Ah, okay! So the problem is then knowing where and when to ‘turn the other cheek’ and simply remain inactive? — I like sushi

Not sure about that. I mean, every country needs law enforcement officials. It's just that, in general, people get along pretty well with each other without said officials governing their daily affairs.

I don’t buy that “inaction is action” argument when it comes to morality - that is precisely, in my denial of morality itself! See what I mean? — I like sushi

Depends on your views of people in general. A cop once told me that in dire situations people can behave quite irrationally. But, such situations are quite rare, along with the fact that the Trolly dilemma is (in my view) a perversion of philosophy with extremist inclinations.

I agree, with the caveat that one also embrace one's reason toward the ethical. — Galuchat

Sorry to get back to your post so late, as I got caught up in a dialogue with I like sushi.

From my posting and knowledge hereabouts, I understand the issue as a complex interrelated dynamic between emotions and reason. But, I don't understand the details here. For example, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy can serve as a backdrop where Hume's sentiment towards reason being the slave of the passions, as not being entirely true, at least not on face value.

What are your thoughts about this matter?

I'm interested if anyone else arrived at this conclusion or whether it makes sense. — Wallows

Sure. Foundational moral stances have to be emotional, because they're preferences re "how people should behave."

And yeah, rationality and emotions are definitely not isolated from each other.

Foundational moral stances have to be emotional, because they're preferences re "how people should behave." — Terrapin Station

Not sure if this is correct. Hume outlined the is-ought problem, have you been able to overcome it?

Not sure if this is correct. Hume outlined the is-ought problem, have you been able to overcome it? — Wallows

I don't know how you're reading me as suggesting something contra the is-ought problem.

In other words, I was saying that foundational moral stances can't be reasoned, because of the is-ought problem. No fact(s) can give you a foundational moral stance. You only "feel" your foundational moral stances. That's emotion/preferences.

I don't know how you're reading me as suggesting something contra the is-ought problem. — Terrapin Station

Well, you did say that foundational emotivist stances outline "how people should behave". Not, that they do in a certain way. Which led me to conclude that you were claiming an ought for an is...

Does that sound more like what you were saying?

Well, you did say that foundational emotivist stances outline "how people should behave". Not, that they do in a certain way. Which led me to conclude that you were claiming an ought for an is... — Wallows

A preference about how people should behave. The person is telling you how they feel about interpersonal behavior.

A preference about how people should behave. — Terrapin Station

So, does adding that it is a preference, make this a normative claim for how people should behave or a positive statement?

If it's an "ought" utterance, it's a normative by definition. That's what normatives are. That doesn't make it true, or a(n objective) fact or anything like that. Normatives are value statements, preferences that individuals have.

It's not a "positive statement," because you can't derive values from non-value facts.

Normatives are value statements, preferences that individuals have. — Terrapin Station

Here's what Wikipedia says:

In philosophy, normative statements make claims about how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, and which actions are right or wrong. Normative claims are usually contrasted with positive (i.e. descriptive, explanatory, or constative) claims when describing types of theories, beliefs, or propositions. Positive statements are (purportedly) factual statements that attempt to describe reality. — Wiki

And, you say here:

I was saying that foundational moral stances can't be reasoned, because of the is-ought problem. No fact(s) can give you a foundational moral stance. You only "feel" your foundational moral stances. That's emotion/preferences. — Terrapin Station

So, this leads me to believe that you either don't believe in ought statements or that you stipulatively use normative claims as not value apt. What is it then?

I understand the issue as a complex interrelated dynamic between emotions and reason. — Wallows

I agree.

But, I don't understand the details here. For example, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy can serve as a backdrop where Hume's sentiment towards reason being the slave of the passions, as not being entirely true, at least not on face value. — Wallows

I am unfamiliar with CBT and Hume, however; I agree that if Hume's sentiment is that reason is the slave of the passions, it is not entirely true.

