Defending metaphors as metaphors seem a mug's game, but as to the "relevance" of the CI to the "act," can you make that clearer? You can start by distinguishing "acts" from maxims (I find "maxim" a strange word; if you prefer "rule" I'd agree to that change).Well l don't think the analogy applies here, the act will be relevant to CI, if there is one but if there isn't any, the act can exist on its own. — Wittgenstein
and trust me there is no way we will agree on what was Kant was saying if we regard him as right.
If we think Kant's position is weak, we can certainly share some common criticism of his theory. — Wittgenstein
Rules can be explained without applying to any problem, for example addition is opposite to subtraction.We can describe general concepts.As a prior generality, it has no concept of the particular in question just as the rules of addition in themselves cannot add even 2+2.
If you don't like my metaphor, well, there's no accounting for taste. I myself think of it as a metaphor and a pretty good one, but as with any metaphor, not the thing itself but merely illustrative of some aspect of the thing itself. But you fault it for cause, viz, both that it is a metaphor and given the subject matter is already out-of-court, but also that
HIS ? l don't think anyone can claim that he is speaking for Kant after he is dead.All we have is reading his work and commenting on what we think are his thoughts.This may seem a trivial or a stupid point but it is practical and realistic.and, on what grounds with respect to his thought ?
A conditional maxim is a contradiction in terms. — Wittgenstein
We can throw away certain maxims or make them part of others but that will leaves us confused and destroy any ethical theory. — Wittgenstein
Again, the point is we do not know what maxim is correct, hierarchically. — schopenhauer1
So let's say that the clerk is rude because his wife died a couple weeks earlier and that puts him in a bad mood. So then in that case the maxim might be, "A clerk should not be rude, unless a tragedy befalls him close to the time of rudeness to a customer, as then no one would be allowed time to process their grief appropriately". This then trumps the maxim, "Clerks should never be rude to customers as this is violating civility and denying their humanity". Which rule wins out? — schopenhauer1
Yes! to clarity. No, to a science of ethics.It is not a matter of taste but clarity of thought.
If you want to treat ethics like a science ( i think so ), — Wittgenstein
There wouldn't be emotional exception to a maxim, since that defeats the point. The idea behind the CI is to have reason guide your actions, not emotion. Kant would uphold the duty of civility (assuming it applies for the moment) even if an emotional reaction would be understandable. — Echarmion
All we have is reading his work and commenting on what we think are his thoughts. — Wittgenstein
If the CI works, there should not be a hierarchy of maxims, since a maxim that can be universalized cannot conflict with another maxim that can be universalized, or else they cannot be universalized.
A good will is good under any circumstances and conditions but the categorical imperative can only be carried out by a good will. Changing the maxim based on circumstances undermines the role of will and makes it subservient to ends/goals. — Wittgenstein
Further more the maxim being based on a universal categorical imperative should not be extended into particulars as we cannot practically decide a universal when the conditions exceed the bare minimum but the bare minimum can always be reduced a condition less maxim such as "Do not Kill" a true maxim which can be reasoned and followed by all reasonable man. — Wittgenstein
Lastly, I think you are confusing the motivation for following a maxim with the content of the maxim itself. The reason for adopting a maxim in accordance with the CI should be unconditional duty. But that doesn't mean that the maxim must apply to all circumstances.
Isn't that just saying that the CI cannot be practically applied? After all real situations are always particular. Besides, "Do not kill" without any conditions cannot be universalised, since it rules out self defense.
I don't see why there couldn't be something that shakes out in some universal violation.. "If everyone didn't allow for exceptions for emotional grieving, out of reasons of civility, that would itself endanger civility".. I don't know.. I'm sure I can think of a better one, but you get my gist. — schopenhauer1
I kind of find it funny that he is pitting "reason" with "emotion". That's kind of a false dichotomy. Property, life, civility, trustworthiness would be things we would have to value in the first place. Presumably value has some sort of emotional preference attached to it. Actual, now that I think about it, another criticism is that these contradictions might reduce down to preference theory or a hypothetical imperative.. because it presumes that we must value property, getting along, etc. — schopenhauer1
Once the maxim is made on the foundation Categorical imperative, it cannot give a maxim which we cannot rationally follow.Every moral act will be carried in some event which is logically related, but the circumstances need not to be mentioned.We will have a hierarchy of maxims that way, where we will end up selecting one maxim over another in a certain circumstance. — Wittgenstein
I think most people would like to have statements like
" Do not kill except in self defense " , the problem with such maxims is that it can't be universalized.
Consider the CI
"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law."
If we try to universalized the first statement, we will end up disputing what "self defense".The maxim " Do not kill" can be easily universalized, the right to live is well preserved. — Wittgenstein
We can apply the CI in logically related situations without specifying the particulars.
