Then what about the original discovery. Would that thing exist if it were not for the human intervention?

It also does not exhaust the requirements for a thing to exist in its entirety to its discovery. I know you cannot accept this disjunction. — Merkwurdichliebe

I do not see the problem.

What have we discovered that did not exist in it's entirety prior to our discovery?

What have we discovered that did not exist in it's entirety prior to our discovery? — creativesoul

The better question is: what is it that we can actually presuppose exists in its entirety prior to our discovery of its existence in its prior entirety?

I am not trying to be difficult or obstinate. I sincerely want to understand these questions better. And I would never get the chance to work out these things anywhere but TPF.

The invention of pens is no different from the discovery of pens. — Shamshir

Rubbish. The latter is existentially dependent upon the former, and not the other way around.

Tommy can discover a pen, by seeing it for the first time. He cannot invent it by seeing it.

@creativesoul

I feel a strong sense of time or history to be present in your basic pressuppositions here.

He cannot invent it by seeing it. — creativesoul

I respectfully disagree.

He cannot invent it by seeing it.
— creativesoul

I respectfully disagree. — Merkwurdichliebe

That's ok.

Don't you even want to know my stupid reason?

Tommy can discover a pen, by seeing it for the first time. He cannot invent it by seeing it. — creativesoul

Ok, let's say,

Jommy cannot invent it without discovering it , without seeing (experiencing) it.

So there is an obvious distinction between discovery and invention that we are confusing here. How do we factor in identification here?

How do we factor in identification here? — Merkwurdichliebe

All notions of "identification" and/or "identity" are existentially dependent upon metacognition. Metacognition... language. Language... thought/belief.

Identification is required for successful reference.

The notion of "identity/identification" is overplayed... All identification presupposes existence, regardless of subsequent further qualification.

Howzit relevant?

The better question is: what is it that we can actually presuppose exists in its entirety prior to our discovery of its existence in its prior entirety? — Merkwurdichliebe

"its existence in its prior entirety"? What is that saying?

I wouldn't know what "its existence in its entirety" would be saying, even, that "its existence" wouldn't suffice just as well for (in other words what is "its entirety" adding to "its existence"?), but then modifying "entirety" by "prior" is that much more confusing.

"its existence in its prior entirety"? What is that saying?

I wouldn't know what "its existence in its entirety" would be saying, even, that "its existence" wouldn't suffice just as well for (in other words what is "its entirety" adding to "its existence"?), but then modifying "entirety" by "prior" is that much more confusing. — Terrapin Station

That is what I'm saying. But, if we must, how do we reconcile this complex arrangement of terms? What is it trying to say, and how can it be said better or differently?

All notions of "identification" and/or "identity" are existentially dependent upon metacognition. Metacognition... language. Language... thought/belief.

Identification is required for successful reference.

The notion of "identity/identification" is overplayed... All identification presupposes existence, regardless of subsequent further qualification.

Howzit relevant? — creativesoul

It's good to get the terms straight.

So then, you would agree that existence as it is in its entirety prior to its discovery is absolute. And, that any particular relation of an existing thing to absolute existence is relative.

So then, you would agree that existence as it is in its entirety prior to its discovery is absolute. And, that any particular relation of an existing thing to absolute existence is relative. — Merkwurdichliebe

Well, no. I take issue with the above suggestion on several counts...

I reject the absolute/relative dichotomy.

Existence is not the sort of thing that exists. It is not discoverable. It has no elemental constitution. Thus, it makes no sense on my view to talk in terms of "existence as it is in it's entirety".

It is presupposed within all thought/belief and/or statements thereof. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, regardless of subsequent further qualification. All thought/belief consists entirely of correlations.

Things exist in their entirety. What counts as in their entirety all depends upon the sort of thing we're considering.

It's good to get the terms straight. — Merkwurdichliebe

Given the history of philosophy proper...

You can say that two times!

:wink:

I wouldn't know what "its existence in its entirety" would be saying, even, that "its existence" wouldn't suffice just as well for (in other words what is "its entirety" adding to "its existence"?), but then modifying "entirety" by "prior" is that much more confusing. — Terrapin Station

In Merk's defense, he is attempting to use my framework, and in doing so is being very diplomatic in checking for my agreement.

