I haven't read Nussbaum's Frontiers of Justice, but I did read Creating Capabilities when it first came out, which outlines her approach to the Capabilities Approach and human development. It was very influential for me in developing my own views regarding ethics and politics, along with Amartya Sen's Development as Freedom, given the centrality of human agency. (I also find Spinoza's moral philosophy to be very much aligned with this approach). I think it is a very persuasive model outlining the importance (and fragility) of positive rights, which, to my mind, are of absolute necessity in a flourishing society (consider Aristotle's eudiamonia).

The Central Human Capabilities
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive ductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason-and to do these things in a "truly human" way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, cation, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination tion and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political cal and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain.
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience ence longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting porting this capability means supporting forms of human association tion that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious gious observance.)
7. Affiliation.
A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions tutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)
B. Having the social bases of self-respect andnonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination nation on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control over One's Environment.
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable able goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment

Martha C. Nussbaum. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Tanner Lectures of Human Values (Harvard University)) (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values) (Kindle Locations 909-912). Kindle Edition.

I met a Kantian who thought that doing right was doing one's duty. Again, there seems ed to me to be something important absented by this approach. How could one do one's duty when it felt wrong. — Banno

No, that's freedom. Freedom is being free to do your duty. Doing "right" is acting in accord with his categorical imperative in its three, sometimes four forms. And if it feels wrong, maybe it needs to be rethought.

Just now I've taken a dip into online Nussbaum/Kant references. It's enough to cause me to think you might well yourself have more to say on the topic. But at a glance here, I see nothing that Kant didn't cover, although in ways appropriate to his time and stated purposes. See his Critiques, Metaphysics of Morals, Groundwork..., and Lectures on Ethics.

Freedom is being free to do your duty. Doing "right" is acting in accord with his categorical imperative in its three, sometimes four forms. — tim wood

I understand that I don't have strong grasp of Kant; but there is not much there that leads me to want to read him in primary sources.

The main divergence of Nussbaum from Kant, at least in what I have read, is that she does not take rationality as the mark of personhood.

Cheers. At the least it deserves wider consideration.

Nussbaum says that GDP doesn't tell us how well a nation is developing because it's been observed that GDP can rise, but due to income inequality, the well being of the population can remain the same or even decline as GDP rises.

Nussbaum says that in order to bring the state of human dignity in line with our "common values" we need to look at how policies effect human capabilities.

If someone (with social Darwinists leanings, for instance) doesn't recognize these values as common, is there any response we could have (other than condemning this person for not having our common values)?

What would your response be?

The main divergence of Nussbaum from Kant, at least in what I have read, is that she does not take rationality as the mark of personhood. — Banno

I agree, but would go further. Reason is determinate for Kant not just for personhood but for moral action. It abstracts from particulars such as circumstances and intentions. Nussbaum returns to the Greek notions of phronesis (practical reason or practical wisdom, prudence), and sophrosyne (moderation or temperance, but also wisdom and discretion). Instead of universal rules ethics is about how one is to live and deliberation in particular situations.

The capabilities approach locks us in to considering our own feelings and those of others in a way that I find appealing. If one is not taking others into account one is not acting ethically. Flourishing at the expense of others is not acting ethically. Acting ethically is maintaining human dignity, and hence a life worthy of that dignity. — Banno

This certainly isnt anywhere near being original or mind-blowing. People who understand other peoples intentions and their own and who find intelligent ways if navigating between the two are considered moral or ethical. Ethics is about having goals and finding ways to ensure a good compromise between different or conflicting goals. Ethical dilemmas arise as a result of seeing everyone as equals and therefore having equal rights to achieving their goals. If others didnt have goals or equal rights in achieving them, we wouldnt need ethics.

Ethics is about having goals and finding ways to ensure a good compromise between different or conflicting goals. — Harry Hindu

Such an understanding of ethics is at odds with the prevailing schools of thought - deontology and consequentialism. Nussbaum's views are not original, but are worth being heard given what for many are the default positions, deontology and consequentialism, that frame moral and ethical issues.

History shows that the result would be a wilful misunderstanding on the part of my interlocutors of a story that will not fit in such small format as a series of forum posts. — Banno

I have just acquired the book and will read it.

Hope you find it worthwhile.

What would your response be? — frank

Not short.

Someone who does not see the sense of this is most likely to do so because of their disposition, not because they have been convinced by philosophical arguments. So there is a sense in which someone's disagreeing tells us about them rather than about ethical truths.

As for Social Darwinism, I'd point out that they are committing the Naturalistic Fallacy. I'd also point to a few of the many explanations of why this is not what evolution implies, and to the history of their doctrine.

