That we have a private experience that cannot be mapped? That's what I dispute about what I perceive to be your pragmatist stance.

You forget that I am arguing the pragmatist view and so Occam's razor applies. You can pretend to worry about invisible powers that rule existence in ways that make no difference all you like. You are welcome to your scepticism and all its inconsistencies. But as I say, if whatever secret machinery you posit makes no difference, then who could care?

So we have a pragmatic metaphysics? I agree, but for me the pragmatism is a reading of nature from an alternative perspective. I build in insights from the apophatic enquiry, discovering what we don't know is equally as illuminating as establishing what we know we can say.

You have read me wrong on this point again, I didn't say realities beyond the veil(I will label x ) make no difference, I said we can't determine the difference. It might be all around us, but we just don't see it. The apophatic truth is that we don't know what the world would be like absent x, with an x added if there is none, or if either state is or is not an impossibility(i.e. x is a necessary being).

Further more and this ties in with Schopenhauer1's point , we can't determine to what extent the veil is involved/tied up within ourselves. We don't even know if our experience of being is mediated through a veil by a hidden source, or, need I say, the extent of our ignorance of the self.

What this boils down to is we don't know if we are actually doing metaphysics, or just playing at it.

For selection to be an action of something is a contradiction. For someone to take some action, difference needs to be already defined, else there is no one to take the action and not action to take. Selection must occur regardless of states of the world, else the different meanings expressed in the world would not be defined.

In this way you misread my analogy to God. The subject of the inquiry is not "nothing." It is selection. Just as someone says: "But what is it that causes God?", I am asking: "What causes selection?" In both questions, the subject (God, selection) is treated as real and I am asking what thing acted to make it so. For either question, "nothing" is a truthful answer because there is no thing which causes either.

Yeah, but as soon as your private experience is framed by yourself as an argument, it is social, even if never in fact articulated publicly. So to be mapped is already crossing the line that is the epistemic cut upon which human introspective "self consciousness" is constructed. It invokes the "self" as the interpreter of a sign, the sign being now the observable, the claimed phenomenon.

You seem to imagine that naive experiencing of experiences is possible. But to talk about the self that stands apart from his/her experiences is already to invoke a pragmatist's sign relation.

Yeah, but as soon as your private experience is framed by yourself as an argument, it is social, even if never in fact articulated publicly. — apokrisis

How is the actual experience experienced by the experiencer "framed"? Only afterwards in analysis or description, not the experience itself.

You seem to imagine that naive experiencing of experiences is possible. But to talk about the self that stands apart from his/her experiences is already to invoke a pragmatist's sign relation. — apokrisis

That's because I am choosing to have the experience of introspecting and analysis that these philosophy forums demand when explaining consciousness.

What this boils down to is we don't know if we are actually doing metaphysics, or just playing at it. — Punshhh

You are just repeating what I've already dealt with. Of course beyond the known knowns, and the known unknowns, there could be the unknown unknowns. Pragmatism takes that for granted.

But the point then is twofold.

First, if there really are unknown unknowns, they still remain open to being discovered if they make a difference.

Then second, they would have to be unknown unknowns about which we could care. Pragmatism is also about truth in terms of the purposes that can define being a self, being an observer. So it is a Janus faced epistemology in defining both observer and observables in a fully consistent fashion.

Thus there could be differences that don't make a difference - to us. In fact, to now switch to the ontological view relevant to the OP and its confusions about selections and hinges, the world is presumed to be full of potential difference. Variety begins unconstrained - the definition of vague. And then "self-interested" constraints or habits develop to regulate variety, turning it into a crisp contrast between signal and noise, meaning and irrelevance.

So again, pragmatism has no interest in denying the unlimited possibilities of difference. And that is because it speaks to the regulatory possibility that is the separation of that kind of vague potential into differences that make a difference, and the differences that don't.

How is the actual experience experienced by the experiencer "framed"? — schopenhauer1

The clue is in the fact you have to mention the experiencer.

The clue is in the fact you have to mention the experiencer. — apokrisis

No.. I mapped the experiencer to you on this philosophy forum.

Yes I see that but, we are blind to what we are in some sense. We need to be able to see through the veils, including the veil which is our thinking mind itself, the extent to which we are the blind leading the blind. By analogy a cat leading another cat through quantum theory while all they know about is mice and territory. I am concerned with other or unconventional ways of knowing and other means of seeing and witnessing and the development of wisdom. Your pragmatism is interesting and certainly more grounded in academic philosophy and the sciences which is solid progress, but it seems I and others like me are reaching similar insights through alternative means.

Nothing much one could say to that gibberish.

Right because what you say exceeds the norm.. Anyways, I was just guessing what you were trying to get at with your last statement. To go even further, it looks like you do not even acknowledge the distinction between a primary and secondary consciousness.

That we have a private experience that cannot be mapped? — schopenhauer

I find this question to be a little be strange. Is not the point of the map that it is secondary, only a representation of a territory which is some other state? If so, doesn't that make all experiences maps?

