Sure. Do you want to have this discussion here? — Banno

I suppose we should just focus on Wittgenstein's approach and whether it works.

Even better, how we would know whether it works. When can we say a long standing philosophical problem has been properly dissolved?

I guess it's when you stop asking that question and start asking others.

Do you want to talk about realism and chairs? Another example?

IS the issue there that we see chairs as solid, manipulable items in our world, but scientists tell us they are particles and space - something quite different?

IS the issue there that we see chairs as solid, manipulable items in our world, but scientists tell us they are particles and space - something quite different? — Banno

Yes, realism about ordinary objects given what science has to say.

The early Wittgenstein dealt with the problem of universals by advocating an approach that quantified a qualifier of the property of an object. Logical simples/Russellian atomism, descriptivism, and whatnot.

The latter Wittgenstein repudiated this by adhering to an approach that negated the 'objectivity' of a universal by the way we use language. Family resemblances/pragmatism, and intuitionism, or the property of human beings that allows them to agree that red is red, and whatnot.

I'm using Austin rather than Wittgenstein. More direct, yet along the same lines.

Yes, realism about ordinary objects given what science has to say. — Marchesk

Ok, let's look at the word real.

We talk of a real coin as opposed to a counterfeit. A real McCubbin as opposed to a fake. A real gem as opposed to an artificial one.

What we mean by "it's real!" is decided by what we are opposing it to.

How's that?

Yeah, one question that lingers in my mind, is whether Wittgenstein advocated nominalism in his latter or early period. (Debatable)

Haven't yet read Austin, though it might be a good thing to do.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2452/wittgenstein-and-nominalism

What we mean by "it's real!" is decided by what we are opposing it to.

How's that? — Banno

Ehhh, wouldn't it be the other way around? What we suppose is fake, an illusion, fictional, etc. is decided by being opposed to what we have reason to believe is real.

Are philosophical problems language on holiday?

I don't think that all of them are, unless I really don't understand what many folks are saying (and vice versa). It seems to me like many of us really have different beliefs about what (sorts of things) exist(s), what's possible/impossible, what we can know, what the nature of things is, how things work, etc.

If everyone really agrees with me on all of that, and I really agree with everyone else, and we just don't realize it because of language issues, then we sure do not know how to sort out those language issues, do we?

If you like; the point being that context is all. It's a real paining as opposed to an illusion, but it's not a real McCubbin. The frame is real wood, not plastic.

If you like; the point being that context is all. It's a real paining as opposed to an illusion, but it's not a real McCubbin. The frame is real wood, not plastic. — Banno

Okay, so the context is wanting to know whether the world is populated by ordinary objects in addition to their scientific versions (particles and empty space). Or whether they are the same thing, or don't exist (the scientific version is exclusive).

The "scientific versions" aren't different than the "ordinary versions." They're other ways of looking at the ordinary versions, they're the ordinary versions from other reference points, at least different explanatory reference points.

The "scientific versions" aren't different than the "ordinary versions." They're other ways of looking at the ordinary versions, they're the ordinary versions from other reference points, at least different explanatory reference points. — Terrapin Station

The problem is that this leads to paradoxes because the scientific version raises issues for our concept of ordinary objects.

For example, How do you decide exactly which collection of particles is the chair? Note that if you give an imprecise answer here, this conflicts with our notion of chairs having precise boundaries.

Chairs aren't vague objects with imprecise boundaries such that we can give a rough answer to which collection of particles count as the chair. This is the problem of many.

The problem is that this leads to paradoxes because the scientific version raises issues for our concept of ordinary objects. — Marchesk

You'd have to give an example. The only thing I can think of is that the concept of a particular "ordinary object" might not include what's really going on to make the ordinary object as it is from a typical phenomenal standpoint, but ordinary object concepts are not usually claims in that regard anyway.

Okay, so the context is wanting to know whether the world is populated by ordinary objects in addition to their scientific versions (particles and empty space). — Marchesk

It's a real paining as opposed to an illusion, but it's not a real McCubbin. The frame is real wood, not plastic. — Banno

So, if someone insists the painting is real, what do they mean?

Is the chair real?

So, if someone insists the painting is real, what do they mean? — Banno

In context of art, they're disagreeing over whether it's a forgery. In general, they're being pandantic about the painting existing.

Is the chair real? — Banno

Not if we take science seriously, in my opinion. Is there some other context you have in mind when we ask that question?

You'd have to give an example. The only thing I can think of is that the concept of a particular "ordinary object" might not include what's really going on to make the ordinary object as it is from a typical phenomenal standpoint, but ordinary object concepts are not usually claims in that regard anyway. — Terrapin Station

I updated my response as you were posting. Go back and read the extra part about boundaries, particle collections and vagueness. I can also link you to an article on the problem of many.

Not if we take science seriously, in my opinion. — Marchesk

Science isn't saying anything at all like "chairs aren't real" lol

Not if we take science seriously, in my opinion. — Marchesk

Are they?

In context of art, they're disagreeing over whether it's a forgery. In general, they're being pandantic about the painting existing. — Marchesk

Are they? IF one of them says, "sure, it's not a forgery - but it's not real..." what do we say?

Meh. I'll wait until you finish with @Terrapin Station

Science isn't saying anything at all like "chairs aren't real" lol — Terrapin Station

Yeah, but you're missing the philosophical argument here. The problem arises because philosophers noticed conflicts between our notion of everyday objects and what science says they're made up of.

Are they? IF ne of them says, "sure, it's not a forgery - but it's not real..." what do we say? — Banno

We seek clarification, because it doesn't make sense without proper context.

How do you decide exactly which collection of particles is the chair? — Marchesk

Ordinary object concepts aren't about molecules, are they?

Ordinary object concepts aren't about molecules, are they? — Terrapin Station

They are not, which is a problem when doing ontology, since science says they're made up of molecules.

The problem arises because philosophers noticed conflicts between our notion of everyday objects and what science says they're made up of. — Marchesk

That would be a misunderstanding of what science is doing/saying. There's no conflict.

That would be a misunderstanding of what science is doing/saying. There's no conflict. — Terrapin Station

If you say so. But I'm telling you it is problem discussed in contemporary metaphysics. Of course not everyone agrees it's a problem

It's not a problem. As I said, "The only thing I can think of is that the concept of a particular 'ordinary object' might not include what's really going on to make the ordinary object as it is from a typical phenomenal standpoint, but ordinary object concepts are not usually claims in that regard anyway."

It's not a problem. — Terrapin Station

So you're saying professional philosophers agree it's not a problem and don't discuss it? Or that you have just solved it now?

, "The only thing I can think of is that the concept of a particular 'ordinary object' might not include what's really going on to make the ordinary object as it is from a typical phenomenal standpoint, but ordinary object concepts are not usually claims in that regard anyway." — Terrapin Station

So there are two important things here. The first is that our concept of ordinary objects may not reflect what makes an ordinary object, which leaves the door open to the possibility that there are no ordinary objects.

The second is more along the lines that language is being taken out of context. I disagree here, because I've always understand ordinary objects to be an implicit claim to existence, thus everyone's shock when someone says they don't exist. Or laughter after passing the pipe.