I'd also draw their attention to a similarity between Social Darwinism and the capabilities approach. Both are about allowing folk to reach their potential unencumbered.

There was a horrendous episode in US history when eugenics became popular. People were forcibly sterilized in order to make the world a better place. It was originally conceived by a British person, but grew in the US supported by pseudo science (much in the same way eugenics was supported in Nazi Germany).

Scientists did come forward explaining that the basis of it was not scientific, but what really put it to rest was the moral gut punch which was the Holocaust.

I've been wondering lately why it settled so easily into conventional wisdom. Did it have something to do with the age? If the magic of the Holocaust were to wear off and that way of thinking arose again, would it really take another Holocaust to put an end to it?

I'm not sure if it would or not, but I have come to the conclusion that the fact that our present moral underpinnings are so weak is a potential problem. I think that foundation is weak because it's so easy for us to look at ourselves as mechanisms as opposed to persons.

I've also concluded that we aren't in a position today to deal with that issue. But still, do you have any thoughts about it?

I don't get it.
Are you asking for an answer to something you have declared there cannot be one to?

but I have come to the conclusion that the fact that our present moral underpinnings are so weak is a potential problem. — frank

I'm not convinced of this.

And if one reflects on what we ought to do, then it is apparent that we ought to hope.

Hope is something that Nussbaum encourages. She argues with conviction that our choices and actions have improved over the last hundred years or so, and that there is good reason to think that this present malaise can be overcome.

Such an understanding of ethics is at odds with the prevailing schools of thought - deontology and consequentialism. Nussbaum's views are not original, but are worth being heard given what for many are the default positions, deontology and consequentialism, that frame moral and ethical issues. — Fooloso4

And both positions have their criticisms and faults precisely because they fail to acknowledge the reality of morality - that there is no such thing as an objective morality and why there are ethical dilemmas. What it ultimately boils down to is that we all find ourselves as social beings sharing a world with others that have goals that we are trying to pursue both as individuals and as groups, and that sometimes those goals come into conflict.

When using ethical theories, I find it useful to apply them to alien species and see if it would apply to them. Is it ethical for an alien species to eradicate the smaller human population of Earth in order to save their larger population from their deteriorating planet (consequentialism)? Would it be ethical if they exterminated us without any awareness or pain on our part (deontology)? As a human, you'd be appalled at such a thing, but is what those ethical theories propose is ethical to do. What if aliens don't recognize us as having the right to exist? Do we hold the same ethical standards for other species - why or why not?

Here's an odd thing: the introduction of the words objective and subjective freezes ethics.

So, don't.

From another thread:

...I'm finding that beliefs have more to do with psychology than good arguments. The psychology of belief is much more powerful than any argument, and this is true no matter what educational level you're dealing with. One can see this especially when we consider religion and politics. People like to follow their particular group, be it a large group or small group, it's comforting to think that others think like you. What we need are more independent thinkers, those who can think outside the box, those who are non-conformists. The other problem is that sometimes you can get to far outside the box. Why people believe what they do is very complicated. — Sam26

Hope is something that Nussbaum encourages. She argues with conviction that our choices and actions have improved over the last hundred years or so, and that there is good reason to think that this present malaise can be overcome. — Banno

She focuses on vulnerable populations and how government policies affect them. I think GDP directly impacts the flexibility and power of a government to help vulnerable people. I'm looking for whether she addresses that. Thanks for the Nussbaum tip. It's definitely in line with what I've been pondering lately.

This list of capabilities implies that this is something that people should be born to do. If suffering is a part of life, why bring more life into the world, in order for them to carry out these "capabilities" in the first place?

An alternative would be to not produce more people who even need to experience the execution of these human capabilities. Answer solved. But somehow, without justification other than, "we just want it", these capabilities being carried out, are deemed as of the utmost importance, even in light of suffering being brought into the world.

But really my question is, what makes this list of capabilities inherently more valuable than preventing suffering?

If I proposed an argument that said that suffering takes precedent over producing more people that should have opportunities to carry out capabilities, why would that be automatically wrong?

Stanford page on the 'capabilities approach', of which there are several. Probably worthwhile at least reading this before wading in, considering the OP's request for those familiar with Nussbaum (and presumably would also be ok with those familiar with other capabilities scholars).

She focuses on vulnerable populations and how government policies affect them. I think GDP directly impacts the flexibility and power of a government to help vulnerable people. — frank

“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that's all.”

Because those things are worth doing, despite suffering.

But I don't expect you to agree. Nor am I that interested in arguing the point.

Because those things are worth doing, despite suffering.