If you are seriously interested, I suggest re-reading a few of our exchanges and asking me about anything you may not find clear enough for your understanding.

That is what I'm saying. But, if we must, how do we reconcile this complex arrangement of terms? What is it trying to say, and how can it be said better or differently? — Merkwurdichliebe

Well. I would first suggest a verbatim quote. Re-arranging key terms in an order that I would not use them does nothing to help you understand what I am referring to and/or talking about. As best I know, there are a few notions at work in my work that are novel. So, I expect and welcome questions about the semantics.

When we acquire knowledge of something's elemental constituency(that's the result of a universal criterion), we find ourselves in a position to be able to determine whether or not that particular thing is capable of existing in it's entirety prior to our account of it, because we can isolate the basic elemental constituents, individually, and confidently assess whether or not any of those elements are existentially dependent upon being taken account of.

If any of them are, then the only conclusion that we can draw is that the thing in question is not capable of existing prior to our account of it.

The interesting feature of this framework is that we can easily swap "being taken account of" with all sorts of other considerations. We can isolate the elemental constituents and assess whether or not any of them are existentially dependent upon any number of things.

Given the history of philosophy proper...

You can say that two times! — creativesoul

It's good to get the terms straight. :grin:

Existence is not the sort of thing that exists. It is not discoverable. It has no elemental constitution. Thus, it makes no sense on my view to talk in terms of "existence as it is in it's entirety". — creativesoul

I like that. Existence is a paradoxical concept and impossibly abstract, very much like thought. Whenever we think about existence, we suspend its actuality by translating it into thought. Thought produces the universal, but existence is found only in particular being. If this were not true, then anything I could imagine could be said to exist including (the thought of existence). So when discussing existence, it is important to understand that we are limited to the particular - the thought/belief about existing things, that may or may not be existentially dependent upon being taken account of.

existentially dependent upon being taken account of. — creativesoul

This is a very important point. Can you give me some examples of both (being existentially dependent and independent of an account)?

The interesting feature of this framework is that we can easily swap "being taken account of" with all sorts of other considerations. We can isolate the elemental constituents and assess whether or not any of them are existentially dependent upon any number of things. — creativesoul

To exhaust all the possible considerations is quite the task. But this seems like a very potent schematic (it takes account of creating, identifying, discovering, inventing, &c.)

In Merk's defense, he is attempting to use my framework, and in doing so is being very diplomatic in checking for my agreement. — creativesoul

It requires humility to attempt a foreign framework and to risk being wrong often. But it is one of the best ways to expand one's philosophical acumen. It also requires an interlocutor who is clear on what he knows, and patient, very patient.

By the way, you reflect a strong logic in your terminology... do you actually work out the logic formally on the side, or just intuit it in your writing?

Existence is not the sort of thing that exists. It is not discoverable. It has no elemental constitution. Thus, it makes no sense on my view to talk in terms of "existence as it is in it's entirety".
— creativesoul

I like that. Existence is a paradoxical concept and impossibly abstract, very much like thought. — Merkwurdichliebe

I apologize for the sheer quantity of disagreements I've levied here. I can only hope that the explanations minimize future possible numbers...

However, it must be done. Coherency is at stake, and while coherency is inadequate for truth, it is certainly a requirement for true statements. Coherency maintains meaning. That is pivotal for shared understanding, for it consists - in part at least - of shared meaning.


Talking in terms of conceptions is fraught. That's objection numero uno. It's based upon the following... All conceptions have linguistic form, and as such all are existentially dependent upon language. Not all other things are.

Acquiring an understanding of that allows one to further discriminate between competing conceptions. When conceiving of that which exists prior to our conceptions thereof, our terminological framework can make or break us.


Thought is not impossibly abstract and/or paradoxical. That's numero dos.

Whenever we think about existence, we suspend its actuality by translating it into thought.

This reads like nonsense on my view. According to the position that I'm arguing for/from...