I think that emotions:
1) Are a mind-body response to an awareness of the circumstance(s) of an object of concern.
2) Have intensity, duration, arousal, and valence dimensions.
3) Are caused by a triggering event, affect, personality, and context recognition or appraisal.
4) Produce affect display, motivation, and action/behaviour.
5) Are an automatic mental process. (Kahneman, 2011)

So, cognition is clearly involved in constructing emotion. (cf. Barrett, 2016)

Also:
1) Cognitive dissonance may result from a contradiction between thought and emotion, attitude, motivation, intent, volition, action, or behaviour. (Festinger, 1957)
2) Affect and motivational intensity may broaden or narrow cognitive scope. (Harmon-Jones, et al., 2013)
3) A peripheral (emotion-based) method of persuasion tends to activate heuristics rather than reasoning. (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986)

I agree that if Hume's sentiment is that reason is the slave of the passions, it is not entirely true. — Galuchat

To what degree can reason influence emotions? I'm aware of higher brain functions ability to suppress impulses and direct behavior. Yet, to what extent, "valence dimensions" can be appraised by reason is something that I would be interested in uncovering.

To what degree can reason influence emotions? — Wallows

Barrett, Lisa Feldman. 2016. The Theory of Constructed Emotion: An Active Inference Account of Interoception and Categorization. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2017, 1–23. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsw154.

I'm aware of higher brain functions ability to suppress impulses and direct behavior. — Wallows

Brains transmit, convey, and receive, action potentials. Minds "suppress impulses and direct behavior".

Yet, to what extent, "valence dimensions" can be appraised by reason is something that I would be interested in uncovering. — Wallows

Let me know what you find.

Yep. Simplistically speaking ‘consciousness’ is an inhibitory system over the more ‘base’ instincts - and I mean SIMPLISTICALLY!

Our ability to make rational choices is more like holding back the flood - that is roughly how I view what is going on (esp. in regards to the cortex versus the midbrain).

I agree.

Oughts and expectations are close cousins, due to the inferential semantics of propositions. For example, the meaning of the sentence "this apple is red", if it is to express anything inter-personal, is for it to express how it ought to appear to different observers under different circumstances. Yet this causal sort of 'ought' , has as Hume points out, no purely rational justification. Therefore causal oughts must express emotional sentiment, and hence causal justifications cannot be cleansed of moral sentiment.

So I agree that normatives are "about how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, and which actions are right or wrong," which is what you quoted from Wikipedia.

I'd change the beginning--the language of "statements or claims," because those terms suggest something that has a truth value, something that you can get correct or incorrect. What I'd say instead is "Normatives are utterances about how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, and which actions are right or wrong." And I'd add: "What one is doing when one makes such an utterances is stating how one feels, or stating one's preferences."

And I'd add: "What one is doing when one makes such an utterances is stating how one feels, or stating one's preferences." — Terrapin Station

Yeah; but, if we take the summum bonum of all net preferences and tastes, then for interpersonal relations, some consensus can be derived. And, this is how you can derive an ought from an is. Is this in align with what you have said already?

Yeah; but, if we take the summum bonum of all net preferences and tastes, then for interpersonal relations, some consensus can be derived. And, this is how you can derive an ought from an is. Is this in align with what you have said already? — Wallows

To suggest that a consensus has any implication for "right" normatives is to commit the argumentum ad populum fallacy. So no, I wouldn't at all agree with that.

You definitely can determine consensuses. It's just that they don't tell you anything other than what's popular statistically. (And you can use them to pander to consensus tastes if you're marketing, and so on.)

To suggest that a consensus has any implication for "right" normatives is to commit the argumentum ad populum fallacy. So no, I wouldn't at all agree with that. — Terrapin Station

The ad populum fallacy sounds like something a rationalist or any person with authoritarian tendencies might advocate. It's a topic worthy issue, as to whether group consensus overrides individual inclinations or knowledge, as it often does. I suppose Rawls would have something to say about this.

The ad populum fallacy sounds like something a rationalist or any person with authoritarian tendencies might advocate. — Wallows

The idea behind it is simply that nothing is made correct merely by agreement about it. Agreement is just agreement. It doesn't make or change objective facts (besides the fact that there's an agreement).

We can't have knowledge about normatives (in other words, we can't have knowledge that "X should y" for example) because knowledge requires truth value (knowledge is justified true belief), and normatives have no truth value.

It's my understanding that most philosophers nowadays are some cognitivists or neo-empiricists. — Wallows

Which ones?

Which ones? — god must be atheist

Nagel, Quine, Pinker, Chomsky just off the top of my head.

Which ones?
— god must be atheist

Nagel, Quine, Pinker, Chomsky just off the top of my head. — Wallows

Well done.