But I don't expect you to agree. Nor am I that interested in arguing the point. — Banno

Granted, but if you were to be interested in arguing the point, I would ask for a justification that puts experiencing a list of human activities is more ethical than exposing new people to (theoretical) structural suffering and (definite) contingent forms of suffering. It is obvious that prior to birth, there is no actual person that needs anything. I would question then why have people that need to experience X, Y, Z experiences in light of the fact that all suffering could be prevented and no actual person would exist prior to be deprived otherwise.

Then my guess is the debate would go down to something like, "a majority feel that these experiences would be good" in which case I would bring up the thread I had about the happy slave. In other words, having an agenda for the new person of to experience X,Y,Z seems oddly unnecessary and circular being that the person did not need to experience those things in the first place (especially in light of suffering being a consequence).

Then it would devolve further into some "net benefit" form of utilitarianism that is arrived at through combining surveys of subjective evaluations of life. Then I would point back to the claim that it would always be wrong to foist known and unknown challenges and sufferings on a new individual, even for some X, Y, Z reason that purports that the person needed to born to experience those things, but without justification. Why would humans then be beholden to the principle of X, Y, Z? Saying, "they are just good" seems too brute fact to be much of a philosophical point.

But we shall not argue any of this.

Craig Coombs was diagnosed with throat cancer five or six years ago. It had spread, giving him a year or so to live. So he decided that he would put a photo of himself, naked, up on the internet each Tuesday - "Naked Tuesday". Comedian Adam Hills saw this and featured him on his TV show. Craig went on to appear in Clown Heart and to sort a line of comedy shows in Melbourne and elsewhere, as well as to do considerable charity work - all of which is irrelevant, because what counts is how direct, personable and just plain real Craig is.

Of course Craig has suffered, quite considerably. Is it worth it? When the Abyss stares into Craig, he turns around and waves his fat naked arse at it. Does what he does make up for the suffering? Is the suffering justified by anything? The question is absurd, irrelevant, obtuse.

It's a good page.

It's the beings and doings that give value to life, and the enabling of these that sets up what it is we ought to do.

That is great for Craig Coombs. I commend him on "staring the void down with his arse" :lol: . I think my response in another thread works just as well here though so I will simply paste it below.

That's all fine and good, but then I will point you back to my thread about the happy slave. Foisting challenges on a new person by giving them life (which de facto requires challenges to overcome) is never right. If you answer that overcoming challenges is necessary, this would be a contradiction, as the person did not exist for anything to be necessary for. You are creating the situation out of nothing. You are then saying, "There needs to be someone who exists that then must overcome challenges". This is slightly sadistic, even if meant as gentle "doable" challenges. The point being that it is ethically never good to promote suffering or foist challenges to a new person who never needed to be exposed to it in the first place. Just like the happy slave scenario, even if the slave/child eventually identifies with their situation, it was not right to have been given challenges and exposure to suffering in the first place. The conceit is "something needs to get done by somebody!" But nothing has to get done by anybody. Your romantic vision perhaps that there will be no one around to enjoy things and love, is just that, a romantic projection.

What actually would be the case is that there would be no one deprived of anything, as there is no person to exist. You can then say, "We all agree life is better than not-life" but this doesn't make sense. Good experiences in life in and of themselves only matter relative to an actual person. However, overcoming challenges and suffering are the result of being born. Good experiences would not be missed out by an actual person, and challenges and suffering would be prevented. The hidden assumption here is that pleasure, relationships, flow-states, accomplishment, et al (the good experiences) need to be carried out by someone. No they don't. Nothing needs to happen for anyone. To bring up some odd socially constructed assent argument would not work either. Like zombies saying, "We the united people of peoplehood need more people to experience good things, because we need more people to experience good things, because we need more people to experience good things...". New humans aren't vessels for the mission of carrying out humanity's goal of furthering good experiences like they are a Starship Enterprise living out existence for humanity's benefit of having someone to experience the world. That would be using people with the conceit that existence is for them to make utility of, when it is not. Rather, the person would be used as a vessel to carry out romantic visions of humanity's need to have "someone" experience life. That would be using people, despite the harm they would be endure as well.

Here's an odd thing: the introduction of the words objective and subjective freezes ethics.

So, don't. — Banno

I'm not introducing anything into the contemporary discussion that isn't already there. I think for a Jordan Peterson fan, psychology is nothing other than looking at people mechanistically and essentially amorally (the way we examine giraffes or fleas).

The strongest counter approach is religious.

That's a potential problem. Being hopeful would mean believing that we'll discover the right answer when push comes to shove.

That was more directed at Harry than at you.

The strongest counter approach is religious. — frank

How so?