.

AS far as I can see you didn't respond to the core point.

Even if you come up with one axiom that everyone might agree on - it does not guarantee that we have objective or universal moralities. And this gets even more true if we talk about a specific act - like some horrible act against children or something. That axiom does not necessarily at all lead to other agreed upon axioms. And once you have differing sets of axioms (even if an overlap of one or even a few axioms) you can end up with incredible different ethical systems and ones that are not compatible with each other.

If you can present with one universal axiom that we all have - and actually I don't think this will be easy - I can then try to show you this what I just asserted above. I explained in my earlier post using an example, but I am happy to try with whatever axiom you think we have in common.

Any idea why we tell students that you can't understand formal logic by plugging natural language into it?

Sure. I can think of several. So can you.

In certain bases, like base 10, but not in others. — Coben

In most bases, actually in all bases, except that in a very few, "4" is called something else. If your point is that it's always possible for someone to be distracted and go off track, I agree. But don't worry about it, it's just a sign of youth.

But to our point as I understand it: are you supposing there are no absolute shoulds or oughts? You have never been around children, then, have you. Or apparently around bad people. You're looking for the wrong sense of absolute. If you have two things here and two other things there, and you put them together, then you have four things, universally and necessarily so. No one has a problem with this. And one reason they don't is because no matter how hard they or anyone else tries, you cannot have it any other way. So must folks accept it as an "absolute." And in this sense they confuse and transfer the "absoluteness" from the essence of the thing and instead base it on their own inability to change it. It's a subtle shift but a very confused shift.

The case is different with shoulds and oughts. There are some things you ought to do - for whatever reason. And that's a first difference. It's a should or an ought for a reason. If that reason does not apply, then neither does the moral constraint or obligation.

For example. I claim 2+2=4, always. You say, not so; I have one thing here and two things there, and that's three, not four. Sounds silly, but the confusion in this case lies in not distinguishing between the abstract arithmetic proposition, and the on-the-ground reality.

Next, suppose you ought to go to church, and suppose there's a reason. First, the ought is as at least good as the reason. And being that good, it is absolutely that good. But typically people will argue against and adduce other reasons. And just maybe those other reasons will prevail. In no way does that touch the quality of absoluteness of either argument, with respect to their several arguments - given the arguments themselves are good.

And no matter what the quality of the argument, you might just decide, "The hell with it, I'm not going." And from that people draw the conclusion that because the absolute moral constraint or obligation was not also absolutely compelling in force, that it on that account is not absolute - in any sense.

The ten commandments and the golden rule. Read them carefully and you will find in each an expression of an absolute. But you can break every one of them, most without too much difficulty. Does that mean they're equivocal? Certainly not. It just means that they're qualitatively different from arithmetic theorems. You cannot make 2+2=5, but you can covet your neighbor's ass. But what does the commandment say? You shall not & etc. Doesn't say you can't.

What I am trying to do here is get you to understand "absolute" in what may be for you a new way. How can something be absolute if it is not always the case that it must necessarily be so? First, look at the language (to make sure you understand it - and in the case of translations, that it is correctly translated(!)). Second, realize that if you do something wrong, it does not mean that, or cause, the right to be no longer right.

And, none of this is easy. Two quick examples. The English Bible (many of them, anyway) says don't kill and don't fornicate. But these are mis-translations. The Bible itself says something different. In a way, this becomes like the confusion between numbers and numerals. With respect to shoulds and oughts, how they're expressed may be, can be, a problem. It then becomes the task to find out what they're really about, because that is what they're really about!

In most bases, actually in all bases, except that in a very few, "4" is called something else. If your point is that it's always possible for someone to be distracted and go off track, I agree. But don't worry about it, it's just a sign of youth. — tim wood

My point was, again, that something you seem to be putting forward as the only way something can be taken, isn't the only way. I am not exactly sure what your point was, but it seemed like you were saying that,and it doesn't really matter if in most bases it would be 2+2=4, just that it is not universal. Similarly when you said no geometrist would take me seriously if I said the angles of a triangle did not add up to 180 degrees,when in fact they very well might. How exactly this all relates to ethics for you, I am not sure. Doing my best?

But to our point as I understand it: are you supposing there are no absolute shoulds or oughts? You have never been around children, then, have you. Or apparently around bad people. — tim wood

I have been. I know these bad people for example have friends who think they are good people. But in any case, you just told me I didn't have certain experiences, but haven't explained why this must be the case.