For example " Do not kill a murderer" or "Do not kill a soilder that has surrendered" are essentially saying "Do not kill".They can be applied to all particular situations if we take their general form. — Wittgenstein
In most of the countries, any lawyer would tell you, using " self defense" is arbitrary/difficult to apply in most of the cases. — Wittgenstein
Consider how killing someone who has trespassed into your property can be killed if you are also within the realm of your property but if you are outside of the property, you cannot kill the intruder. — Wittgenstein
If we try to universalize it, everyone will act differently even with the same maxim. — Wittgenstein
Let's suppose they act in the same way as you would, l think it will undermine the right to life and hence be unreasonable. — Wittgenstein
a positive value, but maxims that, if universalized, would defeat their own purpose. The thief aims to enrich himself, but if stealing were universalized, all the thief's wealth would be itself subject to stealing, and hence mostly worthless. — Echarmion
Right, so the theory itself rests on the value/emotional weight put on property itself. There is something beyond the contradiction that is added. The thief has to actually value property in the first place. Thus, it does turn hypothetical: "If you value property, then you would not steal, as property itself would be usefuless for you". Hence why I claimed that the supposed "categorical" imperative becomes "hypothetical". — schopenhauer1
For example, one might simply steal because one has no other way to acquire food, or simply to deprive the owner of the item in order to spite them. In those cases, no self-contradiction occurs, and it's then a matter of asking whether or not one can will the maxim to be universal.This second step is similar to the well known "golden rule", or perhaps in a more modern form Rawl's veil of ignorance. — Echarmion
There's several problems here. First, again is that it reduces to a hypothetical: "If you want to live in a world where property is honored for daily living, then you would not steal". There is an element of common interest there. We can choose to not value property and be okay living in a society that property doesn't matter. Perhaps it is a treacherous "all man for yourself" society that we desire. Then stealing would be fine. Sure, this is probably not something most people would value or desire, but in some possible world, person can indeed value this type of society. — schopenhauer1
Thus, the contradiction itself like "property being useless as a concept", or some such, is really based on social norms, emotional feelings about the value that may or may not be contradicted, and more generally things that are more qualitative, probabilistic (being socially constructed and contingent), and not universal in application. — schopenhauer1
So, Kant would argue that in a truly moral world, there is absolutely no room for lying. And even the smallest lie destroys his precious categorical imperative. So, Kant would say, if a killer came to your house, looking to kill the man hiding upstairs and asked where he was, you'd be obliged to tell him. In his perfect world, you know, you couldn't lie.
Yeah, I can see the logic that if you open the door, even just a crack, you accept a world where lying is permitted.
Okay, then, then you'd say if the Nazis came to your house, hiding Anne Frank and her family, and asked if anyone was in the attic, you'd say, "Ja, the Franks are upstairs." I doubt it. Because there's a difference between a theoretical world of philosophy bullshit, and real life, you know? Real, nasty, ugly life that includes greed, and hate, and genocide. Remember, if you learn nothing else from me, you should learn that much of philosophy is verbal masturbation. — irrational man
A conditional maxim is a contradiction in terms. — Wittgenstein
Could you elaborate on that? — Echarmion
My reference can be found here: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5682/5682-h/5682-h.htm#link2H_4_0005 . Scroll to SECOND SECTION—TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, then scroll some more to the 7th indented footnote on what a maxim is — Mww
The reason you apply though, is practical reason. As such, it does not operate in "some possible world" but always in the context of human society. And humans, by and large, have common interests. Sociopaths and mental illnesses exist, but those are exceptions. Kant assumes that humans have a common ability to reason, and I think it's difficult to disagree with that. — Echarmion
Thus, "property is a concept that is good for society" is really more what Kant is saying morally, and not the categorical imperative. — schopenhauer1
I can't speak for Wittgenstein, but I would suggest that it means that a rule can't be contingently universal. There's a contradiction in terms there. — Theologian
Notice how in all of the above, Kant never once, not once, considers that there may be some alternative maxim that could also apply, and which you could at the same time will to be universal, and that this may, perhaps, make the act permissible. — Theologian
Finally, currently there is a debate going on on this thread as to whether you can add as many conditions as you like to a “maxim.” Frankly, I don’t think that expanding out your maxims in this way is consistent with the term as used in Kant’s writings. — Theologian
The more freedom you give me to design maxims as I see fit, the easier it becomes for me to come up with at least one maxim that seems to apply that no-one could at the same time will to be universal. The freedom to add additional clauses and contingencies as I see fit makes it easier, not harder, for me to dream up some perverse maxim that an act is in accordance which, yet which you could not, at the same time, will to be universal. You’re strengthening, not weakening my hand. — Theologian
What I said above is fine just so long as all our maxims are "Thou shalt nots." But what if we also have a maxim that's a "thou shalt," and the two conflict? — Theologian
All (or at least most) ethical theorists have sought to establish an objective basis to their favored theory. Kant’s is that morals are implied a priori by reason. To be immoral is to be irrational, and to be perfectly rational is to be perfectly moral. That is what Kant actually said. — Theologian
My own “naïve” response to this is that when you act according to a maxim, you are not making it universal. That is simply not the decision you are making. So superficially at least, it seems profoundly irrational to insist on acting as if it was. — Theologian
So what masquerades as Kant’s conclusion – that there is an objective basis to morality – is in fact his unstated premise: That there is an objective basis to morality. So reduced to its naïve form, with its real fundamental premise laid bare, Kant’s true argument form devolves to A therefore A. — Theologian
Kant's solution only works if we absolve ourselves of all responsibility for the actions of others - or at least, of all others we recognize as rational beings. But suppose the maxim "absolve yourself of all responsibility for the actions of all other rational beings" became universal. — Theologian
This really is very murky.. "human society".. "common ability to reason".. Not everyone has, does, or will come up with a same common reasoning about society and its interests. — schopenhauer1
There is already an assumption of what is good behind the "practical reasoning" for which the categorical imperative is supposed to focus on. — schopenhauer1
Thus, "property is a concept that is good for society" is really more what Kant is saying morally, and not the categorical imperative. — schopenhauer1
But this already means that the CI itself is just a heuristic and not morality itself- there is something beyond it whether that be a good, a value, or an emotional weight or moral sense of something, depending on your theory. — schopenhauer1
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