Existence is not the sort of thing that has actuality. Actuality is what's happened and/or happening. Existence does not have what's happened and/or happening.

Again, put a bit differently, there is no referent for the term except as a use of language. We do not translate existence. We translate our use of the term "existence". All translation is the translation of one language use into another. We do not translate statements into thought. We translate statements of thought uttered in one language into semantically equivalent statements of thought uttered in another(or semantic equivalents within the same language).

We translate by virtue of comparing/contrasting meaning. The term "existence" has meaning. That meaning is attributed solely by virtue of language use. The meaning of the term(as is the case with all terminological use) is determined solely by virtue of the connections drawn between it's use and something else.

"Existence" is a term. Terms are existentially dependent upon language. Language... thought/belief. All thought/belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between different things. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.

That's it. That is the extent of it. Nothing more can be said, nor need it be. All thought/belief presupposes existence. Some thought/belief is prior to language. Conceptions of "existence" require language. The presupposition of existence inherent to all thought/belief does not.

Statements of thought/belief presuppose existence, truth(correspondence to what's happened), and meaning. Knowledge of all thought/belief enables us to proper account of how that comes to be the case. It also dovetails nicely with Tarski and redundancy.

Thought produces the universal

This misleads... and unnecessarily so. We use thought to discover that which is common to all particulars. If something produces something else, the latter is always existentially dependent upon the former.

The common denominators are not always existentially dependent upon being taken account of. Rather, taking account of something is existentially dependent upon something to be taken account of and an adequate means for taking account.

...existence is found only in particular being. If this were not true, then anything I could imagine could be said to exist including (the thought of existence)...

Existence is not the sort of thing that has a spatio-temporal location. Thus, it makes no sense to say "existence is found only"...

And...

Anything you can imagine does exist. How it exists can be parsed in terms of existential dependency, elemental constituency, and it's affects/effects.

P.S. I have overlooked these differences in recent past, but it seems they ought have been given due subsequent attention. Hence...

existentially dependent upon being taken account of.
— creativesoul

This is a very important point. Can you give me some examples of both (being existentially dependent and independent of an account)? — Merkwurdichliebe

Here's the rest...

When we acquire knowledge of something's elemental constituency(that's the result of a universal criterion), we find ourselves in a position to be able to determine whether or not that particular thing is capable of existing in it's entirety prior to our account of it, because we can isolate the basic elemental constituents, individually, and confidently assess whether or not any of those elements are existentially dependent upon being taken account of.

If any of them are, then the only conclusion that we can draw is that the thing in question is not capable of existing prior to our account of it. — creativesoul

Apples are not existentially dependent upon being taken account of.

Mt. Everest is not existentially dependent upon being taken account of.

The ability to draw, and/or the mental activity required in order to draw a correlation between different things is not existentially dependent upon being taken account of.

The attribution of meaning resulting from drawing the above correlations does not require being taken account of.

The meaning of "existence" requires taking account of it's use in language. A proper account will explicate the correlations drawn between it's use and other things.

...this seems like a very potent schematic (it takes account of creating, identifying, discovering, inventing, &c.) — Merkwurdichliebe

If we get thought/belief wrong we get something or other wrong about everything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered. The same scope of consequence applies to getting it right.

In Merk's defense, he is attempting to use my framework, and in doing so is being very diplomatic in checking for my agreement.
— creativesoul

It requires humility to attempt a foreign framework and to risk being wrong often. But it is one of the best ways to expand one's philosophical acumen. It also requires an interlocutor who is clear on what he knows, and patient, very patient.

By the way, you reflect a strong logic in your terminology... do you actually work out the logic formally on the side, or just intuit it in your writing? — Merkwurdichliebe

I appreciate the accolades.

You're too kind. I do make a concerted attempt to arrive at sound arguments. Verifiability/falsifiability is valuable. Coherency(lack of equivocation and/or self-contradiction) is imperative. I work from statements as foundational premisses that have the strongest possible justificatory ground.

@creativesoul

There is a lot here that makes a lot of sense. To be honest, I'm trying to get a better grasp on your methodology. I know existential quantification plays a heavy role, but you are very informal in your approach. So bear with me, I have points to address.