If you have two things here and two other things there, and you put them together, then you have four things, universally and necessarily so — tim wood

Water drops, piles, holes. Have two water drops here, two there, bring them together you can end up with one water drop. Likewise piles and holes.

But what this has to do with ethics who knows.

You have one kind of ethics here and one kind there, sure, you often end up with two kinds of ethical systems.

I am not sure what we have proven.

The case is different with shoulds and oughts. There are some things you ought to do - for whatever reason. And that's a first difference. It's a should or an ought for a reason. If that reason does not apply, then neither does the moral constraint or obligation. — tim wood

Or there are some things that I do not like, but which I cannot prove to anyone else they should not like. Some of these disliked, like say hurting children for no reason, are disliked by most other people, though those who differ cannot be swayed by reason. And then there is a mass of stuff where there are large groups who disagree. Like with suicide.

For example. I claim 2+2=4, always. You say, not so; I have one thing here and two things there, and that's three, not four. Sounds silly, but the confusion in this case lies in not distinguishing between the abstract arithmetic proposition, and the on-the-ground reality. — tim wood

And what this has to do with ethics, I see no clear explanation of.

And no matter what the quality of the argument, you might just decide, "The hell with it, I'm not going." And from that people draw the conclusion that because the absolute moral constraint or obligation was not also absolutely compelling in force, that it on that account is not absolute - in any sense. — tim wood

I have made no argument based on the ethic or moral rule not being absolute because people can go against it. I am saying there is no way to demonstrate it is objective and I see no ethics that are universal. Universal would mean all agree. Objective would mean that one can demonstrate that one should live this way. Absolute mortals, well that might mean....

Moral Absolutism is the ethical belief that there are absolute standards against which moral questions can be judged, and that certain actions are right or wrong, regardless of the context of the act.

which means it is deontological, and many people are not this, and also objective. So if you think there are absolute morals, you need to show you have a process to demonstrate this isn't just your value, but acutally you know what is objective good.

What I am trying to do here is get you to understand "absolute" in what may be for you a new way. How can something be absolute if it is not always the case that it must necessarily be so? First, look at the language (to make sure you understand it - and in the case of translations, that it is correctly translated(!)). Second, realize that if you do something wrong, it does not mean that, or cause, the right to be no longer right. — tim wood

YOu seem to be arguing against a position I do not have. I do not think that because people can go against it or because they might err or because not all follow it. There is the Christian idea that God has shared what is absolutely good and we may or may not follow that. There is an epistemological claim in there. 'I know what God thinks is Good' and here is a kind of deductive claim in there. If God thinks something is good or bad, it is absolutely so. Those claims need to be backed up and I don't think they can be.

Now that may not be how you decide what is absolute good and bad. I don't know. But what is your way of knowing what it is? What backs up your epistemological claim?

It's immoral if their assisted suicide would cause more suffering to those who care about them than the suffering that they are currently experiencing.

Which is, basically, almost never. I can't actually think of a case where it's immoral. I can only think of cases where it's moral. People who want help to kill themselves seem to be always suffering a great deal. And a great deal more than their selfish friends and/or family who would rather the person, who they supposedly loved, forced themselves to keep living merely for their own benefit.

Of course, in some cases, the person is suffering so much that even their friends and/or family want them to die. And it's just the law that doesn't allow it. And that's just stupid, of course.

Now that may not be how you decide what is absolute good and bad. I don't know. But what is your way of knowing what it is? What backs up your epistemological claim? — Coben

I am not by any means sure that I'm making an epistemological claim. From you I get it that without care in speech an auditor can almost always find alternative meanings based on alternative understanding of the words used. So, if I say the sum of the interior angles of all Euclidean triangles is 180 degrees, you can then observe that there are non-Euclidean geometries where they don't. Sometimes that's useful; sometimes that's counterproductive; sometimes destructive, and sometimes intended to be destructive.

The point I am making is that if a thing is so in some regard - and we're not simply mistaken - then with respect to that circumstance, it is absolutely so. Doesn't matter who likes it or doesn't, buys it or doesn't, or how anyone votes or how many votes there are, or how many fallacious arguments are made against.

I go back to T Clark, above

Morality is a matter of human values. To the extent those values are universal, I guess you could say they're "absolute." But to the extent they are cultural and personal, they are not.

Are you prepared both to claim and defend the claim that there are no universal values?