In that case, I don't think the "private experiences question" makes any sense. The supposed failure of knowledge, not being the territory, was never attempted in the first place. Knowledge was always only a map (i.e. something known, not the existence something). The controversy about "private experiences" seems to be a storm over nothing. If experiences are only maps, knowing what someone is thinking or feeling is no more difficult than anything else. One just has to have that particular map (e.g. this person is sad). Access to the privacy of experience (i.e. being that experience) isn't needed for knowledge.

I find this question to be a little be strange. Is not the point of the map that it is secondary, only a representation of a territory which is some other state? If so, doesn't that make all experiences maps? — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, communicating the experience is the map.. making it "information" a "difference that makes a difference".. there is still the actual experience which is not the map itself.

Yes I see that but, we are blind to what we are in some sense. — Punshhh

But if that is so, then we are only dealing with a known unknown. And if my epistemology accepts that there can be unknown unknowns, then it is reacting to that very known unknown. It builds in the fact that we could be blind - and explains the degree to which it could then matter.

I am concerned with other or unconventional ways of knowing and other means of seeing and witnessing and the development of wisdom — Punshhh

Fine. But you are not showing that they have a demonstrable advantage - except as a way to block open minded, publicly conducted, ontological inquiry.

and explains the degree to which it could then matter

Matter to what?
And to what degree have you enquired?
Are you sure you can see through the mist?

Fine. But you are not showing that they have a demonstrable advantage - except as a way to block open minded, publicly conducted, ontological inquiry.

This is your perception perhaps.

I have not begun yet, I am still familiarising myself with the established terminology.

Anyway it's late and I need my beauty sleep.

Matter to what?
And to what degree have you enquired?
Are you sure you can see through the mist? — Punshhh

Sorry. which of those questions is about pragmatism rather than being an expression of pragmatism?

You haven't yet addressed the key point of my argument though, and that is the nature of selection itself. Deleuze characterizes selection as non-voluntary, necessary, whereas I consider selection as a free act of will. As an act of free will, we have to allow for will-power, which is to resist the temptation to choose, and to resist the habituated choice. As I described, the act of will-power is resistance to change and difference, therefore a selection of the status quo, lack of change, the same — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't address this because I have nothing to say about 'free-will' that isn't disparaging. Nobody has any idea what a 'will' is, let alone a 'free' one. If 'free-will' is your (completely arbitrary) criteria for a metaphysics, then there's nothing to discuss.

The subject of the inquiry is not "nothing." It is selection. — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK, selection is the subject of the inquiry.

In both questions, the subject (God, selection) is treated as real and I am asking what thing acted to make it so. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Now you ask what thing acts to make a selection.

For either question, "nothing" is a truthful answer because there is no thing which causes either. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Your answer, "nothing".

My point: if nothing acts to make a selection, then there is no selection, just like if our subject is "going to the store" and nothing acts to go to the store, there is no going to the store.

For selection to be an action of something is a contradiction. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Since "selection" is most commonly defined as an act or instance of selecting, what you say here is nonsense. In all actions there must be something which carries out the act, or the described act is just a fiction.

Selection must occur regardless of states of the world, else the different meanings expressed in the world would not be defined. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This may be true, but it doesn't change the fact that for selection to occur there must be something which selects.

I didn't address this because I have nothing to say about 'free-will' that isn't disparaging. Nobody has any idea what a 'will' is, let alone a 'free' one. If 'free-will' is your (completely arbitrary) criteria for a metaphysics, then I've nothing to say to you. — StreetlightX

I consider that a very odd response from someone who starts a discussion entitled "Metaphysics as Selection Procedure". If you want to discuss selection without discussing will, then go ahead and have a good conversation with yourself.

For sure, but what does that have to do with the knowledge is question? If I know you're upset by the suffering in the world, the fact that your experience (your "private" experience) and my experience (my "private" experience) are other than the map (knowledge that you are upset) has no negative impact. I know suffering upsets you perfectly well.

Since it is only the map which tells, the fact it's not the territory has no impact on its ability to say something. Anyone may know anything about another experience. They'll just never "be" that experience.

My point: if nothing acts to make a selection, then there is no selection, just like if our subject is "going to the store" and nothing acts to go to the store, there is no going to the store. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know that's your point. Mine is that that doesn't make sense. Selection, as spoken about in this thread, cannot be an action. It's incoherent. Without a defined difference, there is no-one to act and no actions to take. The point here is the definition of "selection" you are using cannot apply.

Much like when someone attacks the notion of a transcendent first cause God on the grounds there is no evidence or empirical form. Your usage of "selection" just doesn't get the topic of discussion and so fails to speak about it.

Oh, and by the way StreetlightX, it was you who brought up the notion of will, by saying that selection is non-voluntary. And this is indicative of this whole philosophy of difference, you cannot say what difference is, only that it is not the same. You cannot say what selection is, only that it is not voluntary, it is necessary.

Isn't that identifying why free will is irrelevant to selection? What could be further from free will than the non-voluntary? Something we cannot control, that presents without our decision, without our choice: to be different, to be the distinct actor who gets to make a choice between distinct outcomes.