Talking in terms of conceptions is fraught. That's objection numero uno. It's based upon the following... All conceptions have linguistic form, and as such all are existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

If all conceptions are existentially dependent upon language, and the thought/belief of "existence" is exististentially bound to the linguistic form, then talking of existence in terms of conception seems to be relevant. If the thought/belief of existence is not dependent on language, then it becomes the kind of thing that can be said to exist else-wise, and that seems to be problematic.

I'll put as much as I can into a more formal presentation. It will be later on. In the meantime, you may want to click on my avatar, click on 'discussions' and have a look at a few of mine concerning these matters. It ought be helpful. Check out the successful reference thread. It's relevant to this particular topic.

I'm on vacation and have just scanned the recent exchanges.

You appear to know where I'm coming from with the language focus, but in order to avoid being caught in a word regress, I turn to Maturana's view of 'languaging' as a form of behavior which enables 'structural coupling'. This avoids representational issues by taking a 'systems view' of cognition.

'Existence' is a human concept, and like all concepts requires context in which it is meaningful. — fresco

You say in the title of this thread that existence is relative, not absolute. And in the above quoted you say that the term 'existence is relative to the context in which it is used. So, there is no absolute or uniquely privileged meaning of the term 'existence'. This implies that there are different kinds of existence, or in other words there are things which exist in different ways. Taking a certain kind of approach, to find out the way in which anything exists, perhaps we could ask: 'What is it made of?' 'What does it depend upon'? 'What can it do?'

If something is made of some material(s) then it is a physical object. If something is made of thought or imagination, then it is a concept or a mental image. If something is made of emotion or sensation then it is a feeling. A thing depends upon what it made of. So, concepts and images depend upon thought and imagination in the sense that without thought and imagination there would be no concepts or images. Physical things depend upon matter in the sense that without matter there would be no physical things. And feeling things depends on emotion or sensation in the sense that without emotion or sensation there would be no feeling things. Anything which is not dependent upon human beings for its existence is usually thought of as enjoying an absolute existence.

(I will return to this point after a brief excursus into a quite different perspective):
Heidegger, to reference a different approach, distinguishes between three kinds of being: Dasein (persons), things (entities including animals) and the paraphernalia or equipment of human life (everything we use for some purpose or other, for example, hammers, language. computers, books, domestic animals and so on). But Heidegger does not equate being with existence, because for him only Dasein exists, for to exist is to have a reflective sense of being, which allows Dasein to reflectively "stand out" for itself. Other things can also pre-reflectively be for us as either equipment or things which can reflectively stand out for us; but he does not refer to this latter "present at hand-ness" of 'reflectively standing out' as existence. but he could have done, and it is only his disavowal of ordinary sense that distinguishes his schema from the one implicit in ordinary English usage. (I am assuming that ordinary use for German speakers is more or less equivalent to ordinary use for English speakers here). In any case, regardless of the issue of the semantic relation between <being> and <existence>, existence for Heidegger is obviously relative, insofar as it is dependent on Dasein.

So, in a way it seems that the whole question of whether existence is relative or absolute is flawed, because the kinds of alternative answers that become possible will depend on the perspective that always already underlies any question, that is they will depend upon the kinds of metaphysical or ontological presumptions implicit in the way the question is framed. In the ordinary sense of course our different uses of the term 'existence' do have built into them a distinction between two main kinds of existence, dependent on us, in the sense of conceptual, fictional or imaginary and not dependent on us in the sense of physical things and (at least some of) their attributes, and the latter are the kinds of existences which it would be logical to refer to as absolute at least in some relative ( :wink:) sense.

So we certainly do have a notion or concept of absolute existence, which means that if the OP is understood to be asserting that we do not have such a notion or concept then it is mistaken. The other possible sense of the OP: the metaphysical or ontological question as to whether there are absolute existences independent of our idea of them is the kind of question which seems to be unanswerable in principle at best, and incoherent at worst, because from a commonsense perspective it is trivially true that there are such, and it is not clear that the question has any coherently meaningful sense beyond the commonsense.