I am not by any means sure that I'm making an epistemological claim. From you I get it that without care in speech an auditor can almost always find alternative meanings based on alternative understanding of the words used. So, if I say the sum of the interior angles of all Euclidean triangles is 180 degrees, you can then observe that there are non-Euclidean geometries where they don't. Sometimes that's useful; sometimes that's counterproductive; sometimes destructive, and sometimes intended to be destructive. — tim wood

It's still not clear to me why you keep bringing in math. It seemed like you were saying that certain things were simply true in math, period. I pointed out that what you presented as simply true - absolute, universal, objective - were not that. Perhaps this was a tangent on my part. Just doing my best to understand what the point was/seemed to be and point out what would be the flaws if that is what you meant. Even here it seems like you make no attempt to clarity. You tell me that my act might even be intended to be destructive or acts like mine. But then you don't explain how or why or how I misinterpreted your math analogies, if that's what they were.

The point I am making is that if a thing is so in some regard - and we're not simply mistaken - then with respect to that circumstance, it is absolutely so — tim wood

That is extremely abstract. Could you apply that to morals in some specific way. If it is meant to apply to morals.

Doesn't matter who likes it or doesn't, buys it or doesn't, or how anyone votes or how many votes there are, or how many fallacious arguments are made against. — tim wood

At this rarified abstract level I agree. People's beliefs do not necessarily change the truth of something. IOW if something is objectively true, then even if someone does not agree that it is, it doesn't change the fact that it is objectively true. However universal means that every has that value. A universal value is one that is held by everyone. By definition. It can even be wrong, but as long as it is held by everyone, it is universal.Which means that the following is confused

I go back to T Clark, above
Morality is a matter of human values. To the extent those values are universal, I guess you could say they're "absolute." But to the extent they are cultural and personal, they are not. — tim wood

Are you prepared both to claim and defend the claim that there are no universal values? — tim wood

Their might be a value that everyone shares. Perhaps some extremely harsh punishment of someone with no benefits to others. That value would then be universally held. This would not mean it is absolute or objective. It does not mean that those people will necessarily agree on much else or that all or even some conflicting ideas of the good can be resolved.

I have not been convinced there is a way to determine objective or absolute values.

And I don't see this as having much bearing on the topic of the thread. I would happily claim that there is no universal value in relation to suicide. I think there is likely evidence in this thread. There is certainly a wide variety of values on the subject out there. If you are skeptical I can find a few examples of differing values on suicide.

That is extremely abstract.... At this rarified abstract level I agree. — Coben

Next, as to

Morality is a matter of human values. To the extent those values are universal, I guess you could say they're "absolute." But to the extent they are cultural and personal, they are not.

This identifies morality is being a matter of human values. I take that to mean what matters to humans. After some thought - not necessarily final or conclusive - I think mattering is a sine qua non of morality. If it matters then it falls in some way under morality. If it does not matter, then it's hard to see how it could be a matter of morality. There may be some things that should matter and don't right now. But it seems to me that if they should, then they will, soon enough. Which means that ignorance can confound but not deny morality. And ignorance itself, I'll argue, is in all cases a failure of reason, whether theoretical, practical, or applied. Ultimately, then; i.e., in terms of consequences, ignorance is never exculpatory; may be explanation, but not excuse.

Our concern is "absolute" values. Yours is a good point against thoughtlessly associating universal with absolute. T Clark's scare quotes around absolute are then meaningful - whether or not intended. Everyone can be absolutely and universally wrong. Or maybe not. You and I, not being of the everyone (e.g., maybe they all lived 700 years ago) might even know they were wrong. But if they held a belief, and that belief was not in itself mistaken, and it concerned something that was so in some way, we then are already committed to its being absolutely so, at least for them, yes? No?

Further, when such a thing is in question, that thing, in virtue of its being questionable, is itself subject to question, meaning only that the proposition that presents the thing maybe needs scrutiny and refinement. And that happens. In the post referring to Kant above, ff.

Kant's categorical imperative is usually expressed in three forms... — tim wood

Kant works through a refinement of the idea of suicide in different lectures. And it's clear that he moves from suicide itself, to what purposes it might properly serve. And he finds a class of such.

Kant's conclusion, then, is that suicide can be moral, and is not immoral in all cases.

I'm content to leave this here - you?

I'm content to leave this here - you? — tim wood

Sure, there are so many things you do not explain or give concrete examples for when I ask and you often do not respond to core points I make. I am glad that Kant's argument, whatever it was, satisfies you. I don't see the argument here. You produce quite a bit in response. I appreciate the effort you put in, but you just don't seem to be responding to me or completing your own thoughts Yes, let's leave it here.