We did not choose to be those who make choices. We just found ourselves like that. Non-voluntary difference.

I know that's your point. Mine is that that doesn't make sense. Selection, as spoken about in this thread, cannot be an action. It's incoherent. Without a defined difference, there is no-one to act and no actions to take. The point here is the definition of "selection" you are using cannot apply. — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK, so you take a well used, well defined word, like "selection", give it a secret definition, which no one has heard of, or knows about, then claim that the way we normally use that word is contradictory according to your secret definition.

So what is your definition of selection, "defined difference"? Defined difference requires that it must be different from something else, so all you are saying is "not the same". So "selection" means not the same thing as what it normally means.

Your usage of "selection" just doesn't get the topic of discussion and so fails to speak about it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK fine, you want to talk about selection which is not selection at all, it is something different from selection. So what is it that we are talking about?

It appears like both StreetlightX and Willow of Darkness want to think about things which words cannot describe, then discuss these things using words. So we have things without identity, which we cannot say that they are not the same as anything else, because this identifies them according to sameness. And we have a form of selection which we cannot associate with willing, because willing identifies with sameness as well. Why are we attempting to discuss these things which are defined in such a way as to make discussion about them contradictory?

Since it is only the map which tells, the fact it's not the territory has no impact on its ability to say something. Anyone may know anything about another experience. They'll just never "be" that experience. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, I cannot exhaust the experience by simply verbalizing/mapping it. I can simply recreate a model of it. It may be a detailed map, but a map nonetheless. That is not simply saying you can never "be" the experience, but you can never really communicate the experience the way it was either.. there is a distinction there.

OK fine, you want to talk about selection which is not selection at all, it is something different from selection. So what is it that we are talking about? — Metaphysician Undercover

How logical distinctions are defined. How is it there is difference between myself and the computer screen? Why is one me and the other one not? I'd say "selection" is used because it refers to the presence of one difference over another. If we consider the uniform (e.g. substance, the world) which has no distinction), any distinction that occurs is but one possibility over many.

How come within the unity the world, I am distinct from my computer monitor rather than not? Why are those logical meanings "selected" rather than not? What makes it so that I have a different meaning than the computer monitor?

You act like you don't know what I'm talking about, but I don't think this is true. I think you are aware of what I'm talking about and want to say it's impossible. What I think you want to say is that logical distinction depends on the act of experience. That for selection to occur, for difference to be defined, it has to be performed by an act of will.

So while my usage of "selection" is not yours, I suspect you think your usage of "selection" is the one which applies to the topic we are discussing.

A strawman. There was no claim of exhausting your experience at all. Indeed, I outright said the opposite: what shown in experiences is only a map; it cannot be exhaustive of experiences.

That's what it means to know something: to have a model which is not exhaustive of the world. My point this is no limit on what may be known.

If I know what you are thinking of feeling at sometime, the point is I have a map of a tiny part of you and the world. The failure of the map to be exhaustive doesn't prevent it from telling me your upset. I can know that perfectly well.

That's what it means to know something: to have a model which is not exhaustive of the world. My point this is no limit on what may be known.

If I know what you are thinking of feeling at sometime, the point is I have a map of a tiny part of you and the world. The failure of the map to be exhaustive doesn't prevent it from telling me your upset. I can know that perfectly well. — TheWillowOfDarkness

If it's a strawman then it's from your confusing statements. According to what I see above:

Models are not exhaustive
Map has a "tiny part" of me in the world
You can tell X thing from the tiny part (like being upset)

Yes, I agree that all these things can be had from mapping the world. But my claim was not that things cannot be communicated, simply the claim that experiences cannot be completely recreated in models. I did not claim that it cannot be useful or effective for a certain outcome by communicating so and so information. Rather, I am claiming contra apokrisis, that personal experiences, no matter how much communication, cannot be conveyed as it is experienced in that moment by that person. The primary experience is not perfectly translated through the map, but a semblance of it through communication can be expressed through language. As Wittgenstein seemed to be saying, we develop the correct language games so that this information can be translated into something others can understand, sent out, received, and hopefully clearly understood as the message was intended.

So we have things without identity, which we cannot say that they are not the same as anything else, because this identifies them according to sameness. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've never said there were thing without identity. To speak about difference or selection is not to speak about any thing. We are talking about logical concepts. The expressions given by objects being distinct. We aren't talking about existing things here.

The point is, more or less, than the identity of a thing is wider than merely empirical manifestation or idea. I am different to everyone else. A truth not defined by a a decision of will (e.g. "I now think the distinction of Willow the poster on ThePhilosophyForum" and it happens) or particular empirical distinction (The distinction of Willow is defined by their location in time and space, what other people observe of them, etc., etc.), but given necessary by logic. I am a distinct thing-in-itself. A non-voluntary difference. A "selection" in which I, nor anyone else, had any choice.

For sure, but that's why it's a strawman. In arguing we know or understand what others are feeling (sometimes said in the form: "knowing what it's like to experience" ), one is only ever discussing maps and what they say.

The primary experience was never claimed to be transferred (i.e. to literally be the other person's experience).